Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. (Slip Opinion)Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. (Slip Opinion)
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} In this consolidated certified conflict and discretionary appeal by appellant, the director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”), we address whether
{¶ 2} We also conclude that the commission’s practice of listing the names and addresses of parties who were sent a copy of its final decision without identifying whether those parties are “interested parties” fails to comply with
{¶ 3} While we agree with the Ninth District that the naming of interested parties is not a jurisdictional requirement under
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 4} In January 2011, Pryor enlisted with the Army for a four-year term as a combat medic. The Army honorably discharged Pryor in August 2012, before the completion of his full term of service, so that Pryor could enter an officer-training program. Pryor applied that same month to ODJFS for unemployment compensation.
{¶ 5} The ODJFS Office of Unemployment Compensation initially determined on September 10, 2012, that Pryor was eligible for benefits. After an appeal by the Army’s Human Resources Command, however, the director of ODJFS issued a redetermination on April 18, 2013, reversing ODJFS’s September 10, 2012 decision and ordering Pryor to return $10,800 in overpaid benefits.
{¶ 6} Pryor appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, and the commission held a hearing on the matter in accordance with
{¶ 7} On July 24, 2013, the commission issued a decision denying Pryor’s request to review the hearing officer’s findings. In a section entitled “Appeal Rights,” the commission’s decision informed Pryor that if he appealed from the commission’s decision he “must name all interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal, including the Director of [ODJFS].” The same paragraph of the decision informed Pryor that he had 30 days from the mailing date of the decision to file an appeal in the court of common pleas of the county where he resides or
{¶ 8} On August 23, 2013, Pryor filed an appeal in the Summit County Common Pleas Court in accordance with
{¶ 9} The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed and concluded that Pryor’s failure to name his former employer was not a jurisdictional defect. The court held that
{¶ 10} The court certified that its judgment conflicted with the judgments in the following cases: Dikong v. Ohio Supports, Inc.,
{¶ 11} In accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 8.03, we determined that a conflict exists on the following question: “When appealing an unemployment compensation decision to the trial court, are the requirements contained in
ANALYSIS
Requirements for perfecting an appeal under
{¶ 12} When a statute confers a right to appeal, the appeal can be perfected only in the mode the statute prescribes. Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp.,
{¶ 13}
(A) THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE FOR APPEAL
Any interested party, within thirty days after written notice of the final decision of the unemployment compensation review commission was sent to all interested parties, may appeal the decision of the commission to the court of common pleas.
(B) WHERE TO FILE THE APPEAL
An appellant shall file the appeal with the court of common pleas of the county where the appellant, if an employee, is a resident or was last employed or, if an employer, is a resident or has a principal place of business in this state. If an appellant is not a resident of or last employed in a county in this state or does not have a principal place of business in this state, then an appellant shall file the appeal with the court of common pleas of Franklin county.
(C) PERFECTING THE APPEAL
The timely filing of the notice of appeal shall be the only act required to perfect the appeal and vest jurisdiction in the court. The notice of appeal shall identify the decision appealed from.
(D) INTERESTED PARTIES
The commission shall provide on its final decision the names and addresses of all interested parties. The appellant shall name all interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal. The director of job and family*5 services is always an interested party and shall be named as an appellee in the notice of appeal.
(E) SERVICE OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
Upon filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the court, the clerk shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon all appellees, including the director.
(Capitalization sic.)
{¶ 14} Our starting point here is the statute’s text.
{¶ 15} The dissent interprets the word “shall” in
{¶ 16} The director of ODJFS relies on Spencer to argue that the party-naming requirement in
{¶ 17} The key statutory provision in Spencer stated that “ ‘[t]he filing of the notice of the appeal with the court is the only act required to perfect the appeal.’ ” Spencer at ¶ 9, quoting
{¶ 18} Unlike the more open-ended language examined in Spencer,
{¶ 19} For these reasons, we conclude that timely filing of the notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional requirement for perfecting an appeal under
Commission’s failure to identify all interested parties
{¶ 20} We also conclude that the commission’s decision did not meet the procedural requirements of
{¶ 22} More recently, in Hughes,
{¶ 23} Here, the commission’s July 24, 2013 decision failed to indicate that the Army was an interested party that Pryor must name in his notice of appeal.
CONCLUSION
{¶ 25} For the reasons above, we reverse the judgment of the appeals court and remand to the commission to issue a decision that complies with
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 26} The majority employs two different standards to interpret two adjacent, parallel sentences in the same statutory section. Because this approach is not supported by well-settled principles of statutory construction, I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 27} The majority properly starts with the statute’s text but then veers off course in interpreting the following two sentences in
The commission shall provide on its final decision the names and addresses of all interested parties. The appellant shall name all interested parties as appellees in the notice of appeal.
{¶ 28} The majority concludes that the first sentence above constitutes a procedural requirement with which the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission must strictly comply in order to start Marcus Pryor’s 30-day appeal period. Leaving aside the fact that there is no language in
{¶ 29} But the majority rejects both a plain-language reading and strict-compliance approach to interpret nearly identical language in the very next sentence of the statute when determining Pryor’s obligations. The majority concludes that the phrase “[t]he appellant shall name all interested parties” (emphasis added) is not a mandatory requirement, thereby rendering that part of the statute meaningless. In fact, the majority concludes that Pryor’s only requirement to perfect an appeal was to timely file a notice of appeal under
{¶ 30} Such a selective reading of the statute is not supported by the case law on which the majority relies. See Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce,
{¶ 31} Nor is the majority’s reading of the statute supported by the principles of statutory construction. It is a tenet of statutory construction that we give effect to the words used and refrain from inserting or deleting words. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland,
{¶ 32} The statute means what it says. And “shall” cannot be construed as having one meaning when applied to the commission and another when applied to Pryor. Here,
{¶ 33} It is troubling that the majority excuses this omission but then creates a mandatory requirement for the commission not found in the statute. Under the guise of “common sense,” the majority concludes that in order to start the 30-day appeal period, the written notice of final decision must include, in addition to the names and addresses of all interested parties as the statute expressly requires, a label identifying the parties named as “interested parties.” This requirement is not supported by the statutory language. And if common sense is the guide, it would seem that Pryor should have been aware that his former employer — the Army — would be an interested party to his unemployment-compensation appeal. And it makes little sense that anyone other than interested parties would be listed on the commission’s notice of final decision.
{¶ 34} It is unclear to me why the majority goes so far as to create an additional requirement for the initiation of the 30-day appeal period, particularly when Pryor did not argue for this additional requirement and the issue is not raised in the conflict question certified to us. If, as the majority holds, all that is required to perfect an appeal is the timely filing of a notice of appeal, regardless of what information that notice contains, then the administrative appeal should not have been dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction. The majority overreaches its limited role in statutory interpretation to reach its desired outcome.
{¶ 35} To require the commission to strictly comply with a requirement to start the 30-day appeal period that is not plainly expressed in the statute and at the same time hold that Pryor does not have to comply with an explicit requirement regarding the contents of the notice of appeal is inequitable and contravenes basic principles of statutory construction. Accordingly, I dissent.