United States v. Michael JonesUnited States v. Michael Jones
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Matthew Ahn, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Alissa M. Sterling, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellee.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which STRANCH, J., joined. COOK (pp. 23–24), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The “compassionate release” provision of
The First Step Act and COVID-19 have redefined the compassionate release landscape. Because this court had little opportunity to examine compassionate release before this annus horribilis, technical questions regarding
Here, the district court found for the sake of argument that an extraordinary and compelling circumstance existed in Jones’s case but that the
I. BACKGROUND
Last year, Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base, R. 135 (Superseding Information), and the district court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, R. 189 (Sent’g Hr’g at 12) (Page ID #1391).4 Jones is serving his sentence at FCI Elkton. R. 190–1 (Pro Se Mot. at 1) (Page ID #1398). In mid-2020, Jones filed a pro se emergency motion and a supplemental motion by counsel seeking compassionate release. R. 190 (Pro Se Mot.); R. 193 (Suppl. Mot.).5 Jones asserted that “[t]he outbreak of COVID-19 at Elkton is an extraordinary and compelling circumstance that justifies a reduction in [his] custodial sentence.” R. 193 (Suppl. Mot. at 2) (Page ID #1404). Jones contended that he exhibited symptoms of COVID-19, “including a dry cough, lack of taste and smell, chills, respiratory trouble, and an intermittent fever,” but was not tested until May 22, 2020, id., “weeks after his symptoms began[,]” id. at 8 (Page ID #1410).6 Three medical factors may expose Jones to a high risk of complications associated with COVID-19: Jones may have respiratory issues due his exposure to tuberculosis in 2003, id. at 10 (Page ID #1412), he is over forty years old, id., and he is obese, R. 202 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 1) (Page ID #1539). According to Jones, that “inmates at Elkton continue to die[] demonstrat[es] that the medical capabilities of the BOP are leading to otherwise preventable deaths.” R. 193 (Suppl. Mot. at 2) (Page ID #1404). Accordingly, Jones requested that the district court “reduce his sentence to time served” and that he be placed on supervised release so that he could get the “appropriate diagnosis and
The district court denied Jones’s motion. R. 202 (Dist Ct. Op. at 1) (Page ID #1539). The court explained that it “may reduce a prisoner’s sentence if (1) ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’ and (2) ‘such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission’ [pursuant to]
On appeal, Jones argues that the district court “abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jones’s release based on an improper weighing of the
Jones’s case raises three queries that are relevant to all compassionate release cases: what are the necessary components of a compassionate release decision; must a district court defer to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 in rendering its “extraordinary and compelling circumstance” decision; and what does it take for a district court to satisfy its obligation to explain the factual reasons undergirding its compassionate release decision? To answer these three questions, we start with a short historical review.
II. THE HISTORY OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
We begin with the origin of compassionate release. In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress abolished federal parole and forbade the federal courts from “modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has
But two entities—the BOP and the Sentencing Commission—circumscribed the courts’ ability to reduce sentences under
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also provided that “[t]he [Sentencing] Commission, in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in [
Despite the command of Congress in 1984, the 2006 policy statement did not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Rather, the statement was little more than an unenlightening repetition. Section 1B1.13(1)(A) parroted the “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [a sentence] reduction” language from
Frustrated with the BOP’s conservative approach, a bipartisan coalition in Congress sought to boost grants of compassionate release by reforming
Data indicate that the First Step Act’s tearing down the BOP’s levee between imprisoned persons and the federal courts is already achieving Congress’s desired effect. In 2019, federal courts granted 145 compassionate release motions; incarcerated individuals filed ninety-six (67.1%) of the motions, and the BOP filed the other forty-seven (32.9%). See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 47. We are now well into the second year of the First Step Act’s implementation, a year defined by COVID-19. The BOP denied or ignored more than 98% of compassionate release requеsts in the first three months of the pandemic. See Blakinger & Neff, supra note 1 (citing data provided by the BOP). Now unhindered by the BOP’s procedural bars, incarcerated persons’ filing and federal courts’ granting
III. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s Three-Step Test
With this historical backdrop in mind, we turn to the pertinent statutory text. After the First Step Act,
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment.—The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
(1) in any case—
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of
probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that— (i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .
(emphasis added).
From the plain text, we can glean the necessary ingredients for a district court’s compassionate release analysis. Congress’s use of “may” in
But due to
Supreme Court precedent confirms that the order of analysis that we identified in Ruffin is correct.
In Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), the Court considered the constitutional and practical implications of sentencing decisions pursuant to
(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment.—The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
. . .
(2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) , upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
Section 3582(c)(2) instructs a district court to “conside[r] the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,” but it authorizes a reduction on that basis only “if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”—namely, § 1B1.10. The statute thus establishes a two-step inquiry. A court must first determine that a reduction is consistent with § 1B1.10 before it may consider whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part, according to the factors set forth in § 3553(a). . . . Because reference to § 3553(a) is appropriate only at the second step of this circumscribed inquiry, it cannot serve to transform the proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) into plenary resentencing proceedings.
Id. at 826–27 (first alteration in original); see also United States v. Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948–49 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying two-step inquiry from Dillon); United States v. Webb, 760 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2014) (same).
Sections 3582(c)(1)’s and (c)(2)’s parallel language and structure10 compel us to conclude that compassionate release hearings are sentence-modification proceedings and that courts considering motions filed under
authorized by [steps one and two] is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Id.
Here, the district judge assumed for the sake of argument that extraordinary and compelling reasons existed in Jones’s case and then proceeded to weigh several
IV. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE § 1B1.13
To understand our second holding—that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not an “applicable” policy statement when an imprisoned person files a motion for compassionate release—a brief recap of the Sentencing Commission’s role in the compassionate release process is merited. The Sentencing Commission helps determine which “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant compassionate release. In
Thus, a question arises: given the First Step Act’s procedural reforms to compassionate release, is § 1B1.13 still an applicable—“that is, ‘relevant’ or ‘appropriate,’” Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 2020 WL 6268582, at *6 (citation omitted)—policy statement for the purposes of the second
Examining the four corners of § 1B1.13 alone, it becomes immediately apparent that the policy statement does not wholly survive the First Step Act’s promulgation. The first sentence of § 1B.13 predicates the entire policy statement on the Director of the BOP’s filing a motion for compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018) (“Upon motion of
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons under
Congressional intent further dissuades us from enforcing the black letter of Application Note 1’s catch-all provision as written, which limits district courts to “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that the BOP has defined. Again, the First Step Act’s main co-sponsors were displeased that a mere trickle of compassionate releases occurred under the BOP’s supervision. See 2017 Letter from Senator Brian Schatz et al., supra. In the First Step Act, Congress sought to “expand[] compassionate release[,]” 164 Cong. Rec. S7774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018), “expedite[] compassionate release applications,” id., “improve[] application of compassionate release[,]” 164 Cong. Rec. H10362 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2018), and “increase the use of compassionate release[,]” 2017 Letter from Senator Brian Schatz et al., supra. Section 603(b)’s title itself speaks volumes about Congress’s intent: “Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release.” First Step Act of 2018, § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239. “After watching decades of the BOP Director’s failure to bring any significant number of compassionate release motions before the courts, Congress allowed [persons] seeking compassionate release to avoid BOP” and “made the courts the decision maker as to compassionate release.” Brooker, 976 F.3d at 236. It would make little sense for the courts to operate as if the BOP remains the sole gatekeeper of compassionate release, which would reflect a bygone era that Congress intentionally amended in the First Step Act.
We are also attentive to the Sentencing Commission’s careful composition of § 1B1.13’s Application Note 1. Concerned with “two reports issued by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General that are сritical of the Bureau of Prisons’ implementation of its compassionate release program[,]” the Commission “conducted an in-depth review of” compassionate release. See U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amendment 799 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N NOV. 1, 2016). This review included “consideration of Bureau of Prisons data” and holding a public hearing in 2016 on the subject. Id. Recognizing the “need to broaden the criteria for eligibility, to add guidance to the medical criteria, and to remove other administrative hurdles that limit the availability of compassionate release for otherwise eligible defendants[,]” the Sentencing Commission “broaden[ed]” its “guidance on what should be considered ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for compassionate release” in its 2016 amendments to Application Note 1. Id.18 Thus,
By following the Second Circuit’s lead, we weave together three compatible aspirations: preserving as much of § 1B1.13 that can be saved, adhering to Congress’s intent, and respecting the Sentencing Commission’s thoughtful authorship of § 1B1.13’s commentary.20 In cases where incarcerated persons file motions for compassionate release, federal judges may skip step two of the
V. DISTRICT COURTS’ OBLIGATION TO EXPLAIN
We now consider whether the district court properly weighed the
We review a district court’s denial of compassionatе release for abuse of discretion. See id. at *4; United States v. Keefer, — F. App’x —, No. 19-4148, 2020 WL 6112795, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2020); United States v. Kincaid, 802 F. App’x 187, 188 (6th Cir. 2020) (order).22 The abuse-of-discretion standard is “deferential,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007),
but “‘discretion’ does not mean ‘whim.’” Keefer, 2020 WL 6112795, at *4 (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)). The standard “does not preclude an appellate court’s correction of a district court’s legal or factual error[.]” Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014). “A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)); see also United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381, 383 (6th Cir. 2010) (“A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies the law improperly, or uses an erroneous legal standard.”). “A court might abuse its discretion, for example, if it misreads the meaning of the extraordinary-reason requirement” or “if it interprets the law to bar it from granting a reduction when, in fact, it has discretion to do so.” Keefer, 2020 WL 6112795, at *4.
We must strike the proper balance under the abuse-of-discretion standard, which demands that we both accord due deference to district judges and correct their factual and legal errors. We start by requiring “a thorough factual record for our review”: district courts must supply “specific factual rеasons, including but not limited to due consideration of the
District judges maintain an “obligation to provide reasons” in both sentencing-modification decisions, Chavez-Meza v. United States, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1963 (2018), and traditional sentencing decisions, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–58 (2007).23
This
Of course, we do not “insist[]” that district courts pen a “full opinion” in every sentencing or sentencing-modification decision. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356). “[W]here ‘a matter is [] conceptually simple . . . and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.’” Id. (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 359). But our leniency is highly dependent on “context and the record[,]” id. at 1966 (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 359), and is reserved for the simplest of cases, see id. at 1967–68 (“[G]iven the simplicity of this case, the judge’s awareness of the arguments, his consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, and the intuitive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bottom of the new range, the judge’s explanation (minimal as it was) fell within the scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing judge.”). Even when sentence-modification cases appear straightforward, we nonetheless encourage judges to be explicit and particular with their factual reasoning. See id. at 1967 (“[T]he courts of appeals are well suited to request a more detailed explanation when necessary.”).
But the Chavez-Meza Court declined to decide whether district judges’ obligation to explain their decisions is the same in sentencing and sentenсe-modification proceedings. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965. Nonetheless, the Court indicated that some obligation to explain the reasons behind sentence-modification decisions exists. See id. (“The Government, pointing out that this is a sentence-modification case, argues that this fact alone should secure it a virtually automatic victory. That is because, unlike an ordinary Guidelines sentencing case, the statute governing sentence-modification motions does not insist that the judge provide a ‘reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.’ . . . [T]he Government asserts . . . that ‘the court has no duty’ to provide an ‘on-the-record explanation’ of its reasons. We need not go so far.”) (citations omitted)). Our decision here is in line with Chavez-Meza.
When compassionate release motions are decided on the papers—as they often are—appellate courts cannot glean district judges’ factual findings from hearing transcripts or other record items as is possible in our reviews of traditional sentencing decisions. We require judges to write more extensively in
In the mine-run of
We further refine the district court’s obligation to explain at the third
Once again, we counterpoise deference and review. District courts should consider all relevant
Notably, the district judge went through every relevant
Jones argues that the judge, in his compassionate release decision, should have explicitly contеmplated the judge’s own statements at Jones’s initial sentencing proceeding that his “hands are tied” in giving Jones the mandatory minimum sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 3, 5. But the very statements that Jones points to indicate that the district judge did consider Jones’s mandatory
minimum sentence. Again, district judges may be more cursory in their compassionate release decisions if the
“Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added). A record that is all bones and no meat starves criminal defendants of meaningful appellate review. But when the whole record denotes that a judge carefully reviewed all the arguments and evidence when applying
We affirm.
CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT
COOK, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. The scope of “extraоrdinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release under
The majority writes that “we can abstain no longer” from deciding this issue because, unlike Ruffin, the district court here “did not reference [USSG] § 1B1.13 at all in deciding whether ‘extraordinary and compelling’ circumstances existed.” Op. at 13. But I maintain that distinction makes no difference here. Ruffin “merely flag[ged]” the issue because the court could “affirm the denial of relief based on the third discretionary rationale alone”—the
To the extent the majority finds that its three-step “order of analysis” for compassionate-release claims requires our intervention, I disagree. Op. at 10. No feature of
I agree with the majority that the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the
I concur in the judgment to affirm.