Case Information
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[This decision has been published in
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at
T HE S TATE OF , A PPELLANT ,
v
. P ARKER , A PPELLEE .
[Cite as
State v. Parker
,
Criminal law—Defendant charged with a crime punishable by death who has
waived his right to trial by jury must have his case heard and decided by a three-judge panel even if the state agrees that it will not seek the death penalty.
(Nos. 2001-0733 and 2001-0957—Submitted March 12, 2002—Decided June 26,
2002.)
A PPEAL from and C ERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No.
76395,
__________________ YLLABUS OF THE OURT A defendant charged with a crime punishable by death who has waived his right to
trial by jury must, pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3), have his case heard and decided by a three-judge panel even if the state agrees that it will not seek the death penalty.
__________________
D OUGLAS , J.
On January 12, 1995, Vincent Parker, appellee, was indicted on one count of assaulting a police officer. On February 22, 1995, appellee was indicted on three further counts. Count One charged appellee with aggravated murder with a felony-murder specification. Count Two charged appellee with aggravated robbery. Count Three charged appellee with possession of a weapon while under disability. Each of the three counts also carried a firearm specification. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), these charges made appellee eligible for the death penalty. In exchange for appellee’s plea of guilty to the charges, the state of Ohio, appellant, agreed that it would not seek the death penalty. However, appellant did not amend the indictment to delete the death-penalty specification. On June 30, 1995, in a proceeding before the trial court, appellee
waived his right to a trial by jury and his right to a three-judge panel. Appellant nolled the count of possession of a weapon under disability and deleted the firearm specification from the aggravated robbery count. Appellee then entered pleas of guilty to the remaining charges as set forth in both indictments and was sentenced, by a single trial judge, to imprisonment for a term of twenty years to life on the aggravated murder charge with no possibility of parole for twenty years, three years’ actual incarceration on the firearm specification, to be served consecutively to the murder sentence, and eighteen months for the assault charge, to be served concurrently with the previous terms. On appeal, appellee claimed that, pursuant to R.C. 2945.06, a single
trial judge lacks jurisdiction to accept a plea in a capital case and that an accused
may not waive the right to a trial by a three-judge panel. The Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County agreed, vacating appellee’s sentence and remanding to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with the judgment of the court of appeals.
The court then granted appellant’s motion to certify to this court pursuant to Section
3(B)(4), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. The court of appeals found its judgment to
be in conflict with the judgments of the court of appeals in
State v. Griffin
(1992),
agrees not to pursue the death penalty in an aggravated murder case, but does not delete the death penalty specification, does the requirement that the proceedings be
January Term, 2002
held by a three judge panel as set forth in R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3) still apply?” We answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold, for the reasons that follow, that the single trial judge lacked authority to accept appellee’s plea.
{¶5} R.C. 2945.06 provides:
{¶6}
“In any case in which a defendant waives his right to trial by jury and
elects to be tried by the court under section 2945.05 of the Revised Code, any judge
of the court in which the cause is pending shall proceed to hear, try, and determine
the cause in accordance with the rules and in like manner as if the cause were being
tried before a jury.
If the accused is charged with an offense punishable with death,
he shall be tried by a court to be composed of three judges.”
(Emphasis added.)
Crim.R. 11(C)(3) provides:
“If the indictment contains one or more specifications that are not
dismissed upon acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest to the charge,
or if pleas
of guilty or no contest to both the charge and one or more specifications are
accepted, a court composed of three judges shall
: (a) determine whether the offense
was aggravated murder or a lesser offense; and (b) if the offense is determined to
have been a lesser offense, impose sentence accordingly; or (c) if the offense is
determined to have been aggravated murder, proceed as provided by law to
determine the presence or absence of the specified aggravating circumstances and
of mitigating circumstances, and impose sentence accordingly.” (Emphasis added.)
R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3) clearly establish that, in a capital
case where a criminal defendant has waived the right to trial by jury, a three-judge
panel is required. However, appellant contends that a three-judge panel is required
only where the death penalty is
actually
available as a sentencing option. Appellant
relies on
State v. Griffin
(1992),
N.E.2d 1051, Henry, the criminal defendant, was originally indicted for aggravated
murder with a death-penalty specification. The indictment was later amended to
remove the death-penalty specification, and Henry pled guilty before and was
sentenced by a single judge. Henry subsequently sought to vacate his conviction
and sentence, alleging that he was entitled to a three-judge panel pursuant to R.C.
2945.06. We held that “neither R.C. 2945.06 nor Crim.R. 11(C) required an
examination and determination by a three-judge panel because Henry was no longer
charged
with an offense punishable by death at the time he entered his guilty plea.”
(Emphasis added.) Id., 87 Ohio St.3d at 545, 721 N.E.2d 1051. “We have
consistently required strict compliance with Ohio statutes when reviewing the
procedures in capital cases.”
State v. Filiaggi
(1999),
death-penalty specification. Therefore, under R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3), regardless of the state’s agreement that it would not seek the death penalty, appellee was still charged with an offense that was punishable with death. Accordingly, we hold that a defendant charged with a crime punishable by death who has waived his right to trial by jury must, pursuant to R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3), have his case heard and decided by a three-judge panel even if the state agrees that it will not seek the death penalty. The three-judge-panel requirement of R.C. 2945.06 is a jurisdictional
matter that cannot be waived.
State v. Filiaggi
,
January Term, 2002
867. Since there was no amendment to the indictment deleting the death-penalty specification, it was required that appellee’s case be heard by a three-judge panel. The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
M OYER , C.J., F.E. S WEENEY and P FEIFER , JJ., concur.
R ESNICK and L UNDBERG S TRATTON , JJ., dissent. OOK and L UNDBERG TRATTON , JJ., dissent
__________________
A LICE R OBIE R ESNICK , J., dissenting .
{¶13} The majority opinion is a classic example of deciding a case based on a hypertechnicality even though the result is contrary to a reasonable interpretation of the statute in question and does not serve the ends of justice. In 1995 during the proceedings at issue, appellee was represented by two attorneys. At that time he waived not only his right to trial by jury but also his right to be tried by a three-judge panel. The prosecuting attorney, appellee, the defense attorneys, and the judge agreed that the death penalty would not be sought or applied. Therefore, there was no need to assign two other judges for a three- judge panel. Now, after many years have passed, a majority of this court is setting aside the appellee’s guilty plea and conviction due to a questionable technical violation of R.C. 2945.06. A close reading of R.C. 2945.06 makes clear that only when an
accused is prosecuted for an offense “punishable with death” does the statute actually come into play. In this case an agreement was entered into by all parties that the death penalty was not a possible punishment. Therefore, it was unnecessary to require that a three-judge panel preside over the acceptance of appellee’s plea and subsequent sentencing. The majority errs by distinguishing State ex rel. Henry v. McMonagle
(2000),
Henry is not totally clear, it appears that the majority may view the lack of an amendment to the indictment as equivalent to leaving the door open for the prosecution to change its mind and revert to pursuing the death sentence at some future date. What the majority overlooks is that once a single judge begins the
consideration of whether to accept a guilty plea, the death penalty is conclusively
removed as an option with just as much finality as if the indictment had been
amended. See
State v. Griffin
(1992),
January Term, 2002
benefit of counsel, when the death penalty was eliminated as an option just as surely as if the indictment had been amended. I believe that no substantial rights of appellee were affected by the circumstances under review in this case. The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed, and appellee’s guilty plea and sentence reinstated.
L UNDBERG TRATTON , J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
__________________ OOK , J., dissenting. Today’s majority concludes that “[t]he three-judge-panel
requirement of R.C. 2945.06 is a jurisdictional matter that cannot be waived.” In
so holding, the majority has necessarily decided that the trial court lacked
subject
matter jurisdiction
over Parker’s trial. See, e.g.,
Patton v. Diemer
(1988), 35 Ohio
St.3d 68,
panel requirement, I find the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ discussion in
State v.
Swiger
(1998),
the lack of a three-judge panel with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Writing
for a unanimous court, Judge Dickinson correctly recognized that the term
“jurisdiction” encompasses at least three distinct concepts: (1) subject matter
jurisdiction, (2) jurisdiction over the person, and (3) jurisdiction over the particular
case. Id. at 462,
which category of jurisdiction encompassed R.C. 2945.06’s requirement that a
three-judge panel preside over cases involving capital offenses. As a fundamental
matter, an Ohio court of common pleas “has original jurisdiction over all crimes
and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which
is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.” R.C. 2931.03. Given
this unquestioned and unambiguous statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction
over serious offenses, Judge Dickinson reasoned that the three-judge panel required
by R.C. 2945.06 could be nothing other than “a procedural protection that, even if
arguably ‘jurisdictional,’ falls within [the] third category of jurisdiction.”
Swiger
,
January Term, 2002
was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction when a single judge, instead of the three-judge panel required by statute, decided the merits of a cause). Swiger ’s persuasive analysis should dictate the outcome of this case.
Not only does it accurately differentiate between the different jurisdictional
categories, it is also consistent with this court’s implicit recognition that the term
“jurisdictional” does not always mean subject matter jurisdiction. See
State v. Pless
(1996),
S
re Waite
,
L UNDBERG TRATTON , J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
__________________
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lisa Reitz Williamson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
James A. Draper, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Patricia Koch Windham, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender.
__________________
1. Because this case involves a defendant convicted only of noncapital crimes, I express no opinion
on the question whether a single judge could sentence a defendant to death notwithstanding a waiver
of the three-judge panel. But, see,
State v. Griffin
(1992),