*1 DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN SOUTH July 6, Argued No. 75-76. March 1976 Decided Janklow, William J. Attorney General of Da- South kota, argued the cause for petitioner. him With on the brief Mettler, was Earl R. Attorney Assistant General. Ulrich,
Robert C. appointment of the 1012, argued respondent pro the cause for hac vice. him on With the brief were Lee McCahren and M. *2 Hagemann* John F. Burger opinion of delivered
Mr. Chief Justice the Court. judgment Supreme
We review the Court of holding police Dakota, South local violated the Fourth ap- Amendment Federal Constitution, plicable the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, they when conducted a routine inventory search an lawfully impounded by police automobile for violations municipal parking ordinances. Local prohibit parking ordinances certain areas of downtown Vermillion, D., between the hours of a. m. and During early morning a. m. of Decem- hours ber police respond- a Vermillion officer observed 10, 1973, unoccupied ent’s vehicle illegally parked in the restricted At approximately zone. 3 a. the officer issued an m., parking overtime placed ticket and it on the car’s wind- shield. The citation warned:
“Vehicles in of any parking violation ordinance may be towed from the area.” At approximately 10 o’clock on the an- morning, same urging by *Briefs of amici Hvelle curiae reversal were filed J. General, Younger, Attorney Winkler, Jack At- R. Chief Assistant torney General, Attorney Clark Moore, General, Assistant and Kent Anderson, Deputy Attorneys L. Richland and Robert R. Gen- eral, by California; Sendak, Attorney for the State of Theodore L. Attorney General, Bogard, Donald P. and Executive Assistant Gen- eral, by Toney Attorney General, Indiana; Anaya, State of Harris, Deputy Attorney General, O. Warren F. for the State Wayne Mexico; of New W. Schmidt for Americans for Effec- Enforcement, tive Law Inc.
other officer second park- issued a ticket for an overtime ing routinely violation. These circumstances were re- ported police headquarters, and after the vehicle was city the car inspected, impound was towed to the lot. From impound outside the car at lot, officer observed a on other watch the dashboard and of personal property items located on the back seat and back floorboard. At the officer's the car door direction, was then and, using unlocked a standard form pursuant to standard procedures, the officer in- ventoried the contents of the car, including the contents glove which was There compartment, unlocked. he found plastic bag. marihuana contained All *3 items, including contraband, the were removed police department for safekeeping.1 During the late of 10, afternoon December respondent appeared at the police department claim property. his The marihuana by police. was retained
Respondent subsequently charges was arrested on of possession of suppress marihuana. His motion to yielded by inventory evidence denied; search was he was jury convicted after a trial and sentenced to a fine of days’ $100 and 14 county incarceration in the jail. On Supreme appeal, Court of South Dakota reversed
1 respondent’s trial, At inventory officer who conducted the testified as follows: “Q. you why And did this car? “A, Mainly for safekeeping, we because have had a of trouble lot past people getting impound breaking into the lot and stealing
into cars and stuff out them. “Q. you Do know whether the vehicles that were broken . . into . were locked unlocked?
“A. locked, they Both of them were would be locked.” 74. Record describing impound lot, the officer stated: county “A. It’s the highway yard. old It has a wooden fence partially part it, around dilapidated and kind of fence, a wire makeshift Id., fence.” at 73.
367 the conviction. 89 228 -, S. D. 2d 152. N. W. court concluded that the evidence had been obtained Fourth prohibition against violation of the Amendment granted unreasonable searches and seizures. cer We tiorari, U. S. and we reverse. (1975), traditionally This Court has drawn distinction be tween automobiles and or offices in relation to the homes Fourth Although Amendment. automobiles are “effects” and thus Amendment, within the reach of the Fourth Cady Dombrowski, U. S. war- rantless examinations of automobiles been upheld have in which circumstances a search of a home or office would not. Cardwell Lewis, (1974); Dombrowski, Cady v. supra, at Chambers v. 439-440; Maroney, 399 (1970).
The reason
well-settled distinction is twofold.
First,
mobility
inherent
cir
automobiles creates
cumstances of
exigency that,
practical necessity,
such
as a
rigorous enforcement of
requirement
the warrant
is im
possible.
Carroll v. United
153-
Coolidge
154 Hampshire,
v. New
459-460
But the
upheld
Court has also
warrant-
less searches where no immediate
danger
presented
*4
the car
jurisdiction.
would be removed from the
Maroney,
Chambers v.
supra,
51-52; Cooper
v.
California,
sponsibilities for ensuring public safety, law enforce- ment necessarily brought officials are frequent into con- tact with distinctly automobiles. Most of this contact Dombrowski, Cady noncriminal nature. supra, Automobiles, subjected 442. unlike are homes, per- to governmental vasive and continuing regulation and con- including trols, periodic inspection licensing and require- everyday As an ments. police stop and occurrence, plates examine vehicles when license inspection or stickers have or if other expired, such violations, as exhaust fumes or excessive are if noise, noted, headlights or or other safety equipment are not in proper working order.
The expectation privacy to fur- as automobiles is ther obviously diminished public nature of auto- Only mobile travel. two Terms Court ago, the noted: “One has a expectation lesser in a mo- tor transportation vehicle because its function is as seldom serves one’s residence or the reposi- tory personal effects. It public ... travels thor- oughfares occupants where both its its contents plain Lewis, are view.” Cardwell v. supra, at 590.
In public safety the interests of part and as of what “community the Court has caretaking called functions,” Dombrowski, Cady supra, at 441, automobiles are fre- quently custody. into police taken Vehicle accidents present such permit one occasion. To the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some preserve circumstances evidence, damaged disabled or vehicles will often re- highways moved from the or streets at po- the behest of lice engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activi- inspection private dwellings into and premises commercial safety ascertain health or contrast, procedure conditions. has applicable never been held inspections safety automobile purposes.
369 will frequently ties. Police also impound remove and which automobiles violate which parking ordinances and thereby jeopardize safety public both the and the efficient authority movement of vehicular traffic.3 The of police seize remove impeding from streets vehicles public traffic threatening safety or convenience beyond challenge.
When vehicles are police departments local impounded, generally follow a practice securing routine and in ventorying the automobiles’ procedures contents. These developed response to three distinct needs: protec tion of the property owner’s while it remains in police United Mitchell, States 458 961 custody, 960, F. 2d (CA9 1972); protection against claims disputes over lost or stolen property, States Kelehar, 470 F. 2d 178 (CA5 1972); protec and the potential tion of the from Cali danger, Cooper v. fornia, supra, practice has been 61-62. viewed as to respond essential to incidents of theft or vandalism. Commonwealth, Cobbler 212 Va. 184 S. E. 2d 1073 denied, cert. State, (1972); Warrix v. 368, 376, Wis. 2d 184 N. W. (1971). 2d In police frequently at addition, tempt determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and thereafter abandoned. uniformly caretaking procedures
These have almost by upheld by been state courts, which virtue of localized nature of consider regulation traffic have had able occasion to with Applying deal the issue.4 Appeals York The New Court has noted that York New City alone, 108,332 away cars were towed for traffic violations People during Sullivan, 69, 71, 1969. 2d 272 N. E. N. Y. 2d 464, engaged everyday caretaking to state officials contrast functions:
“The contact with vehicles federal law enforcement officers *6 370 5 the “reasonableness,”
Fourth Amendment standard of concluded even overwhelmingly state courts have that, if the inventory “search,”6 an is characterized as a usually, always, investigation of if not the detection or involves Cady operation crimes v. Dom unrelated to the of a vehicle.” browski, (1973). 433, 440 5 analyzing non, the vel courts have issue reasonableness inventory justi sought protective not to determine whether a by “probable probable fied cause.” The standard of cause is peculiarly investigations, routine, to criminal not non related procedures. generally Note, criminal Warrantless Searches and (1974). Automobiles, 835, Seizures of 87 Harv. 850-851 L. Rev. probable-cause approach unhelpful analysis when centers upon the caretaking reasonableness of routine administrative func tions, particularly protective when no claim is made procedures subterfuge investigations. are a for criminal inventory searches,
In view of the noncriminal context of inapplicability setting requirement probable such a cause, quite correctly courts have held—and search warrants —that required, requirement textually are not linked as the warrant is to probable-cause frequently concept. We have observed that requirement legal warrant assures that inferences and conclusions probable magistrate cause unrelated will drawn a neutral investigative-enforcement process. respect to the criminal With noninvestigative police lawfully inventories of automobiles within governmental custody, however, policies underlying the war- requirement, refers, rant Mr. are which Justice Powell inapplicable. 6 intrusion, benign context of the see Given noncriminal Wyman 309, James, v. 400 U. 317 courts con some have inventory cluded that an does constitute a search for Fourth not purposes. See, g., People Sullivan, supra, 77, Amendment v. e. 2d, 469; People Willis, App. 436, 208 272 E.N. v. 46 Mich. N. W. 2d Wallen, 49-50, 372, 204 44, State 173 2d Neb. N. W. 376, denied, (1970). cert. have ex Other courts pressed to whether the doubts as intrusion is classifiable as a All, App. 286, 770, State 284, search. N. C. 193 S. E. 2d 772, denied, Petitioner, S. 866 however, cert. has expressly abandoned the contention that in this case is exempt from the Fourth Amendment of reasonableness. standard Arg. Tr. of Oral 5.
intrusion is constitutionally permissible.
g., City
e.
See,
St. Paul v. Myles, 298 Minn. 298, 300-301, 218 N.
W.
2d 697, 699 (1974); State v. Tully, 166
Conn. 348 A. 2d
(1974); People
Trusty,
183 Colo.
296-297,
P.
2d
425-426 (1973); People v.
Sullivan, 29
Y.N.
2d 69, 73,
likewise reasonable sustained police intrusions. As Wisdom has observed: Judge custody take sort of con
“[W]hen automobile it is reasonable tainer an ... as] [such property to itemize the container police. underlying held [This reflects] only principle proscribes that the fourth amendment Gravitt, unreasonable United searches.” States v. (CA5 484 2dF. 378 414 cert. 1973), denied, (emphasis 1135 (1974) original). U. S.
372 1142 (CA4 2d Superintendent, v. 528 F. also Cabbler Johnson, 75-1463; Barker v. pending, cert. No.
1975), Mitchell, 458 (CA6 1973); 2d 941 United States v. 484 F. 435 Lipscomb, United States (CA9 2d 960 v. 1972); F. 401 980 (CA5 (1971) ; 2d 795 F. cert. 1970), denied, Pennington, 441 2d 249 cert. United States F. (CA5), v. Boyd, 404 United States v. U. S. 854 denied, (CA5 2d 1203 Cotton United 1971); F. (CA9 Hopper, 2d 385 Lowe 1967). Accord, F. Supp. 976-977 (SD 1975); F. Ga. United States v. Spitalieri, 391 Supp, (ND 1975) F. 169-170 Ohio ; Smith, (Conn. States v. 340 F. Supp. 1972); Fuller, United States Supp. (DC 1967), F. aff'd, App. conviction D. C. F. 2d 533 cases have recognized These that standard in ventories often glove include an examination of the com partment, customary since it is a place for documents of ownership and United States registration, Penning ton, supra, place temporary well as storage of valuables.
The point decisions of this Court unmistakably to the by conclusion reached both federal and state courts that pursuant inventories police procedures standard are In reasonable. the first such case, Mr. Justice Black plain made the nature of the inquiry before us: “But question the here is not whether the search was authorized by state question law. The is rather whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Cooper California, 386 U. S., at (emphasis added). in his last on writing the Fourth And, Amendment, Mr. Justice Black said: Fourth Amendment require
“[T]he does not every search be pursuant made to a It warrant. only and seizures.’ prohibits ‘unreasonable searches the test is not the reasonableness The relevant 0/ warrant, a the reason- opportunity procure but circumstances. ableness of the seizure under all the se by fixed per test of reasonableness cannot be its case must decided own facts.” rules; each on Coolidge New Hampshire, U. 509-510 S., dissenting) added). (concurring (emphasis adopted In the reasonableness standard applying consistently Court the has sustained Framers, impounded in intrusions into automobiles or otherwise process custody lawful where the is aimed at secur- its ing Cooper car and contents. protecting California, supra, upheld inventory the Court of a impounded authority car under the of a state forfeiture statute. Even though was conducted distinctly criminal and carried out setting7 a week after the car been had the Court nonethe- impounded, found less the car examination including search, glove compartment where contraband was found, reasonable under This circumstances. conclusion was reached despite fact that no warrant had issued probable cause to search for the contraband vehicle had not been established. The Court said language explicitly applicable here:
“It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain custody the car their for such length time, no had right, even their own to search protection, it.” 386 61-62.8 S., 7In Cooper, owner had been narcotics-charges, arrested on *9 the car custody pursuant was taken into to the state forfeiture statute. The search was conducted several months before the for proceedings actually feiture were instituted. was, course, certainty There no at the time of the search that proceedings forfeiture would ever be Accordingly, held. there following the Court in Term, the Harris v. upheld U. S. 234 the introduction of conducting officer who, seized an after an
evidence, inventory taking a and while means to search of car safeguard registration lying card it, observed a car on stripping argu- the car the Rejecting metal of the door. ment that a warrant was the held that necessary, Court justifiable protect the was since it to intrusion was “taken the it police custody.” Id., car while was in at 236.9 Cady Dombrowski, Court
Finally, supra, up- the held a warrantless search of an automobile towed to a private no garage though probable even cause existed to believe the that vehicle contained fruits of crime. The justification sole was the warrantless incursion that caretaking was to police incident the function of the local protect community’s safety. protec- to the Indeed, solely tive was police search instituted because local impression” incapacitated “were under Chicago carry driver, police officer, required was his times; service had revolver all reasonable grounds might to believe a be weapon car, thus available to at 436. S., vandals. carefully Court noted protective automatically was no for the reason to assume that the auto eventually Indeed, mobile would forfeited the State. as the Appeal stated, California Court of record instant nowhere “[T]he proceedings respect discloses that forfeiture were instituted in People Cooper, defendant’s car . . .” App. . 234 Cal. 2d Rptr. Cal. No would reason therefore Cooper appear impoundment pursuant to limit to an to a forfeiture statute. expressly legality The Court noted that presented, was not since the point evidence was at the discovered when taking protective the officer was to secure the measures auto mobile from the clearly elements. But the Court held that officer properly acted in opening protective the car for reasons. *10 carried out in procedures accordance with standard police the local ibid., a factor to en- tending department, sure that the intrusion would be limited in scope to necessary carry extent caretaking out the function. United States Spitalieri, Supp., 391 F. at 169. reaching Cady this the Court result, distinguished Preston v. United on grounds that the holding, invalidating a car search con- ducted after vagrancy only arrest, prop- “stands for the osition that the challenged there could not jus- tified as one incident to an arrest.” 444. S.,U. Preston therefore not did raise the issue of the constitu- tionality of protective inventory lawfully of a car within custody. holdings Harris,
The in Cooper, Cady point way to the correct resolution of this case. None of the three cases, course, precise pre- involves the situation here; sented but, as all Fourth Amendment we cases, obliged are to look to all the facts and circumstances of this in light case principles set forth in prior these decisions. a search and seizure is unreasonable
“[W]hether within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment de- pends upon the facts and circumstances of each . . . .” Cooper California, case at 59. S., The Vermillion were indisputably engaged ain caretaking lawfully search of a impounded automobile. Lawson, Cf. States v. 2d (CA8 F. 1973). inventory The only was conducted after the car had been impounded multiple parking for violations. The having left owner, illegally parked his car for an ex- subject tended and thus period, impoundment, present not arrangements make other the safekeep- ing of his belongings. itself was prompted by presence plain view a number of inside As in Cady, sugges-
valuables the car. is no there tion essentially whatever that procedure, standard like followed throughout pretext *11 the was a country, concealing investigatory police an motive.10
On record following we conclude that in standard police procedures, prevailing throughout country the and approved by overwhelming majority the of the courts, conduct of the not was “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. judgment
The of the Supreme South Dakota Court is therefore the reversed, and case is for fur- remanded ther proceedings not opinion. inconsistent with this
Reversed remanded. and concurring. Me. Justice Powell, join I opinion While of the I opin- add this Court, ion express why additional views as to the search con- ducted in this case Fourth is valid under and Fourteenth inquiry Amendments. This involves two inventory distinct questions: whether routine searches (i) are they if impermissible, (ii) not, and whether must be pursuant conducted to a warrant. inventory Respondent's scope. The was not unreasonable in suppress inventory only challenged
motion to state court plain as police to items inside the car not in view. But once lawfully man personal property was inside the car secure the plain view, open not glove unreasonable to the unlocked compartment, ready to which would vandals have had and unob once car. structed access inside the by theory The “consent” the dissent rests on advanced assumption exclusively protection for the protection the car It is not. municipality owner. of the public property officers from claims of or stolen pro- lost and the public Cady tection might firearm, from who vandals find a Dombrowski, here, drugs, contraband are also crucial.
I The central purpose the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard security against of individuals arbitrary by government invasions g., officials. See, e. United States Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. Camara v. Municipal 387 U. prior None of our dispositive decisions is the issue whether the permits Amendment routine in-
ventory “searches” of automobiles.2 Resolution of this
1 Routine inventories of
upon
automobiles intrude
an
area which
private
citizen has a
expectation
privacy.”
“reasonable
Katz v. United
(Harlan,
con
J.,
curring). Thus, despite
benign
purpose,
their
when conducted
government
*12
they
officials
purposes
constitute “searches” for
of the
Fourth
Terry
Ohio,
1,
Amendment. See
v.
392
n. 15
S.
18
U.
(1968); United
Lawson,
(CA8 1973);
States v.
487
2d
F.
468
Superior Court,
Mozzetti
84,
v.
4
699, 709-710,
Cal. 3d
2d
484 P.
(1971) (en
90-91
banc).
Lewis,
Cf.
583,
Cardwell v.
417 U. S.
591
(1974) (plurality opinion).
2
principal
justify
decisions relied on
the State to
inventory
case,
search in this
Harris
United
v.
S.U.
(1968); Cooper
California,
Cady
v.
co C--
question requires weighing governmental of the and justify societal interests advanced such intrusions against constitutionally protected interest of the in dividual citizen in of his effects. United Martinez-Fuerte, States v. at United States v. post, 555; Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 878-879; States v. Ortiz, Dombrowski, (1975); Cady U. Ohio, (1973); Terry 447-448 20-21 Municipal supra, Cf. Camara v. ante, at 534 — 535. As noted in opinion, the Court’s see generally sup three interests been have advanced port (i) protection searches: danger; (ii) protection from police against claims disputes over lost or stolen property; (iii) pro tection property of the owner’s while it remains in custody.
Except danger in rare there is little associated cases, impounding with But the oc- unsearched automobiles. danger may casional exist cannot be discounted en- tirely. Cooper California, 61-62 (1967). The consequences harmful in those rare cases may and there not be great, appear does effec- way tive of identifying in advance those circumstances or classes of automobile impoundments represent which greater Society important risk. also has an interest minimizing against police the number of false claims filed *13 they may community’s respect since diminish the for law generally enforcement department morale, and lower thereby police.3 of It impairing the effectiveness the case, not, provide in the of this circumstances additional alone did justification glove compartment the for the search of closed console in the contraband was discovered. which liability protecting police the from The interest in for lost or Respondent's property in this case. stolen is not relevant motion suppress plain to items inside in was limited the automobile not is not clear, that however, completely inventories are a effective means of discouraging claims, false since there remains possibility the of accompanying such claims with an assertion that an prior item was stolen to the inven- tory or intentionally police from omitted the records. protection the property significant owner’s is a interest for both the policeman and It the citizen. is argued that an necessary not locked since doors rolled-up and windows afford the same protection that the contents of a parked normally enjoy.4 automobile But many might owners leave valuables in their automo- bile temporarily they would not leave there unat- tended the days several police custody may last. There is thus a gain security substantial in if automobiles are inventoried and storage. valuable items removed for And, while security same could be attained posting guard at storage lot, that alterna- may tive prohibitively especially for expensive, jurisdictions.5 smaller
Against these interests must be weighed the citizen’s interest privacy of his contents automobile. Although the expectation automobile is an significantly less than expectation traditional privacy associated with the United States Mar home, tinez-Fuerte, Ortiz, post, at 561-562; United su States v. pra, Lewis, at 896 n. 2; see Cardwell v. 590- 591 (1974) (plurality opinion), unrestrained search And, view. the Supreme Court of South Dakota here held that objects view, plain closing removal of and the windows locking of any duty doors, department satisfied owed protect automobile’s property possession. owner D. -, -, (1975). 89 S. 228 N. W. 2d Superior Court, See Mozzetti v. supra, 2d, at 709-710, 484 P. at 90-91. Note, Automobiles, Warrantless Searches Seizures of Harv. L. Rev.
of an automobile and its contents would constitute a upon serious intrusion in of the individual many circumstances. But such a search is not at issue this As opinion case. the Court’s search emphasizes, the inventory here was limited to unoccupied an auto- strictly mobile and was conducted accord with regulations of Department.6 Up- the Vermillion Police holding type general searches provides no license for the to examine all the contents of such automobiles.7
I agree with the Court that permits Constitution inventory routine and turn searches, question next they pursuant whether must be conducted to a warrant. “inventory complete report” required A is of all im vehicles pounded Department. the Vermillion Police The standard inventory survey windows, consists of a of the vehicle’s exterior — fenders, trunk, apparently and damage, interior, for and its hood — storage. part inventory locate “valuables” for As of each a stand report completed. report ard form The in this case listed the items in both the discovered automobile’s and the unlocked interior glove compartment. only regarding notation the trunk was that impounded was locked. A officer testified that all searched, always glove vehicles are the search includes the compartment, and that the trunk had not been searched in this case because it 33-34, was locked. See Record 73-79. part inventory As their police may search ma discover terials upon such as letters or checkbooks that “touch intimate areas personal of an affairs,” individual’s per much “reveal about a activities, associations, son’s and beliefs.” Bankers Assn. California Shultz, (Powell, 78-79 concurring). J., Fisher also v. United 401 n. 7 police found, alia, this case the inter papers,” “miscellaneous checkbook, book, an loan security installment and a social status is, card. 77. however, Record There no evidence record carrying their out established duties the Vermillion police do other than storage prop remove for such erty examining without its contents.
II While the Fourth speaks broadly Amendment in terms 8 of “unreasonable searches and seizures,” the decisions of this Court recognized have that the definition of “rea sonableness” turns, at least in on part, specific the more dictates of the Warrant Clause. United See States v. United States District 407 (1972) U. S. 315 297, ; Court, States, Katz v. United 389 (1967); U. S. 356 Camara 347, Municipal Court, v. 387 U. atS., 528. As the Court ex plained in States, Katz v. United supra, 357, at conducted without warrants held “[s]earches have been unlawful 'notwithstanding unquestionably showing facts probable Agnello States, v. United 20, cause 33, for the Constitution requires 'that im deliberate, partial judgment of judicial a officer interposed ... between the citizen Wong and the . Sun v. .. States, United 371 U. 471, although S. 481-482.” Thus, have argued that relevant test is not “[s]ome '[t]he whether procure reasonable to a warrant, search but whether the search was United States v. reasonable/ " Rabinowitz, 339 U. 56, (1950),” S. 66 his view has [t] not been accepted.” United States v. United States Dis trict supra, and 16. Chimel n. v. Cali fornia, (1969). 395 U. 752 Except carefully S. in a few defined classes of a search cases, private property without valid consent is “unreasonable” unless it has been authorized g., valid search warrant. See, e. States, Almeida-Sanchez v. United 413 U. S. 269 (1973); Stoner California, 376 U. 486 (1964); S.
8 provides Amendment right people “The persons, houses, to be secure in their papers, effects, against and unreasonable searches seizures, and violated, issue, shall not be and no shall upon probable Warrants but cause, supported by affirmation, particularly Oath or describ- ing place searched, persons things to be or be seized.”
382 Municipal Court, United supra, 528;
Camara v.
Jeffers,
Agnello
(1951);
States v.
51
S.
States,
U.
S.
Although the Court has validated warrantless searches
justify
of automobiles in circumstances
would
not
Dombrowski,
Cady
a home
office,
U.
Maroney,
433 (1973);
Chambers v.
Carroll United
these
general
excep
decisions establish no
“automobile
*16
tion” to
Preston
requirement.
the warrant
v.
See
States,
they
United
376 U.
(1964).
S. 364
dem
Rather,
“
purposes
onstrate that
'for the
of the Fourth Amend
ment there is a constitutional difference between houses
” Cady Dombrowski,
439, quoting
and
supra,
v.
at
cars
Maroney,
may
Chambers
supra,
52,
v.
at
a difference
a
justify
some cases
warrantless search.9
The routine
search under consideration
this case does not fall
ex-
within
the established
ceptions
requirement.10
to the
But
warrant
examination
protected
of the interests
when
which are
searches are
9
mobility
This
primarily
difference turns
on
of the auto
obtaining
many
and
impracticability
mobile
a warrant
circumstances,
g.,
States,
132,
e.
Carroll v. United
267
153—
U. S.
expectation
privacy
154
The lesser
an automobile also
Ortiz,
891,
is important.
United States v.
422
See
U.
896 n.
S.
(1975);
Lewis,
2
S.,
590;
Cardwell v.
417
at
U.
v.
Almeida-Sanchez
266,
States,
concurring).
(Powell,
J.,
United
413 U.
279
Cady Dombrowski,
S.,
v.
441-442.
at
10See,
g.,
California,
e.
(1969); Terry
Chimel v.
U.
395
S. 752
(1968);
Ohio,
Hayden,
294,
Warden
387 U. S.
298-
(1967); Cooper
California,
Brinegar
(1967);
A purpose requirement related of the warrant is to prevent hindsight affecting from the evaluation v. Mar States reasonableness of a search. See tinez-Fuerte, Watson, 565; cf. United States post, dis J., 455 n. (Marshall, In senting). the case of an search conducted department proce accordance with standard danger justifi of dures, significant hindsight there is no impair of will not The absence a warrant cation. review of the reasonableness post-search effectiveness of inventory search. particular of a the context required have been outside Warrants also Municipal Camara In investigation. of a criminal consent, held absent a warrant that, the Court in- necessary building conduct an areawide code though spection, even the search could made absent cause to there par- believe were violations being ticular In buildings requiring searched. a war- emphasized practical rant the Court effect “[t]he of existing procedures warrantless search had [the been] occupant subject to leave the discretion of the of- ficial in since the field/'
“when inspector demands entry, occupant [an] way knowing no of enforcement of whether ha[d] the municipal require inspection code involved [d] way of his no premises, knowing of the lawful limits power way the inspector’s search, and no knowing inspector acting whether the himself [was] proper under S., authorization.” at 532. In the inventory search context these concerns are absent. The owner prior occupant of the automobile is not many present, is there real likelihood cases, nor, that he could be located within period a reasonable time. More no importantly, significant discretion placed in the hands the individual officer: usually he has no subject choice as to the of the search or its scope.11 I with sum, agree the Court that the routine inven- tory search in this case is constitutional.
Mr. Justice whom with Mr. Justice Marshall, Brennan Mr. Justice dissenting. Stewart join, today
The Court holds that the Fourth Amendment permits a routine inventory search of the closed
11In case, example, the officer who conducted the search offending testified that city automobile was towed to the im pound lot after a second ticket had parking been issued for a vio lation. The officer further testified that all vehicles taken to the lot *18 are searched in accordance with a “standard sheet” and “all items in the are removed for safekeeping.” [discovered vehicles] supra. Record 6, 74. See n. impounded a locked automobile compartment of glove hold- ordinary for Under the Court’s traffic violations. se- be without to may attempting such search made ing, particular of cure the consent the owner and without impounded reason contains believe the automobile presents any or dan- contraband, evidence, valuables, I to its ger public.1 custodians or the Because believe contrary holding to to sound elaboration estab- I lished Fourth Amendment dissent. principles, requirement As Mr. recognizes, Justice Powell of a warrant question resolution whether aside, an inventory compartments closed inside a justified locked automobile can ever be as constitution- ally “reasonable” depends upon search2 a reconciliation constitutionally protected owner’s inter- ests against governmental gov- and legitimate intrusion, by ernmental interests furthered car its securing the Terry Ohio, contents. 20-21 1,S. v. Municipal
Camara 387 U. 536- 523, 534-535, 537 (1967). The Court fails clearly articulate the reasons its reconciliation of in this these interests but is least clear to me case, that the considerations consider, however, Court does not police might whether the open glove compartment and search locked, if it is or whether the police might search a locked compartment. trunk or other agree 2 1 with Mr. Justice conclusion, ante, Powell's at 377 n. 1, that, petitioner conceded, Arg. Tr. of Oral the examina glove compartment tion of the closed in this case is a “search.” Municipal Court, See Camara v. (1967): “It surely say private is prop anomalous individual his erty fully protected only are the Fourth Amendment when suspected Cooper individual criminal behavior.” See also California, quoted (1967), Indeed, S.U. in n. infra. recognized Court Harris procedure invoked here would constitute a search purposes. for Fourth Amendment
386 by Mr. by to and further discussed
alluded the Court’s justify to are insufficient Powell, Justice result in this case. appears by to refer begin suggest
To Court with, the expectation ante, a of privacy, ence to “diminished” person’s protecting a 368, that interest constitutional compartments auto of closed of his locked integrity may in routinely governmental mobile be sacrificed requiring privacy terests interference with that that are justify less compelling necessary than would be scope person’s search of similar home or office. This never correctly has been the law. The Court ob prior serves that some cases have drawn distinctions be tween automobiles and homes or Fourth offices Amendment but even as the discussion cases; Court’s clear, makes for reasons distinction in those cases are not present here. Maroney, Chambers 399 Thus, U. 42 States, and Carroll United 267 U. S. 132 (1925), permitted probable-cause certain searches to be out carried without of warrants view the exi gencies mobility created but automobiles, both decisions reaffirmed that the standard of probable cause necessary authorize such a search was no less than the applicable standard to search of a home or office. Cham bers, supra, Carroll, at 51; supra, at 155-156.3 other contexts the Court has recognized that automobile travel sacrifices some publicity interests to the plain g., e. Lewis, Cardwell v. view, U. S. (1974) (plurality opinion); States, cf. Harris United 234 (1968). But this is in- too, recognition, apposite question there is no here, of plain view in is, course, “probable This cause in specific the sense of knowl edge particular about automobile.” Almeida-Sanchez (Powell, J., concurring). this case.4 Nor does this case concern intrusions scope that the Court apparently assumes would ordi- narily permissible in order to insure running *20 safety of a may car. While it privacy expecta- be that tions associated with automobile travel in are some re- gards less than those associated with a home or office, see United States Martinez-Fuerte, v. post, at 561-562, equally it is clear that word 'automobile' is not a “[t]he talisman in presence whose the Fourth Amendment fades away . . Coolidge . Newv. Hampshire, 403 U. 443, S.
4 opinion below, In its Supreme Court of South Dakota stated in justified its view the constitutionally entering were remove, list, car to objects plain secure view from the outside of the -, -, car. 89 152, D. 228 N. W. 2d 158-159 (1975). presented This issue is not on certiorari here.
Contrary
however, ante,
assertion,
to the
375-376,
Court’s
at
respondent’s
the search of
any way
by
car
“prompted
was not in
presence
plain
view of a number of valuables inside the car.”
fact,
plainly
every
In
the record
states that
vehicle taken to the
city impound
inventoried,
74,
lot was
33,
75, and that as
Record
procedure,” “every inventory
matter of “standard
search” would
Id.,
entry
glove
involve
compartment.
43,
into the ear’s closed
at
44.
Arg.
any case,
See also
of Oral
7.
Tr.
as Mr. Justice Powell
recognizes, ante,
377-378,
2,
plain-view
entry
n.
to remove
articles
justify
from the car could not
a further search into the car’s closed
California,
areas. Cf. Chimel v.
752, 763,
395 U. S.
764-768
Despite
point
the Court’s confusion on this
reflected
its
—further
Superior Court,
discussion of Mozzetti v.
699,
4 Cal. 3d
5Moreover, Cooper supra, California, as the Court observed in *21 custody at 61: of an not of itself automobile does “'[Idawful dispense requirements with constitutional of searches thereafter ” made of it.’ wholly say It be would unrealistic that no reason to there is expectation maintaining able and actual in the of closed compartments automobile, customary of a locked when it is for people day carry personal papers in this their private to most and and effects in their automobiles from time to time. Cf. Katz 347, (1967) (opinion Court); the id., J., 361 (Harlan, concurring). Indeed, implicit is this fact very holding compartments the basis of the Court’s such —that may safeguarding. contain valuables in need of ante, observes, n.
Mr. Justice Powell and the police justified through in sifting papers would not be under secured this, procedure employed agree the here. I with and I note that the opinion inspection suitcases, boxes, Court’s does not authorize the might or sealed, removed, containers other which be themselves See, g., secured without e. further intrusion. United States v. Lawson, (CA8 McDougal, 1973); F. 2d State 2dWis. Superior Court, supra. N. 2d 671 Mozzetti 228 W. remedy But this not limitation does the Fourth Amendment intru- simple inventorying tokens, sion when of closed discloses areas literature, medicines, things may or other which face on their person’s activities, associations, beliefs,” much about “reveal opinion appears to its result suggest The Court's inventory any justified be because the may event procedure response search is a “reasonable” protection “three distinct needs: of the own- property police custody ; er’s while it remains . . . protection police against claims dis- putes property pro- over lost or stolen . ; . . and the Ante, potential tection of the from danger.” at 369.7
This suggestion flagrantly be- misleading, however, cause the record of this explicitly any case belies rele- any vance the last two my concerns. event it is view that “needs,” separately none these or together, justify can suffice procedure ap- proved by the Court. justified search cannot
First, way any safety Court measure, though ignores it—the for— purpose sole given for po- the State the Vermillion lice’s inventory procedure valuables, was to secure Record any 98. Nor is there indication that officer’s search in this any way case tailored in safety or that concerns, ordinarily it sois circumscribed. Even aside from actual basis practice in this I case, not however, do believe that blanket safety argument justify could a program of routine Shultz, Bankers Assn. v. 78-79 California *22 (Powell, J., concurring). 7The addition, frequently Court also observes that police “[i]n attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen and there Ante, after abandoned.” at places 369. The Court no reliance on case, however, this concern this nor could sug it. There is no gestion police respondent's suspected stolen, that the that car was or at, stopped that their search with, was directed or a determination of ownership. Indeed, readily the car’s although police the identified respondent’s, car 98-99, the Record the record does not show they that sought ever him. contact As Mr. scope permitted here.
searches of the Justice danger is little as- ordinarily “there recognizes, Powell ante, automobiles,” impounding sociated with unsearched may not safety at 378.8 while the rationale be en- Thus, surely tirely when it relied it actually discounted is upon, upon cannot car of justify every the search the basis on possibility harm; contrary, undifferentiated the justified only such be an intrusion could ordinarily those inspection individual cases where officer’s prompted by specific indicating pos- circumstances very premise argument, of the State’s chief the cars must be protect guard searched in order to valuables because no is posted vehicles, argument they around the itself belies the must city be searched protect police at the lot in order there. distinguish These alone circumstances suffice to the dicta from Cooper California, S., ante, 61-62, at recited U. at 373. suggests
The Court a justification further “crucial” for the search “protection public might case: from vandals who find firearm, Cady a Dombrowski, (1973)], here, U. or as [413 drugs” (emphasis added). Ante, contraband at 376 n. 10. This rationale, absolutely too, support is without in this record. There is simply police looking dangerous no indication the were items. Indeed, shotgun though even shells in found the in- they car, opened terior of the never the trunk to determine Cady, might shotgun. supra. whether it a contain Cf. Aside from this, suggestion simply a untenable as matter of If this law. justifies asserted impounded automobiles, rationale search of all logically justify must automobiles, also the search of all whether im- pounded not, area, argument located in a similar for the is not upon Cooper based police. the custodial role of the See also v. Cali- fornia, supra, 61, quoted 5, supra. n. But this Court has permitted never car or home on the mere undif- assumption might ferentiated that it vandalized the vandals might dangerous weapons Certainly Cady find or substances. Dombrowski, permitting limited search a wrecked automobile where, alia, inter had a belief that reasonable the car con- firearm, specific S., tained does not so hold.
391 sibility of a particular Terry danger. See 392 Ohio, Cady 413 27; Dombrowski, cf. S., suggests the Court that the search valu-
Second, ables glove compartment justified closed be might as protect a measure against property lost claims. this suggestion is belied Again, record, although the Court declines to discuss it—the since— South Supreme Dakota Court’s interpretation of state explicitly law absolves as “gratuitous deposi- the police, tors,” any obligation from beyond inventorying ob- jects in plain locking view and , the car. 89 S. D. -, N. 2d (1975).9 W. Moreover, ante, Mr. Justice Powell may notes, it well 378-379, doubted an procedure that would event work significantly to minimize the frustrations of false claims.10 suggests public Court
Finally, interest protecting may valuables that be found inside closed a compartment impounded may of an justify car the in- ventory procedure. I recognize genuineness governmental in protecting pilfer- interest from property I age. But even if assume that posting guard a would be fiscally impossible as an alternative means to 9Even to impose higher were the State standard of custodial responsibility upon police, however, equally clear that such requirement light must be read in of the Fourth Amendment’s pre-eminence require protective measures other than interior examination of closed areas. 10Indeed, if all, they such claims can be deterred at might more effectively by sealing be deterred the doors and trunk of the car so certify that an unbroken seal would the car had not been opened during custody. v. Superintendent, Cabbler 374 F. Supp. 690, (ED 1974), rev’d, (CA4 Va. 2d 1975), F. pending, cert. No. 75-1463. *24 protective cannot with end,111 agree
the same the Court’s ap- conclusion. The Court’s result authorizes —indeed it pears require nearly every12 to routine search —the impounded.13 car my In the Constitution does view, permit not such searches as a matter of routine; absent specific permissible only such a search is consent, exceptional particular necessity. circumstances of
It is at any prohibit least clear that owner might the police from executing protective search of his im- pounded by hypothesis since car, inventory the is con- ducted the owner’s benefit. it is obvious Moreover, that not everyone impounded whose car is would want it to be Respondent searched. proves himself this; but believe,
11 1 do not however, that the Court is entitled to make this assumption, being there no such indication in the record. Cf. Cady Dombrowski, supra, at 447. v. 12The clear, ante, Court makes at police may that not proceed to impounded search an car if the owner is able to make arrangements other safekeeping for the belongings. of his Addition ally, while the require Court does not search, consent before a it does police may not hold that proceed with such a search face of permission. the owner’s my denial of view, if the owner police custody vehicle is in or otherwise in communication police, with the his consent prerequisite to the is to an inventory search. Superintendent, See Cabbler supra, 700; at McDougal, cf. State 2d, 68 Wis. at 2d, 678; 228 N. W. at Superior Mozzetti 3d, 2d, Cal. 484 P. at 89. 13In requiring, so appears the Court recognize to that a search of some, all, but not cars specific which there is no cause to believe contain valuables would itself belie asserted property-securing purpose. The Court makes much of the fact that the search here was a procedure, Cady routine attempts analogize to v. Dombrowski. quite But it is Cady clear that only the routine in to search where there was a reasonable belief that the car danger- contained a weapon, ous S., 443; Cady, see Dombrowski 319 F. Supp. 530, (ED 1970), not, here, Wis. every to search car in custody particular without cause. carry prefer one not to that need contraband private not possessions. examine one’s Indeed, preference premise is the the Fourth Amendment. result according to Court’s the law Nevertheless, may presume each in respondent’s position owner consents to the I In my search. cannot agree. view, approach squarely Court’s contrary the law consent;14 ignores the absence of duty, consent, analyze in each individual case whether there is a need a particular car for protection of its owner *25 which is sufficient to the outweigh particular invasion. It is clear to me under principles established in to order override explicit the absence of consent, such search must at upon least conditioned ful be the of requirements.15 fillment two First, there must be specific cause believe scope that a of the to be to undertaken necessary is in preserve order to integ the rity particular of property valuable by threatened the impoundment: justifying particular police
“[I]n intrusion the officer must be point specific able to and articu- lable reasonably facts which . . . warrant that intru- Ohio, sion.” Terry v. S., 392 U. at 21. requirement
Such a
in
“specificity
the information
upon
which
predicated
action is
is the central
teaching of this Court’s Fourth
jurispru-
Amendment
id., at 21 n.
dence,”
18, for
basic purpose of this
“[t]he
may
many
ordinarily
if it
persons
Even
be true that
would
protective inventory
consent to a
upon
impound
their
car
its
ment,
majority
dispositive
this fact is not
since even a
lacks au
thority to consent
all
search of
cars
order to assure the
Matlock,
search of theirs.
v.
Cf.
States
415 U.
California,
Stoner v.
Amendment, safeguard security indi- Court, against arbitrary by governmental offi- viduals invasions at 528. Municipal S., cials.” Camara v. 387 U. Brignoni-Ponce, Cf. United States 883- Dombrowski, 448; (1975); Cady S., Ohio, Terry supra, at 27. where a search Second, even might may only follow appropriate, such an intrusion under the exhaustion and failure of reasonable efforts identify of the circumstances to and reach the owner property order to facilitate alternative means of secur- ity or to obtain his in this con- search, consent to the right text to refuse with the the search remains Carolina, North Bumper owner. Cf.
(1968).16 proce-
Because the record in this case shows that searching dures followed the Vermillion re- spondent’s my car fall far of these standards, short the search must be impermissible view and its fruits suppressed. First, shows, so far as the record police in this case had no reason to believe that glove compartment impounded car contained *26 particular property any substantial value. More- apparently thought adequate had it to over, owner protect in on overnight whatever he left the car the street in simply a business area to lock the and there car, is nothing the record to show that the im-
16Additionally, record, although not relevant since the on owner, procedure premised upon it is benefit to the cannot be executed in case which there is reason to believe the prefer forgo fully principle, it. owner would This which con today, requires, example, sistent with Court’s result for that when police suspicions (amounting probable cause) than harbor to less may automobile, that or contraband be found inside the evidence they may inventory it, they presume not must that the owner permit refuse to the search. would poundment prove lot would a less secure against location pilferage,17 cf. Mozzetti Superior Cal. 3d 2d P. (1971), particularly when it would likely seem the owner would claim his car and its contents if at least promptly, contained valuables worth protecting.18 Even if the had cause to be lieve that impounded glove compartment car’s con particular tained valuables, they made no effort however, to secure the owner’s consent to Although the search. the Court relies, upon as it must, respondent the fact that present not arrangements make other for the care ante, of his belongings, my view that is not the end of inquiry. readily Here the police ascer tained the ownership yet the vehicle, 98-99, Record they immediately searched it taking any without steps respondent to locate procure his in consent to the ventory or advise him to arrangements make alternative safeguard id., his property, 32, 72, 73, 79. Such a failure is inconsistent with the in rationale that ventory procedure is out for carried the benefit of the owner.
The Court’s result in this case elevates the conserva- property tion of possibilities interests —indeed mere property security interests —above the in- suppression hearing suggested While evidence at the inventory procedures prompted past impound were at the thefts lot, testimony only thefts, ante, refers to such two see at 366 n. period over an undisclosed of time. There is no reason on this higher pilferage record to believe that the likelihood of at the lot was respondent or lower than that on the street where left his car with Moreover, plain inside. the failure of the valuables view frequently battery, suggests items as the car’s to secure such stolen impoundment thought in fact that the risk of loss from the was not severe. *27 possessions respondent In fact claimed his about five hours his car the street. Record 93. after was removed from protected terests by the Fourth Amendment. For this I reason dissent. On the remand it should be clear in any event holding Court's preclude does not contrary resolution of this case others involving the same issues under applicable state law. Oregon Hass, 420 J., (Marshall, dissenting).
Statement of Mr. Justice White. I Although do not my subscribe to all of Brother Mar- dissenting opinion, particularly shall’s aspects some his discussion concerning necessity for obtaining the consent of the car I agree owner, with most analysis of his and conclusions and consequently dissent from judg- ment of the Court.