In re K.K.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In re K.K., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3888.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3888
IN RE K.K. ET AL.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In re K.K., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3888.]
Juvenile procedure—Former
(Nos. 2021-0822 and 2021-0857—Submitted March 30, 2022—Decided November 3, 2022.
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Butler County, Nos. CA2020-12-130, CA2021-01-002, and CA2021-01-033, 2021-Ohio-1689.
{¶ 1} This is a discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals and a certified-conflict case in which we have recognized that a conflict exists between the Twelfth District‘s judgment and the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in In re L.S., 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3719, 2020-Ohio-5516. The questions presented relate to whether a judgment granting temporary custody of a child is void or voidable when the dispositional hearing was held beyond the 90-day limit set forth in former
{¶ 2} The memorandum in support of jurisdiction originally presented two questions. The first question asks whether former
{¶ 3} The certified-conflict question asks whether, on an appeal from a judgment granting permanent custody, res judicata bars a parent from challenging the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction based on the court‘s failure to have held a dispositional hearing on the issue of temporary custody within 90 days of the filing of an abuse, neglect, or dependency complaint.
{¶ 4} Appellee A.T. is the biological mother of three minor children, K.K., D.T., and M.K. Appellee M.K. Jr. is the biological father of K.K. and M.K.
{¶ 5} The Butler County Department of Job and Family Services-Children Services Division (“the agency“) received temporary custody of the minor children, K.K., D.T., and M.K., on the basis that they were abused, neglected, or dependent children. It is undisputed that the dispositional hearing granting the agency temporary custody of the children occurred more than 90 days after the filing of the complaints for temporary custody.
{¶ 6} Pursuant to
{¶ 7} The father first raised the issue that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant permanent custody to the agency in his appeal of that judgment. He argued that because the dispositional hearings granting temporary custody to the agency were held more than 90 days after the complaints for temporary custody were filed, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the agency permanent custody. He asserted that the temporary-custody judgment is void, not voidable. The appellate court agreed, reversed the judgments of the juvenile court granting permanent custody of K.K., D.T., and M.K. to the agency, and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for further proceedings. We disagree.
{¶ 8} The statute in effect while this matter was pending in the juvenile court stated that a dispositional hearing on an agency‘s motion for temporary custody “may not be held” more than 30 days after the adjudicatory hearing was held but “shall not be held” more than 90 days after the complaint was filed. Former
{¶ 9} ” ’ “It is only when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the judgment voidable.” ’ ” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 22 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting State v. Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d 456, 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033 (1998). The language of former
{¶ 10} Under the plain language of former
{¶ 11} Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals and answer yes to the certified-conflict question. We remand the matter to the Twelfth District to address the remaining assignments of error.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Juvenile-Court Proceedings
{¶ 12} This appeal arises from judgments granting the agency permanent custody of all three children. The mother and the father argue that the permanent-custody judgments and the judgments underlying the motions for permanent custody, that is, the judgments that held that the children were neglected and dependent and granted temporary custody of the children to the agency, are void because the dispositional hearings were held more than 90 days after the complaints for temporary custody were filed.
{¶ 13} On October 25, 2018, the agency filed complaints in the Butler County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, alleging that K.K. and D.T. were abused, neglected, and dependent children because the family home was unsafe. On December 11, the agency filed a complaint alleging that M.K. was a dependent child for the same reason. The agency was granted temporary custody of all three children on an emergency basis, and the children were placed in foster care.
{¶ 14} On March 19, 2019, a magistrate held an adjudicatory hearing. The mother and the father were informed of their right to be represented by counsel but declined representation.
{¶ 15} The mother and the father stipulated that K.K. was neglected and dependent, and the mother stipulated that D.T. was neglected and dependent. However,
{¶ 16} The magistrate found that K.K. and D.T. were neglected and dependent and granted temporary custody of those two children to the agency. The magistrate explained that once the decisions were approved, they would be final unless timely objections were filed. An adjudicatory hearing regarding M.K was scheduled.
{¶ 17} The following day, the juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s decisions, as allowed by
{¶ 18} On April 30, the magistrate conducted a required review hearing in K.K.‘s and D.T.‘s cases and an adjudicatory hearing on the complaint for the temporary custody of M.K. The mother and the father did not appear. In M.K.‘s case, the magistrate found that M.K. was dependent and scheduled a dispositional hearing.
{¶ 19} On June 7, the magistrate held another review hearing in K.K.‘s and D.T.‘s cases and a dispositional hearing in M.K.‘s case. The mother and the father appeared and proceeded without counsel. The magistrate granted temporary custody of M.K. to the agency. The mother and the father were again told that they could file objections to the magistrate‘s decision.
{¶ 20} On June 10, the juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s decision regarding the adjudication and disposition of temporary custody of M.K., as allowed by
{¶ 21} Neither the mother nor the father moved to dismiss the cases on the ground that the dispositional hearings had been held more than 90 days after the complaints were filed. See former
{¶ 22} On February 12, 2020, the agency filed motions for permanent custody in all three cases. In those motions, the agency alleged that the children had been in the agency‘s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period. It further alleged that the children‘s parents were not able to provide adequate parental care. The agency stated that permanent commitment of the children to the agency was in the children‘s best interest.
{¶ 23} On September 29, an adjudicatory hearing was held on the agency‘s motions for permanent custody. The mother and the father were present and represented by counsel.
{¶ 24} On October 5, the magistrate found that placement of the three children in the permanent custody of the agency was in the children‘s best interest. On the same day, the juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s decisions granting permanent custody to the agency, as allowed by
{¶ 25} The father and the mother timely filed objections to the magistrate‘s decisions. Neither the mother nor the father argued in those objections that the underlying judgments for temporary custody were void because the dispositional hearings had been held more than 90 days after the filing of the complaints for temporary custody.
{¶ 26} On December 15, the juvenile court held a hearing on the objections. The court heard arguments from the mother and the father, who were represented by counsel, the guardian ad litem, and the
{¶ 27} At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that the magistrate did not err, overruled the objections, and adopted the decisions of the magistrate granting permanent custody of the children to the agency as final, appealable judgments of the court. The court journalized its judgments and notified the parties of their right to appeal. The mother and the father each appealed.
B. Appellate-Court Proceedings
{¶ 28} The father argued in the court of appeals that the juvenile court had lacked jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights and that the matter should have been dismissed. Both the father and the mother argued that the order of permanent custody was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, the father argued that the COVID-19 pandemic had affected his ability to reunify with his children and that he should have been given additional time to complete his plan to reunify with his children. After finding that the father‘s assignment of error arguing the lack of jurisdiction was dispositive, the appellate court declined to address the other assignments of error.
{¶ 29} The father argued, based on the plain language of former
{¶ 30} Relying on In re K.M., the appellate court determined that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to issue the temporary-custody orders. The appellate court stated that our decision in In re K.M. noted that there was an ” ‘express limitation on a juvenile court‘s authority for failure to comply with the statutory deadline.’ ” 2021-Ohio-1689, 172 N.E.3d 1083, ¶ 10, quoting In re K.M. at ¶ 23. The court of appeals held that because the dispositional hearings were not held until March 19, 2019, for D.T. and K.K. and June 7, 2019, for M.K., “the juvenile court erred by not dismissing the complaints without prejudice once it failed to hold the dispositional hearings within 90 days as required by [former]
{¶ 31} The appellate court also rejected the agency‘s argument that the father‘s assignment of error related to jurisdiction was barred by res judicata. The court stated that an attack “on subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be forfeited and can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.” Id. at ¶ 20, citing Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v. Toledo Edison Co., 145 Ohio St.3d 125, 2015-Ohio-4797, 47 N.E.3d 786, ¶ 22. The court held that because the juvenile court is a creature of statute that can “exercise only those powers that the General Assembly confers”
upon it (emphasis sic), id., the juvenile court had no authority to act once the 90-day limit had expired.
{¶ 32} The agency appealed the decision of the appellate court. We accepted the agency‘s appeal on two propositions of law,
The language requiring dismissal for violations of the 90-day limit set forth in
R.C. 2151.35(B)(1) is not self-executing since it requires the filing of a motion by the court, by the parties to the case, or by the child‘s guardian ad litem. As such, the 90-day limit is not jurisdictional.
See 164 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2021-Ohio-3233, 173 N.E.3d 1229.
{¶ 33} The Twelfth District also certified that its judgment was in conflict with a judgment of the Fourth District that held that an argument regarding the 90-day limit was barred by res judicata, since the parents had not raised the claim in a direct appeal from the dispositional order. In re L.S., 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3719, 2020-Ohio-5516, ¶ 20.
{¶ 34} We agreed that a conflict exists, consolidated the certified-conflict case with the jurisdictional appeal, and ordered the parties to brief the following question:
“According to the language in place prior to the April 12, 2021 amendment, does res judicata bar a parent‘s argument on appeal from a permanent custody determination that the juvenile court failed to abide by the 90-day limit set forth in
R.C. 2151.353(B)(1) when the parent failed to raise the argument to the juvenile court and failed to appeal an underlying abuse, neglect or dependency disposition?”
164 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2021-Ohio-3233, 173 N.E.3d 1218, quoting 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2020-12-130, CA2021-01-002, and CA2021-01-003 (July 12, 2021).
{¶ 35} Therefore, we examine only the agency‘s first proposition of law and the certified-conflict question.
II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
{¶ 36} The agency argues that when a parent fails to seek dismissal of a complaint for temporary custody because the juvenile court did not hold a dispositional hearing within 90 days of the filing of the complaint, the doctrine of res judicata bars the parent from raising the issue for the first time on appeal of a judgment awarding permanent custody to the agency. The agency advances two reasons: (1) because former
{¶ 37} Relying on In re K.M., 159 Ohio St.3d 544, 2020-Ohio-995, 153 N.E.3d 245, the father and the mother counter that the 90-day limit in former
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 38} The issue presented here is a narrow one: Did the failure of the juvenile court to hold the dispositional hearing within 90 days of the filing of the complaints for temporary custody, as required by former
{¶ 39} “When the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said.” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12. “The question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus.
B. Former R.C. 2151.35(B)(1)
{¶ 40} A public children-services agency that has been granted temporary custody of a child is required to file a motion for permanent custody when the child has been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.
{¶ 41} The statute at issue here, former
{¶ 42} “The dispositional hearing shall not be held more than ninety days after the date on which the complaint in the case was filed.” (Emphasis added). Id. The statute stated that if the dispositional hearing was not held within 90 days, “the court, on its own motion or the motion of any party or the guardian ad litem of the child, shall dismiss the complaint without prejudice.” Id.
C. In re K.M. Is Factually Distinguishable
{¶ 43} Recently, in In re K.M., 159 Ohio St.3d 544, 2020-Ohio-995, 152 N.E.3d 245, ¶ 1, 4-15, we consolidated two cases to consider whether former
{¶ 44} We concluded that the statutory deadline was mandatory because the requirement that a complaint be dismissed without prejudice, either on a motion by a party or the guardian ad litem or on the court‘s own motion, was an “express limitation on a juvenile court‘s authority.” Id. at ¶ 23. We held that “the plain language of [former]
{¶ 45} The mother and the father argue that In re K.M. guides the resolution of the matter before us. But the only guidance In re K.M. provides to the current dispute is that the 90-day limit is mandatory. The factual difference between the current cases and In re K.M. prevents its application here.
{¶ 46} In the cases at issue here, the mother and the father were present at the dispositional hearings on the agency‘s motions for temporary custody of the children. Neither parent asked for the dismissal of the complaints for temporary custody or filed motions seeking the dismissal of the agency‘s complaints. Nor did they raise an objection to the magistrate‘s decisions or appeal the juvenile court‘s judgments on the basis that the dispositional hearings were held after the expiration of the 90-day limit.
{¶ 47} The father did not raise the issue on appeal from the final order granting temporary custody but instead raised the issue for the first time on appeal to the appellate court after the decision on permanent custody was issued. Therefore, the issue is res judicata, unless the 90-day limit affects the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.
D. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
{¶ 48} To resolve this case, we focus on whether the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 12. ” ’ “It is only when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the judgment voidable.” ’ ” Id., quoting Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 22 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d at 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033. “Generally, a voidable judgment may be set aside only if successfully challenged on direct appeal.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 26, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 28.
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34. “A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. Instead, “the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23.
Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14.
{¶ 49} Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived or forfeited and may be challenged at any time. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). Subject-matter jurisdiction is a condition precedent to a court‘s power to adjudicate and render judgment in a case, and “in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, a court lacks the authority to do anything but announce its lack of jurisdiction and dismiss,” Pratts at ¶ 21.
{¶ 50} As the term suggests, ” ‘jurisdiction over the particular case,’ ” involves ” ’ “the trial court‘s authority to determine a specific case within that class of cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction.” ’ ” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting Parker at ¶ 22 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d at 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033. A judgment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the particular case is merely voidable. Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 51} Therefore, we turn to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
E. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division
{¶ 52} The
{¶ 53} The General Assembly created juvenile courts and gave them exclusive original jurisdiction over certain subject matters as courts of record within courts of common pleas.
{¶ 54} While former
“Courts, including this Court, * * * have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in [claim processing] rules * * *. Classifying time prescriptions, even rigid ones, under the heading ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ can be confounding. Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court‘s adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454-455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 915, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004) (citation, some internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-414, 124 S. Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004). Similarly, this court has in recent years clarified that “not all mandatory requirements are jurisdictional in nature.” In re R.B., 162 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-5476, 165 N.E.3d 288, citing Smith v. May, 159 Ohio St.3d 106, 2020-Ohio-61, 148 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 31. And “[i]n the absence of language clearly stating that the failure to comply with the timing provision creates a jurisdictional barrier, this court will be reluctant to find one.” Id., citing May at ¶ 24. Had the General Assembly intended to implicate the court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, it could have included language to that effect. For example,
[T]he Legislature must be assumed or presumed to know the meaning of words, to have used the words of a statute advisedly and to have expressed legislative intent by the use of the words found in the statute; * * * nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself; and * * * the court may write no limitations therein.
Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 236-237, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948). The fact that the legislature did not include any mention of the court‘s jurisdiction in former
F. The conflict case: In re L.S.
{¶ 55} In In re L.S., 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3719, 2020-Ohio-5516, ¶ 1, a complaint seeking temporary custody was filed in a juvenile court alleging that L.S. was a dependent child. Four months after the filing of the complaint, the magistrate held an adjudicatory hearing. L.S.‘s mother and father stipulated that the child was dependent, and based on the stipulation, the magistrate adjudicated the child dependent. Three months later, the magistrate conducted the dispositional hearing and issued a decision ordering the child to remain in the custody of nonrelatives. The juvenile court subsequently granted the mother‘s motion for a return of custody, placed L.S. in the legal custody of the mother, and closed the case.
{¶ 56} Six months later, the mother filed a motion under
{¶ 57} The Fourth District rejected the parents’ argument. It considered this court‘s decision in In re K.M., 159 Ohio St.3d 544, 2020-Ohio-995, 152 N.E.3d 245, and concluded that the 90-day time limit in
G. The Challenge to the Dispositional Order Awarding Temporary Custody Is Barred by Res Judicata
{¶ 58} “[A]n adjudication that a child is neglected or dependent, followed by a disposition awarding temporary custody to a public children services agency pursuant to
{¶ 59} The judgments granting the agency temporary custody of the children in this case were issued on March 20, 2019, for K.K. and D.T., and June 10, 2019, for M.K. Pursuant to
{¶ 60} “[U]nless it is vacated on appeal, a voidable judgment has the force of a valid legal judgment, regardless of whether it is right or wrong.” State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 17, citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 494, 159 N.E.2d 594 (1927). “Res judicata bars relitigation of a matter that was raised or could have been raised on direct appeal when a final, appealable order was issued in accordance with the law at the time.” State v. Griffin, 138 Ohio St.3d 108, 2013-Ohio-5481, 4 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 3.
{¶ 61} Because the mother and the father failed to timely appeal the judgments of temporary custody, the judgments are valid and the current challenge is barred by res judicata.
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 62} The language of former
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only.
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion.
FISCHER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 64} Cases involving the rights of parents are always difficult. Our juvenile courts are tasked with navigating a complex legal system to address important issues, like parental rights and the wellbeing of children, that often evoke strong emotional responses from all parties. Juvenile courts are required to work expeditiously, for the sake of the parents and the children involved. But they must also proceed cautiously and intentionally. The General Assembly has set forth procedures for juvenile courts to follow to properly balance the rights of parents against the interest of protecting children. In this matter, we must address whether a juvenile court‘s failure to comply with the requirement set forth in former
{¶ 65} The majority opinion holds that a juvenile court‘s failure to comply with the 90-day dispositional-hearing requirement in former
{¶ 66} Juvenile courts are creatures of statute and have no jurisdiction when the General Assembly has not provided it. The General Assembly has provided juvenile courts with exclusive jurisdiction over children who are alleged in a
complaint to be abused, neglected, or dependent.
{¶ 67} Because the deadline in former
Subject-matter jurisdiction includes the authority to both hear and decide a case
{¶ 68} We have most recently discussed void-or-voidable judgments in criminal cases involving sentencing. See State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, and Henderson. But the concept applies in other areas of law as well, including the area—abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings—involved here. See Miller v. Nelson-Miller, 132 Ohio St.3d 381, 2012-Ohio-2845, 972 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 1 (when “a court possesses jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, mechanical irregularities regarding the trial court‘s signature render the judgment voidable, not void“). The determination whether a judgment is void or voidable necessarily involves determining whether a court had jurisdiction to proceed. See Harper at ¶ 21, citing Ex parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81, 82 (1857).
{¶ 69} To render a valid judgment, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, Std. Oil Co. of Indiana v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 274, 32 S.Ct. 406, 56 L.Ed. 760 (1912), which means that the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the parties. Henderson at ¶ 27. Once a court has both subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and jurisdiction over the parties to the case, the right to hear the cause is perfected and every action taken thereafter is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992); Sheldon‘s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 498-499 (1854). If the court “proceed[s] without jurisdiction,” id. at 498, then “its judgment is void,” id. at 499; Henderson at ¶ 34. But if the court has jurisdiction, then the judgment is merely voidable. Sheldon‘s Lessee at 499; Henderson at ¶ 37.
{¶ 70} Despite the majority opinion‘s contention otherwise, “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits” (emphasis added), Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998); see also Sheldon‘s Lessee at 499 (the power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction); Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, at ¶ 35 (“subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a case” [emphasis added]); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (“It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case” [first and third emphasis added and second emphasis sic]); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (subject-matter jurisdiction is the court‘s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case and ”involves a court‘s power to hear a case” [emphasis added]). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement or consent alone but must be based on the
{¶ 71} The majority opinion, citing Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, points out that this court has stated that a judgment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the particular case is merely voidable. This court did state in Pratts that “‘“[i]t is only when a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the judgment voidable.“‘” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002-Ohio-2833, 769 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 22 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting State v. Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d 456, 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033 (9th Dist.1998). This statement, when read alone, essentially states that when a court has subject-matter jurisdiction generally over the type of case before it but not over the specific case before it, any judgment rendered in the case is merely voidable. But we know that that interpretation is not what the court meant in Pratts. Rather, it was an attempt to state that when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in a case, any judgment rendered in that case is void but when it improperly exercises its jurisdiction in a case, the judgment rendered in the case is voidable. Pratts at ¶ 12; Parker at ¶ 20 (Cook, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in Parker confused subject-matter jurisdiction with defects in the court‘s exercise of jurisdiction).
{¶ 72} This conclusion is best supported by our recent decisions in Harper and Henderson. In Harper, this court held that “[w]hen a case is within a court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction and the accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction * * * renders the court‘s judgment voidable.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, at ¶ 4. In Henderson, this court explained that a judgment is void only when a court lacks “jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused.” Id. at ¶ 27. Thus, for a court to render a valid judgment or a judgment that is merely voidable, the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case—the authority to hear and decide the matter before the court—and personal jurisdiction over the parties. Henderson at ¶ 37.
{¶ 73} When we look at cases such as Pratt, that is, cases that originate in the court of common pleas, it is easy to see how this court reached the conclusion that the judgment was voidable. Common pleas courts have original subject-matter jurisdiction over all justiciable matters. See
{¶ 74} But that same analysis does not apply to the juvenile court in this case—a statutory court that has no general jurisdiction and has only the jurisdiction that has been provided by the General Assembly. See Linger v. Weiss, 57 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 386 N.E.2d 1354 (1979) (Juvenile Rules cannot affect the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts as established by statute); In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 66 (juvenile courts are legislative creations);
A juvenile court is a creature of statute: its jurisdiction is limited by the General Assembly
{¶ 75} Juvenile courts are not constitutional courts in Ohio. See
{¶ 76} A juvenile court generally is a division of a common pleas court,
{¶ 77}
{¶ 78} In abuse, neglect, and dependency cases, the General Assembly requires
{¶ 79} Because a juvenile court is a creature of statute and its jurisdiction is limited to the authority granted in
Noncompliance with a mandatory statute that affects jurisdiction renders proceedings “illegal and void”
{¶ 80} Generally, a court has discretion to determine whether to dismiss a case or to reach its merits. In re Z.R., 144 Ohio St.3d 380, 2015-Ohio-3306, 44 N.E.3d 239, ¶ 27. And juvenile courts, in the past, have been given latitude in complying with jurisdictional requirements. Id., citing Marion Cty. Children‘s Home v. Fetter, 90 Ohio St. 110, 106 N.E. 761 (1914) (juvenile court was permitted to exercise jurisdiction over custody and control of a child even though divorce proceedings were commenced in another county). But this discretion does not extend so far as to permit noncompliance with the dismissal provision in former
{¶ 81} Our determination that the dismissal provision in former
{¶ 82} Generally, timing provisions in statutes are directory in nature and thus do not affect jurisdiction. Farrar at paragraph three of the syllabus; In re Davis at 522-523. They will be treated as directory “‘unless the nature of the act to be performed or the phraseology of the statute or of the other statutes relating to the same subject-matter is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation upon the power of the officer.‘” (Emphasis added.) In re Davis at 522, quoting Barnell at 255. We determined in In re K.M. that because former
{¶ 83} The majority opinion contends that simply holding that the dismissal provision in former
{¶ 84} In re R.B., which was decided after In re K.M., illustrates this analysis. This court held that a provision of
{¶ 86} The General Assembly made a clear and unequivocal statement in plain language in
{¶ 87} The majority opinion‘s failure to construe former
{¶ 88} And lastly, for this court to hold that the dismissal requirement in
{¶ 89} While one could argue that this limit on a juvenile court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is unenforceable because once subject-matter jurisdiction has attached or been conferred, it remains, see Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 34; see also Sheldon‘s Lessee at 499; Pizza, 62 Ohio St.3d at 385, 582 N.E.2d 992 (collecting cases in which directory statutes did not deprive a court or official of jurisdiction to proceed), this argument fails in this case because a juvenile court does not have the same jurisdiction as a constitutional court—its jurisdiction is limited.
{¶ 90} The General Assembly established the subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court in abuse, neglect, and dependency cases and limited that jurisdiction under former
Conclusion
{¶ 91} Because a juvenile court is a statutory court and the General Assembly sets the court‘s jurisdiction, a juvenile court‘s failure to follow former
{¶ 92} I fully understand that voiding adjudications of abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings may affect cases involving the termination of parental rights, adoptions, and other custody matters that rely on those adjudications. Additionally, I acknowledge the other concerns raised by the parties in this case, many of which were also asserted in In re K.M., 159 Ohio St.3d 544, 2020-Ohio-995, 152 N.E.3d 245. While these concerns are valid, and they tempt me to join the majority opinion, they are not enough for me to disregard my duties as a justice and favor policy over the law. See
{¶ 93} For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Jeannine Barbeau, for appellee A.T.
Dawn S. Garrett, for appellee M.K. Jr.
Brian Davidson, Emily Edwards, and Tiffany Alston, urging reversal for amicus curiae Legal Aid Society of Southwest Ohio, L.L.C.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association and Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.