*1 DEPARTMENT OF HIBBS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA v. WINN REVENUE et al. 20, 2004—DecidedJune Argued January
No. 02-1809. *4 Terry Goddard, General of Arizona, Attorney argued Mary cause for With him on the briefs petitioner. were O’Grady, Joseph Bickett, Solicitor' General, Paula S. and Kanefield, Special Assistant General. Attorney
Deputy Hungar Solicitor General the cause for argued curiae amicus the United States reversal. With urging him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney O’Connor, Jones, General Kent L. and Kenneth L. Greene. With the cause for respondents. argued
Marvin Cohen R. Bender and Steven were Paul on the brief Shapiro.* him Court. Ginsburg delivered opinion Justice income-tax credits law authorizes payments Arizona and tu- award educational scholarships organizations See Ariz. schools. children attending private ition grants filed for the State of Cali- of amici curiae reversal were urging *Briefs California, Manuel M. of Lockyer, Bill Attorney General by fornia et al. Hoch, Mederios, General, Lynn Andrea Assistant Chief Solicitor State General, Chaney, General, David S. Attorney Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kristian Deputy Attorney Borcherding, Supervising Randall P. Whitten, General, and Anabelle Secretary Rodriguez, D. Attorney Deputy Rico, Attorneys and General for their by respec- Justice of Puerto of Jr., Alabama, D. Gregg H. Pryor, as follows: William of tive jurisdictions M. Arkansas, Colorado, Mike Beebe of Ken Salazar Alaska, of Renkes of Crist, Jr., E. Florida, J. Thurbert Delaware, Charles Brady Jane of of Mark J. Bennett Guam, of Douglas Moylan B. of Baker of Georgia, Illinois, Steve Idaho, Lisa Madigan Lawrence G. Wasden of of Hawaii, Ieyoub J. Miller of Richard P. Iowa, of Louisi- Thomas Indiana, Carter of Curran, Jr., Thomas Maine, Joseph Rowe of J. Maryland, of Steven ana, A. Cox of Mike Moore of Massachusetts, Michael Reilly of Michigan, F. Mike McGrath Mon- Missouri, of W. Nixon of (Jay) Jeremiah Mississippi, Peter Peter W.Heed of New Nevada, tana, Hampshire, Brian Sandoval of Mexico, Eliot Patricia A. Madrid of New Harvey C. of New Jersey, Dakota, Jim Petro of Stenehjem North York, of Wayne of New Spitzer Patrick D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Hardy Myers Ohio, Oregon, Carolina, of South Lawrence McMaster Island, Henry of Rhode Lynch C. Tennessee, Greg Summers of Abbott G. Dakota, Paul Long E. of South W. Christine Jerry Kilgore Utah, Texas, Marie L. Shurtleff Virginia, McGraw, Jr., V. of West Darrell Virginia, O. Gregoire Washington, Wisconsin; for the Council of State Govern- Lautenschlager of Peggy A. Crowley; I. and for the Honorable Ruda and James et al. Richard ments W.Bull. by Benjamin Franks et al. Trent the NAACP curiae urging affirmance was filed for of amici A brief Jones, TheodoreM. Inc., Elaine R. Fund, & Educational Defense Legal Shaw, J. and Norman Chachkin. Separation for Americans United for amici curiae was filed A brief of Khan, Mincberg, M. N. Elliot by Ayesha et al. and State of Church E. Judith Schaeffer. *5 (West 2003). §43-1089
Rev. Ann. Stat. Plaintiffs Supp. here, below, an in action federal respondents brought court §43-1089, and seeking its challenging enjoin operation, Clause Establishment is grounds. question presented (TIA whether the Tax Act or U. C. Injunction Act), 28 § 1341, which lower federal court from prohibits restraining “the assessment, or collection of tax under levy State any law,” bars the suit. do Plaintiffs-respondents not contest their do own Nor seek to Arizo- liability. they impede na’s suit, of tax revenues. Their hold, we receipt kind 1341 proscribes.
In decisions a near half courts spanning century, Court, federal this have system, including entertained chal- to tax credits authorized lenges law, state without con- §1341 as a barrier. ceiving jurisdictional On first issue, occasion confront we squarely confirm the au- federal courts exercised those thority cases.
It is
States,
ancient
once
main
hardly
bent on
history
schools,
racial
and
taining
segregation
public
allocating
resources
to benefit white
to the
disproportionately
students
detriment of black
fastened on
students,
tuition
grants
tax credits
aas
means to circumvent Brown promising
Education,
Board
(1954).
tax to schools private credits support closed), race schools remain based on while aff’g public (closure 1962) (ED of Va. schools public F. Supp. Lambert, See also Moton 367, 368 508 F. Supp. enjoined). 1981) (ND dis Miss. to (challenge exemptions racially court). schools in federal may proceed criminatory private Hibbs, case, of the instant Director Arizona’s petitioner Revenue, in effect, that we and other argues, Department in those cases. The federal courts were wrong civil-rights maintains, 1983; Act, TIA, according petitioner trumps lower interference with bars all federal-court petitioner, endeav- state tax even when are not systems, challengers them, to avoid a on and no matter whether tax imposed oring would raised revenues be or lowered should the State’s bar, which plaintiffs prevail. jurisdictional alleged peti- tioner asserts has existed since the TIA’s in 1937, enactment not even was in the jurists pathmarking imagined or the defendants in cited, cases those civil-rights just interest cases, federal-court every litigants defeating Our no re- decisions command adjudicatory authority. prior constitute mere “sub because they spect, petitioner urges, Brief for 8. We silentio Petitioner holdings.” Reply reject that assessment. both term examine in this of the opinion
We scope TIA, used in and the whether “assessment” as question consti- was intended insulate tax laws from Act federal the suit in lower courts even when tutional challenge no collection. Conclud- would have negative impact neither 1341’s this suit ing conception implicates we nor of the statute’s assessment underlying purposes, any affirm the Court judgment Appeals.
I in the Arizona filed suit taxpayers, Plaintiffs-respondents, Arizona, for the District States District United (West §43-1089 Ann. Stat. Supp. Ariz. Rev. challenging Establishment Clause. Sec- 2003) with the as incompatible tion 43-1089 credit to who contribute taxpayers provides (STOs). to “school An tuition STO is money organizations” form nonprofit organization moneys, .directs to students enrolled elemen- scholarship grants, private scholar- schools. STOs must disburse as tary secondary received, at least 90 of contributions grants ship percent may allow students, donors to individual direct scholarships not allow donors to name their own must may dependents, at least will two schools whose students receive designate *7 funds, and must not schools that on “discriminate designate race, the of basis familial status or national color, handicap, §§43-1089(D)-(F). See are not STOs origin.” precluded Arizona’s statute from that schools provide designating instruction or that on admissions religious preference give the basis of or affiliation. When religion taxpayers religious to STO, them, § donate a allows 43-1089 money qualified their tax Arizona to credit to of calculating liability, $500 up (or their donation for a married filing $625 couple jointly, 43-1089(A)(2)). effect, §43-1089 Arizona an election. gives taxpayers $625) direct (or, filers, for to an They may $500 joint-return or to STO, the Arizona of As Revenue. Department long donors do not more than their total tax give STOs liability, their $500 or are contributions costless. $625
The Arizona a 3-to-2 Court, vote, Supreme rejected facial §to 43-1089 before statute went into ef- challenge fect. Kotterman Killian, 273, 193 Ariz. 972 R 2d 606 (1999) (en banc). That case took the form of a discre- special action tionary the court’s invoking jurisdiction. original id., Kotterman, at 972 P. 2d, it 610. is undisputed, has no preclusive effect on the instant as-applied challenge §to 43-1089 different brought by plaintiffs.
Respondents’ federal-court Director complaint against of Arizona’s (Director) Department Revenue alleged §43-1089 “authorizes the formation of that have as agencies their sole purpose distribution State funds to children of a particular denomination or religious to children attend- Com- denomination.” schools of a religious
ing particular de- 10. Respondents sought injunctive plaint ¶ App. funds an STOs relief, and order pay claratory requiring Id., state fund.” still their “into the general possession 7-8, 15. App. action, Director moved dismiss relying TIA, which in its reads entirety: restrain or
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend under State assessment, or any collection levy be efficient may law where a remedy plain, speedy 1341. had of such U. S. C. the courts State.” The Director not assert a federal-court order enjoin- did §43-1089 with the State’s levy would interfere ing collection He that a federal injunction efforts. urged only law.” taxes would restrain the “assessment” of “under State that the Director, held with the the District Court Agreeing Cert. 31. TIA dismissal the suit. Pet. required App. hold reversed, for the Ninth The Court of Circuit Appeals that “a federal action ing challenging granting Killian, Winn tax credit is [TIA].” prohibited by *8 (2002). F. 3d from affect[ing] Far “adversely the state’s the revenue,” to raise Court of Appeals ability observed, “the relief . . . would [respondents] requested by result in the be used state’s more funds that could receiving Id., cer 1017, 1018. for the benefit.” We public granted tiorari, (2003), in view of the of opinion U. S. 986 division to state on whether bars the TIA constitutional challenges at 1017, tax credits in federal F. 3d, court. Compare Bridges, with ACLU Foundation 421-423 334 F. 3d (CA5 2003) (TIA bars federal have any part action seeking unconstitutional). of a now State’s tax We declared system the affirm Circuit. Ninth judgment
II Before must case, the merits of this we address reaching for cer- contention that Director’s the respondents’ petition tiorari was under 28 U. S. C. jurisdictionally untimely 2101(c) our Rules. Brief in 8-13. Sec- Opposition 2101(c) tion a instructs for certiorari be must petition filed “within after the of . . . ninety days entry judgment.” This Court’s Rule 13.3 elaborates:
“The a time file for a writ of certiorari runs petition from the date of or order entry judgment sought to be reviewed, and not the issuance date (or mandate its if under local But equivalent practice). a for petition is filed in the lower court rehearing timely by any time to file the for writ of party, petition (whether certiorari for all or not parties they requested in the for runs rehearing joined petition rehearing) from the date of the denial for the petition rehearing or, if the for the subse- petition rehearing granted, quent entry judgment.” assert
Respondents Director’s missed the petition Rule’s deadlines: More than 90 between the days elapsed date the Court of and the first entered Appeals judgment date the filed, was petition rendering filing untimely under the first sentence of the Rule; and no because party petitioned the extended rehearing, periods prescribed by the Rule’s second sentence came into never play. case,
This however, did not follow the course. The typical Court of its own recalled Appeals, motion, its mandate and ordered the to brief parties whether question case should be order, reheard en we That conclude, banc. suspended 2101(c), under as a judgment’s finality just filed timely would, or court’s petition rehearing appropriate decision to consider a late-filed Com rehearing petition. Young pare Harper, 143, 147, n. (appeals *9 court to agreed consider a late-filed time rehearing petition; liness of for certiorari petition measured from date court dis of Jenkins, posed Missouri 495 rehearing petition), (1990) (“The U. 49 time for for certiorari will applying granted appears that lower court not be tolled when it the solely purpose ex- rehearing for its order the or amended time.”). tending that appropriate timely petition, rehearing
A a court’s decision untimely rehearing petition, court’s and a to entertain an parties the address direction, initiative, on its own key rehearing charac- be ordered share this whether should question will All three raise the whether the court teristic: modify judgment parties’ rights. id., the the and alter (“A timely petition rehearing operates sus- for . . . pending finality judgment, pend of the . the . . court’s judgment should court’s further determination whether adjudication rights of the its be modified so as alter Banking parties” (quoting Department Pink, Neb. v. curiam); (per origi- U. S. alterations nal)). petition rehearing [a] words, In other “while considering, initia- pending,” or on its own while the court is rehearing be is no tive, ordered, “there whether should ‘judgment’ Jenkins, S., at 46. to be reviewed.” light, petition we Director’s a hold that the for writ Appeals timely. or- of certiorari was When the Court days yet briefing rehearing had not issue, dered on the opinion. panel passed Because from the issuance of §21Ql(c)’s 90-day yet expired, the clock could limit had not whether left Unresolved still be reset an order that modify judgment. court-initiated its would court genuinely briefing just a had effect. Because order judgment statute, we must treat final is critical under the rehearing denying en banc as the court’s order date judgment petition filed entered. The was date was timely days of that date and was thus under within 90 statute. only guide, so that we read our
Were Rule sole rehearing petition party reset statute’s could filed objec- congressional 90-day sight of the we would lose count, 2101(c): adjudi- underpinning appellate court’s final An tive *10 cation, indicated, marks the Congress time from which the allowed for certiorari period to run. The petition begins takes statute over the rules priority “procedural adopted for transaction of its business.” orderly States, Schacht v. 58, (1970). 398 U. S. United. When court-created rules fail to unusual circumstances anticipate that fit within a federal securely statute’s compass, e. controls See, statute our Kontrick decision. g., Ryan, (2004) (“‘[I]t 443, 540 U. S. is axiomatic’ that [court- prescribed ‘do not procedural create rules] or withdraw fed- ” eral jurisdiction.’ Owen & Erection Equipment (quoting Co. (1978))). 365, 437 U. S. Kroger, Because the peti- tion for a writ of certiorari § was 2101(c), under we timely have jurisdiction to decide whether the TIA bars respond- ents’ suit.
Ill To determine whether this falls within TIA’s litigation it prohibition, first, to appropriate, relief identify sought. seek Respondents relief prospective only. Spe their cifically, complaint requests relief “injunctive prohibit [the ing Director] to allowing the tax taxpayers utilize credit authorized § A. R. S. 43-1089 for made payments to STOs make tuition grants children reli attending schools, to gious children schools of attending one reli only denomination, or gious to children selected on the basis of their 15. religion.” fur Complaint App. Respondents ther ask “declaration A. R. its 43 — face and as violates the Establishment applied,” Clause “by affirmatively STOs to use State income-tax authorizing reve nues tuition for students pay schools attending religious or schools that discriminate on the basis of Ibid. religion.” seek order that Finally, respondents in “[a]n [the Director] form all STOs all [such] that... funds their possession of the date of this Court’s order must be into the state paid 7-8, fund.” general 15. Complaint App. account of Taking nature of the relief prospective does requested, respond- 1341’s seek sus- words, 28 U. to “enjoin, S. C. suit, ents’ assessment, or collection of any or restrain levy pend on the turns law”? The answer that question under State TIA.1 “assessment” as in the of the term employed meaning *11 (IRC), the term in the Internal Revenue As used Code the tax- the amount involves a of “recording” “assessment” § 26 U. The “as- S. C. 6203. owes the Government. payer Laing a notation.” is “essentially bookkeeping sessment” States, (1976). v. United 161, 170, U. S. n. 13 Section 423 6201(a) the of IRC authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury all . of taxes . . make . . . assessments “to imposed is of made the “by An assessment recording liability title.” of the in accordance with the office Secretary the taxpayer §6203.2 rules or the Secretary.” prescribed regulations 10.02, Practice Saltzman, also IRS and Procedure ¶ See M. (2d 1991) (when ed. Internal 10-4 to 10-7 Revenue Serv- pp. (IRS) of list” to record assessment “summary ice signs of “the official act assessment has amount of tax liability, Code”).3 of for the occurred purposes 1 taxation, §1341 includes local taxation. 17 purposes, State Miller, § Federal and Procedure Cooper, A. & E. Practice Wright, C. (2d 1988) (“Local imposed authority taxes are under of ed. pp. 643-644 Injunction applies have held that the Tax Act state law and courts Fallon, Meltzer, them.”); & D. Shapiro, R. D. Hart and Wechsler’s (5th (“For 2003) 1173 System purposes Courts and Federal ed. Federal to be ‘under Act, uniformly have been held collected local taxes of ”). law.’ State states that an Treasury Regulations Section 301.6203-1 of assess officer rec signing summary is the “assessment accomplished by ment records,” assessment,” which, “identi “through supporting provides of ord assessed, the taxable liability taxpayer, the character fication of the of CFR the amount the assessment.” applicable, if and period, (2003). §301.6203-1 a In the is used in in tax law. variety ways The term “assessment” by which the usually process word refers to the setting, property-tax personal property. value or a taxable to real authority assigns taxing g.,e. Policy See, Schoettle, and Local Taxation: The Law State F. (“ASSESSMENT (2003) process Taxation Multi-Jurisdictional —The do not focus on the word We “assessment” in isolation, Instead, however. we follow “the cardinal rule that statu- must be tory read context language phrase gath- [since] Dynamics General ers words around it.” meaning Systems, Cline, Land Inc. (inter- S.U. omitted). nal marks In 1341 and tax quotation law gener- an assessment tied to ally, the collection closely tax, e., i. the assessment is the official recording liability and collection efforts. levy triggers
The rule against superfluities complements principle that courts are to the words of interpret a statute context. See 2A N. Statutes Singer, Construction Statutory (rev. (“A 46.06, 2000) 181-186 6th ed. statute pp. should be construed so that effect is to all its so that given provisions, no will be part inoperative void or superfluous, insignifi- (footnotes omitted)). cant . . . .” If, as the Director asserts, *12 the term “assessment,” itself, by entire signified “[t]he plan or scheme fixed for or upon Brief charging for Peti- taxing,” tioner 12 Webster’s New (quoting International Dictionary (2d ed. English Language 1934)), the TIA would not need the or words “collection”; “levy” the term “assess- ment,” alone, would all the do work. necessary a value on or putting personal real for property purposes aof tax to be measured as a percentage property values. The valuation ordinarily is official, a assessor,’ done by government the ‘assessor’ or ‘tax will who hire private professional valuations.”); sometimes to do the actual (7th 1999) Black’s Law as, ed. inter Dictionary (defining “assessment” alia: “Official of property purposes valuation for of taxation assessment appraisal.”). of the beach house>. —Also termed tax assessment. Cf. (M. Powell, 2000). See also 5 R. Property Real 39.02 Wolf ed. To calcu- owed, late the amount of property taxes the tax multiplies assessor e. g., R. by See, assessed value appropriate Werner, tax rate. Real (11th 2002). taxes, Law contrast, Estate ed. Income typically are anyone self-assessed in the United As States. who filed a tax has return unlikely is to forget, taxpayer, not the authority, is taxing the first party make relevant calculation of income taxes The owed. word “self-assessment,” 6201(a) however, term; a technical as IRC indi- cates, the IRS executes the formal act income-tax assessment. Term, Galletti, States v. 541 U.
Earlier this United S. (2004), important “two identified conse the Government timely quences” assessment: that follow from the IRS’ may employ “[T]he administrative enforcement methods IRS outstanding tax,” and levies to collect the as tax liens such and “the time within §§ 6321-6327, 6331-6344; see 26 U. S. C. administratively may or either which the collect IRS [from years] 'proceeding extended to 10 in court’ is 6502(a). §§6501(a), years assessment,” see date after the Galletti, United for States in States T. Brief United O. pp. thus made 02-1389, No. 15-16. The Government briefing that, definition, Galletti under the clear IRC trigger levy-and as the collection tax “assessment” serves syn did not describe the term as efforts. onymous Government plan of with the entire taxation. did it Nor disas company (“levy sociate collection”) word “assessment” from the keeps.4 Instead, that word and in accord with understanding, the related our Government “assessment” collection-propelling function. the term’s
IV §1341 upon Congress modeled earlier federal '“statutes of import,” paralleled provi turn, laws that, similar enjoin proscribing in State courts sions “actions collec Rep. county taxes.” S. 75th tion of State and No. (1937)(hereinafter Rep.). compos Cong., Sess., 1st particularly Congress drew on an 1867 ing text, the TIA’s (AIA), Anti-Injunction Act called the measure, sometimes *13 entertaining brought “any a “for court” from suit which bars restraining the or purpose assessment collection § 10, 14 [federal] 2, 1867, 169, ch. Stat. any of Mar. tax.” Act 4 hand, On one it twice in this regard. The dissent is of two minds § “assessment,” pur for 1341 of the term definition proper suggests or taxing.” or fixed upon charging “the entire scheme plan is poses, word hand, would disconnect Post, the dissent at 117. On the other collection”) sets that “assessment” (“levy from the process enforcement in 117-119. post, motion. See at
108 475, 7421(a). now § codified at 26 U. S. C. See Jefferson Acker, County v. (1999). 423, U.S. 434-435 While 7421(a) § has no recorded “apparently legislative history,” Bob Simon, Jones Univ. v. (1974), U. S. has text, the AIA’s recognized, that the measure serves twin It to purposes: “the responds Government’s need to assess and collect taxes as with expeditiously possible a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference”; and it “ that the ‘required] to the be legal sums right disputed de ” ibid, refund,’ termined in suit for Enochs Wil v. (quoting liams Co., & Nav. Packing (1962)).5 S., 1, U. Lower 7421(a). federal courts have § See, similarly comprehended e. McGlotten g., (DC Connally, F. 453-454 Supp. 1972) (§ court) 7421(a) does not bar (three-judge action seek to ing enjoin income-tax to fraternal orders that exemptions exclude nonwhites from action, for in such an membership, “does not plaintiff tax, contest the amount of his own nor he does seek to limit the amount of tax revenue collectible (footnote the United Tax omitted)); States” Analysts Advocates v. Shultz, 1974) (DC (Section 889, 892 376 F Supp. 7421(a) does not bar to IRS revenue allow challenge ruling contributors ing candidate committees to avoid political federal tax on $3,000 contributions gift excess of ceiling; 7421(a) while suits restrain the “precludes assessment or taxes,” collection of does when proscription apply seek not “plaintiffs to restrain the from col Commissioner taxes, but rather to additional him to collect require lecting taxes to the mandates of the law.” according (emphases original)).6 5That Congress challenges had in mind collec to assessments triggering e., i.
tions, revenue, attempts prevent the collection of is out borne 7421(a), the final clause of 26 C. added 1966: or not such “whether against person person whom such tax was assessed.” (Emphasis added.) ranks South Carolina incorrectly 6 The dissent Regan, 465 U.S. Post, (1984), Analysts McGlotten and Tax and Advocates. post, decisions, notes, 120-121. See also 122. The latter as the text contrast, not seek to stop in South Caro did the collection of taxes. *14 federal tax from AIA shields collections Just as TIA so the shields state tax collec- federal-court injunctions, In both 26 C. restraints. U. S. from federal-court tions 7421(a) 1341, § and 28 U. S. C. directed taxpayers Congress col- refund suits instead of to restrain to attempting pursue suits not the collection lections. to Third-party seeking stop (or a tax contest imposed plaintiffs, validity) 453-454, and Tax McGlotten, 338 F. Analysts, at Supp., were outside 892, F. at Congress’ purview. Supp., explained, is not silent history regard. The TIA’s legislative to restrict “the jurisdiction The Act was designed expressly States over suits courts of the United relating of the district 1. taxes.” the collection State Rep., p. to the Act commented Report Senate Specifically, related, two state-revenue-protective objectives: had closely (1) to between who could eliminate disparities taxpayers out-of-state relief federal usually seek injunctive court — asserting diversity jurisdiction taxpayers corporations —and courts, to state which with recourse only required generally tax- later; and to first and litigate stop taxpayers pay aid of a federal with the withholding injunction, payers, state finances. sums, government thereby disrupting large & D. Meltzer, and Id., Fallon, D. Hart 1-2; see R. Shapiro, The Federal Courts the Federal Wechsler’s System Bank, v. LaSalle Nat. 2003) Rosewell (5th ed. (citing (1981)). 28-29, also 522-523, and nn. U. S. Jef- S., TIA was at 435 that the (observing County, ferson federal provisions anticipatory barring “shaped collector from initiating actions stop by taxpayers TIA, short, collection proceedings”). enacting receipts: to reduce federal revenue the State’s suit aimed Regan, lina Tenth Amendment enjoin as a violation its sought South Carolina taxa income post, but federal exemption,” not “a federal rights held in that bonds. The Court on certain state-issued tion interest 7421(a) juris exercise of original bar this Court’s suit that did not unique S., at 465 U. 381. diction over case. *15 trained its on attention
Congress who to taxpayers sought avoid their tax bill route paying pursuing challenge other than the one specified by No- authority. taxing where does the announce a con- legislative history sweeping direction to “federal-court interference gressional prevent with all of state tax aspects administration.” Brief for Peti- 20; tioner at 123.7 post,
The of the Act’s and understanding purposes legislative set out above history Court’s underpins previous ap of the TIA. plications v. Grace Brethren California Church, 457 (1982), U. S. 393 we that example, recognized TIA was principal to “limit purpose drastically” federal-court interference with “the collection of [state] Id., taxes.” Rosewell, 522). 408-409 S., (quoting U. True, the Court referred to the of “state tax ad disruption ministration,” but it did so in relation to specifically “the collection of revenue.” S., at 410 Perez v. (quoting Ledesma, 82, 128, U. S. n. 17 J., (Brennan, concur in and in The ring part in dissenting part)). complainants Grace Brethren Church were several California churches and schools. federal-court relief from an religious They sought tax that state law unemployment compensation imposed S., them. 457 U. at 398. Their federal action, which by remedies, state was what the TIA passed exactly was de to off. ward The Director the dissent signed endeavor to reconstruct Grace Brethren Church as for the precedent the TIA from lower immunizes proposition totally federal-court “all review of state tax administration, aspects TIA language The significantly differs that of the Johnson Act, provides part: which suspend “The district courts shall not enjoin, with,” or operation of, compliance restrain public-utility rate or §1342 ders made regulatory bodies. 28 U. S. C. (emphasis added). of, The TIA does not interference prohibit with “the operation with,” laws; rather, § or compliance state tax 1341 proscribes interference only with those of state tax aspects regimes produce are needed to e., assessment, revenue —i. levy, collection.
and not the collection of interference with revenue.” just Brief for The Petitioner see at 123-124. endeavor 20; post, before the Court Grace issue given unavailing words Brethren Church and the which the “state context tax administration” appear. invokes other Director several decisions alleged free from matters “state tax entirely administration”
keep lower federal-court Brief for Petitioner “interference.” 17-21; accord at 124-125. Like Brethren Grace post, Church, all of them fall within 1341’s undisputed compass: All involved federal who mounted plaintiffs litigation (or taxes). avoid state taxes a refund of such paying gain *16 relief, therefore, Federal-court would have to re- operated duce the flow of state tax Arkansas Farm revenue. See (1997) (cor- Credit Ark., Servs. Central 824 821, 520 U. S. of chartered federal law claimed under porations exemption from Arkansas sales and Private taxation); income National Council, Comm’n, Truck Inc. Tax 515 U. v. Oklahoma (1995) (action to from collect- Oklahoma prevent seeking taxes on nonresident Fair ing carriers); State motor imposed Assessment in Assn., Real U. S. Estate Inc. v. McNary, 100, 105-106 of taxation (taxpayers, alleging unequal real alia, inter measured al- property, sought, damages by (state tax Rosewell, S., at 510 leged overassessments); 450 U. assessed, her was re- taxpayer, alleging property inequitably taxes).8 fused to state pay
Our decisions are cut loose from prior not fairly portrayed secure, their See, e. state-revenue-protective moorings. g., 8Petitioner urges, and the dissent TIA agrees, safeguards the an other vital authority state interest: the state courts determine what 21; state law means. Brief for Petitioner 125. post, Respondents, at however, have asked the District Court to any state law— interpret there is no disagreement toas the meaning Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 43- (West 2003), whether, Supp. only about the applied, State’s law violates the Federal ques at That is a supra, Constitution. 94-95. tion federal are courts no doubt equipped adjudicate. (“If Church, Brethren at 410 federal declara- S., 457 U. Grace assessments, available to relief were test state tory be into and administration thrown tax- disarray, might payers escape the might ordinary procedural requirements state law. of the federal imposed by During pendency suit the collection revenue under law challenged obstructed, be State’s might consequent damage and to the tax- State risk budget, perhaps shift Ledesma, S., U. payer insolvency.” (quoting n. in in em- (Brennan, J., dissenting part); concurring part (“The Rosewell, added)); S., at 527-528 com- phases nature of these Justice considerations by [identified pelling Brennan in is underscored of state dependency Perez] revenues. . We on the of local tax . . budgets may receipt encountered difficulties readily appreciate county be should substantial of its tax revenue portion rightful actions.”).9 tied injunction up
In sum, this has the TIA interpreted applied address, e., cases wrote the Act to i. cases Congress only in which state seek federal-court orders taxpayers enabling them to avoid state taxes. See 105-106. paying supra, We have read the 1341 instruction condition- harmoniously bar on the of “a jurisdictional ing availability plain, and efficient state court. The remedy” remedy speedy *17 uni- in our decisions was not one for the designed inspected Rather, it verse who sue the was a rem- State. plaintiffs Rosewell, See, tailormade edy e.g., taxpayers. (“Illinois’ S.,U. at 528 that remedy provides property legal note, furthermore, “principles has relied upon We that this Court 26, comity,” preclude Brief for original jurisdic Petitioner to federal-court have aid in to arrest only plaintiffs sought tion when district-court order See Fair Assessment in Real Estate or countermand state tax collection. (1981) (Missouri Assn., McNary, Inc. taxpayers 107-108 U. S. overassessments); sought by alleged damages for increased taxes caused Dredge & 293, 296-299 Huffman, Great Lakes Dock Co. 319 U. S. tax). (plaintiff's compensation challenged unemployment Louisiana’s paying property protest owners taxes under a refund with- ‘plain, years speedy out interest two is a and efficient rem- [TIA]”); edy’ S., under the Church, Grace Brethren at (“[A] remedy ‘plain, is speedy state-court and efficient’ only ‘provides taxpayer hearing if judi- it with “full and may at she any cial determination” which raise all consti- ” objections (quoting to the tutional tax.’ Rosewell, S., 450 U. 514)).10 at
V §1341 well, In other federal courts as been has read to instituting taxpayers restrain state from federal actions to liability stop contest their for state but taxes, not to third parties pursuing challenges constitutional to tax bene- in a fits federal forum. Relevant to the distinction between taxpayer claims that would reduce state revenues and third- party enlarge claims receipts, that would state Seventh Cir- Judge trenchantly: cuit Easterbrook wrote §
“Although ap- the district court concluded that 1341 plies any litigation touching subject to federal on the language taxes, legislative neither the nor the his- tory of the supports interpretation. statute suggest text of 1341 not does that federal courts should lightly issuing might tread orders gov- allow local legislative ernments to raise additional taxes. The his- tory . designed . . is shows to ensure that federal courts do not interfere collection of states’ long taxpayers taxes, so opportunity as have an present to a imposition court federal defenses legislative collection of history the taxes. The is filled judgments emptying with concern that federal were 10 Far from “ignoring]” “plain, speedy remedy” and efficient proviso, we post, charges, as dissent agree that this “codified exception” key to a proper of the Act. understanding requires The statute State taxpayers provide with a swift and certain when remedy they discretion, resist collections. An action on a dependent court’s for ex ample, would supra, qualify taxpayer’s 96. fitting remedy. Cf.
109 with access to coffers and that corporations could obtain remedies unavailable diversity jurisdiction no There was articulated con- to resident taxpayers. state and local cern about courts’ gov- flogging federal taxes.” Dunn ernments to collect additional Carey, added). (1986) F. 2d 555, (emphasis a similar earlier Second Circuit Friendly expressed Judge view of 1341:
“The and the ... lead context history [TIA’s] legislative that, us conclude Congress speaking ‘collection/ methods similar to assessment and levy, was referring e. distress or ... that would g., execution produce money rather than other directly, indirectly property a more use of coercive Con- general power. through where were re- was cases taxpayers gress thinking the federal courts to raise questions peatedly using state or law to the validity federal going particu- them . . . .” Wells v. Malloy, lar taxes imposed upon added). 2d F. (emphasis (CA8 In re Jackson 150, 151-152 F. 2d County, also 1987) “§ 1341 has been held to be inapplicable (observing taxes, to efforts to of additional collection require opposed taxes”).11 the collection of to efforts inhibit Circuits, opinions, with its own prior In conflict sister and at odds Bridges, (2003), in ACLU Foundation Circuit, Fifth 334 F. 3d Bridges recently way TIA in Director here. construed the does activities several exemptions religious to tax challenge involved Court, Fifth The in line with earlier Circuit Louisiana statutes. District decisions, plaintiff apply held that the TIA did not because the was taxes, “assessment, levy or collection” of state but seeking to restrain the exemptions. Reversing, allegedly to eliminate unconstitutional any any seeking TIA bars federal suit to have Fifth Circuit ruled that the Id., at 421-423. system unconstitutional. portion of State’s tax declared Director refer to four other federal-court and the United States that, no purposes, view for 1341 decisions some for their lending support revenues and line that would reduce challenges should be drawn between *19 110
Further, numerous
de-
federal-court
including
decisions —
cisions of this
federal-court
lower
judg-
reviewing
ments —have reached the merits of
constitutional
third-party
See,
TIA.
to tax benefits without
challenges
mentioning
Jer-
e.
v. Public Funds
Public Schools
New
g., Byrne
for
(CA3
(1979),
442
590
2d 514
U. S. 907
F.
sey,
summarily aff’g
(state
1979)
tax
for
children at-
deduction
taxpayers
Clause),
schools violates Establishment
tending nonpublic
(NJ
444 F.
1978);
1228
Franchise Tax Board
aff’g
Supp.
v.
Schools,
United Americans
Public
California
for
attacks that might augment collections. See
Brief for Petitioner
Reply
8-9
Kraebel v. New York
(citing
Preservation
City Dept. Housing
(CA2 1992);
Collins,
Development,
Gillis, unlike Kraebel Pipeline, third-party and Colonial was a action. The court declined to actually decide does bar the “[w]hether [TIA] relief,” availability of such but that a suit to enhance state seeking noted not, revenues may fall nonetheless within 1341’sbar because “the Act is its own language, 2d, limited to the collection of taxes.” 836 F. at 1005 (emphasis in Act, original). Finally, Perez concerned the Butler §872, U. C.S. a TIA analog applicable Ordering to Puerto Rico. dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction, the court rested its decision not on construction, statutory but on concerns, “underlying]” comity stating: “[A]n order of a federal court requiring Commonwealth officials to collect taxes which its legislature has not seen fit to on its citizens impose strikes us as a particularly inappropriate involvement in a state’s management its fiscal operations.” 2d, 592 F. at 1214-1215. district-court judgment (summarily affirming reduc- down state statute that income-tax
striking
provided
tions
schools);
for
children to
taxpayers
sending
nonpublic
Committee
Ed.
Public
& Religious Liberty Nyquist,
(1973) (state
[*] [*] [*] In a of cases not procession distinguishable rationally one, this no of this Justice or member of the bar ever Court raised a 1341 that, to the in objection petitioner according 12In cases, resort, school as a federal have last courts desegregation asserted of, in, authority to direct local tax imposition or increase levies, even state law. See Mis amounts exceeding ceiling set Jenkins, souri Missouri, (1990); v. S.U. Liddell v. 731 F. 2d 1294, 1320 (GA8 1984) (en banc); Prince Bd. Edward School cf. Griffin (1964). Cty., be, U. S. may Controversial as such a measure Jenkins, S., see (Kennedy, J., 495 U. at 65-81 concurring part con curring in judgment), it noteworthy 1341 was not raised in those counsel, courts, cases by lower or this own Court on its motion. case, have us to should caused order dismissal Allen, Mueller for
action
want
jurisdiction.
(state
S. 388
deduction for
who send
U.
parents
their children to
schools
not
does
violate Establish-
parochial
Clause);
ment
S. 907;
United Americans
Byrne,
for
Schools,
Public
890;
Committee
Public Ed. &
419 U. S.
Wolman,
756;
413 U.
901;
Religious Liberty,
413 U. S.
Affirmed. Stevens, Justice concurring. Kennedy
In Part IV of his dissent, Justice observes that of unexamined habit “years and the litigants courts” do lessen this Court’s obligation correctly interpret Post, statute. at 126. It merits however, emphasis, silence to a in prolonged congressional settled response *21 of a federal statute terpretation provides powerful support for In matters, status maintaining statutory judi quo. cial restraint counsels to take strongly waiting Congress the initiative rules on which and liti modifying judges Limited, See BedRoc have relied. LLC v. United gants States, 176, (2004) (Stevens, J., U. S. dissenting); Federal NR A Election Comm’n v. Political Fund, Victory Com 88, J., S. 100-105 (Stevens, dissenting); Fink, missioner 89, 101-103 (1987) 483 U. S. (Stevens, J., McCrary, 160, 427 U. 189-192 dissenting); Runyon court, confirming may In cases of this order be brought that federal do “state courts are rate suggest we not second constitutional arbi Post, Instead, adjudications ters.” at 113. we underscore of great barrier, 93-94, see be writ discerning supra, moment no at cannot 114, custom,” ten as nothing off more than “unexamined reflecting post, “habit,” unthinking post, at 126. (1976) (Stevens, J., In a contest between the concurring). decisis, and the doctrine of stare the latter dictionary clearly wins. The I Court’s fine which without reser- opinion, join vation, is with these views. consistent with whom The Chief Kennedy,
Justice Jus- Justice, and Justice join, dissenting. tice Scalia, Thomas In case, the Court shows for the state great skepticism to vindicate constitutional courts’ Two ability wrongs. make clear that the Court treats States as diminished points and disfavored rather than powers, merely applies statutory First, text. Court’s the Tax Act analysis Injunction (TIA or Act), 28 U. S. C. contrasts with read- a literal Second, terms. its Court’s assertion that ing legisla- tive histories conclusion that suits support “[t]hird-party (or collection contest seeking stop validity) taxa were ... outside imposed plaintiffs Congress’ pur- view” in the TIA and the enacting anti-injunction provision ante, on which the TIA modeled, was out not borne sources, those previously Court. recognized by of these at- light today’s should be points, holding probably tributed the concern the Court shows candidly animates ante, it. See at 93 it was the federal courts that (noting the Constitution’s “upheld protection equal requirement” when States circumvented Brown Education, v. Board of laws). 483 (1954), U. S. their tax The by manipulating it concern, seems, is that state courts are rate second con- arbiters, stitutional to their federal unequal counterparts. due State courts are more than this. Dismissive respect of state courts is treatment since the particularly unjustified TIA, terms, a federal express provides safeguard: *22 Act lifts on its bar federal-court intervention when state “a courts fail to rem- efficient plain, provide speedy, § 1341. edy.”
In text, view the TIA’s congressional judgment arbiters, courts constitutional and the re- are qualified 114 state courts I deserve,
spect disagree majority’s the balance the Act strikes between superseding federal- and state-court I with the adjudication. agree that the majority for certiorari was § under 28 petition timely U. S. C. 2101(c), ante, see 96-99, and so submit this dissent on respectful the merits of the decision.
I
is the first
time
Court has
Today
considered whether
the TIA bars federal district courts from granting injunctive
relief that would
from
States
prevent
citizens statuto-
giving
mandated state tax
rily
credits.
cases,
There are
some dat-
back almost 50
which
ing
as if
years,
proceeded
the jurisdic-
tional bar did not
to tax credit
apply
but some
challenges;
more recent decisions have said the bar is
Com-
applicable.
e.
Allen,
Mueller v.
g.,
463
388
(1983); Committee
pare,
U. S.
Public Ed. &
Religious Liberty
Nyquist,
U. S. 756
(1973);
v. School Bd.
Prince Edward
377 U. S.
Cty.,
Griffin
e.
(1964),
ACLU
with,
g.,
Foundation
La. v. Bridges,
(CA5
In re Gillis,
2003);
F. 3d
(CA6
trict Court from relief the tax granting injunctive against two First, the term requires inquiries. assessment, credit — as used in 1341, must be defined. Second, we must deter- if mine an the Director of Arizona’s injunction prohibiting (Director) of Revenue Department the credit allowing would or restrain an enjoin, suspend, assessment.
The word assessment in the TIA is not isolated from its use in another federal statute. The TIA was modeled of the Internal Revenue Code anti-injunction provision 7421(a). (Code), U. S. C. Acker, County Jefferson (1999). U. S. That and has provision specifies, *23 since federal 1867, that courts not restrain or specified may an or “assessment collection of tax.” enjoin any [federal] 7421(a) (first § U. S. C. Act of by 2, 1867, codified Mar. ch. 475). 10,§ 14 Stat. The of the term assessment meaning this Code is discernible reference to other provision by Code seq. et § 1 sections. 26 U. S. C.
Chapter Title addresses the assess- subject ments and sheds on the of the term in light meaning the Code. Section 6201 first instructs Secre- “[t]he the [of Internal Revenue tary is . . . required Service] make the . .. assessments of all . taxes . . imposed by 6201(a). § title....” 26 U. S. C. Further it provides, “[t]he shall all taxes Secretary assess determined the by taxpayer 6201(a)(1). or the . . . .” Secretary Section 6203 in turn sets forth a method for an assessment: “The making assessment be shall made the by recording the liability in the of the office taxpayer Secretary.” Taken the of Title 26 establish that an provisions together, assessment, term is in 7421(a), used must at the least the of a ultimate tax encompass recording taxpayer’s This is what the owes the liability. taxpayer Government. Laing States, v. United also 161, 170, n. 13 U. S. (1976) (“The ‘assessment,’ nota- a essentially bookkeeping tion, is when made the or his Secretary establishes delegate rolls”). an account on the tax Whether against taxpayer Commissioner) or his Secretary delegate (today, makes on basis a self- recording taxpayer’s form chooses on his own reported filing instead rely (e. g., audit) calculation of the via an is taxpayer’s liability irrelevant. of the liability the Govern- recording ment’s tax rolls is an itself assessment.
The TIA was modeled on the see anti-injunction provision, County, supra; it the same terminol- incorporates Jefferson it that terminol- ogy employed by provision; employs sensible, then, the same ogy It purpose. interpret the TIA’s terms reference to Code’s use of term. (1978)(“[W]here, as Pons, 575, 581 434 S.
Cf. Lorillard incorporating Congress adopts here, new law sections prior Congress normally presumed can be to have had law, given incorporated knowledge interpretation to the *24 statute”). as it law, at least insofar affects the new Appeals, that an assessment was of which concluded property used the official of the value of income or estimate imposition someone, or on to calculate a tax the of a. tax (CA92002), prin placed 1011, 1015 Killian, 307F. 3d Winn dictionary cipal interpretation a definition. for its reliance entirely misplaced; but unless the' definition is That was not prior advantage statute, in the context of considered guidance interpretive of that is lost. statute’s Furthermore, court defined the term an unusual way. dictionary was when It relied on a unavailable of the enacted; the TIA it relied not on the definition was consideration, “assessment,” term under but on the definition form, “assess”; verb and it examined term’s related only portion dictionary a In of that term’s definition. by Appeals, used the Court of the verb is defined in two ways not noted the court. One the alternative defini- “(2) quite is to fix or determine the amount tions relevant — ibid, etc.).” (damages, Compare tax, a a with fine, Ran- (1979). English Language Dictionary dom House Further: panel] dictionary, [the [it] lay
“Had looked in a different contrary pre- a definition to the one it would have found upon plan or scheme fixed ferred, such as ‘the entire charging taxing.’ panel considered tax . . Had the . it would have found treatises and law dictionaries ... . . Even with this broader . much accord definition. reading supports a broad the federal income tax code Killian, F. 3d ‘assessment.’” Winn v. 2003) (CA9 (Kleinfeld, dissenting denial of re- J., banc). hearing en first Internal Revenue an Code, assessment
Guided recording 1341, at taxpayers’ minimum, under liability though TIA, on the State’s tax rolls. The a federal interpreted as a statute that must be matter law, of federal operates respect, state-law context. the Act interpreted apply evenly must be as to so the 50 various regimes recording state-law various schemes employ. It is therefore irrelevant States whether state offi- taxpayer pen speci- cials record liabilities their own in a by collecting maintaining taxpayers’ location, fied self- filing reported forms, in some other manner. The or. recordkeeping equates taxpayer to the determination of liability on the is the State’s rolls whatever assessment, agree the method. The Court seems to with this. See ante, at 99-102. *25 dictionary provides
The definition of assessment further Contemporaneous relevant information. dictionaries from time expan of the TIA’s enactment define assessment in They any understanding sive terms. would broaden g., term, See, so Act’sbar. e. Webster’s Inter New (1927) Dictionary (providing national three rele context ap vant for the term definitions assessment: It is the act of portioning determining paid; or an amount to be a valuation property purpose plan taxation; of for the of or the entire or upon charging taxing). or scheme fixed for See also United Galletti, (noting 114, 122 States 541 S. that under only the term refers recordings the Code assessment liability of but to “the tax also calculation ... of a liabil ity,” including by taxpayer). self-calculation done The scope not decide the full Court need the term assessment present purposes, in the For TIA, however. narrow defi Applying nition of the term suffices. defini narrowest enjoining, tion, the TIA’sliteral text bars district courts suspending, restraining recording taxpayer a State’s liability recordings rolls, on its tax whether the made are filing
self-reported taxpayer forms or a State’s calculation taxpayer liability. “enjoin, suspend, require The terms or restrain” little scrutiny. they purposes doubt, No have discrete in the con- they text of the meaning. TIA; but also have a common They varying that restrict refer to actions assessments to degrees. noteworthy “enjoin” It is that the term has not just meaning its meaning the restrictive sense but also has Dictionary an affirmative sense. The Black’sLaw current gives at the TIA’s as a enactment definition of the “to term, require; positively command; direct.” Black’s Law Diction- (3d 1933). ary 663 That may impli- ed. definition well be invalidating here, cated order since an a tax credit would they seem to to collect command States taxes otherwise parties, proceed would not collect. The however, the as- sumption enjoin unobjectionable means to bar. It is assumption leaving too, Court make the the broader definition for later consideration.
Respondents argue the TIA injunction does not bar the they enjoined, seek because even after the credit is the Di- rector will taxpayers’ be able to record and enforce liabili- Respondents ties. Brief for respondents 16. In fact, say, way with the credit out of the the Director will be able higher liability profit to record and enforce a level of and so (“The payable by State. Ibid. amount some tax- hardly payers increase, would but that can be characterized injunction process”). as an or restraint of the assessment ignores argument, important part however, an *26 (“The § the “under law.” 28 U. S. Act: State C. dis- enjoin, suspend trict courts shall not or restrain the assess- law”). any only ment of tax ... under State The Act not enjoining, suspending, bars district courts from or restrain- ing recording taxpayer altogether; but State’s liabilities enjoining, suspending, restraining it also bars them recording taxpayer liability the State from that state law mandates. (West 2003) §43-1089
Arizona Rev. Ann. Stat. is Supp. state law. It is an of the statute; State’s tax it integral part is reflected on state tax the forms; and State Court Supreme has held that it is of the calculus part to determine necessary Killian, Kotterman tax 273, 279, 193 Ariz. liability. (1999). 285, 606, 612, 972 R 2d A of a recording taxpay er’s under state must be law made in accordance liability §with 43-1089. The same said can be to each respect of the State’s law. To the order every provision Director not to record on the State’s tax rolls liabil taxpayer (or that reflects of 43-1089 ity operation other any matter) for tax law that would be to bar the provision Direc tor from the correct The recording TIA’s taxpayer liability. bars this relief and so bars this suit. language The tries to avoid this conclusion by saying that constitute assessments under 1341 must recordings ante, function,” have a “collection-propelling at issue here do not have such a function. recordings ante, (“[T]he See also 4n. dissent would disconnect the word from the enforcement [assessment] process”). That A is wrong. on the taxpayer recording liability State’s tax rolls course collection. In most cases propels will his and thus payment accompany taxpayer’s filing, will so that assessment no literal collection accompany who As has taxes must moneys necessary. anyone paid however, if know, owed were not with the included payment one’s State’s on the State’s recording liability filing, rolls efforts, would cause collection certainly subsequent (i e., assessment) col- would filing’s recording propel lection the State’s to the by establishing legal right taxpay- er’s moneys.
II offers majority prior judicial interpretations Code’s worded similarly anti-injunction provision support ante, its conclusions about the text. See contrary statutory at 102-103. That this Court and other federal have courts
allowed suits tax credits to nontaxpayer challenging proceed in the face of the is not at all con provision anti-injunction Those cases are Had the trolling. quite distinguishable. in those suit, cases been barred from there would plaintiffs have been no available all for forum their claims. See (DC 1972) F. 448, McGlotten 453-454 Connolly, Supp. court) (“The course of (three-judge [such preferred raising and for deduction] a suit refund exemption objections not available. this situation we cannot read the statute suit”). to bar also Tax and present Advo Analysts Shultz, (DC (“Since 889, 892 1974) cates v. 376 F. Supp. plain tiffs are not restrain of taxes, collection seeking since cannot relief obtain suit, a refund they [26 through 7421(a) § bar the U. S. does not relief C.] injunctive they seek”). The Court ratified those decisions insofar as only as relied this limited rationale for they basis an excep tion to the bar on statutory adjudication. See South Caro . 367, lina v. 465 U. Regan, the anti- (holding to a injunction provision State’s inapplicable challenge of a federal constitutionality exemption provision, 103(a) (which Code from a exempts taxpayer’s gross income the interest on the earned State), obligations any 310(b)(1) amended Tax Fiscal Equity Act of Stat. because “the Responsibility was not intended to bar an action [anti-injunction provision] . where . . has not with an Congress provided plaintiff tax”). alternative of a legal way challenge validity was Even that strict limitation strict four enough of the one of whom Court, Members noted “the broad sweep S., 465 U. [a]nti-[i]njunction [provision].” (Blackmun, J., other three judgment). concurring allowed an Justices went further still. would have They to the bar on non- literal anti-injunction provision’s exception if suits tax exemption only taxpayer challenging provisions due were at stake. See id., at (O’Con- process rights (“Bob Jones J., concurring University's judgment) nor, *28 that the re- recognition judicial complete inaccessibility view abso- due concerns might implicate process provides no for to the anti- basis an lutely exception” crafting Act “no a who has due for injunction right plaintiff process forum”). to review of claim a its in judicial In contrast to the TIA on its the anti-injunction provision, own terms ensures an forum for claims it bars. adequate The TIA heard actions that could not be specially exempts in state courts an for instances exception providing “where a had and efficient be plain, speedy, remedy [not] may the courts of 28 U. S. 1341. The TIA’s State.” C. [the] text thus that con- check already Regan incorporates cluded could be read even into anti-injunction provision 'could “[t]he though [anti-injunction provision]’s language be more suits scarcely explicit’ prohibiting nontaxpayer like S., J., this one.” at concurring (O’Connor, Simon, Bob Jones Univ. 416 U. S. judgment) (quoting (1974)). 725, 736 The that a literal effect is practical reading of the TIA for federal provides district courts to stand at where ready encounter obstacles practical litigants legal state tax in state credits courts. And challenging Court, of course, stands to review decisions ready state courts on these matters.
The Court does not discuss this codified exception, yet clause is It crucial. a congressional represents judgment about the balance that should exist between the due respect (for to the States both their administration of tax schemes laws) and their courts’ of tax and the need interpretation for constitutional is to vindication. To ignore provision has ignore balanced these interests. Congress already admit would be Respondents heard in state court. they Indeed a similar action heard quite was there. previously See Killian, (1999). Kotterman v. 273, 972 193 Ariz. R 2d 606 (akin As result, the TIA’s to that exception recognized by does not To Regan) as if it is to apply. does proceed replace Congress’ of the noted interests with the balancing Court’s.
III further TIA’s argue respondents federal relatedly anti-injunction pro- policy purposes (as histo- discerned vision’s legislative policy purposes ries) The two reflect Acts, they say, justify today’s holding. “In both ... directed unitary purpose: Congress taxpayers refund suits instead to restrain [tax] attempting pursue Ante, ante, at 104. also collections.” 105 (concluding that the Act’s is to bar suits by “taxpay- underlying purpose bill”); to avoid their tax see also Brief ers who paying sought 18-20. This the Court and re- purpose, Respondents that the Act not intended to fore- shows was say, spondents *29 close relief to tax credits. The challenges proposition on the that the TIA’s sole is to rests purpose premise prevent that would district court orders decrease the in state moneys Because the histories of the fiscs. Acts are not legislative manner that limited the carefully reading suggests, literal the of the Act’s policy argument against application terms fails. first, the federal as has
Taking anti-injunction provision con- before, been noted reflects the “[its] history expressly desire that all suits the tax col- injunctive against gressional Regan,. S., lector 465 U. at 387 be prohibited.” (O’Connor, The J., to concurring judgment). provision responded intrusion of the which dangers accompany injunc- “the grave the tive of the courts into administration of the reve- power Id., 388. It resolu- nue.” precludes judicial “generally at controversies,” whether of all abstract tion brought Id., id., at 387- 392; or a see also taxpayer nontaxpayer. the history anti-injunction (reviewing legislative enactments). amendments, and related its various provision, is not bar Thus, the to suits object just might provision’s ” but taxes,’ “[simi- ‘the ... collecting “interrupt process evidence,a de- lar and history congressional ly, language the tax to courts from aspect sire restraining any prohibit Id., at 399. laws’ administration.” The of the TIA’s is reading history majority’s legislative also inconsistent of this same interpretation history in the earlier Court’s cases. Court has made clear that the TIA’s not but fisc also purpose only protect the State’s tax administration protect and tax system policy implementation. v. Grace Church, Brethren California U. S. 393 is a (1982), prime example.
In Grace Brethren Church Court held that the TIA bars actions only individuals to stop collectors (i suits) e., but also bars collecting injunctive moneys declaratory id., suits. See 408-410. The ex plained suits would permitting declaratory proceed “defea[t] the Tax principal Act: ‘to purpose Injunction limit federal district court to inter drastically jurisdiction fere with so a local concern important collection Id., taxes.’” at 408-409 Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. (quoting (1981)). Bank, 503, 522 450 U. S. It continued: “‘If federal were relief available to declaratory test state tax assessments, state tax be administration might thrown into disarray, taxpayers might escape ordinary procedural law. requirements imposed by of the federal suit the During collection of pendency revenue under the law obstructed, be challenged might *30 with to the State’s and consequent damage budget, per a shift to the risk of in State haps taxpayer are solvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues to turn on of state tax like questions law, which, likely issues of law, state are more heard regulatory properly in Church, the state courts.’” Grace Brethren supra, at Perez v. Ledesma, (quoting approval (1971) 82, 128, (Brennan, U. n. 17 in J., S. concurring part and in dissenting part)). this,
While course, demonstrates that protecting state fisc TIA’s it part damage purpose, equally shows that actions that would throw the “state tax adminis- also the Act
tration ... into and its implicate disarray” pur- The concern with Court’s administrative pose. preventing in context its that the TIA’s explanation disarray puts princi- concern is to limit federal district court interference with pal of taxes.” The context, the “collection this refers phrase, tax to the of the whole collection and the operation system of entire tax of it. policy, just implementation part order with a While an collection suit dis- interfering specific one of the most essential of a State’s rupts, aspects sys- it is not the in which tem, federal courts can way only disrupt the State’s tax system: of the Tax Act dem-
“[T]he legislative history Injunction onstrates that worried not so much about the Congress of relief available in the form federal courts, as about the federal courts of to interfere divesting jurisdiction with state tax administration.” Grace Brethen Church, supra, at 409, n. 22. decisions in Fair Assessment Real Estate
The
Court’s
McNary,
Assn., Inc. v.
National Private
S. 100 (1981),
Council,
Comm’n,
Truck
Inc. Tax
Oklahoma
and language the statute. The Act bars all orders unqualified any enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment of tax effecting congressional intent we should state law. under proscriptions simple broad in the statu- give full force to tory language. purpose comprehen- language and are
Because the TIA’s congressional ques- arguments on the based on silence sive, moneys applies to actions TIA that increase tion whether the system Contra, collects are no moment. a state tax Carey, (relying on at 1017-1018 Dunn v. Winn, 3d, 307 F. (CA7 1986)); (relying ante, see also at 108-109 F. 2d Dunn). weight gives legislative one histo- Whatever to on legislative a ries, silence in the record is irrelevant when “[W]hen plain congressional declaration exists on a matter. may unambiguous speculate probabili- terms are we not Ritchie, ties of intention.” Insurance Co.v. 5 Wall. (1867). Congress Here, said courts are barred has district disrupting operations. It is immaterial the State’s collection is raised or lowered. A court whether the State’s policy replace the if order will thwart and State’s chosen authority supports proposi- either it causes result. No reducing citizens’ tax an interest its tion that a lacks State troubling pro- proposition Court burden. It is a assumption that the in limit- State’s interest ceed on the ing the tax burden on its citizens to that for which its law secondary policy, deserving respect provides a of little is from us.
IV
majority
respondents
which both the
The final basis on
by litigants and the
years
unexamined habit
rest is that
entertaining
in federal courts’
resulted
alike have
courts
challenges
(citing
ante,
credits. See
at 110-111
to state tax
cases).
not reverse
we should
representative
While
obligation
lightly,
is
practice
our
of our unexamined
course
not
are
interpretation We
statute.
give
correct
maintain
status
when the status
is
quo
obliged
quo
unfounded. The exercise of federal
does not and
jurisdiction
See United
L. A.
cannot establish
States jurisdiction.
Inc.,
Lines,
Tucker Truck
(1952).
33, 37-38
344 U. S.
“[T]his
not
bound
exercise of
in a
prior
jurisdiction
where it
case
was
and it was
sub si
questioned
passed
Id.,
lentio.”
In this
38.
case is no
respect,
present
than Federal Election Comm’n NR A
different
Political
*33
(1994).
Fund,
“Nor are we the FEC’s it impressed by argument itself this has before Court represented on several occa- sions in without been any past question having so____ raised about its to do authority jurisdiction was Court none actions, of these challenged and therefore is an one before us.” question open at Id., 97. Police,
See also Will State Michigan Dept. of U. S. (1989) (“‘[T]his 63, n. 4 has never considered itself when a bound case subsequent finally jurisdic brings Lavine, tional before us.’ 528, 535, issue Hagans (1974)” (alteration in n. 5 These cases make clear original)). failure that our to consider ato question equates hardly ante, Contra, decided. 112-113 thing’s being (Stevens, J., silences of the courts concurring) (referring prior as stare decisis to the TIA settled respect interpre tation). As a I would follow the consequence, statutory language.
[*] [*] [*] 128' of tax- decision,
After associations “[njontaxpaying today’s will now be allowed to and most other nontaxpayers, payers, resolution [federal] Congress’ policy against judicial sidestep S., tax controversies.” 465 U. abstract [state] Regan, This, J., unfortu- concurring judgment). (O’Connor, state courts of nate the first result deprives opportunity hear such cases and to the relief Constitution grant requires. reasons, with
For the I dissent. foregoing respect,