CARL L. GREGORY, LEILA GREGORY v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
No. 22-10707
United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
May 30, 2023
[PUBLISH]
BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal is a tax dispute over a yacht. It raises an issue of first impression about whether hobby losses under Section 183(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code should be treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions. This treatment matters for many reasons, including because taxpayers (during the relevant time) could deduct miscellaneous itemized deductions only for amounts that exceeded two percent of their adjusted gross income.
Carl and Leila Gregory chartered their yacht, Lady Leila, in 2014 and 2015. They did not conduct the chartering activity for profit—it was a hobby. Though the hobby generated income, it also incurred sizeable expenses each year. The Gregorys deducted some of those expenses under Section 183(b)(2) and placed them “above the line” to reduce their gross income. After an audit, the Commissioner determined that the Section 183(b)(2) deductions were miscellaneous itemized deductions under Section 67, meaning that they belonged “below the line” and reduced adjusted gross income, not gross income. Moreover, because the Gregorys had earned tens of millions of dollars in 2014 and 2015 and, at that time, the Code allowed miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent that they exceeded two percent of adjusted gross income, the Commissioner disallowed the Section 183(b)(2) deductions altogether. Facing deficiencies and penalties, the Gregorys petitioned
Everyone agrees that Section 183(b)(2) allows a deduction for a certain amount of hobby losses, which is capped at the hobby‘s gross income. But we must decide where those deductions belong on a taxpayer‘s return: above the line (reducing gross income) or below the line as miscellaneous itemized deductions (reducing adjusted gross income). We believe the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, taken together, answer this question and hold that Section 183(b)(2) expenses are below-the-line miscellaneous itemized deductions. We agree with the Tax Court and deny the petition for review.
I.
We begin by reciting the relevant facts, which are not disputed. In 2011, the Gregorys formed CLC Ventures, Ltd., a Cayman Islands corporation, to own and charter a yacht named Lady Leila. Because CLC elected for treatment as a disregarded entity, the Gregorys reported CLC‘s income and expenses on their personal returns. It is undisputed that CLC was not engaged in for profit within the meaning of
The Gregorys filed joint tax returns for 2014 and 2015, reporting CLC‘s income and expenses on their Schedule C (Profit or Loss from Business). In March 2018, the Commissioner issued a Notice of Deficiency to the Gregorys for tax years 2014 and 2015. Because CLC lacked a profit motive, the Commissioner adjusted
The Gregorys reported taxable income1 of $19,666,293 and $80,154,735 for 2014 and 2015, respectively, and the Commissioner disallowed all deductions attributable to CLC except for several hundred dollars of taxes and licensing expenses. The Commissioner then assessed over three hundred thousand dollars in deficiencies and penalties.
The Gregorys petitioned the Tax Court to reconsider the deficiencies, arguing that hobby expenses under Section 183(b)(2) are not miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the two-percent floor imposed by Section 67(a). The Tax Court disagreed, determining that the Code‘s plain language and statutory scheme confirmed that Section 183(b)(2) grants a miscellaneous itemized deduction. The Gregorys filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Tax Court denied. The Tax Court issued a final decision upholding the deficiencies—$267,221 in total—but not the penalties.
II.
We review the Tax Court‘s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo. Roberts v. Comm‘r, 329 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th Cir. 2003). The Tax Court‘s application of statutes and conclusions of law also receive de novo review. Peterson v. Comm‘r, 827 F.3d 968, 986 (11th Cir. 2016).
III.
A.
Before discussing the parties’ arguments, we explain the statutory scheme for above- and below-the-line income tax deductions. To be clear, our background discussion of the relevant statutory scheme is meant to give context to the parties’ specific arguments. The Code has a byzantine character, and exceptions to the following generalizations may apply in certain circumstances.
Income tax deductions reduce taxes owed by reducing the overall amount of income that is subject to a tax. The Code distinguishes—albeit not explicitly—two principal classes of deductions: above-the-line and below-the-line. Above-the-line deductions reduce gross income, that is, “all income from whatever source derived,” and are enumerated in Section 62(a).
The amount and type of deductions available to taxpayers “depend[] upon legislative grace.” See New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Put differently, there is no general right to a deduction. And not all deductions are created equal. For instance, taxpayers can usually deduct the full amount of business expenses, but other kinds of expenses must rise above a statutory floor to trigger a deduction or may not be available to taxpayers whose income exceeds a certain threshold. Compare, e.g.,
Except for twelve deductions identified in Section 67(b), all itemized deductions are “miscellaneous itemized deductions.”
This two-percent floor rendered miscellaneous itemized deductions of little value to most taxpayers. After the relevant time period here, Congress amended the Code to disallow all miscellaneous itemized deductions of whatever amount, rendering them of even less value. But this provision is set to sunset in 2025.
B.
We now turn to the parties’ arguments. The Tax Court held that hobby losses under Section 183(b)(2) are miscellaneous itemized deductions that are applied below the line and subject to the two-percent floor imposed by Section 67(a). Because the Gregorys’
The language of the relevant statutory provisions settles this question. See Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). We presume that the Internal Revenue Code “says . . . what it means and means . . . what it says.” See Conn. Nat‘l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992). We therefore begin our statutory interpretation with the words of the statutes themselves. Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Still, “[s]tatutory provisions are not written in isolation.” In re Shek, 947 F.3d 770, 776 (11th Cir. 2020). A provision‘s meaning must consider both the “particular statutory language at issue” and “the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 777 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)).
Three provisions of Section 183 are relevant. First, Section 183(a) prohibits all hobby loss deductions except for those allowable in Section 183(b).
Everyone agrees that Section 183(b)(2) allows the Gregorys a potential deduction for their hobby losses from chartering Lady Leila because they could deduct those losses “if such activity were engaged in for profit.”
Section 183 does not expressly answer these questions. In this respect, Section 183(b)(2) resembles many other Code provisions that identify an allowable deduction but do not account for
For their part, the Gregorys resist this reasoning and argue that, unlike other Code provisions, Section 183(b)(2) does say how the deduction should be treated. Specifically, they assert Section 183(b)(2) creates an above-the-line deduction that is not subject to the two-percent floor. The Gregorys make two text-based arguments in support of this reading, but neither is persuasive.
First, the Gregorys argue that Section 183(b)(2) does not confer a specific deduction but a deduction framework. That framework, as the argument goes, requires us to treat Section 183(b)(2) expenses the same as business expenses in all respects. The Gregorys contend that, because Section 183(b)(2) waives the for-profit requirement for other deductions in Chapter 1 of the Code, Section
The text does not support the Gregorys’ argument that Section 183(b)(2)‘s deduction must be given the same priority and placement as a trade or business expense. Section 183(b)(2) grants “a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions” allowable for activities engaged in for profit.
Second, the Gregorys argue that, because Section 183(b)(2) caps the deduction amount at the hobby‘s gross income minus the Section 183(b)(1) deductions, we can surmise that Section 183(b)(2) expenses are supposed to reduce a taxpayer‘s gross income—not the taxpayer‘s adjusted gross income—and therefore belong above the line. That argument also misses the mark. The Section 183(b)(2) cap is based on the hobby‘s gross income; above-the-line deductions reduce an individual‘s overall gross income from whatever source. These are two very different things. Section 183(b)(2) limits deductible hobby losses “to the extent that the gross income derived from such activity [i.e., the hobby] . . . exceeds the deductions allowable by [Section 183(b)(1)].”
We start with Section 62, which lists all above-the-line deductions that reduce gross income. See
Next, we move to Section 63. Section 63(d) defines “itemized deductions” as all deductions except (1) the above-the-line deductions listed in Section 62 and (2) “any deduction referred to in any paragraph of subsection (b) [of Section 63].”
Lastly, we come to Section 67. Section 67(a) imposes the two-percent floor on “miscellaneous itemized deductions.”
We note that our reading of these statutes is consistent with other courts and IRS regulations. Although none of our sister circuits has addressed the Gregorys’ arguments, several lower courts have reached the same conclusion we do here. See, e.g., Purdey v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 413, 417 (1997) (concluding that Section
Tax analysts and commentators also agree that “expenses of an activity not carried on for profit are” one of “the principal categories of miscellaneous itemized deductions.” B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 30.4.2 (July 2022). Leading tax treatises inform tax practitioners that “[d]eductions for hobby activities are claimed as itemized deductions on Schedule A” and “[e]xpenses . . . allowed under the hobby loss rules are ‘miscellaneous itemized deductions.’” Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) ¶ M-5804 (Apr. 2023 update); see also 1 Richard D. Blau et al., S Corporations Federal Taxation § 7:29 (Nov. 2022 update) (same); 33 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Taxation ¶ 1153 (May 2023 update) (same); 1 Edward F. Koren, Estate, Tax and Personal Financial Planning § 4:10 n.15 (Mar. 2023 update) (same). Put another way, Section 183(b)(2) deductions “must be taken as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the 2%-of-AGI (adjusted gross income) reduction (Section 67).” Donald Samelson, The Income Tax Aspects of Artistic Activities, 93 Prac. Tax Strategies 244, 244 (2014).
In summary, the Tax Court correctly calculated the Gregorys’ tax liability. Section 183(b)(2) allows a deduction for hobby
C.
In response to this plain-text analysis, the Gregorys make five additional arguments. None is persuasive.
First, the Gregorys argue that we “recognized the connection between Section 183 deductions and the analogous adjustments under Section 162” in Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1984). In Brannen, taxpayer-Brannen invested in a limited partnership to purchase a “spaghetti western” film to distribute in the United States. Brannen, 722 F.2d at 697–700. The film flopped, and the Commissioner disallowed certain losses claimed by Brannen “because the purchase and subsequent distribution of the movie [by the limited partnership] was an activity ‘not engaged in for profit.’” Id. at 701. In affirming the Tax Court, we stated that “Section 183 takes effect only when the taxpayer is engaged in an activity . . . not otherwise entitled to claimed deductions under Sections 162 or 212.” Id. at 704. Thus, in assessing profit motive, “we
Brannen correctly describes the relationship between Section 162 and Section 183(b)(2) in determining profit motive. Though we held that Brannen could deduct certain expenses to the extent of gross income derived from the partnership under Section 183(b)(2), we did not opine on the placement of those deductions or whether hobby losses belong above or below the line. Moreover, Congress did not enact Section 67, which imposed the two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, until 1986, a couple of years after this Court decided Brannen. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113–14. Accordingly, Brannen does not stand for the proposition that Section 183(b)(2) confers an above-the-line deduction, and the Gregorys’ reliance on it is misplaced.
Second, the Gregorys contend that our interpretation of Section 183(b)(2) contravenes congressional intent. They point to legislative history, arguing that Congress enacted Section 183 to prevent wealthy taxpayers from generating artificial losses, not to pre-
This argument misses the point. The Gregorys have a deduction for their hobby losses under Section 183—just as Congress intended. But they cannot benefit from that deduction because another Code provision, Section 67, requires that—to actually take a deduction for a miscellaneous itemized deduction such as the one for hobby losses—“the aggregate of such deductions [must] exceed[] 2 percent of adjusted gross income.”
Third, the Gregorys urge us to resolve any statutory ambiguity in their favor because “ambiguous tax statutes are to be construed against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.” Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. United States, 108 F.3d 290, 294 (11th Cir. 1997). But there is no ambiguity in the tax statutes at issue here. See generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (explaining that a provision is “genuinely ambiguous” only when, after a court has
Fourth, citing the canon against implied repeals, the Gregorys posit that our reading of Section 62, Section 63, and Section 67 implicitly repeals Section 183(b)(2). See, e.g., Posadas v. Nat‘l City Bank of N.Y., 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (describing repeal by implication). Not so. This case does not implicate the presumption against implied repeal because we can read the relevant Code sections harmoniously. Section 183(b)(2) grants a deduction for certain hobby expenses; Sections 62 and 63 place that deduction below the line as an itemized deduction; Section 67 renders it a miscellaneous itemized deduction subject to the two-percent floor. Because our reading of Sections 62, 63, and 67 does not contravene or undermine Section 183(b)(2), the presumption against implied repeal—and implied amendment—are inapposite.
Fifth, the Gregorys argue that our reading would lead to an odd or absurd result. A court may “disregard[] or judicially correct[]” a statutory provision “if failing to do so would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 234 (alteration omitted). When “the literal reading of a statutory” provision compels an odd or absurd result, “we must search for other evidence” to avoid that result. Pine v. City of West Palm Beach, 762 F.3d 1262, 1272 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep‘t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989)). But courts should invoke the absurdity doctrine only when “the absurdity is ‘so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.’” Packard v. Comm‘r, 746 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)).
The Gregorys contend that applying Section 67‘s two-percent floor to deductions under Section 183(b)(2) creates an absurd result because a taxpayer will need either a very low income or very large hobby losses (and hobby income) to benefit from the deduction. We disagree. This consequence may be unfavorable for the Gregorys, but it is not absurd. The absurdity doctrine should “correct obviously unintended dispositions, not . . . revise purposeful dispositions.” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 239. Here, Congress deliberately devised the complained-of result by imposing the two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions. Congress can cap or reduce taxpayer eligibility for a tax deduction if it wants, and, here, it elected to do so.
IV.
The petition is DENIED.
I agree with the majority‘s holding that hobby expenses under Section 183(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code are below-the-line miscellaneous itemized deductions, but I would reach this conclusion differently. In my view, the plain language of Section 183(b)(2) is ambiguous. Thus, I would look to Congress’ intent to determine whether Section 183(b)(2) expenses are to be deducted above the line (reducing gross income) or below the line as miscellaneous itemized deductions (reducing adjusted gross income (AGI)).
The majority concludes that the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions—namely, Sections 183, 62, 63, and 67—settles the question of whether Section 183(b)(2) creates an above-the-line deduction for income-producing hobbies. Maj. Op. at 8, 13–16. As the majority correctly notes “the text of Section 183 does not tell us how to treat the hobby loss deduction it provides.” Maj. Op. at 13. But rather than turn to other Code provisions to deduce the meaning of Section 183, I would look to congressional intent for guidance. We look beyond a statute‘s plain language to extrinsic materials to determine congressional intent if the statute‘s language is ambiguous. United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). “A word or phrase is ambiguous when the question is which of two or more meanings applies.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 32
Here, the language of Section 183(b)(2) is ambiguous because it creates a question of “which of two or more meanings applies.” Scalia & Garner, supra. For hobbies not engaged in for profit, Section 183(b)(2) permits
a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which would be allowable . . . only if such activity were engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived from such activity . . . exceeds the deductions allowable by reason of [Section 183(b)(1)].
Under the Commissioner‘s interpretation of this provision, hobby expenses are miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to Section 67‘s two-percent floor and are deductible below the line against AGI. Under the Gregorys’ interpretation, hobby expenses are akin to business expenses and thus can be deducted above the line against gross income. Yet, on its face, Section 183(b)(2) simply does not tell us whether hobby expenses are miscellaneous itemized deductions or if they may be treated as business expenses. Indeed, based on a facial reading of the plain text, either interpretation seems plausible. Given the ambiguity in the statutory language, we can—and should—look to extrinsic materials to ascertain how Congress intended hobby expenses to be treated under the tax code. See DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1281.
Like the majority, I would deny the petition.
