UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Aрpellee, v. SAIEED JEAN TEXEIRA-NIEVES, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 21-1034
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
January 12, 2022
Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
Before Lynch and Selya, Circuit Judges, and McCafferty,* District Judge.
Eleonora C. Marranzini, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, and Cherrelle Herbert, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, were on brief, for appellant.
Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
* Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
January 12, 2022
I
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the case. In 2018, Puerto Rico police arrested the defendant during a traffic stop. He was driving a vehicle that contained a loaded gun, thirty-one additional rounds of ammunition, and a satchel of controlled substances. In an interview with federal agents, the defendant admitted that he possessed the controlled substances because he was in the business of selling drugs and that the firearm was there for protection.
In due course, the defendant was charged in a five-count federal indictment. He subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts: possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, seе
The district court convened the disposition hearing in July of 2019. The court imposed a one day term of immurement on the drug count and a consecutive sixty-month sentence on the firearms count. The court also imposed concurrent terms of supervised release. The defendant did not appeal.2 And according to calculations by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) the defendant is scheduled to be released on or about February 1, 2023.
The defendant, who is in his late twenties, has several pre-existing medical conditions, including sickle cell disease. His sickle cell anemia and complications stemming from that disorder were documented in the PSI Report. In June of 2020 after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic the defendant submitted alternative requests to the warden of the correctional facility at which he was confined: he sought compassionate release pursuant to
In October of 2020, the defendant moved for compassionate release pursuant to the
In December of 2020, the district court denied the defendant‘s motion on the papers. In its order, the court stated that it adopted as its reasons for denial those provided by the government in its opposition and sur-reply memoranda. The court went on to statе that the defendant had not demonstrated any extraordinary or compelling reason to grant his request for compassionate release, that the defendant was still a danger to the community, and that the court did not have the authority to order him to home confinement. This timely appeal followed.
II
Before granting a sentence reduction in response to a prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release alleging extraordinary and compelling reasons, a district court must make three findings. The court must find both that the defendant has presented an “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting a sentence reduction,
In this appeal, the defendant marshals three primary arguments. First, he contends that the district court unduly constrained the sweep of its discretion because it considered itself bound by the current policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission. Second, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to offer an adequate explanation for denying his motion. Third, he contends that the district court erroneously concluded that it did not have the legal authority to order him to serve the remainder of his sentence on home confinement. After pausing to address a threshold issue, we examine the defendant‘s trio of arguments one by one.
A
As an initial matter, the government asserts that the defendant‘s compassionate-release motion was improperly before the district court because the defendant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The question of whether and to what extеnt issue exhaustion applies to judicial review of compassionate-release motions is freighted with uncertainty but we need not resolve that question today. Cf. Privitera v. Curran (In re Curran), 855 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[C]ourts should not rush to decide unsettled issues when the exigencies of a particular case do not require such definitive measures.“). Rather, we assume, favorably to the defendant, that he has satisfied
To be sure, some district courts have questioned whether the administrative exhaustion requirement for prisoner-initiated compassionate-release motions is jurisdictional. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman Soto, No. 18-10086, 2020 WL 1905323, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2020). If the administrative exhaustion requirement is of jurisdictional dimension, bypassing the issue may not be an available option. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that “a federal court ordinarily may not assume the existence of jurisdiction in order to decide the merits of a case or controversy“). In our judgment, however, this exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional limitation: as several circuits previously have held, it is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule. See United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
A rule is jurisdictional only if Congress has “clearly state[d] that a prescription counts as jurisdictional,” and “when Congress does not rank a prescription as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2019) (quotations and alterations omitted). The administrative exhaustion requirement in
B
On the merits, the defendant‘s lead argument relates to the requirement of the compassionate-release statute that a reduction be “consistent” with “applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
We have encountered this argument before, see Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 7-8, and
This issue at least potentially could have significant ramifications in other cases. For example, if the current policy statement does not apply, a district court is free (within the usual constraints of statutory construction) to craft its own definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” As another example, if the policy statement does not apply, a district court would not need to adhere to the policy statement‘s requirement that the court may grant compassionate release based on extraordinary and compelling reasons only if “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.”3 USSG §1B1.13(1)(A), (2). With such ramifications in mind, we previously have found it prudent to refrain from resolving this issue when the circumstances of a particular case do not demand such a resolution. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 8.
We follow the same path today. The defendant‘s qualms about the inapplicability of the policy statement were not raised below and, in any event, this case does not require that we decide the issue. Even if we assume (favorably to the defendant) that the district court treated section 1B1.13 as mandatory and that, in so doing, it committed error (or even plain error), the defendant still would not prevail. We explain briefly.
A defendant who demonstrates both that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction and that such a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statement must clear yet another hurdle. He must persuade the district court that the section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence reduction. See id. at 4 (explaining that court must consider sentencing factors and determinе whether reduction is “warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case” (quoting Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827)). These issues need not be considered in any particular order. See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1116 (6th Cir. 2020) (Cook, J., concurring) (“No feature of [section] 3582(c)(1)(A) precludes a court from tackling the [section] 3553(a) factors first.“). Thus, a district court‘s decision to deny compassionate release may be affirmed solely on the basis of its supportable determination that the section 3553(a) factors weigh against the granting of such relief. See, e.g., Ward v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2020). In other words, a supportable determination that the balance of the section 3553(a) factors weighs against a sentence reduction constitutes an independent reason to deny compassionate release. See United States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561, 569 n.4 (1st Cir. 2021); Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 8; cf. United States v. Zayas-Ortiz, 808 F.3d 520, 523 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that even when a defendant is eligible for a section 3582(c) sentence reduction, a district court may determine, based on the sentencing factors, that “a reduction would be inappropriate” (quotations omitted)).
This is such a case. The district court expressly found that the defendant remained a threat to the community and cited to section 3553(a). Its order also explicitly adopted “the reasons indicated by the United States in its opposition and sur-reply.” These reasons included the government‘s position that the sentencing factors disfavored a sentence reduction and outweighed the defendant‘s medical concerns. Thus assuming that the district court did not abuse its discretiоn in calibrating the section 3553(a) balance there is no need for us to wade into the debate over the applicability of the current policy statement.
C
This brings us to the district court‘s decision to deny the defendant‘s motion based on the section 3553(a) factors. We start with the elementary tenet that district courts possess significant discretion in evaluating motions for compassionate release. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4-5. Our review is solely for abuse of that discretion. See Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th at 564; Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4-5. Under this respectful standard, “we review the district court‘s answers to legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and judgment calls with some deference to the district court‘s exercise of its discretion.” Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2020).
As relevant here, the compassionate-release statute provides that a district court “may” rеduce a sentence “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” See
To permit appellate review, we must be able to discern to some extent a
In reviewing the imposition of a sentencе, we consider the entire context and record. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1967 (2018). So, too, we consider the entire context and record in determining whether a district court‘s denial of a compassionate-release motion allows for adequate appellate review. See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112; cf. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (reviewing entire record in assessing sufficiency of district court‘s explanation for sentence-modification decision).
With this preface, we turn to a consideration of whether the district court abused its discretion in weighing the section 3553(a) factors. Section 3553(a) is “a tapestry of factors, through which runs the thread of an overarching principle.” United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 228 (1st Cir. 2008). This overarching principle directs courts to ensure that a sentence is “sufficient, but not greater thаn necessary.”
In effect, section 3553(a) “invite[s] the district court to consider, broadly,” United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2008), information relevant to the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”
Here, the context and record show that the district court gave due consideration to the section 3553(a) factors. It concluded by adopting the government‘s arguments and reasons for denial of the defendant‘s compassionate-release motion that the section 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of a sentence reduction. The reasoning for this conclusion can easily be discerned from the record, especially the parties’ briefing and the court‘s order. See United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Rita, 551 U.S. 338 (explaining that a court‘s reasoning for its sentence can “often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did“).
The district court cited to sectiоn 3553(a) immediately following its finding
An additional factor helps to tilt the balance. The defendant‘s compassionate-release motion was decided by the same judge who originally had sentenced him. When imposing a sentence, a judge necessarily acquires an intimate knowledge of the offense of conviction and the history and characteristics of the offender. See United States v. Aponte-Guzman, 696 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2012) (affording “considerable measure of respect” to denial of sentence-reduction motion by judge who imposed original sentence and, thus, had “superior coign of vantage” and “hands-on familiarity with the case“). This reservoir of knowledge does not vanish into thin air when the judge later considers the offender‘s motion for compassionate release.
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying compassionate release based on the section 3553(a) factors. As the government argued below, the offenses were serious: the defendant an admitted drug-peddler who carried a firearm to protect himself and his inventory was arrested driving a car while in possession of a firearm loaded with eleven rounds of .40 caliber ammunition, several additional rounds of ammunition, and a satchel of drugs. What is more, the judge after considering the defendant‘s history and characteristics determined that the defendant continued to pose a danger to the community, and that finding was not clearly erroneous.
The defendant counters that there are other reasons the sentencing factors should weigh in favor of a sentence reduction. He points to the effect of the pandemic on the conditions of incarceration, which could not have been predicted at the time of sentencing. He also points to aspects of his history, health, and characteristics that, in his view, throw shade on the district court‘s finding that he continues to pose a danger to the community. But the defendant‘s arguments, along with the relevant medical records and the PSI Report, were before the district court. And where, as here, the district court weighs the relevant considerations and makes a reasonable judgment call, deference is due to its determination. See Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 9 (noting that “[m]erely raising potentially mitigating factors does not guarantee a favorable decision” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010))); see also United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020) (explaining that the
D
In a related vein, the defendant contends that the district court‘s sparse reasoning is itself an abuse of discretion. The fact that we have beеn able to review the district court‘s decision, see supra Part II(C), is a good indication that the district court‘s order is not so inscrutable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
It is true, of course, that the district court‘s order contains only minimal reasoning. A fuller explication of the court‘s thinking would have been helpful. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (“Providing a more detailed statement of reasons often serves a salutary purpose separate and apart from facilitating appellate review.” (quotations omitted)). In the circumstances of this case, however, we deem the explanation adequate.
Critically, the district court‘s reasoning is illuminated by what the order says, by the briefing, and by the record as a whole. Though the district court‘s minimalistic approach of merely adopting the government‘s reasons for denying compassionate release could conceivably be inadequate in some cases, cf. id. at 1967 (suggesting with respect to motion for sentence reduction that “district court‘s use of a bare bones form order,” though sufficient based on circumstances at hand, might “be inadequate” in other cases), we think that such an approach was within the ambit of the court‘s discretion in this case. As a denial of a sentence reduction by the same judge who shortly before had imposed the defendant‘s sentence, the consideration of the sentencing factors involved passing on much the same information as at the initial sentencing. Any new considеrations brought forward by the defendant were relatively uncomplicated matters. Thus, we reject the defendant‘s contention that the explanation was so sparse as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
E
Finally, the defendant challenges the district court‘s conclusion that it lacked the authority to order home confinement. Because this challenge hinges on a question of law, our review is de novo. See Akebia Therapeutics, 976 F.3d at 92.
The compassionate-release provision contemplates any form of sentence reduction. See
We “must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
In an effort to make an end run around the statutory scheme, the defendant advances a different reading of the district court‘s ruling. To lay the groundwork for this alternate reading, the defendant notes that the district court could have reduced his sentence to a term of supervised release and ordered home confinement as a condition of supervised release. Building on this foundation, he says that the district court‘s ruling incorrectly assumed that the court did not have these powers. In other words, he suggests that the district court must have thought that it could not craft any sort of sentence modification incorporating home confinement even if it granted the compassiоnate-release motion.
This reading of the district court‘s ruling elevates hope over reason. In the proceedings below, both parties acknowledged that the district court could reduce a sentence to time served, impose a term of supervised release equal to the unserved portion of the term, and order home confinement as a condition of supervised release. The district court flatly rejected this alternative: it concluded that no sentence reduction (let alone a reduction to time served) was warranted. Viewed against this backdrop, the purport of the district court‘s statement is clear as day: it believed that the duration of the defendant‘s sentence should not be modified and that the court lacked the authority to change his place of confinement.
The defendant has a fallback position. He argues that the district court could have recommended that the BOP place him in home confinement. But this argument was not advanced in the court below, and a party who has not asked for specific relief in the district court cannot secure that relief on appeal. See United States v. Adams, 971 F.3d 22, 37 (1st Cir. 2020) (applying “general rule that a party cannot ask the court of appeals for relief that he did not seek in the district court“); Beaulieu v. IRS, 865 F.2d 1351, 1352 (1st Cir. 1989) (“It is a party‘s first obligation to seek any relief that might fairly have been thought available in the district court before seeking it on appeal.“). Consequently, we deem thе argument waived.
III
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
Concurring Opinion Follows
MCCAFFERTY, District Judge, concurring. I agree with the majority that the district court‘s decision can be affirmed based on the
In addition, Texeira-Nieves attached medical records from 2018 to his October 2020 compassionate release motion. These records stated that he had sickle cell anemia, and indicated that he was “stable on treatment” yet “chronically ill.” He also attached a declaration from a doctor who had not evaluated him specifically, but stated that, in general, preliminary data revealed that the COVID-19 mortality rate for those with sickle cell disease was twice that of the general population.
Despite this evidence, the government asserted in its opposition brief before the district cоurt that the defendant “ha[d] not provided sufficient documentation or evidence that the asserted medical condition is currently active and seriously affecting his health,” nor any evidence that his “ailments still exist today.” Given the chronic nature of sickle cell anemia (and, if there were any doubt, defendant‘s medical records indicated he was “chronically ill“), the government‘s assertions were spurious.
In response to the government‘s assertions, Texeira-Nieves attached additional medical records to his reply. These records indicated that while incarcerated in October 2020, Texeira-Nieves “was found to be in sickle cell crisis” and was admitted to an outside hospital.7 They also stated that while incarcerated he continued to take medication to treat his sickle cell disease. In addition to his sickle cell symptoms, the records indicated that Texeira-Nieves needed hip surgery, experienced “debilitating pain,” and suffered from various additional medical conditions.
Yet in the government‘s surreply, it again attempted to cast doubt on Texeira-Nieves‘s sickle cell anemia. The government acknowledged that Texeira-Nieves had provided “some medical notes,” but argued that the diagnoses in the medical records were based only on Texeira-Nieves‘s own reports, and that “there [were] no independent medical records corroborating Defendant‘s diagnoses and/or that he currently suffers [from] thоse medical conditions (except for hip pain).” The government‘s repeated assertion that Texeira-Nieves did not suffer from sickle cell anemia was entirely unfounded.
Even on appeal, the government has not relented. In its brief to this court, it asserts:
As the government argued, and the district court agreed, Texeira failed to adequately support that he had a sickle cell disease condition. He initially provided old medical notes, which these [sic] did not clearly indicate a clear diagnosis of sickle cell disease and reflected generally good health. (ASA 48). In a subsequent reply, Texeira provided additional medical records. (ASA 132). But the records again did not reflect a clear diagnosis of sickle cell disease. (Id.).
I am at a loss to understand how the government can argue in good faith that a PSR containing uncontroverted evidence of Texeira-Nieves‘s sickle cell anemia, combined with records from medical providers he saw while incarcerated that confirm the same, is not sufficient documentation of his chronic illness.
The district judge‘s order denying Texeira-Nieves‘s compassionate release motion stated that the motion was “DENIED, for the reasons indicated by the United States in its opposition and sur-reply.” The order went on to state that “Defendant Texeira-Nieves ha[d] not shown any extraordinary or compelling reason to grant his request for compassionate release.”
If this court were to reach the issue of extraordinary and compelling reasons, I would hold that the district court‘s finding that Texeira-Nieves did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons was premised on a clearly erroneous factual finding. The district court based its denial of release on the government‘s argument. The government‘s argument that Texeira-Nieves had not shown he suffered from sickle cell anemia is not only clearly erroneous based on reviewing the entire record, but it lacks any supporting evidence whatsoever. See Pullman-Standard v. Swift, 456 U.S. 273, 284 n.14 (1982) (citation omitted) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistakе has been committed.“). However, since the extraordinary and compelling reasons issue need not be reached in this case, I concur with the majority.