Riddick v. D'eliaRiddick v. D'elia
Ira S. Schneider, Baldwin, N. Y., Leonard S. Clark, Hempstead, N. Y., for plaintiff-appellee Nassau/Suffolk Law Services Committee, Inc.
BARTELS, District Judge:*
Appellee Bertha Riddick brought this action pursuant to
Both Joseph D‘Elia, as Commissioner of the Nassau County Department of Social Services, and Barbara Blum, in her capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, were named defendants in the action below. The District Court granted appellee‘s motion for summary judgment, permanently enjoining the state‘s practice, and Barbara Blum has appealed.
The appeal presents two questions: (1) whether appellee‘s constitutional claim is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction under
AFDC is a federal-state benefit program designed to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and their parents or relatives who live with or care for them.
The facts are not in dispute. Bertha Riddick and her husband, Eugene, reside in Hempstead, New York with their 37 year-old, mentally-disabled daughter, Constance, and with Constance‘s 7 year-old daughter, Lulu. Bertha has received a monthly AFDC grant on Lulu‘s behalf since June 1, 1977. Constance is entitled to federal OASDI payments because of her disabling mental illness, but her father, Eugene, is the representative payee for the OASDI payments pursuant to
Until April 1978, the monthly AFDC grant for Lulu was in the amount of $212.30, but in that month Bertha received notice from defendant D‘Elia that, effective April 24, 1978, the payment would be reduced to $143.90. The appellant recomputed Lulu‘s grant because the Department of Social Services had discovered that Constance was the beneficiary of a monthly OASDI payment of $189.10.1 According to the state public assistance standard of need set out in
On April 19, 1978, Bertha requested a fair hearing to review the AFDC reduction. At the hearing, on May 23, 1978, Bertha‘s and Eugene‘s uncontradicted testimony indicated that all of the OASDI money for Constance was being used for Constance‘s needs, and there was no surplus available for Lulu. While Constance spent something over a dollar a day on personal expenses, mostly cigarettes, Bertha testified that she dipped into her own funds to help buy Constance‘s clothes. Defendant offered no evidence that Constance did not need for herself all of her OASDI grant, but instead took the position, as the hearing officer summarized it, of “relying on the public assistance budget, and they (the Department of Social Services) don‘t go into actual needs.” The determination to reduce Lulu‘s AFDC grant was affirmed by Barbara Blum, Commissioner of New York State Department of Social Services, on June 27, 1978 and the reduction took effect on July 1, 1978, This action was commenced on July 31.4
The District Court held it had jurisdiction under
It is axiomatic that under
With this background in mind we must first decide whether the application of this presumption in appellee‘s case raises a constitutional question sufficiently substantial to support federal jurisdiction under
“‘Constitutional insubstantiality’ for this purpose has been equated with such concepts as ‘essentially fictitious,’ (cit. omit.); ‘obviously frivolous,’ (cit. omit.); and ‘obviously without merit,’ (cit. omit.). The limiting words ‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent legal significance. In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the substantiality of constitutional claims, those words import that claims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; . . . only if ‘“its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.“’ ” (cit. omit.).
Id. at 537-38, 94 S.Ct. at 1379.
Viewing such prior decisions, in a number of cases the Supreme Court has struck down on constitutional grounds legislation embodying conclusive presumptions not justified by the facts or by general experience. United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 93 S.Ct. 2832, 37 L.Ed.2d 767 (1973) (conclusive presumption that certain food stamp applicants are not needy); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973) (conclusive presumption of non-residency of university students who applied from out-of-state); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1971) (conclusive presumption that unwed father is unfit for custody of child); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974) (conclusive presumption that school teacher is unfit to teach after fourth month of pregnancy). The Seventh Circuit found that substantial constitutional allegations were made in plaintiffs’ attack on Indiana medicaid regulations which conclusively presumed the income of one spouse to be available to the other. Brown v. Stanton, 617 F.2d 1224, 1226 n.1 (7th Cir. 1980). In Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1979), --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653, this court recently held that a due process claim alleging that certain aspects of Connecticut‘s AFDC program embodied impermissible irrebuttable presumptions did raise a substantial constitutional question within the meaning of Hagans v. Lavine, supra. See also Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 at 494 (2d Cir. 1980).5
On the other hand, as Judge Mansfield points out in his dissent, the Supreme Court has upheld against constitutional attack welfare classifications, standards of need and presumptions, provided they have a rational basis, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978), recognizing that there is no constitutional entitlement to any particular level of welfare benefits. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 96 S.Ct. 1010, 47 L.Ed.2d 249 (1976), and that individualized hearings are not always feasible, Califano v. Jobst, supra; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, supra.
The Supreme Court has apparently never dealt with the equal protection rights of illegal aliens in this context . . . We do not characterize plaintiff‘s constitutional arguments as persuasive; we hold merely that the district judge could not dismiss them out of hand.
Judge Mansfield argues that the constitutional claim is insubstantial because it is patently rational for the legislature to balance household income against presumed expenses to determine whether a child of that household is eligible for aid. He suggests that it is no problem for a state to presume that the income of a natural parent, whether or not he actually supports the children, will be deemed to be available to the children, citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968) and Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970). To these principles we agree without, however, agreeing to Judge Mansfield‘s conclusion. King and Lewis do imply that the mother‘s income may be deemed available to her child because the parent is under a duty to support the child. But it does not follow that Eugene, the representative payee for the parent Constance, who must apply the OASDI payments for Constance‘s needs, is under any legal duty to support Constance‘s child Lulu. The use of Constance‘s income by the representative payee for her “best interest,”
III
We, therefore, turn to the pendent statutory claim challenging the state practice as contrary to federal law and regulations governing OASDI. Appellant contends that the state policy is mandated by federal law and regulations requiring it to consider the income of a mother living with her minor child as available to the minor child for the purpose of computing entitlement to and level of AFDC benefits.
In its opinion, the District Court relied principally on
Affirmed.
LUMBARD, Circuit Judge (concurring):
I concur in affirming the judgment of the district court.
First, the district court had jurisdiction. Appellee‘s constitutional claim was “substantial” under Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), because previous decisions do not foreclose the claim that the New York practice complained of is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and because that policy, whose effect is to take from Lulu Riddick an amount that, in fact, she may not receive from Eugene Riddick, is not “so patently rational as to require no meaningful consideration.” Id. at 541, 94 S.Ct. at 1381. Thus, the claim was of sufficient substance to justify the district court in taking jurisdiction, even though a further and fuller consideration would probably reveal that the claim has no merit, as the state statute does have a rational relation to a reasonable and economic operation of the state‘s welfare system.
Second, the district court was therefore required to determine the claim that the state practice conflicted with the federal statute and its regulations. I agree with Judge Bartels that the district court was correct in holding that a conflict existed and that the state must be enjoined from reducing the allowance for Constance Riddick.
MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent for the reason that the constitutional claim asserted by plaintiffs is so patently insubstantial as to deprive federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).
We have pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ statutory claim only if plaintiffs’ constitutional claim raises substantial questions under
As the majority indicates, AFDC is a federal-state cooperative program designed to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and their parents or relatives who live with or care for them. A state participating in the AFDC program will typically determine a public assistance standard of need, which is the level of income the state believes is necessary to maintain a hypothetical family unit, and pay to each recipient an amount equal to that standard of need less the amount of other income and resources available to him or her. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). Indeed, federal law requires that each state shall, “in determining need (of an eligible child), take into consideration any other income and resources of (the) child or relative claiming aid . . . .”
I disagree. As we recently noted in Clayborne v. Califano, 603 F.2d 372, 380 (2d Cir. 1979), the Supreme Court, in a line of cases beginning with Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1974), has all but ruled the irrebuttable presumption analysis inapplicable to social welfare cases.1-1 In Weinberger v. Salfi the Court stated “There is thus no basis for our requiring individualized determinations when Congress can rationally conclude not only that generalized rules are appropriate to its purposes and concerns, but also that the difficulties of individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments in the precise effectuation of congressional concern which they might be expected to produce.” Id. at 785, 95 S.Ct. at 2476. Given that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the constitutionality of a social welfare classification depends not on whether it constitutes an irrebuttable presumption but whether it has a “rational basis,” e. g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), the district court erred when it simply assumed that the mere use of a conclusive presumption raises substantial constitutional questions.
The presumption challenged here, that of “deeming” income of a parent to be available to a child, is clearly rationally related to a legitimate state interest. I begin with the firmly established proposition that because there is no constitutional obligation to provide minimum levels of support, Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. 1010, 1015, 47 L.Ed.2d 249 (1976), the states and the federal government are free to determine levels of need for welfare applicants, regardless of actual need, and may even award a level of benefits amounting to less than the state presumed standard of need. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2133, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Dandridge v. Williams, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, supra. A legislature may, in short, conclusively presume that an applicant has needs of a certain amount without granting to the applicant an individual hearing as to those actual needs.
That is all that the State has done here. The State is legitimately concerned about the possibility of parents shielding income from their children in order to render them eligible for AFDC aid. It also desires to use limited welfare funds to assist those truly in need. Therefore it has simply balanced household income against a presumed standard of need to determine the child‘s eligibility and need for AFDC aid. Nothing could be more rational. Not only is it reasonable for a State to presume that parents, who are legally obligated to support their minor children, will in fact use their income to support their children, but it would be highly inefficient, prohibitively expensive, and unduly burdensome for the State to be required to determine individually on a case-by-case basis whether parents actually made their income available to their children. Quite simply, the procedure of presuming needs and “deeming” income to be available is necessary to the efficient operation of, and is relied upon by, all social welfare programs, including Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicaid, see
“We only add that HEW might reasonably conclude that only he who is near as a real or adoptive father would be has that consensual relation to the family which makes it reliably certain that his income is actually available for support of the children in the household. HEW may, in other words, reasonably conclude that an obligation to support under state law must be of ‘general applicability’ to make that obligation in reality a solid assumption on which estimates of funds actually available to children on a regular basis may be calculated.” (At 558-59, 90 S.Ct. at 1285).
Judge Bartels, though not disputing the principles announced in King and Lewis, apparently contends that the mother‘s receipt of her income indirectly through a representative payee in this case presents more serious constitutional questions than those raised in King and Lewis. But that fact, whatever its significance for the statutory issue presented in this case, has no constitutional significance. The duty of the representative payee to use Constance‘s income in her “best interests,”
In upholding the constitutionality of various legislative presumptions, many of which are far more susceptible to a constitutional challenge than the presumption challenged here, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized not only the power of a legislature to act on the basis of reasonable general factual inferences but also the necessity of avoiding individual case-by-case determinations. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (upholding denial of benefits based on a residency presumption); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53, 98 S.Ct. 95, 99, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1978) (upholding the presumption that a dependent child‘s need terminates upon marriage);2-1 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2764, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976) (upholding the presumption that legitimate children, and some illegitimate children, were dependent on a deceased wage earner);3-1 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1974) (upholding the denial of benefits to the widow and survivors who had a relationship of less than nine months prior to the wage earner‘s death). See also Norman v. St. Clair, 610 F.2d 1228, 1242-43 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding the constitutionality of deeming income from one spouse to be available to another for the purpose of determining Medicaid eligibility); Kollett v. Harris, 619 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1980) (upholding the constitutionality of deeming income of a stepparent to be available to his stepchild for the purposes of determining the child‘s SSI benefits even though the stepparent was not legally obligated to support the stepchild).4-1
Finally, it should be noted that requiring plaintiffs to litigate their statutory claim in state court is not an empty promise. The New York courts have been a sympathetic forum for claims of this sort. Snowberger v. Toia, 60 A.D.2d 783, 400 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1978), aff‘d, 46 N.Y.2d 803, 413 N.Y.S.2d 922, 386 N.E.2d 833 (1978).
Accordingly, I would dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.