In re A'vion A.
The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children, A, L, and Z. She claimed that the trial court improperly denied her motion to compel the Department of Children and Families to provide additional reunification services to her, improperly concluded that she had failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by statute (
1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent mother‘s motion to compel the department to provide additional reunification services: it was within the court‘s discretion to make decisions relating to its case management authority and it was not improper for the court to have predicated its decision on the fact that the termination trial had been postponed months earlier and was scheduled to begin in eighteen days, more than two years after the children had been transferred to the custody of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families; moreover, because the adequacy of the department‘s efforts at reunification would have been an issue at the termination trial, the mother would have had the opportunity to present argument and evidence at that trial refuting the petitioner‘s claims that she was provided with appropriate reunification services or that she was unwilling or unable to benefit from them.
2. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly concluded that she had failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation so as to encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of Z: record evidence supported the court‘s findings that the mother failed to fully comply with key portions of the court-ordered specific steps to facilitate her reunification with the minor children, including that she had refused to participate in certain services for which she had been referred, she had rescinded releases with some providers, she refused to cooperate with home visits by department workers, and she failed to properly notify the department of a change in her household when she subsequently became pregnant and gave birth to another child during the termination proceedings; moreover, the court also found that she continued to exhibit inappropriate behaviors during visits with the minor children, was argumentative and hostile with visitation supervisors and had not acknowledged her personal issues that had led to the removal of the children; furthermore, the mother failed to challenge the court‘s determination that she had not achieved the requisite degree of rehabilitation with respect to her older children.
3. This court concluded that the respondent mother‘s claim that the trial court improperly determined that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the minor children was moot: because the mother did not challenge the trial court‘s finding that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, but challenged only one of the two separate and independent bases for upholding the trial court‘s determination that the requirements of
ELGO, J. The respondent mother appeals from the judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating her parental rights as to A‘vion, Aaliyah, and Azra, her minor children.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court improperly (1) denied her October 2, 2019 motion to compel the Department of Children and Families (department) to provide additional reunification services, (2) concluded that she failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The respondent is a convicted felon who has a variety of mental health issues. She has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, recurrent depression, borderline personality disorder, and adult antisocial behaviors.
The respondent began a romantic relationship with the father in 2011, and they married in 2015. Both the respondent and the father have extensive histories of domestic violence incidents and violations of protective orders.
A‘vion and Aaliyah were born in 2012 and are fraternal twins. On April 17, 2014, the department received a report of an incident involving the respondent and A‘vion and Aaliyah. After the father left the family‘s home following a domestic altercation with the respondent, the respondent sent him a text message stating that she was holding a knife to A‘vion; she then threatened to kill A‘vion and Aaliyah if he did not return. The respondent at that time also slashed the couches in the home. Police responded and arrested the respondent for threatening A‘vion and Aaliyah with a knife.
Following that incident, A‘vion and Aaliyah were adjudicated neglected and placed under an order of protective supervision, which was allowed to expire in June, 2016. The department referred the respondent to two parenting programs and an individual therapy and medication management program, which she completed. The respondent also participated in a psychological evaluation conducted by Bruce Freedman, a licensed psychologist. In his written evaluation, Freedman stated that the respondent‘s ‘‘history of fighting and assaults, her inadequately treated psychological problems, her early maladjustment, and her failure to accept court restriction on her behavior all are factors associated with a high probability of future aggressive
On May 11, 2017, the department received a report of physical neglect pertaining to A‘vion and Aaliyah stemming from a motor vehicle accident in which the vehicle operated by the respondent struck another vehicle and then fled the scene. The police later located the respondent‘s vehicle and confirmed that, although A‘vion and Aaliyah were inside, the vehicle contained no booster seats for the children. The respondent, who at that time was seven and one-half months pregnant, refused a request by the police to have the children evaluated for injuries.
On May 18, 2017, the department received another report alleging physical abuse of A‘vion by the respondent. A bystander witnessed the respondent strike A‘vion on the back of the head, causing him to fall to the sidewalk. The bystander flagged down a police officer, who found the respondent to be uncooperative with his investigation and expressed concern about the respondent‘s use of profanity around the child. Although the allegations of physical abuse were unsubstantiated, the case was transferred to ongoing services with the department. Azra was born several weeks later.
On October 3, 2017, the department received a report from school officials of facial injuries to A‘vion, which A‘vion indicated were caused when the respondent struck him in the face. Although the respondent denied any involvement in causing those injuries and blamed a teenage babysitter,2 Aaliyah subsequently confirmed that the respondent had hit A‘vion in the face with a boot. In response, the department initiated a ninety-six hour hold on behalf of the minor children.
The next day, A‘vion and Aaliyah were evaluated by Rebecca Moles, a pediatrician at Connecticut Children‘s Medical Center, who was admitted without objection at trial as an expert in child abuse pediatrics. Moles opined that the injuries to A‘vion‘s face were ‘‘highly suspicious for inflicted injury.‘’ Moles also observed bruising on Aaliyah‘s forehead and linear scars on her back, which Moles opined were ‘‘suspicious for inflicted injury.‘’ The respondent later was arrested and pleaded guilty to risk of injury to a child in violation of
On October 6, 2017, the petitioner applied for and secured an order of temporary custody for all three minor children, which was sustained on October 13, 2017. The minor children thereafter were adjudicated neglected and were committed to the care and custody of the petitioner on January 11, 2018. At that time, the
On March 27, 2019, the petitioner filed petitions to terminate the respondent‘s parental rights predicated on her failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to
Before turning to the respondent‘s claims, we first set forth the legal principles that govern our review. ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by
I
The respondent first claims that the court improperly denied her motion to compel the department to provide additional reunification services. We do not agree.
The following additional facts are relevant to the respondent‘s claim. After securing an order of temporary custody for the minor children in October, 2017, the department provided the respondent with a variety of mental health resources, parenting education resources, intensive family preservation services, anger management and domestic violence services, and psychological evaluations. The petitioner subsequently filed petitions to terminate the respondent‘s parental rights on March 27, 2019. The department thereafter continued to provide services to the respondent to facilitate her reunification with the minor children, including domestic violence treatment and supervised visitation services.
On May 20, 2019, the petitioner filed a motion for review of the permanency plan, in which she sought approval of the proposed plan of termination and adoption of the minor children and a finding that the department made reasonable efforts to achieve that plan.5 The respondent filed an objection, in which she contested the issue of whether the department had made reasonable efforts at reunification. The trial court then conducted an evidentiary hearing in accordance with
One of the referral questions asked Freedman to identify the types of services that he would recommend if the respondent lacked ‘‘the ability to meet the needs of her children given the trauma‘’ that they had experienced. Freedman opined that the respondent ‘‘would need some parent coaching and family therapy to help her regain her children‘s trust, tolerate criticism and normal misbehavior from them.‘’ Freedman also was asked, ‘‘[i]f it is not recommended for the [minor children] to live with [the respondent] at this time, when might reunification be possible and what specific recommendations are made before reunification takes place?‘’ In his report, Freedman did not answer the first part of that question as to when reunification would be possible. Instead, he stated: ‘‘If the court is inclined to consider reunification, it would be recommended that [the respondent and minor children] be referred to a reunification program.‘’ (Emphasis added.) Soon after receiving Freedman‘s updated evaluation, the department issued a referral for parent coaching services to the respondent.6
On October 2, 2019, the respondent filed a motion to compel the department to refer her for additional reunification services. The court held a hearing on that motion on October 17, 2019, at which the parties acknowledged that the previously postponed termination trial was scheduled to begin in eighteen days. At
As a preliminary matter, we note that we are aware of no Connecticut authority in which a trial court has entertained a motion to compel additional reunification services by a respondent, particularly in light of the procedural backdrop of this case, nor has the respondent furnished any such authority. Here, the record indicates that the motion to compel was filed shortly before the termination of parental rights trial was scheduled to commence and followed an evidentiary hearing that was held two and one-half months earlier, which the trial court had scheduled pursuant to the respondent‘s objection to the court‘s finding that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification pursuant to
We also note that the parties disagree as to the applicable standard of review. The respondent maintains that our review of the court‘s decision to deny her motion to compel is plenary, as it implicates her constitutional rights and involves a purely legal determination.8 The petitioner, by contrast, submits that a motion to compel the department to provide additional reunification services that is filed shortly before the commencement of trial is governed by a more deferential standard, as it implicates the court‘s case management authority and a variety of other factors, including the interests of the minor children, the age of the case, and the fact that the department‘s provision of reunification services and the respondent‘s ability to benefit from such services are issues subsumed in the litigation of the termination petition itself. Because the trial court is in a superior position to balance those factors, we agree with the petitioner that deference is warranted. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 296 Conn. 253, 279, 994 A.2d 174 (2010) (Rogers, C. J., concurring) (‘‘we afford trial courts broad discretion to make determina-
The transcript of the October 17, 2019 hearing on the respondent‘s motion to compel plainly indicates that the court‘s decision to deny that motion was predicated on the fact that the termination trial was scheduled to begin in eighteen days, which implicated the court‘s case management authority. As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘case management decisions [are reviewed] for abuse of discretion, giving [trial] courts wide latitude. . . . A party adversely affected by a [trial] court‘s case management decision thus bears a formidable burden in seeking reversal. . . . A trial court has the authority to manage cases before it as is necessary. . . . Deference is afforded to the trial court in making case management decisions because it is in a much better position to determine the effect that a particular procedure will have on both parties. . . . The case management authority is an inherent power necessarily vested in trial courts to manage their own affairs in order to achieve the expeditious disposition of cases.‘’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 818–19, 817 A.2d 628 (2003).
With trial scheduled to begin in fewer than three weeks, the respondent‘s motion to compel the department to issue a referral and thereafter provide additional services was tantamount to a request for a continuance, which likewise is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.9 See In re Ivory W., 342 Conn. 692, 730, 271 A.3d 633 (2022). We further reiterate that the motion to compel also followed an evidentiary hearing held on July 23, 2019, pursuant to the respondent‘s objection to the petitioner‘s motion for review of permanency plan. Under
Moreover, because the adequacy of the department‘s efforts at reunification necessarily would be an issue at the termination trial scheduled to begin in eighteen days, the respondent remained free to present argument and evidence at the termination trial refuting the petitioner‘s claims that the respondent was provided appropriate reunification services or that she was unwilling or unable to benefit from them.
In its oral decision, the court also indicated that it had considered ‘‘the age of the case‘’ in denying the respondent‘s motion to compel.10 As this court has observed, the ‘‘statutory mandates [contained in
In matters for which discretion is vested in the trial court, that court is ‘‘in a much better position to pass upon [the] question than we are.‘’ State v. Laudano, 74 Conn. 638, 646, 51 A. 860 (1902). Such is the case here, where the court exercised its discretion over the management of cases before it and balanced several factors in acting on the respondent‘s motion to compel. Moreover, the court‘s exercise of discretion occurred in the context of a statutory scheme that requires that the department and the court provide multiple, regular and timely opportunities for parents to be heard and to challenge the adequacy and propriety of the department‘s treatment plan and reunification services. See footnote 11 of this opinion; cf. In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn. App. 528, 541, 857 A.2d 963 (2004) (noting ‘‘the extensive nature of the judicial resources involved
II
The respondent also claims that the court improperly concluded that she failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by
Failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation is one of the seven statutory grounds on which parental rights may be terminated under
‘‘We review the trial court‘s subordinate factual findings for clear error,12 and review its finding that the respondent failed to rehabilitate for evidentiary sufficiency. . . . In reviewing that ultimate finding for evidentiary sufficiency, we inquire whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . [I]t is not the function of this court to sit as the [fact finder] when we review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . rather, we must determine, in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the [judgment of the trial court] . . . . In making this determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most favorable construction in support of the [judgment] of which it is reasonably capable. . . . In other words, [i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even if this court
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the respondent had ‘‘failed to fully comply with the key portions‘’ of the specific steps ordered by the court to facilitate her reunification with the minor children. See In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003) (‘‘the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding‘‘); In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 833, 863 A.2d 720 (respondent‘s failure to comply with specific steps supported finding that she failed to attain sufficient degree of rehabilitation), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). The court found, inter alia, that the respondent had refused to participate in certain services for which she had been referred; that she had rescinded her releases with some providers, which impaired the department‘s ability to monitor her progress; that she refused to cooperate with home visits by department workers; and that she failed to promptly notify the department of a change to her household when she became pregnant and subsequently gave birth to another child in March, 2020. Those findings are amply supported by the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record before us.
The court also found that the respondent continued to exhibit inappropriate behavior during visits with the minor children. The record substantiates that finding. Nordia Savage, an employee of Connecticut Youth Resources who provides supervised visitation services, testified at trial that the respondent would yell at the minor children during visits. Savage also testified that the respondent would become easily triggered by the children, leaving them terrified. As one example, Savage recounted a visit at a McDonald‘s restaurant when Savage asked A‘vion and Aaliyah not to take refillable soda containers home with them. Savage testified that, when she explained to the respondent that the children had spilled soda in her car the previous week, the respondent ‘‘snapped at them.‘’ Savage testified that the children got ‘‘this terrified look in their eyes. . . . [They] started crying [and apologizing]. . . . [T]heir reaction made me feel like they didn‘t feel safe.‘’ Cordero similarly testified that the respondent ‘‘consistently‘’ was ‘‘very critical‘’ of the minor children during supervised visits. In his updated psychological evaluation, Freedman similarly noted that, although the respondent‘s visits with the children ‘‘have gone reasonably well . . . [the respondent] is sometimes cold to the children, other times gets angry with them for normal child behaviors, and has repeatedly made inappropriate com-
The court further found, and the evidence indicates, that the respondent frequently became argumentative and hostile with visit supervisors. During one visit, a supervisor encouraged the respondent to participate in Azra‘s potty training. As visitation worker Alexandria Szantyr testified, the respondent was not receptive to that advice and ‘‘in a very aggressive tone [she] told me that she was not going to kiss anybody‘s butt to get her children back and that she did not want to participate in Azra‘s potty training.‘’ When asked what type of language the respondent had used, Szantyr testified that the respondent would ‘‘use vulgar language [and was] very aggressive, very hostile. She will curse at me. . . . [I]t was very argumentative . . . when it came to feedback.‘’
Significantly, the court also found that the respondent had not acknowledged her own personal issues that led to the removal of her minor children and was ‘‘unable to acknowledge any wrongdoing‘’ with respect to her own conduct. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001) (‘‘[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment‘‘). The court specifically noted an incident that transpired during a supervised visit with Azra at a restaurant on December 13, 2019, as to which the court heard uncontroverted testimony at trial. During that visit, Azra had an accident that required a diaper change and left her ‘‘soaking wet from the urine.‘’ The respondent admonished Azra, who was two years old at the time, and began ‘‘huffing and puffing‘’ about her accident. Although the respondent had been instructed to bring supplies for Azra during visits, she failed to bring a change of clothes for the child. As a result, Szantyr wrapped Azra in a cardigan that Szantyr had been wearing. Szantyr then brought up the issue of accountability with the respondent. The respondent asked what accountability had to do with parenting, and Szantyr explained that it pertained to the respondent‘s ‘‘role [in] what has happened with the children.‘’ The respondent became extremely upset and stated: ‘‘I don‘t understand what this has to do with anything. . . . I don‘t need to do [any of] this . . . .‘’ Although Szantyr told the respondent that she needed her to ‘‘calm down‘’ and ‘‘bring [her] tone down,‘’ the respondent was ‘‘adamant‘’ that she did not want to discuss the issue of accountability. When Szantyr explained that they needed to talk
As the situation continued to escalate, Szantyr informed the respondent that she had to conclude the visit. At that point, the respondent, who was holding Azra, grew even more irate and started screaming at Szantyr. When Szantyr said that she needed to take Azra back, the respondent threw Azra in the air at Szantyr, who caught the child.13 The respondent‘s outburst continued as they exited the restaurant. As Szantyr testified: ‘‘She was still very aggressive, very hostile towards me. Her language was still very cursing, she was angry. . . . [The respondent said] you‘re going to make up my visit bitch. . . . I don‘t give an f, I don‘t give an f. I‘m calling my lawyer.‘’ The respondent then threw Azra‘s wet diaper at Szantyr. Once in her vehicle, Szantyr called her supervisor and informed her that she was very concerned for her own personal safety as well as Azra‘s safety. Freedman, who had submitted his updated psychological evaluation approximately six months prior to this incident, testified at trial that the respondent‘s behavior during that visit demonstrated a lack of parenting skills and a lack of self-control.
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, ‘‘[a]cceptance of responsibility is the beginning of rehabilitation.‘’ McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 47, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002). A finding that a respondent parent has failed to acknowledge her own personal issues that led to a child‘s removal may form the basis for a court‘s determination that she had not achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation. See, e.g., In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 589, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015) (‘‘the respondent‘s failure to acknowledge the underlying personal issues that form the basis for the department‘s concerns indicates a failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation‘’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Jermaine S., supra, 86 Conn. App. 834 (respondent‘s inability to admit she had substance abuse problem ‘‘thwarted her ability to achieve rehabilitation‘‘); In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 481, 771 A.2d 244 (2001) (respondent failed to ‘‘accept or recognize her need‘’ for recommended counseling).
In its decision, the court also expressly credited evidence that ‘‘[t]he department continues to have concerns regarding [the respondent‘s] ability to parent [the minor] children, given her explosive reactions to things that can trigger her. [She] has a history of intimate partner violence . . . and continues to demonstrate poor insight [into] the past as to how domestic violence has impacted her ability to provide safe, stable, appropriate, and adequate supervision to her children. . . . Despite completing [two] parenting programs, [the respondent] continued to use excessive physical disci-
On appeal, the respondent implicitly concedes that she has not achieved the requisite degree of rehabilitation with respect to A‘vion and Aaliyah, as she has not challenged the court‘s determination in that regard. Rather, she claims that, because there was no evidence that Azra suffered from the particular trauma symptoms exhibited by A‘vion and Aaliyah, the court‘s determination as to Azra was improper. We do not agree. The factual findings that underlie the court‘s failure to rehabilitate determination—including the respondent‘s inability to acknowledge her own personal issues that led to the removal of the minor children, her failure to fully comply with the specific steps ordered by the court, and her inappropriate behavior during visits with the minor children—bear directly on the ultimate question of whether the respondent had achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation to assume a responsible position in Azra‘s life. Indulging every reasonable presumption in favor of the court‘s ruling, as our standard of review requires; see In re Jayce O., supra, 323 Conn. 716; we conclude that the evidence credited by the court supports its conclusion that the respondent failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by
III
As a final matter, we address the respondent‘s contention that the court improperly determined that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the minor children. We conclude that the respondent‘s appeal is moot with respect to that claim.
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [this] court‘s subject matter jurisdiction . . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . A case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the appellant any practical relief through its disposition of the merits . . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way. . . . Our review of the question of mootness is plenary.‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Katia V., 214 Conn. App. 468, 482, 281 A.3d 509, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 913, 283 A.3d 980 (2022).
Because ‘‘either finding, standing alone, provides an independent basis for satisfying
In In re Natalia M., 190 Conn. App. 583, 585, 210 A.3d 682 (per curiam), cert. denied, 332 Conn. 912, 211 A.3d 71 (2019), this court dismissed a respondent‘s appeal for precisely that reason. As we explained: ‘‘In the present case, the [trial] court found that both alternatives set forth in
Like In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. 556, and In re Natalia M., supra, 190 Conn. App. 588, the trial court in the present case found that both alternatives set forth in
In part II of her appellate brief, the respondent contests the propriety of the court‘s finding that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the minor children. Over the course of ten pages, she discusses relevant legal authority and the evidence before the court with respect to that claim. She has not, however, briefed any claim with respect to the court‘s finding that she alternatively was unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. The sole reference to that independent basis under
As our Supreme Court has noted, ‘‘[o]rdinarily, [c]laims are inadequately briefed when they are merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record . . . .‘’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elijah C., 326 Conn. 480, 495, 165 A.3d 1149 (2017); see also Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc., 341 Conn. 644, 697, 267 A.3d 766 (2021) (‘‘[a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly‘’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Apart from one conclusory sentence in the introduction subsection, the respondent makes no mention of any claim regarding the court‘s unwilling or unable to rehabilitate finding, nor does she provide any legal authority or discussion related thereto. Such a claim is not readily discernible from the respondent‘s brief and the record before us, which is the ‘‘dispositive question‘’ in determining whether a claim has been adequately briefed. In re Elijah C., supra, 495; see also Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 803, 256 A.3d 655 (2021) (‘‘[f]or a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs‘’ (internal quota-
Because the respondent has failed to properly challenge the court‘s findings with respect to both independent bases under
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the respondent‘s claim that the court improperly determined that the department made reasonable efforts at reunification; the judgments are affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
We also note that both the attorney for the minor children and the guardian ad litem for the minor children filed statements adopting the brief of the petitioner in this appeal pursuant to Practice Book §§ 67-13 and 79a-6 (c).
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see