UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTIAN ALEJANDRO ESTRELLA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 22-10027
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
June 6, 2023
Before: Jay S. Bybee and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges, and Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. Opinion by Judge Bennett.
D.C. No. 3:19-cr-00517-WHO-1. Argued and Submitted February 7, 2023, San Francisco, California.
Criminal Law
The panel affirmed the district court‘s denial of Christian Alejandro Estrella‘s motion to suppress evidence in a case in which Estrella entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
Estrella was arrested after two officers discovered a handgun concealed in his vehicle. At the time of this encounter, Estrella was a registered gang member on California state parole, and was subject to a suspicionless search condition that has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Estrella argued on appeal that the officers did not have advance knowledge that he was on parole at the time of this encounter. It is firmly established that a search of a parolee that complies with the terms of a valid search condition will usually be deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This Court has held that as a threshold requirement an officer must know of a detainee‘s parole status before that person can be detained and searched pursuant to a parole condition. But the Court has yet to specifically address how precise that knowledge must be.
The panel held that a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to believe that a person is on active parole before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition. Consistent with caselaw, and with
Applying this standard, the panel concluded that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that Estrella remained on active parole when he was detained and searched. The panel further held that this encounter did not violate California‘s independent prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches.
COUNSEL
Yevgeniy M. Parkman (argued) and Angela Chuang, Assistant Federal Public Defenders; Jodi Linker, Federal Public Defender; Federal Public Defender‘s Office; San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellant.
Molly Smolen (argued) and Kristina Green, Assistant United States Attorneys; Matthew M. Yelovich, Appellate Section Chief, Criminal Division; Stephanie M. Hinds, United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney; San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
BENNETT, District Judge:
On August 14, 2019, Appellant Christian Alejandro Estrella (“Estrella“) was arrested as a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm after two officers discovered a handgun and ammunition concealed in his vehicle. At the time of this encounter, Estrella was a registered gang member on California state parole, and was subject to a suspicionless search condition that has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See
It is firmly established that “[a] search of a parolee that complies with the terms of a valid search condition will usually be deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Cervantes, 859 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017). As a threshold requirement, we have held that “an officer must know of a detainee‘s parole status before that person can be detained and searched pursuant to a parole condition.” Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 2005). However, this Court has yet to specifically address how precise that knowledge must be.
For the reasons articulated below, we now hold that a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to believe that a person is on active parole before he may be detained and searched pursuant to a parole condition. Although a law
Applying this standard, we conclude that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that Estrella remained on active parole when he was detained and searched on August 14, 2019. We further hold that this encounter did not violate California‘s independent prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Estrella‘s motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
As this appeal arises from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the facts set forth in the district court‘s order denying that motion, and the declarations, exhibits, and footage upon which that order was founded. “We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo, and any underlying findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Vandergroen, 964 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2020). In 2015, Estrella stipulated to a gang-related sentence enhancement following a conviction for Obstructing or Resisting an Executive Officer, in violation of
Following his release from prison, Estrella relocated to Lakeport, California. On July 2, 2018, Estrella visited the Lakeport Police Department (“LPD“) to register as a convicted gang member, as required by
On July 3, 2018, one day after Estrella completed his gang registration, Trouette visited Estrella at his home. According to the Government, Trouette and Estrella discussed Estrella‘s parole conditions, and confirmed that he was prohibited from associating with a gang or wearing gang attire. In his declaration, cited by the district court, Trouette describes this conversation as follows:
I told Mr. Estrella that I had not yet reviewed his gang conditions, but I presumed that they included that he could not associate with
other gang members or possess things that are associated with the gang. Mr. Estrella said that he knew all the rules. Later in the conversation, I told him that LPD had knowledge of the Angelino[] Heights Sure[ñ]os and that he would not get away with wearing Oakland Athletics’ hats or other things like that. Based on my training and experience, I know Oakland Athletics’ hats are commonly worn by members of the Angelino[] Heights Sure[ñ]os because, to members of the gang, the ‘A’ on the hat signifies ‘Angelino.’
Thereafter, between July 2018 and August 2019, Trouette “had several additional conversations with . . . Estrella‘s parole officer about . . . Estrella.” Through these conversations, the parole officer informed Trouette of Estrella‘s “conditions of parole and gang terms.” Additionally, in April 2019, the parole officer informed Trouette that Estrella “had violated his parole by committing a battery.”2 He did not indicate at any point that Estrella‘s parole was soon to expire.
This appeal arises from an encounter between Trouette and Estrella on August 14, 2019—fourteen months after Trouette learned that Estrella had been placed on parole, and only four months after Trouette was informed that Estrella had violated his parole conditions. At the time, Trouette was the Field Training Officer for Officer Ryan Cooley (“Cooley“), a new officer enrolled in LPD‘s field training
The officers turned around and drove up Polk Street. As they approached Estrella, Trouette observed that the defendant was wearing an Oakland Athletics hat, which he recognized as a sign of the Angelino Heights Sureños gang and a violation of Estrella‘s parole condition prohibiting gang symbols and attire. The officers parked “several car lengths” down the street and approached on foot, in full police uniform and with their guns visible. Estrella walked towards them and met them partway.3
A short conversation ensued. Cooley asked Estrella “what he was up to.” Estrella explained that he had just returned home from work and was working on his car. Trouette instructed Cooley to inform dispatch of their location, and Cooley stepped away to convey this information. While Cooley was speaking to dispatch,
About ninety seconds after the encounter began, Cooley returned to the scene. Cooley asked Estrella whether he had identification and whether he was on probation or parole. Estrella confirmed that he was on parole and volunteered his driver‘s license, and Cooley again contacted dispatch to verify this information. Dispatch confirmed that Estrella was on probation until October 2019, that he was on California parole until 2020, and that he had registered as a convicted felon and a member of the Angelino Heights Sureños gang. Thereafter, the officers searched his person and his vehicle. Estrella informed Trouette that he had a gun in the car, and the officer promptly placed him under arrest. Cooley found a loaded Ruger 9mm handgun and nine rounds of ammunition in the car‘s center console.
On October 10, 2019, Estrella was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of
Following a hearing, the district court denied Estrella‘s motion to suppress. The court assumed without deciding that a seizure had occurred but found that it was valid as a parole seizure regardless. The court concluded that Trouette had a “reasonable belief” in Estrella‘s parole status and that “this level of knowledge is sufficient” to justify a suspicionless parole seizure under
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence de novo. United States v. Peterson, 995 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 472 (2021); United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016); United Statesv. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court‘s underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, Peterson, 995 F.3d at 1064, while pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 414-15 (9th Cir. 2012). Additionally, this Court may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress “on any basis supported by the record.” United States v. McClendon, 713 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment to the
Nevertheless, law enforcement officers do not possess unfettered discretion to detain and search suspected parolees. Two principles constrain an officer‘s authority to conduct a suspicionless parole search or seizure pursuant to
Estrella invokes both limitations to argue that his detention and search violate the Fourth Amendment.5 First, Estrella claims that an officer must possess “actual knowledge” of the suspect‘s parole status before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition. Applying this framework, he argues that Trouette did not know that Estrella was on active parole, as Trouette did not know precisely when Estrella‘s parole had begun or when it was scheduled to conclude. Second, Estrella argues this encounter was arbitrary, capricious, or harassing, as Trouette was motivated to train Cooley, not by legitimate law enforcement concerns. Both arguments fail. For the reasons detailed below, we hold that an officer must have probable cause to believe that a person is on active parole before initiating a parole search, and that the information known to Trouette at the time of the encounter satisfied this requirement. Additionally, we hold that this encounter does not
I. Knowledge Prerequisite to Parole Searches
The parties dispute whether Trouette had sufficient knowledge of Estrella‘s parole status to detain and search him pursuant to
While we have held that an officer must possess advance knowledge of a parolee‘s status to conduct a parole search, we have yet to decide how precise that knowledge must be. As the LPD‘s gang specialist, Trouette was familiar with the effect of gang-related convictions and the typical length of California parole terms. Prior to the encounter on August 14, 2019, he had spoken with Estrella personally, familiarized
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Estrella relies on United States v. Caseres, in which we held that California‘s statutory search condition “validates a search only if the police had advance knowledge that the search condition applied.” 533 F.3d 1064, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2008). In Caseres, the defendant was arrested following a foot chase, and admitted to the arresting officer that he was on parole. Id. at 1067-68, 1074. Sometime later, officers
Estrella analogizes Caseres to argue that the “advance knowledge” requirement set forth by our caselaw demands nothing short of “actual knowledge.” He proposes a rigorous standard under which “[a]n officer does not know that a person is presently on parole unless the facts known to the officer require that conclusion.” Any lesser rule, he argues, would depart from our precedent and derogate from the privacy protections embodied by the Fourth Amendment,
This argument reads too much into our caselaw. The “advance knowledge” threshold imposed by our jurisprudence is not an “actual knowledge” requirement. Rather, it addresses the general prohibition on retroactive justifications. While we have held that the parole search exception “validates a search only if the police had advance knowledge that the search condition applied,” Caseres, 533 F.3d at 1075-76, the thrust and import of this rule is that officers “cannot retroactively justify a suspicionless search and arrest on the basis of an after-the-fact discovery of an arrest warrant or a parole condition.” Moreno, 431 F.3d at 641; accord Fitzgerald, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (“[A] knowledge-first requirement is appropriate to deter future police misconduct and to effectuate the Fourth Amendment‘s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures” (quoting Sanders, 73 P.3d at 504)). Although these cases found the officer‘s lack of advance knowledge dispositive, they did not discuss or decide the standard for knowledge. Such a standard should not be assumed. See United States v. Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2022) (“[C]ases are not precedential for propositions not considered, or for matters that are simply assumed.” (cleaned up)).
Nor do we read the facts of Caseres to demand such a rigorous requirement. The relevant issue in Caseres was whether “the search of Caseres‘s car can be justified after the fact as a parole search.” 533 F.3d at 1075. As noted above, the officer in that case encountered the defendant during a
As we are not constrained by our precedent, we decline to adopt the inflexible standard Estrella proposes, which would create practical problems for everyday police work. If the standard is “actual knowledge,” with no latitude for uncertainty, officers must possess “up-to-the-minute
The Government suggests that we adopt the standard outlined in People v. Douglas, in which a California appellate court held that “[a]n officer ‘knows’ a subject is on [parole] if the officer‘s belief is objectively reasonable.” 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 89-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). In Douglas, an officer on patrol detained a probationer and searched his vehicle without probable cause, discovering a firearm that led to felon in possession charges. Id. at 82-83. The officer did not consult the police database to verify that the defendant was on probation before conducting the search. Id. However, he had arrested the defendant for weapon possession two years prior, and he recalled seeing the defendant‘s name on a list of probationers “within the preceding two months.” Id.. The trial court denied the defendant‘s motion to suppress, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 83-84. At the outset, the court rejected the argument that an officer must have “absolute certainty” predicated on “up-to-the-minute information” to possess “advance knowledge” of an applicable search condition. Id. at 89.11 Instead, the court analogized state and federal Fourth
This framework is consistent with generally applicable Fourth Amendment principles. Generally, the predicate circumstances that justify a challenged search or seizure must be known to the officer at the time of the challenged encounter. See Moreno, 431 F.3d at 639, 641; accord Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“[A]lmost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer‘s actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.“). Consequently, officers cannot manufacture probable cause or an exception to the warrant requirement based on facts that are discovered during or after a search. Moreno, 431 F.3d at 639, 641; see, e.g., Job, 871 F.3d at 859, 863 (officers found search waiver after conducting pat-down search); United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1973) (officer discovered outstanding traffic warrant after detaining defendant). Thus, in nearly every situation, officers must have “advance knowledge” of the circumstances that justify a search or seizure.
Estrella‘s parole status to justify the seizure, that additional granularity is unnecessary here.
Nevertheless, although we concur with the principles articulated in Douglas, we conclude that probable cause is a more principled standard to apply. “Determining the reasonableness of a particular search involves balancing the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual‘s privacy against the degree to which the search is needed to further legitimate governmental interests.” Ioane v. Hodges, 939 F.3d 945, 953 (9th Cir. 2018); accord Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.“). The statute at issue here confers broad discretion to detain and search parolees “at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant or with or without cause.” Cal. Penal Code § 3067(b)(3). Applied to parolees, whose expectations of privacy are diminished, this provision is reasonable. However, the precondition at issue in this case safeguards the rights of third parties, who retain their privacy interests in full. Granting officers too much latitude to search individuals who are believed to be on parole would create a substantial risk that third parties are searched or seized based on faulty assumptions about their parole status, and without any suspicion of criminal activity. Unfettered discretion of that nature is precisely what the Fourth Amendment proscribes. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).
Probable cause is better calibrated to reduce the likelihood of such intrusions. “The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing interests.” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012). This framework has been developed through decades of caselaw and is familiar to law enforcement officers and judges across this circuit. The principled protections that it offers adequately balance “the individual‘s right to liberty and the State‘s duty to control crime,” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975), “safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy” while conferring commonsense flexibility to police officers, Brinegar, 338
The probable cause threshold also accords with our caselaw defining the scope of a parole search. Before they may search property pursuant to a parole condition authorizing suspicionless searches, “officers must have a sufficient ‘degree of knowledge’ that the search condition applies to the place or object to be searched.” United States v. Dixon, 984 F.3d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2013)). Implementing this prerequisite, we have twice defined the necessary “degree of knowledge” to be probable cause. See, e.g., Dixon, 984 F.3d at 822 (addressing searches of vehicles); Grandberry, 730 F.3d at 973 (addressing searches of homes).12 These cases recognize that a probable cause requirement provides ample protection for the interests of third parties—and that a lesser standard would undermine their most essential Fourth Amendment rights. Dixon, 984 F.3d at 822 (“[A] reasonable suspicion standard runs the risk of officers conducting intrusive searches on vehicles that have no connection to the individual subject to the search
Estrella counters that the public policy and privacy interests at stake compel a more rigid standard, and that anything short of actual knowledge is insufficient to justify the gravity of the intrusions authorized by this statute.13 As Estrella notes:
Officer Trouette‘s experience with the general length of parole cannot make up for his ignorance about Mr. Estrella‘s particular parole term. It is unreasonable for an officer to believe that every parole term is at least three years based on the usual term being three to four years. Otherwise, police officers could stop and search everyone released on parole for at least three years after release without ever checking the length of their parole.
However, this argument dilutes the record. Trouette did not merely assume that Estrella had an average parole term—he
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Applying the foregoing principles, we hold that a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to believe that an individual is on active parole before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition. Consistent with our caselaw, and with general Fourth Amendment principles, the officer must possess advance knowledge of an applicable parole condition before they may detain or search a parolee. Moreno, 431 F.3d at 641. That knowledge must be particularized enough for the officer to be aware that a parole condition applies and authorizes the encounter. Caseres, 533 F.3d at 1076. However, the officer need not be absolutely certain, with ongoing day-by-day or minute-by-minute awareness of the subject‘s parole status. Douglas, 193 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 89-90.14 Instead, it is sufficient for the officer to find, using the well-established rules governing probable cause, that the
Applying this rubric, we hold that Trouette had probable cause to believe that Estrella was on active parole at the time of the encounter. As in Douglas, Trouette was familiar with Estrella: He met Estrella personally, reviewed his criminal history, discussed his parole conditions, and maintained contact with his parole officer. Although he did not know the precise start and end dates of Estrella‘s parole term, he knew that California parole ordinarily lasts three to four years. He also had good reason to believe that Estrella‘s term was not over: Estrella was released from prison in July 2018, about one year prior, and had violated a parole condition in April 2019, only four months prior. And distinct from Caseres, there was no uncertainty that Estrella was placed on California parole. Accordingly, Trouette had probable cause to believe that Estrella was subject to the statutory search condition imposed by
II. Prohibition on Arbitrary and Harassing Searches
In the alternative, Estrella argues that the entire encounter was arbitrary, as Trouette was motivated to train Cooley, rather than to perform legitimate police duties. A parole search may be unconstitutional if “the officers violated California‘s prohibition against arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches.” Cervantes, 859 F.3d at 1183; accord Samson, 547 U.S. at 856; Ped, 943 F.3d at 432. Under California law, a search constitutes harassment if it is “unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by
Estrella argues that “Officer Trouette treated the interaction with Mr. Estrella as a ‘training tool’ for Officer Cooley,” and that the officers had no legitimate reason to detain him.16 Trouette was responsible for training Cooley as part of the LPD‘s field training program. Additionally, he attested that he perceived the stop as a training opportunity, and withheld information from Cooley to test the junior officer‘s resourcefulness. Estrella contends that this is not a
We need not decide whether a stop undertaken solely to train a junior officer would be arbitrary or capricious, because the record does not support Estrella‘s claim that the officers searched and seized him exclusively as a training exercise. Rather, Trouette decided to conduct a parole compliance check and saw Estrella wearing an Oakland Athletics hat—a symbol of the Angelino Heights Sureños and a violation of Estrella‘s parole conditions. This is a wholly legitimate reason to conduct a parole or probation search under California law. See, e.g., People v. Woods, 981 P.2d 1019, 1027-28 (Cal. 1999) (noting that probation searches may be conducted to “monitor the probationer“). It is true that Trouette brought Cooley into the field to train him in the fundamentals of police work, and it may be true that he saw the encounter with Estrella as an opportunity to provide such instruction. Regardless, these considerations do not vitiate Trouette‘s legitimate reason for initiating the encounter. The entire point of field training programs is to give new officers experience with police work through hands-on encounters in the field. That does not make them harassment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the denial of Estrella‘s motion to suppress.