*1 CALIFOR- DIRECTOR, MARTIN, v. LEWIS аl. et SOCIAL OF DEPARTMENT NIA WELFARE, al. et 20, April 3-4, 1970 Decided March Argued 829. No. *2 Anthony G. Amsterdam argued the cause for appel- lants. On the brief were Rubin Tepper, Steven J. Antler, and Peter Sitkin.
Jay S. Linderman, Deputy Attorney General of Cali- fornia, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Palmer, Deputy Attorney General.
Frаncis X. Beytagh, Jr., argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney Gen- eral Ruckelshaus, Lawrence G. Wallace, and Alan S. Rosenthal. Martin Garbus and Carl Rachlin filed a brief for the Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Mr. Douglas Justice delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants are mothers and children who receive wel- fare assistance under California law.1 At the time these actions were commenced, California law provided2 that
1Some of the appellants sue on behalf of themselves, their children,
a man assuming the role of spouse (MARS), and all others sim
ilarly situated. There are also intervenors who represent
two
families, one with a stеpfather and another with a MARS.
2 Cal. Welf. & Inst’ns Code 11351 (1966).
§
September
On
3, 1969, the Governor of California signed into law
a new 11351.5 of
§
the California Welfare and Institutions Code,
vrfiich became effective November 10, 1969. It
leaves unchanged
§
and implementing regulations insofar
they
apply to a
stepfather,
repeals
the old 11351
§
insofar as it applied to “an
adult
person
male
assuming the role of spouse.” Under the new
law, a MARS “shall
required
be
to make a financial contribution
family
which shall not be less than it -would cost him to
provide himself with an independent
living arrangement.” The
new
provides
law also
that,
to be promulgated
by the State Welfare Department,
the MARS and the mother will
required
be
present
the Department with “all of the facts in con-
nection with the sharing of expenses . . . .”
mother
his
“lives
child”
“needy
ato
payments
assuming
person
male
adult
or
stepfather
mar-
although
mother
spouse
role
MARS—
aas
vernacular
her” —known
ried
given
consideration
after
computed
shall
law
MARS.3
or
stepfather
income
children
needs
presumеs
conclusively
from
available
amount
reduced
avail-
fact
inis
it
or
whether
house
man
dependent
needs
meet
used
actually
able
*3
children.
S.U.
Smith, 392
King v.
decision
our
Following
Welfare
and
Education,
Health,
Department
309, the
earlier
its
reaffirming
regulation
a
promulgated
(HEW)
ceremonially
not
man
aof
income
rulings
may
children
dependent
mother
to
married
there
unless
children
available
as
treated
be
Even
contributions.4
actual
made
he
proof
mother
to the
married
ceremonially
isman
where
may
his
father,
adoptive
real
not the
he
unless
children
available
treated
law.5
state
by
children
obligated
three-
a
brought
were
appellants
suits
These
law
California
have
Court
judge
dismissed
court
That
invalid.
declared
regulations
at
MARS
a
governed
regulations
of Social
Dept,
Cal.
brought were
were
suits
these
time
1,
Nov.
(effective
42-535
Manual §§
Services
Social
Welfare, Public
stepfather,
a
1967). As
July 1,
(effective
1967), 44-133.5
1967),
1,
Nov.
(effective
id. §§42-531
were
pertinent
1967).
1,
July
(effective
4A-113.242
sup-
fails
father
natural
against
sanctions
criminal
For
Inst’ns
&Welf.
Cal.
§270;
Code
Penal
Cal.
see
children
his
port
(1966).
11476-11477
Code §§
4 CFR §203.1.
5 Id., §203.1
(a).
complaints, holding the HEW regulations were invalid.
312 F. Supp. 197. The cases are here on appeal and we
noted probable jurisdiction.
The federal statute provides that state agencies ad- ministering plans AFDC “shall, in determining need [of an eligible child], take into consideration any other income and resources [of child] ... as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income.” 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (7) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).
This directive was implemented by a regulation of HEW, effective July 1, 1967, wdiich, as then worded, provided in part: *4 “[0]nly income and resources that are, in fact,
available to an applicant or recipiеnt for current use on a regular basis will be taken into consideration in determining need and the amount of payment.” We stated in King v. Smith, supra, at 319 n. 16, that those regulations “clearly comport with” the Act. And as we have noted, shortly after King v. Smith, HEW 6 HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 3131.7. In its present form the regula,tion provides: “(ii) ... in establishing financial eligibility and the amount оf the assistance payment: . (e) . . only such net income as is actu- ally available for current use on regular a basis will be conádered, and only currently available resources will be considered.” 45 CFR (a) (3) §233.20 (ii), 34 Fed. Reg. 1395. perti- in provided which regulation7 newa promulgated part: nent needy to services and aid for plan A State “(a) the provide must . . . children families deprived been a child whether determination death, the of reason by care or support parental of or physical or home, the from absence continued made will ... parent aof incapacity mental adoptive or natural child's the to relation in only iswho stepparent a child’s relation inor parent, adop- or natural child’s the married ceremonially support obligated and parent tive which applicability general of law child stepchildren support stepparents requires parents adoptive or natural extent same children. their required presence or family, in inclusion “(b) ‘man-in-the- or parent’ ‘substitute of a home, in the described one than other individual any or house’ acceptable section of this (a) paragraph in assuming for ineligibility of finding for basis [I]n ... State. income of availability in resources and income all consideration amount eligibility financial establishing income net only such payment, assistance basis regular aon use current available actually for parent only considered, and bewill will be section this (a) paragraph in described household children available for considered (Em- contributions.” actual proof of absence added.)
phasis *5 negate explicitly words, other In stepfather needs, a child’s determining idea mother child’s to a married man e., a (i. 7 203.1. CFR. §
adopted thе child and is not legally obligated to the child under state law) or a MARS may be presumed to be providing support.8
We said in King v. Smith that AFDC aid can be
granted “only if
parent’
‘a
of the needy child is con-
tinually absent from the home.”
expected 'breadwinners’ who secured employment a, An exception is person whose presence is deemed essential to the well-being of the recipient of assistance and who is included in the family budget unit for calculation of need. See 42 U. S. C. 602 (a) (7) § (1964 ed., Supp. IV) provides: which “A State plan . . . must . . . provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children, or of any other individual (living in the same home as such child and relative) whose needs the State determines should be considered in determining the need of the child or relative claiming such aid, as well as any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning any such income .. .. .. .” The so-called AFDC “essеntial person” is also covered regula- tion. See 45 CFR (a) § 233.20 (2) (vi), 34 Fed. Reg. 1394. *6 558 congressional This children. their support
would basis the on explained reasonably most is expectation mind in had Congress breadwinner of kind the that his support to obligated legally was who one was that to believe reason beyond it think We children. em- providing that considered have would Congress mother deserted aof paramour the for ployment was he whom children mother’s the benefit would support. obligated Congress that think we reasoning, of parity “By a a such in children the that intended have must not- assistance AFDC for eligible remain situation Id., at impropriety.” mother’s their withstanding 329. “sub- Alabama’s invalidate tous led reasoning That tous leads reasoning Like regulation.9 father” stitutе that Court, three-judge the contrary
hold, HEW that add onlyWe valid. is regulation HEW the near is as he only that conclude reasonably might consensual would father adoptive or real aas certain reliably it makes which family the relation the of support for actually available is his words, other in may, HEW household. the in children support obligation an conclude reasonably man, married 'able-bodied regulation, Alabama the “Under children all father substitute considered is single, or if (1) situations: different three in mother’ ... applicant mother adoptive or natural child’s with home lives ‘he home] [the visits ‘he (2) if cohabitation’; or purpose for natural child’s cohabiting with purpose for frequently home frequent does (3) if ‘he mother’; or adoptive or elsewhere.' mother adoptive natural child’s with cohabits children father actually the is father substitute Whether obligated is he whether irrelevant also It is irrelevant. contribute fact does he whether children, he whether simply determinative What support. their 313-314. S., at U. mother.” ‘cohabits’ *7 state law must be of “general applicability” to make that obligation in reality a solid assumption on which esti- mates of funds actually available to children on a regular basis may be calculated.
Any lesser duty of support might merely be a device for lowering welfare benefits without guaranteeing that the child would regularly receive the income on which the reduction is based, that is to say, it would not approx- imate the obligation to support placed on and normally assumed by natural or adoptive parents. That reading of the Act and of King v. Smith certainly cannot be said to be impermissible.
Our decision in King v. Smith held only that a legal
obligation to support was a necessary condition for
qualification as a “parent”;
it did not also suggest that
it would always be a sufficient condition. We find
nothing in this regulation to suggest inconsistency with
the Act’s basic purpose of providing aid to “needy”
children, except where there is a “breadwinner” in the
house who can be expected to provide such aid himself.
HEW,
the agency charged with administering the Act,
has apparently concluded that as a matter of current,
practical realities, the relationship of the MARS to the
home is less stable than that of the stepfather who at
least has the additional
tie of the ceremonial marriage,
and that
the likelihood of the MARS’ contributing his
income to the children —even if legally obligated to do
so—is sufficiеntly uncertain in the absence of the mar-
riage tie, to prevent viewing him as a “breadwinner”
unless the bread is actually set on the table. Nothing
in this record shows that
this administrative judgment
does not correspond to the facts. We give HEW the
deference due the agency charged with the administra-
tion of the Act, see, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co.,
Inc. v. FCC,
at recipients by authorities welfare state against brought (AFDC) Children Dependent With Families toAid recip- AFDC between controversy is real Govern- Federal between and ients presents case This government. state and ment in- General The Solicitor situation. that precisely Edu- Health, Department that Court formed vested agency federal (HEW) Welfare cation, and —the which States insuring duty statute by fed- abide funds matching AFDC federal receive § determined requirements eral —has inconsistent Code Institutions Welfare California with federal AFDC regulations, 45 CFR § 203.1. This California statute provided when this suit was brought the income of a stepfather or a man assuming role of a spouse (MARS) to the mother of dependent, needy children shall be considered as available to the children in computing the AFDC assistance to which the children are entitled. The federal regulations, how- ever, in general refuse to assume that the income of a stepfather or MARS is available to the children in the absence of proof of actual contributions. admits that there is a conflict between these state and federal provisions but contends that the federal regula- tions аre inconsistent with the requirements of the Social Security Act and that its statute is consistent with the Act. The controversy between these two governments is thus real and substantial. It was for exactly such situations that the Social Security Act provided a com- prehensive remedial scheme for resolving disputes be- tween federal and state governmеnts. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 602, 604, (1964 ed. and Supp. IV). Under this *9 scheme HEW has the power, subject to certain notice and hearing requirements, to terminate AFDC assistance to a State that refuses to conform to the federal policies. In this case, the termination of federal AFDC assistance to California or the credible threat to terminate that assistance in the near future would compel a resolution of the underlying issue in this lawsuit by forcing Califor- nia (1) to amend its laws to conform to the existing federal regulations, (2) to challenge HEW’s deter- mination of nonconformity in the federal courts as provided in 42 U. S. C. § 1316 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), or (3) to withdraw from the federally assisted pro- AFDC gram. Generally, the provides Act procedures that allow the state and federal governments to resolve their dif- ference either by agreement or by lawsuit. As I stated in my dissent in Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 434-435, Act’s the establishing in objective congressional the if that imperative is it realized be to procedures remedial by be undermined procedures these of integrity the I recipients. welfare brоught lawsuits premature Security Social provisions remedial these think primary HEW give to intent unmistakable reflect Act issues welfare difficult and technical over jurisdiction ones exclusive be should procedures these that and my in Accordingly, exhausted. been have they until juris- to assume Court for error was it view me indeed strange It case. this decide and diction a made been never has Government Federal deeply are interests its although lawsuit this party involved. however. caution, note this add would I Constitu- our power no has Government Federal its own disobeying into a State coerce force tion My books. on still laws those while laws valid State, a belief my from arises regard this concern prоhibition, constitutional express some absent property determine and fix authority and power persons among obligations relationships opin- hope certainly I boundaries. its within com- as interpreted will today Court ion order laws valid its own violate pelling Government. Federal from money obtain Cali- challenging brought was action this When regulа- federal inconsistent statute fornia effect considering process inwas HEW tions, It statute. the California on new its *10 rule preparing was HEW clear now federal with inconsistent was provision vacate today would Court this If requirements. leave would order Court, judgment Cali- controversy its settle proceed free HEW reason, this For provided. Congress fоrnia
for those stated above, I would vacate the judgment the District Court and order that the case be dismissed as prematurely brought.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting.
Unlike Dandridge v. Williams, ante, p. 471, the admin- istrative procedures provided by statute have not been exhausted here. For this reason HEW’s primary juris- diction remains bar to jurisdiction of federal courts over suits brought by welfare recipients. See Rosado v. Wyman, ante, p. opinion (dissenting of Mr. Justice Black). I therefore join the dissent filed by Mr. Justice Black.