SMITH, APPELLANT, v. MAY, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
No. 2018-0369
Supreme Court of Ohio
January 14, 2020
2020-Ohio-61
[Until this оpinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Smith v. May, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-61.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-61
SMITH, APPELLANT, v. MAY,1 WARDEN, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Smith v. May, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-61.]
Habeas corpus—
(No. 2018-0369—Submitted August 6, 2019—Decided January 14, 2020.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, No. 17 CA 37, 2018-Ohio-300.
{¶ 1} In 2012, four delinquency complaints were filed in juvenile court against appellant, Ja‘Relle Smith, who was then 16 years old. Based on his age and the severity of the charges, the cases were transferred to аdult court, where Smith was convicted of five felony counts and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 16 years. In 2017, he filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District Court of Appeals alleging that the juvenile court had not fully complied with the procedures for transferring jurisdiction to the adult court, because it had not timely notified his father of a hearing in one of the juvenile-court cases that led to the transfer of some of the charges. The court denied the writ, and Smith appeals here as of right.
{¶ 2} We appointed counsel for Smith and ordered supplemental briefing regаrding whether the juvenile court‘s noncompliant notice was a defect that deprived the adult court of subject-matter jurisdiction. We hold that the failure to provide timely notice did not prevent the juvenile court from transferring subject-matter jurisdiction to the adult court. We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.
{¶ 3} Under
{¶ 4} The procedural requirements for bindover are provided in
{¶ 5} Unless the alleged juvenile offender is taken into custody or apprehended after age 21, he “shall [not] be prosecuted as an adult” for the offense “unless [he] has been transferred as provided in”
{¶ 6} This appeal involves the bindover statute‘s notice provision,
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Juvenile and criminal proceedings
{¶ 7} In 2012, the state filed four delinquency complaints3 against Smith in Summit County Juvenile Court related to three different robberies. Because each of the charged offenses was a “catеgory two offense” involving a firearm and Smith was 16 years old at the time, he appeared to be eligible for mandatory transfer to adult court under
{¶ 8} The juvenile court held a hearing on three of the delinquency complaints on March 22, 2012. Smith‘s father was present at that hearing. At the hearing, Smith waived his right to a probable-cause hearing and stipulated to findings of probable cause in each case. The juvenile court found that Smith‘s cases were subject to mandatory transfer and transferred the
{¶ 9} The juvenile court held a hearing on the fourth delinquency complaint on March 27, 2012. Although
{¶ 10} In April 2012, a grand jury indicted Smith on five counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of kidnapping, and one count of burglary. Each count included a firearm specification. Smith later pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated robbery (one with a firearm specification), one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of kidnapping. The court dismissed the remaining counts and specifications and imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 16 years.
{¶ 11} The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed Smith‘s convictions and sentences. State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26804, 2015-Ohio-579.
B. Habeas proceedings
{¶ 12} In 2017, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District Cоurt of Appeals against David Marquis, then the warden of Richland Correctional Institution. Smith primarily argued that the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to convict him because the juvenile court had not provided timely notice of the March 27, 2012 hearing to his father as required under
{¶ 13} After Smith appealed to this court, we appointed counsel for him and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on this question: “Does the procedural error in the juvenile-bindover proceeding create a jurisdictional defect that deprived the general division of the common pleas court of subject-matter jurisdiction?” 155 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2019-Ohio-1315, 120 N.E.3d 865.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal standard
{¶ 14} “A writ of habeas corpus lies in certain extraordinary circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a person‘s liberty and there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Pegan v. Crawmer, 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 666 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). In general, habeas relief is available when the sentencing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Ellis v. McMackin, 65 Ohio St.3d 161, 162, 602 N.E.2d 611 (1992); see also
B. Applicability of R.C. 2152.12(G)
{¶ 15} The juvenile court did not comply with
{¶ 16} We reject this narrow reading of
C. The subject-matter-jurisdiction question
{¶ 17} Smith alleges that he is entitled to habeas relief because the juvenile court did not conduct “a proper bindover procedure.” In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995) (“Gaskins I“), this court held that a petition that alleges that a bindover was improper “state[s] a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus.” This court stated that “without a proper bindover procedure * * *, a juvenile court‘s jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be waived.” Id. And without a valid transfer to adult court, a juvenile‘s conviction and sentence are void, and habeas is “an appropriate remedy despite the availability of appeal.” Id.
{¶ 18} But more recently, we have held that key parts of the bindover procedure may be waived. See State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 21. And we have reviewed for plain error when a juvenile failed to object at a bindover hearing to a juvenile court‘s procedural error. See State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 49. These cases implicitly provide, contrary to Gaskins I, that noncompliance with a statutory bindover requirement does not prevent a juvenile court from transferring its subject-matter jurisdiction and does not render an adult court‘s judgment void. We must decide whether to adhere to Gaskins I in view of this more recent caselaw.
1. Gaskins I‘s tenuous foundation
{¶ 19} In Gaskins I, a prison inmate brought a habeas claim in a court of appeals, initially raising a constitutional challenge to his criminal conviction. Gaskins I at 149. That claim was dismissed as clearly meritless. Id. at 150. But the inmate also had asked the court of appeals for leave to amend his petition to add an improper-bindover claim based on the juvenile court‘s purported failure to have him undergo mental and physical examinations as required by a statute that was in effect at that time. Id. at 149-150. The court of appeals did not allow the inmate to amend his petition. Id. at 150. On appeal, we held that the court of appeals should have allowed the amendment and considered the bindover claim. Id. We stated that “without a proper bindover procedure * * *, a juvenile court‘s jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be waived.” Id. at 151, citing Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.
{¶ 20} The central holding of Gaskins I—that a juvenile offender may collaterally attack an adult criminal conviction in a
{¶ 21} Gaskins I‘s foundation was Wilson, a case in which the state prosecuted a juvenile in adult court under the mistaken belief that he was an adult when he committed his offense. In fact, Wilson wаs a juvenile when he committed the offense, and he was never bound over from a juvenile court. Wilson at 42, 44. Because Wilson had been deprived of a bindover proceeding altogether, this court agreed with the court of appeals that the adult court lacked jurisdiction. We held that “[a]bsent a proper bindover procedure * * *, the juvenile court has the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a delinquent.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. And “[b]ecause the general division of the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict Wilson, the judgment of conviction against him was void ab initio.” Id. at 44. See also State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 76 Ohio St.3d 193, 195, 667 N.E.2d 1 (1996) (habeas case involving an allegedly mistaken belief that a child was an adult). Significantly, the Wilson court recognized that the General Assembly had compelled this result—the bindover statute expressly provided that “‘[a]ny prosecution that is had in a criminal court on the mistaken belief that the child was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense shall be deemed a nullity.‘” (Emphasis added in Wilson.) Wilson at 44, quoting former
{¶ 22} Gaskins I significantly extended Wilson‘s holding. The problem in Wilson was that a juvenile-court proceeding had never happened at all. The state had not used “the only method by which a juvenile court may relinquish its exclusive original jurisdiction concerning a delinquent child,” Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d at 44, 652 N.E.2d 196. That is quite different from Gaskins I, in which the subject-matter jurisdiction of a juvenile court was invoked, a bindover proceeding was held, and subject-matter jurisdiction ostensibly was transferred to an adult court.
{¶ 23} What is more, Gaskins I abandoned Wilson‘s analytical focus on statutory language. The Wilson court rightly allowed the legislature to determine the sentencing court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction. See
{¶ 24} Notably, the parties both seem to accept that Wilson‘s focus on the statutory text was correct; they both cite United States Supreme Court cases that ultimately ask whether the legislature has “clearly state[d]” that a particular statutory requirement is jurisdictional, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.E.2d 1097 (2006). Indeed, we have used the same approach when deciding whether statutory requirements in other contexts are jurisdictional. See Pryor v. Dir., Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, ¶ 14, 16; Nucorp, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 64 Ohio St.2d 20, 22, 412 N.E.2d 947 (1980).
2. The erosion of Gaskins I
{¶ 25} When Gaskins‘s case returned to this court after our remand, we abandoned Gaskins I‘s main premise that a noncompliant bindover procedure renders the resulting adult criminal сonviction void. Gaskins had alleged that the juvenile court had failed to have him undergo mental and physical examinations, which were required by statute at the time. Gaskins I, 74 Ohio St.3d at 150-151, 656 N.E.2d 1282. On remand, the warden presented evidence showing that Gaskins had affirmatively waived his right to those examinations. Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 76 Ohio St.3d 380, 381, 667 N.E.2d 1194 (1996) (“Gaskins II“).
In Gaskins I, this court had viewed all the requirements of the bindover procedure as jurisdictional (and thus not waivable). Gaskins I at 151. But Gaskins II held that the evidence of waiver showed that there had been “full compliance with the bindover procedure,” id. at 382, thus signaling that the mandates of the bindover statute were not jurisdictional after all.
{¶ 26} Just last year, we validated Gaskins II. See Johnson v. Sloan, 154 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-2120, 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 16-17. And in another recent case, we held that a juvenile may waive the right to an amenability hearing, which is central to any discretionary bindover procedure. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 21. This all shows that a bindover procedure is “proper” even when the juvenile waives
{¶ 27} While Gaskins II undermined Gaskins I by concluding that a juvenile may waive the bindover procedure‘s statutory mandates, other cases have undermined Gaskins I by concluding that a juvenile may forfeit them. In Morgan, we held that
3. We overrule Gaskins I
{¶ 28} Gaskins I wrongly extended Wilson‘s holding with no analysis reconciling the significant differenсes between the two cases. Specifically, unlike Wilson, Gaskins I did not involve a statutory provision expressly depriving the adult court of jurisdiction. The Gaskins I court was wrong in adopting the broad rule that any deviation from the statutory bindover procedure renders the adult court‘s judgment void. The Gaskins I court should have examined the statute‘s text concerning the specific error alleged, to determine whether the statute clearly established a barrier to the adult court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Pryor, 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, at ¶ 14. That error has led to significant confusion about when a defendant can challenge a procedural defect in a juvenile-court bindover proceeding, and it necessitates this court‘s clarification.
{¶ 29} Juveniles facing bindover to an adult court maintain the right to object to a juvenile court‘s noncompliance with bindover procedures and the right to appeal from any error in the ordinary course of law. See In re D.H., 152 Ohio St.3d 310, 2018-Ohio-17, 95 N.E.3d 389, ¶ 19. However, we overrule Gaskins I‘s holding that any deviation from the statutory bindover procedure creates a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus. Deviation from a bindover procedure gives rise to a potentially valid habeas claim only if the applicable statute clearly makes the procedure a prerequisite to the transfer of subject-matter jurisdictiоn to an adult court. See Pryor, 148 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2907, 68 N.E.3d 729, at 14.
4. Smith‘s sentencing court had subject-matter jurisdiction
{¶ 30} No language in
{¶ 31} Initially, Smith focuses on
{¶ 32} Smith next points to the notice requirement‘s inclusion within
{¶ 33} Finally, Smith emphasizes that the statutory notice requirement is a due-process protection. Invoking language used in some United States Supreme Court cases, he contends that such an important constitutional protection cannot be treated as a mere “claim-processing rule,” see, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010). This argument misses an important fact. We have held that a juvenile may waive other key parts of the bindover procedure, such as an amenability hearing. D.W., 133 Ohio St. 3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, at ¶ 21. In support of that holding, we explained that “[e]ven though ‘[t]here is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights,’ an individual can still waive his constitutional rights as long as the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently and is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966). Smith has not shown why his waiver of
{¶ 34} Because
D. Smith had an adequate remedy at law
{¶ 35} Finally, we emphasize that Smith had an adequate remedy at law. He could have objected to the juvenile court‘s failure to give his father timely notice, and if the court overruled his objection, he could have appealed the ruling in his appeal from his criminal convictions. But he chose instead to waive his right to have his father present at the hearing. He thus gave up his right to complain of the juvenile court‘s noncompliance with
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J.
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 36} Because appellant, Ja‘Relle Smith, has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, I concur with the majority‘s affirmance of the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ judgment denying the requested writ. I also agree that it is time to revisit our caselaw treating “an improper bindover procedure,” majority opinion at ¶ 27, as a jurisdictional defect for which habeas relief may be available and to clarify that a procedural error in conducting a bindover hearing does not deprive the general division of the common pleas court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a case that has been transferred from the juvenile court. However, because my analysis for determining whether an improper bindover procedure affects the subject-matter jurisdiction of
{¶ 37} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11-12, 34. It is a “‘condition precedent to the court‘s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.‘” Pratts at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). “A court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. Rather, the focus is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy. 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, 6 (3d Ed.2017) (“Jurisdictional analysis should be confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial authority among different courts“).
{¶ 38} ”
{¶ 39} It is therefore within the subject-matter jurisdiction of a juvenile court to transfer a case and within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the general division of the common pleas court to receive it.
{¶ 40} “‘Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an action and the parties to it, “* * * the right to hear and determine is perfect; and the decision of every question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred.“‘” (Ellipsis sic.) Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting Sheldon‘s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494, 499 (1854). And when a specific action is within a court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the court‘s judgment voidable, not void. Pratts at ¶ 12, 21. Generally, a voidable judgment is not subject to collateral attack and therefore may not be challenged in habeas corpus as a substitute for a direct appeal. State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999); State ex rel. Drexel v. Alvis, 153 Ohio St. 244, 246, 91 N.E.2d 22 (1950).
{¶ 41} We have stated that “[a]bsent a proper bindover procedure * * *, the juvenile court has the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a delinquent.” State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), paragraph one of the
{¶ 42} Cases following Wilson, however, confused the difference between a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction and a court with jurisdiction but improperly exercising it. In Gaskins v. Shiplevy, we noted that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that a child had not been represented by counsel at his bindover hearing and had not been given the mental and physical examination required by Ohio‘s statutes at that time “stated a potentially good cause of action in habeas corpus, alleging, as it did, that the court of common pleas lacked jurisdiction over [the child] because of improper bindover.” 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995). We reversed the court of appeals’ dismissal of the petition and ordered the court to require a return and determine whether the bindover was impropеr.
{¶ 43} In Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, a juvenile court had ordered the mandatory bindover of a juvenile for prosecution in an adult court, despite the uncontroverted evidence in the case that the juvenile was in fact not subject to a mandatory bindover. 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 616-617, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001). This court held that the adult court “patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence [the juvenile] on the charged offenses when she had not been lawfully transferred to that court.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 617. Accordingly, “[t]he resulting conviction and sentence [were] void, and the availability of alternate remedies [did] not prevent issuance of the writ.” Id. This court distinguished between “merely challenging the accuracy of the bindover entry” and “challenging the propriety of her bindover.” Id.
{¶ 44} We adhered to both Gaskins and Timmerman-Cooper in Johnson v. Sloan, 154 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-2120, 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 14, in which we explained that “[i]f the juvenile court fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of the bindover statute, its purported transfer to adult court is ineffective and any judgment issued by the adult court is void.”
{¶ 45} And in Turner v. Hooks, 152 Ohio St.3d 559, 2018-Ohio-556, 99 N.E.3d 354, we reviewed a court of appeals’ holding that a juvenile court‘s failure to give notice of a bindover hearing to a child‘s legal custodian invalidated the transfer of the case to adult court and rendered the resulting judgment of conviction void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, id. at ¶ 14, explaining that the notice that the juvenile court had provided to the child‘s biological mother satisfied
{¶ 46} As these cases show, and contrary to the majority‘s assertion, Gaskins, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 656 N.E.2d 1282, is not an outlier that has been eroded by subsequent
{¶ 47} Here, the juvenile court allegedly сonducted a bindover hearing without providing Smith‘s father with timely notice as required by
{¶ 48} In any case, the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct the bindover proceeding and any failure to comply with
{¶ 49} Any alleged procedural error in transferring Smith‘s case to adult court is at most an error in the exercise of jurisdiction that would render the affected convictions potentially voidable on direct appeal, not void. For this reason, Smith had an adequate remedy for purposes of challenging any errors in the bindover proceeding, and the court of appeals correctly denied his request for the writ of habeas corpus.
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Charlyn Bohland and Timothy B. Hackett, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.