Barbara Anne GORRIE, Karen Comnick, Linda Schneider, and Robert Schneider, on behalf of themselves and their minor children, and other persons similarly situated, Appellees, and Jo Anne Heille, Rosa Williams, Jean Sonnenberg, and Linda Garza, on behalf of themselves and their minor children, and other persons similarly situated, Appellees, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Appellant, and Leonard W. Levine, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Services.
No. 85-5394
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
January 16, 1987
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 14, 1987
809 F.2d 508 | 55 USLW 2407
Submitted June 12, 1986.
Martha A. Eaves, St. Paul, Minn., for appellees.
Laurie N. Davison, Minneapolis, Minn., for intervenor Jo Anne Heille.
Before HEANEY and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BATTEY, District Judge.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) appeals the district court‘s order enjoining the enforcement of the Secretary‘s regulation,
I
The AFDC program is a cooperative federal-state assistance program authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act,
The AFDC program provides assistance to dependent children who meet certain age requirements,
Section 2640(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 1145 (codified at
The Secretary‘s interim final regulation implementing the statute became effective October 1, 1984. The regulation states that:
(vii) For AFDC only, in order for the family to be eligible, an application with respect to a dependent child must also include, if living in the same household and otherwise eligible for assistance:
(A) Any natural or adoptive parent, or stepparent (in the case of States with laws of general applicability); and
(B) Any blood-related or adoptive brother or sister.
Barbara Anne Gorrie and other named appellees are the custodial parents of children who do not share a common father. In each family, some of the children receive AFDC assistance and others receive child support payments. Robert Schneider, also a named appellee, is a non-custodial father paying child support for a child living with other children who receive AFDC. Gorrie brought this action on behalf of herself and the other named appellees, their minor children, and a class of all similarly situated individuals in Minnesota. She alleged that the Secretary‘s family unit filing regulation was invalid on statutory and constitutional grounds, and sought injunctive relief.5 On April 1, 1985, the district court certified the class,6 enjoined enforcement of the regulation, and ordered that AFDC applicants or recipients affected by
Jo Anne Heille and other named appellees are the parents of families in which some of the children receive AFDC assistance and others receive Title II Social Security benefits.7 Heille, on behalf of herself and the other named appellees, their minor children, and a class of all similarly situated individuals in Minnesota, sought to intervene in the action pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2).
By an order of September 10, 1985, the district court converted the preliminary injunctions as to both classes into a permanent injunction. Gorrie II, 624 F.Supp. at 92-94.
III
The first issue we must decide is whether the Secretary‘s regulation conforms with the statute that it purports to implement. None of the parties disagree that the regulation requires the independently supported coresident siblings of a dependent child applying for AFDC to be included in the application.9 The statute, however, does not explicitly require that independently supported siblings be included in the AFDC application. Therefore, we must review both the language of the statute and its legislative history for indications of Congress’ intent on this issue.
A
In determining how Congress intended this statute to be implemented, we look first to the language of the statute itself. See Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 193 (1985). The district court found that because the statute incorporated
B
We are further guided in our search for indications of Congress’ intent by the legislative history of
In May 1983, the Secretary submitted proposed legislation to the Congress entitled the “Social Welfare Amendments of 1983.” The Secretary stated that the proposed bill would establish “uniform rules on the family members who must file together for AFDC,” and continued: “In general, the parents, sisters, and brothers living together with a dependent child must all be included; the option of excluding a sibling with income, for example, would no longer be available.” Legislative Addendum to Appellant‘s Brief at 1b (Letter from Secretary Heckler to Vice President Bush (May 25, 1983)). The bill‘s provisions, according to the Secretary, would “more realistically reflect[ ] the actual home situation.” Id. The Secretary‘s summary explanation of the bill stated that the proposal would add “a new requirement that the State include, as a member of the AFDC family * * * the minor siblings of the dependent child * * * if the siblings are, themselves, deprived of parental support or care and under the age limit selected by the State.” Id. at 3b (Section-by-Section Summary of Social Welfare Amendments of 1983). The explanation does not state that a child, to be included, must be needy.
The Secretary‘s proposed legislation was not adopted at the time of its original submission in 1983. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, however, enacted substantially similar changes to the AFDC program. The provision that is now
C
The class members argue that the Secretary‘s construction of the statute, reflected in the regulation, conflicts with the “principle of availability” applicable to the AFDC program. The principle of availability governs the definition of income for purposes of section 602(a)(7).
The statute and its legislative history indicate that Congress intended that all coresident siblings of a dependent child applying for AFDC and their income, including Title II Social Security benefits and child support, should be counted in determining need and thus eligibility for AFDC assistance. An agency‘s construction of a statute under its enforcement jurisdiction is generally accorded deference if the construction “has a reasonable basis in law and is consistent with the congressional policy behind the statute.” International Nutrition, Inc. v. United States Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 676 F.2d 338, 342 (8th Cir.1982); see Connecticut Dep‘t of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524, 532 (1985) (agency‘s construction need not be the only reasonable one); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm‘n, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); Bailey v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 788 F.2d 498, 499-500 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 317 (1986). Although it is persuasive that the Secretary had at least some hand in the genesis of this statute, see International Nutrition, 676 F.2d at 342 (citing Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969)), the mere fact that he takes a position on its interpretation does not make the interpretation unassailable. Phillips v. Noot, 728 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1984). The Secretary argues that Congress, by passing
IV
Appellees argue further that the Secretary‘s regulation conflicts with the federal statutes governing Title II Social Security benefits and with state authority concerning child support obligations.
The Heille class argues that the family unit filing regulation, and thus the interpretation of
The anti-alienation provision “imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process” to reach Social Security benefits. Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973). The Secretary‘s regulation does not subject Title II benefits to legal process, however, nor does it result in an assignment or transfer of benefits. It requires only that Title II benefit recipients apply for AFDC and have their incomes included in the family filing unit. This does not constitute a use of legal process to garnish or attach benefits. See Moore v. Colautti, 483 F.Supp. 357, 368 (E.D.Pa.1979), aff‘d, 633 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.1980). The Title II benefit checks are not actually received and then disbursed by the state agency; rather, they continue to go directly to the child‘s representative payee. See Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 568 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied sub nom. Pavkovic v. Tidwell, 461 U.S. 905 (1983); Moore, 483 F.Supp. at 367. The regulation results in an inclusion of income, not an assignment or transfer of Title II benefits. To the extent that sharing of income among family members occurs after the benefits are paid to the representative payee, it is not prohibited by the anti-alienation provision. The use of Title II benefits by a representative payee is specifically governed by other provisions of Title II.
The Heille class’ second argument is that the Secretary‘s regulation is inconsistent with the representative payee provisions of Title II. Representative payees16 are obligated to spend benefits only for the “use and benefit” of the beneficiary.
The decision in Cunningham v. Toan, 762 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.1985), supports our conclusion that the family unit filing regulation is consistent with representative payee obligations. The Cunningham court considered a challenge to the practice of counting a minor parent‘s Title II benefits paid to a representative payee as income available to the minor parent‘s dependent child for AFDC eligibility purposes. The court‘s original decision invalidating the practice was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Deficit Reduction Act. Cunningham v. Toan, 728 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1984), vacated, 469 U.S. 1154 (1985). On remand, the court interpreted the portion of the Secretary‘s regulation applicable to parents,
The Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (Commissioner)17 argues that the family unit filing regulation conflicts with the state‘s traditional authority over matters concerning child support, and therefore violates the tenth amendment to the Constitution.18 We have no doubt that child support and other family law matters have traditionally been the province of the states, see Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352-53 (1966), but we believe the Commissioner‘s tenth amendment argument is inapposite in the context of this exercise of congressional power under the spending clause.
The spending clause gives Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes * * * to * * * provide for the * * * general Welfare of the United States.”
States that wish to receive federal funds for AFDC programs must comply with the congressional requirements for a state AFDC plan.
The Commissioner argues, however, that this condition on the receipt of federal funds so infringes an area traditionally reserved to the state that it violates the tenth amendment. We cannot agree. The Supreme Court‘s most recent decision on the tenth amendment and the principle of federalism, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), counsels that state sovereignty is to be found in “the shape of the constitutional scheme” and “the structure of the Federal Government itself,” instead of in “predetermined notions of sovereign power.” Id. at 550. The Commissioner concedes that Garcia “raise[s] doubt about the extent to which the tenth amendment provides a substantive limitation on the exercise of federal power.” State Appellee‘s Brief at 24. Even prior to Garcia, however, under the old regime of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, the courts were unwilling to extend the then-prevailing view of federalism to tenth amendment challenges of congressional action under the spending power. Crawford, 708 F.2d at 1037-38; Donovan, 704 F.2d at 298-99; Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 411-12; Marshall, 616 F.2d at 247. The National League of Cities Court, invalidating Congress’ exercise of the commerce power to extend federal wage and hour requirements to state government employees, specifically declined to express any view “as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under * * * the spending power.” National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n. 17. Moreover, the Court found that the provisions invalidated there “directly displace[d] the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional government functions.” Id. at 852. As we have stated, Congress, by passing
In determining whether there is a conflict between the state and federal law in this case, we begin by noting that there is no direct conflict insofar as Congress has not sought to occupy the field of child support obligations and the state has not sought to purposely thwart federal AFDC regulations. See Raskin v. Moran, 684 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.1982). Furthermore, even if the federal AFDC regulation and state child support law are in conflict, that conflict would not affect state authority in cases where no AFDC family is involved. However, in child support cases involving AFDC families and thus implicating
Although we believe that child support funds may be used to secure all of the same products and services that AFDC funds are used to obtain, we recognize that the purposes of the two income sources may be directed at different goals. The Minnesota child support guidelines,
Our review under the supremacy clause takes on a special character because of the involvement of state family law, which will be overridden by conflicting federal law only when Congress has “‘positively required‘” such a result “‘by direct enactment,‘” Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)), and when the state law does “‘major damage‘” to a “‘clear and substantial‘” federal interest. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). Congress did not openly state that it intended to override state child support law, but looking beyond the particular statutory terms, as we may, see Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220-21 (1981), that intent can be established from the legislative history of
[T]his conference report represents a significant contribution to solving the Nation‘s overwhelming deficit crisis. Without this down payment, there is no reason for the financial markets to assume that we will ever act responsibly on the budget. Many of the measures in the bill will be unpopular with some of our constituents, but failure to act will be even more unpopular.
130 Cong.Rec. H7085, H7087 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski). Senator Dole, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, called the Act a “major step toward getting our fiscal policy back on track.” 130 Cong.Rec. S8373, S8374 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dole). It was estimated that
V
Finally, the class members argue that the Secretary‘s regulation violates the due process guarantees and the prohibition on takings of private property in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.
First, the Gorrie class argues that the Secretary‘s regulation deprives the class members of their “liberty interests relating to family sanctity and family choice.” Plaintiff-Appellees’ Brief at 29. This substantive due process argument relies primarily on Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).23 In Moore the Court invalidated a zoning ordinance limiting dwelling occupancy to members of a single family and narrowly defining what constituted a “family.” The ordinance resulted in the criminal conviction of a grandmother who lived with two grandsons who were cousins, not brothers—a grouping that did not meet the ordinance‘s definition of a family. The Moore plurality found that the ordinance intruded on constitutionally protected choices concerning family living arrangements “by forcing all [of the city‘s citizens] to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.” Id. at 506; see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (act requiring all children to attend public school held unconstitutional as interference with liberty of parents; state may not “standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only“); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03, 43 S.Ct. 625, 627-28, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (act forbidding teaching of any language other than English held unconstitutional as in conflict with fundamental rights).
The Gorrie class members argue that the regulation is an unconstitutional infringement of their rights because it forces independently supported children to go on welfare, it disrupts the relationship between independently supported children and their supporting parents, and it compels breakup of the family unit. We do not agree. The ordinance in Moore made it a criminal act for certain family members to live together; by no stretch of the imagination does the Secretary‘s regulation present an equivalent infringement of family choices. Not every regulation that involves or somehow regulates on the basis of family membership is unconstitutional. We believe that “reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with [family choices] may legitimately be imposed.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); see Lyng v. Castillo, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 58, 98 S.Ct. 95, 101, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977), and that a regulation must interfere “directly and substantially,” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387, with family choices before it is unconstitutional. The ordinance in Moore forced certain living patterns on the citizens of East Cleveland, Ohio. The Secretary‘s regulation does not have nearly so direct or substantial of an effect on family choices. Cf. Horton v. Marshall Pub. Schools, 769 F.2d 1323, 1332 (8th Cir.1985). The regulation merely provides eligibility guidelines for receiving AFDC, should a family choose to apply. Any compulsion to apply or to change family living arrangements comes not from threat or coercion by the government, but from a desire to increase family income through the receipt of AFDC assistance. We decline to expand the right created in Moore beyond cases where the government forces family choices to those where it only affects or encourages decisions on family matters. See Bowers v. Hardwick, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2846, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) (there should be “great resistance to expand the substantive reach” of the due process clauses).
Second, both classes argue that the Secretary‘s family unit filing regulation denies them due process of law because their child support and Title II Social Security benefits represent property rights that cannot be abrogated by a congressional presumption that precludes individual factual inquiries. The district court agreed with this argument, concluding that “the plaintiffs’ interests outweigh the government‘s interests” and “the practicable procedural safeguard to protect the plaintiffs’ interests is a pre-deprivation hearing.” Gorrie I, 606 F.Supp. at 373.
The due process issue, as we understand it,24 is whether
We believe that Salfi contains the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the statute and the Secretary‘s regulation under the due process clause.25 Consequently,
The third constitutional argument raised by the classes is that the Secretary‘s regulation effects a taking of property without just compensation.28 Our review of the impact and character of the regulation convinces us that it does not go so far as to effect a taking of property. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922).
If, as we have found,
VI
We hold that the Secretary‘s family unit filing regulation is consistent with the statute authorizing it, with federal law governing Title II Social Security benefits, with the state‘s traditional authority concerning child support matters, and with the
HEANEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The regulation in question,
The members of appellees’ class in this case are children or representatives of children who receive one of two kinds of payments: social security benefits to replace the support formerly provided by a parent now dead, disabled, or retired (Title II benefits), or child support payments under state law to replace the support of a non-custodial parent. These children live in the same household as, and have a common parent with, dependent children receiving AFDC. The Secretary‘s regulation requires the independently supported children and the dependent child to apply together for the AFDC benefits the dependent child seeks. Under the regulation, the Secretary can reduce the dependent child‘s AFDC benefits by offsetting the Title II benefits or the child support payments of the independently supported children against the AFDC benefits.
The offset required by the regulation has led to a dramatic reduction in the size of the AFDC benefits received by many dependent children. For example, Jo Anne Heille is the divorced mother of two children. One of her children received $227 a month in Title II benefits based on the social security earnings of her disabled father. The child‘s half-brother received $331 a month in AFDC benefits. Because the Secretary‘s regulation requires the Title II benefits to be offset against the AFDC benefits, the AFDC grant was reduced to $164. For some members of the class, the AFDC benefits have been terminated entirely because of the offset.
The Secretary contends that
On an intuitive level this question is deceptively straightforward. Benefits designated for a person would seem to be “income of or available for” that person. However, one must be mindful that a child receiving benefits such as Title II and state child support payments does not have direct access to that income to spend as that child chooses. Rather, these benefits are paid, because the child is a minor, to a parent or representative payee for the care of the child as directed by federal or state statute. See, e.g.,
The majority to my mind makes such a mistake when it assumes that income from Title II and child support is “clearly” income “actually available” to the minor recipient of those benefits. See at 516. This conclusion ignores a line of cases which have examined the question of availability of income under AFDC statutes and regulations.1-1 In Owens v. Heckler, 753 F.2d at 675, Shelly Owens, a mother of a minor child, received Title II extended student benefits under
In determining whether the Title II extended student benefits were available for the minor parent and thus includable in the AFDC needs determination, this Court considered whether the Title II benefits served a purpose distinct from that of AFDC. It found that with Title II extended student benefits,
Because of the distinct purposes of AFDC and Title II extended student benefits, the Court concluded that the amount of benefits “actually needed” for educational expenses should not be “available” for the minor parent in determining need under the relevant AFDC statutes and regulations. Thus, no offset of the money “actually needed” for education against the AFDC benefits would be allowed.
In the instant matter, to determine whether Title II benefits and child support payments are “income of or available for” a co-resident sibling under
Unlike “general public assistance laws,” the purpose of Title II benefits is not to “pay money to those who need it the most.” Id. at 185, 97 S.Ct. at 434. “Rather, the primary objective [is] to provide workers and their families with basic protection against hardships created by the loss of earnings due to illness or old age.” Id. at 185-86, 97 S.Ct. at 434.
The purpose of child support payments is determined by state law. For example, in Minnesota, child support guidelines are used in the absence of a child support agreement between parents where one receives public assistance. See
The purposes of both Title II and state child support systems are not merely to provide support for a child at a welfare subsistence level. Title II is a government insurance program for wage earners, and state child support laws, at least in Minnesota, are designed to keep a child of a dissolved marriage at the same “standard of living” she or he enjoyed before the marriage dissolution.
The adoption of the Secretary‘s interpretation of
When two federal statutes conflict, a court should attempt to reconcile them. Owens, 753 F.2d at 679 (citing Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 411, 66 S.Ct. 193, 196, 90 L.Ed. 165 (1945)). And, when state family-property law conflicts with federal law, the state law “must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden.” Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 808, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979) (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352, 86 S.Ct. 500, 506, 15 L.Ed.2d 404 (1966)). Here, I do not believe the Secretary has demonstrated that the state child support laws do “major damage” to “clear and substantial federal interests.” Nor is it expressly stated that state child support laws shall be overridden by
It thus must be determined what a reconciliation among the conflicting statutes requires. The interpretation of the term “income of or available for” in
The majority finds that such an interpretation, with regard to Title II benefits ignores the specific reference in
I recognize that the interpretation which I believe to be correct limits the sweep of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, an act obviously intended by
Accordingly, I think the district court‘s judgment should be affirmed to the extent that the Secretary be enjoined from reducing or eliminating AFDC benefits received by a dependent child unless the Secretary reduces benefits only in the amount that a Title II or child support recipient in the same household actually shares those benefits with the household.
Notes
(a) The term “dependent child” means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home (other than absence occasioned solely by reason of the performance of active duty in the uniformed services of the United States), or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) at the option of the State, under the age of nineteen and a full-time student in a secondary school (or in the equivalent level of vocational or technical training), if, before he attains age nineteen, he may reasonably be expected to complete the program of such secondary school (or such training)[.]
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must--
* * *
(38) provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include--
(A) any parent of such child, and
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title, if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) of this title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this chapter)[.]
(1) When it appears to the Secretary that the interest of an applicant entitled to a payment would be served thereby, certification of payment may be made, regardless of the legal competency or incompetency of the individual entitled thereto, either for direct payment to such applicant, or for his use and benefit to a relative or some other person.
Parent, minor siblings and minor half-siblings must all be included as part of the AFDC assistance unit when they reside in the same home. An application must be submitted for all members of the assistance unit. If application is not made for currently excluded parents, minor siblings or minor half-siblings by November 1, 1984, the AFDC case shall be terminated.
Minnesota Department of Human Services, Instructional Bulletin No. 84-76, Attachment 9 (September 24, 1984).
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must--
* * *
(8)(A) provide that, with respect to any month, in making the determination under paragraph (7), the state agency--
* * *
(vi) shall disregard the first $50 of any child support payments received in such month with respect to the dependent child or children in any family applying for or receiving aid to families with dependent children[.]
There is no requirement in present law that parents and all siblings be included in the AFDC filing unit. Families applying for assistance may exclude from the filing unit certain family members who have income which might reduce the family benefit. For example, a family might choose to exclude a child who is receiving social security or child support payments, if the payments would reduce the family‘s benefits by an amount greater than the amount payable on behalf of the child.
S.Rep. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 980 (Comm.Print 1984).
(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.