United States v. Leon

UNITED STATES v. LEON et al.

No. 82-1771. Argued January 17, July 5, 1984 Decided White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, J.,C. and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed concurring opinion, post, p. 927. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 928. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 960.

Solicitor argued General Lee the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Attorney Assistant General Deputy Trott, Solicitor Frey, General Kathryn Oberly, A. and Robert J. Erickson. Barry argued Tarlow the cause respondent for Leon. With him on the brief were Kaplan Norman and Thomas V. Roger Johnston. L. argued Cossack the cause for re spondents Stewart et al. With him on the Jay brief was L. Lichtman*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali- fornia John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General, William D. Stein, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and K. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Clifford Attorney General; for the State of Kansas et al. by Wilkes C. Robinson, Dan M. Peterson, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of Dakota, South and Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Christopher Court. opinion the delivered White Justice the Fourth question whether presents the ease This so as not modified exclusionary rule should chief case prosecution’s the use bar aon search reliance acting reasonable by officers obtained magistrate but ulti- neutral by a detached issued warrant mately re- To by probable cause. unsupported to be found again the tension once consider must question, we solve hand, one goals on the competing of, sometimes between removing inducements misconduct deterring official other, estab- on the privacy and, invasions unreasonable “ac- defendants criminal under procedures lishing Inc., by New- Association, Attorneys District Heard; for the National N. Massameno, Edwin M. John McGuigan, J. Austin Flanagan, A. man Manak; for Seven P. Yelverton, James E. Miller, Jr., Jack L. Crime Violent Force on Task Attorney General’s Members Former Wayne Bell, B. Carrington, G. Frank Crump, L. Griffin by David al. et Edmisten, Attor- L. Inbau, Manak, FredE. P. Schmidt, Rufus James W. Attorney Deputy Crump, S. David Carolina, and North ney General General. Associa- Bar for filed were urging affirmance curiae amici Briefs Trial Brosnahan; Arkansas for J. by James et al. Francisco of San tion Jr.; Association Hall, Wesley by John et al. Association Lawyers Criminal Bernstein; Texas for Sidney and by America Lawyers of Trial and Marvin H. Goldstein Gerald by et al. Association Lawyers Defense Miller. of Law on Criminal for Committee filed were curiae amici Briefs L. Zimroth by Peter York City of New Bar Association by Bar Association State Underwood; Illinois for D. Barbara and Sachs; Martin, and Joshua J. Hofeld, William Costello, Albert J. Michael H. Seeger, Steven L. Ronald Association Bar State Minnesota for Criminal Association Hanley; for the National H. and Bruce Goldberg, Imhoff, and B. Krause, W. by Marshall Steffan al. et Lawyers Defense Advancement for Association National Spear; for Scott Charles Campbell, and M. Lockman, John P. by Steven et al. People Colored Association Defender and Aid Legal Atkins; the National for I. Thomas County, Attorney, Polk County Johnston, Dan Mogill; for M. Kenneth se. Johnston, pro Iowa, by Mr.

quitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 175

I August In 1981, a confidential unproven informant of reli- ability informed an officer of the Burbank Department Police persons that two known to him as “Armando” “Patsy” selling were large quantities of cocaine methaqualone from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal. The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of methaqualone by “Patsy” at the residence approximately five months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox containing large amount of belonged cash that “Patsy.” He further declared that “Armando” “Patsy” generally kept only quantities small drugs at their residence and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank. On the basis of this information, police the Burbank initi-

ated an investigation extensive focusing first on the Price Drive residence and later on two other residences as well. parked Cars at the Price Drive residence were determined to belong respondents Armando Sanchez, who previously had been possession arrested for Patsy marihuana, and Stew- art, who had no During criminal record. the course of the investigation, officers observed belonging automobile respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who previously had been ar- possession rested pounds of 50 of marihuana, arrive at the Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the shortly house, exited carrying thereafter paper a small sack, away. and drove A check of Del probation Castillo’s records led respondent the officers to Alberto telephone Leon, whose number Del Castillo had listed employer’s. as his Leon had been drug arrested in 1980 charges, companion and a had informed the at that time that Leon heavily in- importation volved in the drugs of country. into this Before investigation current began, the Burbank officers had 902 police officer a Glendale told had informant an

learned resi- methaqualone at his quantity large of a stored Leon investigation, of During course in Glendale. dence living 716 at was Leon learned officers Burbank Canyon in Burbank. Sunset South at persons, several observed officers Subsequently, the arriving at involvement, drug prior had whom one of least packages; leaving with small and residence Drive Price resi- activity two at the variety material other of a observed Magdalena; Via at condominium at a as well dences involving re- activity variety relevant a witnessed and respond- observed also The officers automobiles. spondents’ Miami. flights for separate board Stewart and Sanchez ents together, consented Angeles Los returned pair later The only amount a small luggage that revealed of their to a search and other on these airport. Based left and marihuana, App. 34, Officer affidavit, in the summarized observations an Department, Police Burbank Cyril Rombach prepared investigator, narcotics well-trained experienced and Drive, Price search a warrant application automobiles Magdalena, and Canyon, Via Sunset South list an extensive respondents for registered to each drug-trafficking respondents’ related to be items believed application was extensive Rombach’s Officer activities. Attorneys. Deputy District by several reviewed September issued was facially search valid A ensuing Judge. Superior Court State a Mag- drugs Via large quantities produced searches quantity at a small and Canyon addresses Sunset and dalena discovered Other residence. Drive Price Del Castillo’s in Stewart’s residences at each jury by grand indicted Respondents were automobiles. of California District Central for the District cocaine distribute possess and conspiracy to charged with counts. variety substantive respondents then filed motions suppress the evi pursuant dence seized to the warrant.1 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing and, recognizing while that the case awas close one, id., see granted at 131, the motions to suppress part. It concluded that the affidavit was insuffi cient to probable establish cause,2but did suppress all of the evidence as to all of respondents because none of the respondents standing had to challenge all ofthe searches.3 In

1Respondent Leon moved to suppress the evidence found on his person at the time of his arrest and the evidence seized from his residence at 716 South Sunset Canyon. Respondent Stewart’s motion covered the fruits of searches of her residence at 620 Price Drive and the condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena and statements she made during the search of her resi dence. Respondent Sanchez sought to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his residence at 620 Price Drive and statements he made shortly thereafter. He joined also Stewart’s motion suppress evi dence seized from the condominium. Respondent Del Castillo apparently sought to suppress all of the evidence seized in the searches. App. 78-80. The respondents also moved to suppress evidence seized in the searches of their automobiles. 2“I just cannot find this warrant sufficient for a showing probable cause. “There is question no of the reliability and credibility of the informant as not being established. “Some given details tended to corroborate, maybe, reliability of [the informant’s] information previous about the transaction, but if it is not a stale transaction, it comes awfully it; close to and all the other material I think is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt. just “So I do not think this affidavit can withstand the test. find, I then, that there is probable no cause in this case for the issuance of the search Id., warrant. . . .” at 127. 3The District Court concluded that Sanchez and Stewart had standing to challenge the search of 620 Drive; Price that Leon standing had contest the legality of the search of 716 South Canyon; Sunset that none of respondents had a legitimate established expectation of privacy in the condominium at 7902 Magdalena; Via and that Stewart and Del Castillo each had standing to challenge the searches of their automobiles. The made court Government, from request response to re but faith, good acted had Rombach that Officer clear Amend that the suggestion Government’s jected the evidence apply where not exclusionary should rule ment warrant.4 a search reliance good-faith reasonable, seized re- for motion Government’s the denied Court District The of Court panel the of a divided and at id., consideration, reported judgt. order affirmed, Circuit Ninth the for Appeals con- Appeals first of Court The 2d 187 F. 701 at establish not could affidavit Rombach’s that Officer cluded theTo residence. Drive Price the search to cause probable demonstrating the facts forth set affidavit the extent activity, the knowledge criminal of informant’s the of basis more- affidavit, fatally The stale. was included information credibility. Accord- informant’s the establish over, failed information prongs the Appeals concluded of ingly, Court the both inadequate under was by the informant provided 378 Texas, Aguilar v. two-part established test the of 410 S.U. States, 393 v. United Spinelli (1964),and 108 S.U. investigation neither independent (1969).5 officers’ The in- the of the details corroborated nor staleness cured consid- Appeals then Court The declarations. formant’s for proper basis a formed affidavit whether ered seized introduce intend not it did indicated Government Finally, court Id., 127-129. at vehicles. respondents’ other from Id., 129-130. at Stewart. and by Sanchez given statements suppressed Circuit, law is not obviously that faith, good the issue “On law. apply going not amI good about any question view, there my certainly in say “I will war- agot judge Court Superior ato Rombach] went [Officer faith. long period a for surveilled Had trail. meticulous a obviously laid rant; with consulted he said he I testimony think his I believe —and time, certainly I himself, and proceeding Attorneys before District Deputy three Id., 140. is true.” that that fact about doubt no Term, last (1983), decided Gates, S.U. Illinois In determining for test Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged abandoned for cause probable establish tip suffices an informant’s whether “totality place substituted a warrant issuance approach. circumstances” search of the Canyon Sunset residence. In its view, the affi- davit included no facts indicating the basis for the informants’ statements concerning respondent Leon’s criminal activities and was devoid of information establishing the informants’ reliability. Because these deficiencieshad not been cured investigation, the District Court properly sup- pressed the fruits of the search. The Appeals Court of refused the Government’s invitation recognize good- exception faith to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. petition Government’s expressly certiorari de-

clined to seek review the lower courts’ determinations that the search warrant unsupported by probable cause and presented only question “[w]hether the Fourth Amend- ment exclusionary rule should be modifiedso as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in good-faith reasonable, reli- ance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be granted defective.” We certiorari to consider the propriety of such a modification. (1983). 463 U. S. 1206 Although it undoubtedly is within power our question consider the probable whether cause existed under the “totality of the circumstances” test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. (1983), S. 213 question has not been briefed or argued; and it is also within our authority, which we choose to exercise, to take the case as it comes to accepting us, Appeals’ Court probable conclusion cause lacking under the prevailing legal standards. See this Court’s Rule 21.1(a).

We have concluded that, in the Fourth Amendment con- text, the exclusionary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing ability perform its intended functions. Accordingly, we reverse judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II Language opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has implied sometimes that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Mapp Amendment, v. 906 (1961); v. United Olmstead 655-657 651, 643, S. 367 U. Ohio, is rule (1928), or 462-463 438, S.U.

States, Amend Fifth Fourth conjunction by the required (Black, J., concur supra, at 661-662 Ohio, Mapp v. ments. (1925). 33-34 20, S.U. States, Agnello v. United ring); Fifth long. The us detain not need implications These analysis or critical theory withstood has Amendment S.U. Maryland, 427 v. Andresen see time, test been never “has Amendment (1976), Fourth illegally seized introduction proscribe interpreted to Stone persons.” against all or proceedings all evidence 465, 486 S.U. Powell, v.

A expressly provision no contains Amendment Fourth itsof violation obtained use precluding purposes origin and itsof examination commands, search past unlawful aof fruits use clear makes wrong.” Amendment “work[s] new no seizure or (1974). The S. 414 U. Calandra, States United accomplished” “fully wrong condemned exclu- ibid., and itself, seizure or search by the unlawful invasion “cure able nor intended sionary neither rule already suffered.” has he rights defendant’s dissenting). J., supra, at Powell, (White, v. Stone remedy de- judicially created “a operates thus rule generally rights Amendment safeguard Fourth signed to constitu- personal than effect, rather through deterrent v. States United aggrieved.” party right tional at 348. supra, Calandra, im- appropriately exclusionary sanction Whether “an clear, make decisions case, our particular posed in Amend- question whether separate from issue vio- were rule seeking invoke party rights ment 223. supra, at Gates, v. Illinois by police conduct.” lated it must us, currently before question is Only the former by resolved weighing the costs and benefits of preventing prosecution’s use in the case in chief of inherently trust- worthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search issued a detached and magistrate neutral ultimately is found to be defective. The substantial social costs exacted the exclusionary

rule for the vindication of Fourth rights long been a source of concern. “Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce governmental ideals of rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding judge functions of jury.” United States Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 objectionable An collateral consequence of this interference with justice the criminal system’s truth-finding function is guilty some may go defendants free or receive reduced sentences as a result of plea bargains.6 favorable Particu

6Researchers have only recently begun to study extensively the effects of the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. One study suggests that the rule results in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of between 0.6% and 2.35% of individuals arrested for felonies. Davies, A Hard Look at What (and We Know Still Learn) Need to About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Ar rests, 1988 A. B. F. 611, Res. J. 621. The estimates are higher for par ticular crimes prosecution of which depends heavily physical evi dence. Thus, the cumulative loss due to nonproseeution or noneonviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably in the range of 2.8% to Id., 7.1%. at 680. Davies’ analysis of California data suggests that screening by police prosecutors results in the release because of illegal searches or seizures of as many as 1.4% of all felony arrestees, id., at 650, that 0.9% of felony arrestees are released, because of illegal searches or seizures, at the preliminary hearing or after trial, id., that roughly 0.05% of all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on appeal because illegal Id., searches. at 654. See also K. Brosi, A Cross-City Comparison of Felony Case Processing 16, 18-19 (1979); U. S. General Accounting Office, Report Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 10-11, 14 (1979); F. Feeney, Dill, F. & Weir, A. Arrests Without Convictions: How Often They Occur Why (National 203-206 Institute of Justice 908 objective in acted have officers enforcement law

larly when mag the minor, been have transgressions their or good faith of guilty defendants such on conferred benefit the of nitude v. system. Stone justice criminal the concepts of basic fends the of application Indiscriminate 490. atS.,U. 428 Powell, disrespect “generate] may well therefore, rule, exclusionary Ac 491. at Id., justice.” of administration law the of application device, the any remedial “[a]s with cordingly, remedial its where areas those restricted been has rule the United efficaciously served.” thought most are objectives Powell, v. Stone see 348; supra, at Calandra, v. States U. S. Janis, v. States United 486-487; supra, at (1976).

B character- has objectives remedial to those attention Close scope of concerning the decisions recent our ized sure, to be has, The Court exclusionary rule. efficacious more aof absence “in the seriously questioned, ev- suppress rule of application continued sanction, Rule: Exclusionary of Effects Justice, The Institute 1983);National Exclu- Cost Nardulli, Societal The (1982); 1-2 Study in California A 585, 600. J. Res. F.B. A. Assessment, Empirical An Rule: sionary plea-bargaining affect found been has also rule exclusionary The Illegally Problem Injustice: Exclusionary Schlesinger, S. process. 668-669; at supra, Davies, But see Evidence Obtained 604-606. at Nardulli, supra, exclu- impact concluded have researchers Many of these they with percentages small insubstantial, but rule sionary because released who felons number large absolute amask deal seizures. or searches illegal part in based were them against cases clearly probative access jury denies evidence “[A]ny rule must justification, heavy burden bear must reliable deter- way by pay its it will in which circumstances carefully limited 257-258 S., at Gates, U. Illinois unlawlessness.” ring official can rule find we Because judgment). concurring J., (White, consid- under situations sorts effect deterrent substantial no pay cannot that it conclude 916-921, we infra, case, see eration situations. way in those idence from [prosecution’s] case where a Fourth Amend- ment violation has been substantial and deliberate. ...” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, (1978); Stone v. Pow- supra, ell, at 492. Nevertheless, the balancing approach that has evolved in various including criminal contexts— “forcefully suggests] trials — the exclusionary rule be generally more permit modified to the introduction of evi- dence obtained in the good-faith reasonable belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the Fourth Amend- ment.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 255 (WHITE, J., concurring judgment). In v. Stone supra, Powell, emphasized the costs

of the exclusionary expressed rule, its view that limiting the circumstances under which Fourth Amendment claims could be raised in federal corpus habeas proceedings would not re- duce the rule’s deterrent effect, id., at 489-495, and held that prisoner state who has been afforded full and opportu- fair nity litigate a Fourth Amendment may claim not obtain federal habeas relief on ground that unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial. Cf. Rose v. Mitch- ell, 443 U. S. 545, 560-563 Proposed extensions of the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than the criminal trial itself have been rejected evaluated under the same analytic approach. In United States v. Calandra, for exam- ple, we grand declined to allow jury witnesses to refuse to questions answer based on evidence obtained from an unlaw- ful search or seizure “[a]ny since incremental deterrent effect might achieved extending grand rule to jury proceedings is uncertain at best.” 414 U. S., at 348. Simi- larly, in United States supra, Janis, permitted we the use in federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized state officials since the likelihood of deterring police miscon- through duct such an extension of the exclusionary rule outweigh insufficient to its substantial social costs. In so doing, we declared “[i]f that, . . . the exclusionary rule does not appreciable result in clearly, deterrence, then, its use in the instant situation is unwarranted.” Id., at 454. evi- unlawfully obtained considering use cases As does clear, make themselves trials in criminal dence deterrent exclusionary rule’s emphasis from follow thereby illegal searches deters “anything which value v. Alderman Amendment.” Fourth by the commanded determining whether In 174. at S.,U. 394 States, United damaging of by introduction solely aggrieved persons or co-conspirators their from unlawfully obtained evidence found example, we suppression, seek could codefendants exclu- of extension such of benefits the additional 174-175. Id., at outweigh costs. sionary would rule in cases to limited been thus has rule Standing invoke to illegal of an fruits use to seeks prosecution police misconduct. of victim against the seizure or search (1978); v. United Brown 128 S.U. 439 Illinois, v. Rakas 371 States, United Wong v. (1973); Sun 223 S.U. 411 States, 447 Payner, v. States (1963). United Cf. 491-492 471, U. S. (1980). 727 U. S. challenge introduc- standing to with defendants Even evidence unlawfully obtained of trials criminal their in

tion Evi- evidence. such of use every conceivable prevent cannot Amendment of violation in obtained dence may used be chief in case prosecution’s in the inadmissible v. United testimony. Walder direct impeach a defendant’s to 420 Hass, Oregon v. (1954). also See 62 U. S. States, (1971). S. 401 U. York, New (1975); v. Harris S. U. furthering” “incremental assessment A similar in United to conclude us exclusionary led rule ends (1980), evidence S. 446 U. Havens, v. States otherwise or chief in case prosecution’s in the inadmissible impeach may used guilt evidence as substantive “proper response defendant made statements defendant’s suggested reasonably cross-examination 627-628. Id., examination.” direct in violation obtained considering use When chief, case prosecution’s the Fourth rule for” or “but per se adopt a declined moreover, we that would render any inadmissible evidence that came to light through a chain of causation began illegal with an arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. (1975); S. 590 Wong Sun v. United supra, States, at 487-488. We also have held that testimony witness’ may be admitted even identity when his was discovered in an unconstitutional search. United States Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 perception underly- ing these decisions—that the connection between mis- conduct and evidence of may crime be sufficiently attenuated permit the use of that evidence at product trial —is a relating considerations to the exclusionary rule and the con- principles stitutional designed protect. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. (1979); 200, 217-218 United States v. supra, Ceccolini, at 279.7 In “dissipation short, the concept taint” that the applied Court has deciding in whether exclusion appropriate is particular in a “attempts case to point mark the at which the consequences detrimental illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary longer justifies rule no its cost.” Brown v. supra, Illinois, at 609 concurring J., (Powell, part). surprisingly Not in view purpose, of this an assess- ment flagrancy of the police of the misconduct constitutes an important step in the calculus. Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 218; Brown v. supra, Illinois, at 603-604.

The same purposes attention to the underlying the exclu- sionary rule also has characterized involving decisions not scope of the rule itself. required We have not suppression of the fruits of a search incident to an good-faith arrest made in reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently

7 “Brown’s, focus on ‘the causal connection between the illegality and the confession’ reflected the policies two behind the use of the exclusionary rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. Where there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, only not is exclu sion of the evidence likely more to deter similar misconduct in the future, but use the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts.” Dunaway v. New York, (citation 442 S.,U. at 217-218 omitted). 912 DeFillippo, 443 Michigan v. unconstitutional. declared has been the Court although Similarly, (1979).8 31S.U. principles Amendment Fourth new conclude to unwilling v. States effect, United prospective only always are Amendment Fourth no (1982),9 537, 560 Johnson, S. 457 U. been has past” with break “clear marking decision S. Peltier, 422 U. States v. United See retroactively. applied (1969); 244 States, U. S. 394 v. United Desist (1975); 531 propriety The (1965).10 618 Walker, 381 S.U. Linkletter v. suppres requires 8 exclusionary rule however, that held, haveWe statutes, not pursuant carried out in searches obtained sion sei searches authorize unconstitutional, purporting

yet declared Ybarra v. g., e. See, warrants. search or cause probable without zures (1979); Rico, 465 U. S. 442 v. Puerto (1979); Torres 85S. Illinois, U. 444 New v. (1973); Sibron States, 266 S.U. 413 United v. Almeida-Sanchez 41S. York, U. v. New Berger (1968); 40S. York, U. terms, authorized own by their which, statutes involved decisions “Those traditional satisfy the not which did circumstances under searches Michigan Amendment.” Fourth requirements probable-cause Amendment Fourth The substantive 39. S., at U. DeFillippo, v. holding our with fully consistent eases those announced principles here. Johnson, a construction States in United held The Court s past” with “clear break not constitute did Fourth handed decision when yet final convictions to all applied part 562, turned S., at U. holding, see limited down. effect any retroactive “[fjailure to accord judgment Court’s disregard courts or other ‘encourage police rulings would Amendment let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided adopt a and to decisions of our purport plain v. United Desist original) (quoting (emphasis Id., 561 at approach.’” Contrary dissenting)). J., (Fortas, (1969) 244, 277 States, U. S. 394 good- aof adoption precludes in Johnson nothing assertions, respondents’ reasonably police in which to situations tailored exception faith later but magistrate neutral by a detached issued on relied defective. to be found our on turned part, most have, retroactivity decisions 10 Our (b) standards, by the new served “(a) purpose to assessments standards, old on the authorities enforcement lawby reliance of the extent applica a retroactive justice administration (c) effect (1967). 293, 297 Denno, S. U. 388 v. Stovall new standards.” tion Term: earlier observed As we application retroactive newly of a announced Fourth principle, moreover, has been largely assessed in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the deterrence of misconduct. United States v. Johnson, supra, at 560-561; United States v. supra, Peltier, at 536-539, 542. yet, As we recognized have not any good-faith form of ex- ception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.11 But balancing approach that has during evolved years experience provides with the rule strong support for the currently modification urged upon us. As we discuss below, our evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reli- physical able by evidence seized reasonably officers relying on a warrant by issued a detached and magistrate neutral leads to the conclusionthat such evidence should be admissi- prosecution’s ble in the case in chief.

HHHH A Because a “provides search warrant scrutiny detached of a magistrate, neutral which is a more safeguard reliable “In considering the factor, reliance this Court’s cases have pri- looked marily to whether law enforcement authorities and state justi- courts have fiably relied prior on a rule of law said to be different from that announced by the decision whose retroactivity is at issue. Unjustified ‘reliance’ is no bar to retroactivity. This inquiry is often phrased in terms of whether the new decision was foreshadowed earlier cases or was a ‘clear break with the past.’” v. Stumes, Solem 638, U. S. 645-646 11Members of the have, however, urged reconsideration of the scope of the exclusionary rule. See, g., e. Stone v. Powell, 465, 428 U. S. (1976) (Burgee, J.,C. concurring); id., (White, J., dissenting); Gates, Illinois v. S., 462 U. at 254-267 (White, J., concurring judg ment); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. 590, (1975) S. 609-612 (Powell, J., con curring part); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. (1973) S. 261-271 (Powell, J., concurring); v. Minjares, (1979) California U. S. 916 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from stay). denial of One Court Appeals, no doubt influenced these urgings, individual adopted has a form of good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States Williams, (CA5 622 F. 1980) (en 830 2d banc), cert. denied, 449 U. (1981). S. 1127 914 judgment of hurried than improper searches against competitive en- often ‘engaged the officer enforcement

law ” Chadwick, v. States United ferreting crime,’ out terprise 333 States, v. United (1977) (quoting Johnson 91,S.U. 433 strong preference expressed a (1948)), have we 10, 14 U. S. marginal case or “in a doubtful that and declared warrants for without where may sustainable be a warrant under a search U. S. 380 Ventresca, v. States fall.” United it would one 111. at S.,U. 378 Aguilar Texas, (1965). v. See 102, question may frequently differ minds Reasonable cause, probable establishes particular affidavit whether for warrants preference that concluded thus we “great defer- according effectuated appropriately most Spinelli United v. magistrate’s determination. to a ence” atS., Gates, 462 U. v. Illinois 419. See atS.,U. States, 393 108-109. supra, at Ventresca, v. States 236; United not boundless. however, magistrate, Deference magistrate’s to a accorded deference first, clear, It is inquiry into preclude not does probable cause finding of on which falsity the affidavit knowing reckless or U. S. Delaware, v. Franks based. determination insist also must (1978).12 the courts Second, detached’ “perform ‘neutral his purport magistrate stamp for merely a rubber as serve function Illinois supra, 111. See at Texas, Aguilar v. police.” failing “manifest magistrate A 239. supra, at Gates, judicial officer aof demanded neutrality detachment in- acts application” and who a warrant presented with when provide cannot officer” adjunct law enforcement “an stead search. unconstitutional an otherwise authorization valid 326-327 S. U. York, Newv. Sales, Inc. Lo-Ji magistrate’s] [the upon imposition unthinkable Indeed, “it would a deliber contain fact to after affidavit, revealed authority if a impeachment.” beyond statement, to stand were recklessly false ately or S., 165. 438 U.

Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that “provide does not magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the probable existence of cause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 239. “Sufficient information presented must be magistrate to the to allow that official to probable determine cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Ibid. Aguilar See v. supra, Texas, at 114-115; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. (1958); Nathanson v. United (1933).13 States, 290 U. S. 41 Even if the application supported was by more than a “bare bones” affidavit, a reviewing may court properly concludethat, notwithstanding magistrates deference that deserve, the warrant was invalid magistrate’s because the probable-cause determina- tion reflected an improper analysis of totality of the cir- cumstances, Illinois v. supra, Gates, at 238-239, or because the form of the warrant improper respect. some Only in the first of these three situations, however, has the Court set forth a rationale for suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant; in the other areas, it has simply excluded such evidence without considering whether

13See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964), in which the concluded that “the record . . . does not contain a single objective fact to support a belief by the officers that activity at the time they arrested him.” petitioner was engaged in criminal Id., at 95. Although the Court was willing to assume that the arresting officers acted in good faith, concluded: “‘[G]ood faith on part of the arresting officers is not enough.’ Henry States, United U. S. 102. subjective If good faith alone were test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and people would be ‘secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion police.” Id., at 97. We adhere to this view and emphasize that nothing this opinion is intended to suggest a lowering probable-cause standard. On the contrary, we deal only here with the remedy to applied be to a concededly unconstitutional search. To advanced. will interests rely behavioral on exclusion proponents extent reli- their areas, in these magistrates judges and effects designed exclusionary rule First, misplaced. ance errors punish than rather police misconduct deter no exists there Second, magistrates. judges and ignore to inclined magistrates are judges and that suggesting lawlessness that or Amendment Fourth or subvert extreme of the application requires among actors these of exclusion.14 sanction are and basis, no discern important, we most Third, seized of evidence believing exclusion for none, offered effect significant deterrent a will a warrant pursuant to Many factors of the magistrate.15 judge or issuing rubber become magistrates that some assertions are there 14Although police effectively to screen may be unable others police for stamps Kamisar, (1978); §4.1 Seizure LaFave, Search e.g.,2 W. see, conduct, “Principled Basis” aon Rest Exclusionary Rule (Should) The (Did) Does 565, L. Rev. Creighton 16 Proposition”?, “Empirical an than Rather Al Violations: Amendment Deterring Fourth Schroeder, (1983); 569-571 (1981), we 1361, 1412 L. J. Rule, 69 Geo. Exclusionary to ternatives Tif L. See proportions. major problem is a not convinced Israel, (1967); Crime Rotenberg, Detection D. McIntyre, & D. fany, Warren Legacy Court, and Burger Procedure, Criminal Johnson, Ap New (1977); P. 1414, n. 1319, L. Rev. Mich. Court, 75 Sept. Paper, (Working 8-10 Enforcing the proaches Criminal Israel, Modern LaFave, J.& Kamisar, W. in Y. 1978), quoted Carter, Sutton, & C. Duizend, L. 1980);R. Van (5th ed. 229-230 Procedure Center Draft, National (Review Process, 7eh. Warrant Search 1983). Courts, State in Com recognized Massachusetts Judicial Supreme theAs (1982): 725, 735 E. 2d N. 506, 441 Mass. Sheppard, monwealth mis- judicial deterring tailored well be may not exclusionary rule “The costly as just misconduct, would the rule judicial applied to If conduct. to the ill-fitted may be misconduct, but applied it is when it is as to impartial judge [IJdeally a . . . judges. motivations job-created defendant particular or a is admitted of evidence piece particular a whether evi- piece particular aof abstract, suppression Hence, convicted. itas would judge neutral ato a disincentive effective asbe may not dence court appellate by an ruling may be that It police. tobe that indicate that the exclusionary provide rule cannot “special” effective “general” or deterrent for individual of- fending law enforcement apply officers16 judges as well to or magistrates. And, to the extent that thought the rule is operate “systemic” as a deterrent on a wider audience,17it clearly can have no such effect on empowered individuals issue search Judges warrants. magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; judicial as neutral they officers, have no stake in the particular outcome of crim- prosecutions. inal The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected significantly to deter them. Imposition of the exclusionary sanction is necessary meaningfully to inform judicial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that admitting evidence pursuant obtained to a warrant while at the same declaring time the warrant was somehow defective will any way judicial reduce professional officers’ incentives comply with the Fourth encourage Amendment, repeat them to their mistakes, or lead to granting the of all colorable requests.18 warrant search warrant was unconstitutional would be sufficient to deter similar conduct in the future by magistrates.” But see United States v. Karathanos, 531 26, F. 2d 33-34 (CA2), cert. denied, 428 U. (1976). S. 910 16 See,e. g., Stone v. Powell, S.,U. at 498 (Burger, J.,C. concur

ring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. 665, Rev. (1970). 709-710 17See, g., e. Dunaway v. New York, 220, U. S. (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing Law, the 70 Geo. L. J. 365, 399-401 18Limiting application the of the exclusionary may sanction well increase the care with which magistrates scrutinize warrant applications. We doubt that magistrates are more desirous of avoiding the of exclusion evidence pursuant obtained to warrants they have issued avoiding than of invasions of privacy. Federal magistrates, moreover, are subject to the direct of supervision district courts. They may be removed for “incompeteney, misconduct, neglect duty, or physical or mental disability.” §631(i). 28 U. S. C. If a magistrate serves merely as a “rubber stamp” for the or

B a subse- pursuant obtained evidence exclusion If effect, any deterrent have is to warrant invalidated quently en- law individual behavior the alter must therefore, One departments. their policies the or officers forcement exclusionary cases rule applying argue that could probable cause demonstrate police failed where presentations inadequate future deters application warrant the ends promotes thus shopping” “magistrate or pursu- obtained evidence Suppressing Amendment. Fourth probable supported warrant technically defective to a ant closely more scrutinize encourage officers might also cause judicial suspected point out form of conclude speculative arguments such findWe errors. a warrant pursuant to obtained suppression only case-by-case basis only aon ordered should further will exclusion in which cases unusual those exclusionary rule.19 purposes exclusionary whether questioned frequently haveWe offending officers when any effect deterrent can rule conduct their belief objectively reasonable in the acted empirical “No Amendment. violate did yet been has rule, opponent or proponent researcher, has rule whether any assurance with to establish able S.,U. Janis, States .” United . . effect. deterrent effectively rule assuming even But 22. n. pro- removal or supervision closer judgment, mature exercise

unable exclusionary rule. remedy than effective a more vides in obtained excluding effect the deterrent discussion Our assumes, of warrant invalidated subsequently aon reliance reasonable only searched warrant executed properly officers course, were to believe reasonable it was objects that those for places those 989, at post, Sheppard, Massachusetts Cf. warrant. by the covered rely on the this case in police (“[I]t unreasonable 6n. they had search authorized assurances judge’s requested”). police deters some provides misconduct and incentives for

the law profession enforcement aas whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, cannot expected, be and should not applied, be to deter objectively reasonable law activity. enforcement As we observed Michigan in v. Tucker, 417 U. S.

(1974), and reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S., at 539:

“The purpose deterrent of the exclusionary rule neces- sarily assumes police that the engaged in willful, or very at the negligent, least conduct which deprived has the defendant of right. some By refusing to admit evi- gained dence as a result of such conduct, the hope courts to instill particular in those investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, greater degree of care toward rights of an accused. Where the official pursued action was complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.” The Peltier Court continued, id., at 542:

“If purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful conduct, then evidence obtained from a search suppressed should be only if it can be said that law enforcement officer knowledge, had may or properly charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon- stitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 260-261 (White, J., concurring judgment); United States v. supra, Janis, 459; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (Powell, J., concurring part).20 In short, where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, 20We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one. Many objections to good-faith exception assume that

the exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers. “Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however, retains 920 ends further not will

“excluding evidence pain- way; it is appreciable any in exclusionary rule reason- acting aas is . . the officer that. fully apparent circum- in similar act should would officer able way affect in no can Excluding evidence stances. willing to less him make to it is unless conduct future his at 539-540 S., 428 U. Powell, v. duty.” Stone his do dissenting). J., (White, acting officer an believe, when we true, particularly is This from warrant search a obtained has good faith objective

with most scope.21 In its within acted magistrate judge or a law enforcement for the incentive as an exclusionary rule value with accord in themselves to conduct whole aas profession J., (White, 261, n. S., at Gates, U. v. Illinois Amendment.” S., York, 442 U. v. New Dunaway see judgment); concurring in moreover, adopt, we objective standard concurring). J., (Stevens, prohibits. the law of what knowledge reasonable to officers requires Jerold Professor As 531, 542 Peltier, U. S. States United observed: has Israel lies, I a deterrent effectiveness rule’s [exclusionary] key to the “The training programs police to provided it has impetus believe, amendment fourth imposed limits aware officers make good- objective [An limits. those within operate to the need emphasize programs, such elimination result likely to not is exception] faith professionalism. police aspect important as an now viewed possibility programs; those the tenor likely to alter is Neither unlikely cases in borderline may be admitted illegally obtained amendment fourth attention pay less instructors encourage atten- less pay officers encourage Finally, should [it] limitations. act officer that the requirement as the taught, they are to what tion possibility to the mind one’s closing with inconsistent ‘good faith’ omitted). (footnotes 1412-1413 14, at Israel, supra n. illegality.” Crime, on Violent Force Task Attorney General’s to According duly on a relies an officer in which situation (1981), the Report Final authorized judicial is A warrant faith. good example compelling particularly a“is the officer arrest, and make or a search conduct officer to an mandate believe Accordingly, we provisions. carry out duty to a sworn has such cases, police there is no illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the allegations officer’s probable establish cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot expected question magis- probable-cause trate’s determination or judgment his the form of the warrant is technically “[Ojnce sufficient. warrant issues, literally there is nothing policeman more the can do in seeking to comply with the law.” Id., at 498 C. J., concurring). Penalizing the officer for the (Burger, magistrate’s error, rather than his own, logically cannot con- tribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.22 there should be a rule which states that evidence pursuant obtained to and within the scope of a warrant is prima facie the result of good faith on the part of the officer seizing the evidence.” Id., at 55. 22To the extent that Justice Stevens’ conclusions concerning the in tegrity of the courts, post, at 976-978, rest on a foundation other than his judgment, which we reject, concerning the effects of our decision on the deterrence police illegality, we find argument his unpersuasive. “Judi cial integrity clearly does not mean that the courts must never admit evi dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States Janis, 428 U. 433, 458, S. n. 35 “While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly proba tive evidence.” Stone v. Powell, S.,U. at 485. Our cases establish question whether the use of illegally obtained evidence judicial proceedings represents judicial participation in a Fourth Amendment violation and offends the integrity of the courts “is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. . . . The analysis showing that exclusion in this case has no demonstrated deterrent effect and is unlikely to have any significant such shows, effect by the same reasoning, that the admission of the evi- dence is unlikely to encourage violations of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Janis, supra, n. 35.

Absent unusual circumstances, when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred because the have reasonably relied on a warrant issued detached and magistrate neutral but ultimately found to be defective, “the

c pro benefits marginal or nonexistent conclude We objectively rea obtained suppressing duced war search invalidated subsequently aon reliance sonable doWe exclusion. costs justify substantial cannot rant inappropriate always exclusion however, suggest, abided and warrant a obtained has officer an where in cases rarely will a warrant pursuant “[Searches terms. v. Illinois reasonableness,” into inquiry deep any require judgment), concurring in 267 atS., J., 462 U. Gates, (White, normally suffices magistrate by a issued “a warrant for good in “acted has officer enforcement a law establish” 456 Ross, v. States United conducting search.” the in faith reli officer’s the (1982). Nevertheless, n. 32 823, 798, S.U. determination probable-cause magistrate’s the on ance must issues he sufficiency the of technical the S.U. Fitzgerald, 457 v. Harlow cf. reasonable, objectively eircum- in some clear (1982),23 815-819 800, 259, at Gates, supra, v. Illinois implicated.” is not courts integrity Powell, 428 v. Stone See judgment). concurring in J., (White, 14n. v. States dissenting); United J., (White, id., 23; 540 485, n. S., at U. (1975). 531, 536-539 Peltier, S. U. qualified component subjective Harlow, we eliminated In dep alleged for damages seeking in enjoy suits officials immunity public perfectly are not situations The rights. constitutional rivations beliefs subjective into inquiries eschew also we but analogous, subsequently ato pursuant seize who officers enforcement law occasion, that, “[o]n suggested have we Although warrant. invalidated some may have illegal search an conducts officer with motive rule,” exclusionary applying propriety determining the in relevance (1978), we believe 139, n. 13 States, U. S. v. United Scott minds into expedition anon courts federal “sending state judicial misallocation fruitless grave produce would officers (1968) (White, 560, 565 Painten, U. S. Massachusetts resources.” confined inquiry good-faith our Accordingly, dissenting). J., offi trained reasonably well whether question ascertainable objectively magistrate’s despite illegal was search known would cer circumstances— determination, all of making this In authorization. stances the officer24will have no grounds reasonable believing that the warrant properly issued. Suppression therefore remains appropriate remedy if magistrate judge or issuing in a warrant was misled

information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known except was false for his disregard reckless of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 exception recognize we today will also apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly judicial abandoned his role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 (1979); U. S. 319 in such no circumstances, reason ably well trained officer rely should on the warrant. Nor would an officer objective good manifest relying faith in on a warrant based on an affidavit lacking “so proba indicia of ble cause as to render officialbelief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 concurring J., part); see Illinois v. Gates, (Powell, supra, at 263-264 (White, J., concurring judgment). Fi nally, depending on the circumstances particular case, may facially be so deficient—i. e., in failing par to place ticularize the to be searched things or the to be seized— that the executing officers reasonably cannot presume it to be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at 988-991. limiting

In so suppression remedy, we leave untouched probable-cause standard and the requirements various for a valid objections warrant. Other to the modification of including whether the warrant application had previously rejected been a different magistrate may be considered. — 24References to “officer” throughout this opinion should not be read too narrowly. It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the offi cers who originally obtained it or provided who information material to the probable-cause determination. Nothing in opinion our suggests, for exam ple, officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a “bare bones” affidavit rely and then on colleagues who ignorant are of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, to consider exclusionary rule we Amendment Fourth searches exception for good-faith insubstantial. be signal our to intended not warrants to pursuant conducted requirements strictly enforce to unwillingness have it will not believe dowe Amendment, Fourth good-faith suggested, already have weAs effect. reasonableness, objective turning does exception, officers practice. When apply in to difficult be should should prosecution warrant, ato pursuant acted have without good faith objective establish ordinarily able judicial time. expenditure substantial ex- good-faith aof application persuaded we Nor pre- will warrants pursuant conducted ception to searches seizure, or search constitutionality of the review clude freeze or courts, from guidance deny needed need nois There present state.25 law deciding always practice adopt inflexible courts good faith objective manifested conduct the officers’ whether Amend- the Fourth whether question turning before suppression seeking Defendants violated. been has ment or seizures searches allegedly unconstitutional fruits em- Ill Art. controversies live undoubtedly raise addressing cases As adjudicate. courts powers federal § 1983, C. S. 42 U. immunity under good-faith questions (1975), with S. 422 U. Donaldson, v. compare O’Connor (1978), 14n. 566, 555, S.U. Navarette, 434 v. Procunier compare Milton doctrine, involving harmless-error cases v. (1972), Coleman with Wainwright, U. S. consid- courts (1970), clear, make 1S.U. Alabama, meri litigate incentive their lose will defendants that argument The exception good-faith a result claims Amendment Fourth torious discourage might exception Although unpersuasive. today adopt we magnitude motions, suppression insubstantial presentation unlikely makes motion by successful on defendants conferred benefit substantially diminished. bewill claims colorable litigation erable discretion in conforming their decisionmaking proc- exigencies esses to the particular cases. If the particular resolution of a Fourth ques- Amendment tion necessary guide future by action law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing prevent will reviewing courts from deciding question turning before to the

good-faith issue.26 Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to determine whether the officers reasonably acted without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth question Amendment is not one of import, broad reviewing courts particular could decide in cases magistrates under supervision their need to be informed of their errors and so evaluate good the officers’ only faith finding after a violation. In other circumstances, those reject courts suppression could posing motions important no questions Amendment by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers’ good faith. We have no reason to believe that our Fourth jurisprudence would suffer allowing review- ing courts to exercise an informed discretion making choice.

I V principles When the we have today enunciated applied to the facts of this apparent case, it is judgment Appeals Court of cannot stand. Appeals Court applied the prevailing legal standards to Officer Rombach’s application and concluded that application could support magistrate’s probable-cause determination. In doing, so clearly court magistrate informed that he 26It has been suggested, in fact, that “the recognition of ‘penumbral zone,’ within which an inadvertent mistake would not call for exclusion, . . . will make it less tempting forjudges to bend fourth amendment stand ards to releasing avoid a possibly dangerous criminal because of a minor and unintentional miscalculation police.” Sehroeder, supra n. (footnote at 1420-1421 omitted); see Ashdown, Faith, Good the Exclusion ary Remedy, and Adjudication Rule-Oriented in the Criminal Process, 24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 335, 383-384 aspect of This challenged warrant. issuing the in erred had proceeding. this in attack under is not judgment court’s the is- have not should warrant the that Having determined adopt understandably declined Appeals of Court the sued, exclusionary rule the of a modification Although the sanctioned. previously not had Court the cases, previous our in support strong finds modification be is not self-restraint Appeals’ commendable of Court the of purposes the reexamined now haveWe criticized. exclusionary application of propriety the rule invali- subsequently aon relied have officers where cases rule’s is conclusion Our warrant. search dated purposes in such applying rarely served only will circumstances. magistrate allegation that an of the absence In is suppression role, neutral detached his abandoned reckless or dishonest were officers only the if appropriate objec- harbored have could or affidavit their preparing cause. probable of existence belief tively reasonable reasonably well no contended has Leon respondent Only existed there believed could police officer trained other significantly, house; his search cause probable Officer argument. comparable no advance respondents supported clearly was for a application Rombach’s affidavit affidavit. bones” “bare than more by much and, as investigation extensive an of results related make Appeals of Court panel divided opinions disagreement create sufficient provided evidence clear, existence judges to competent thoughtful among officers’ circumstances, these Under cause. probable cause probable magistrate’s determination on the reliance extreme application reasonable, objectively inappropriate. exclusion sanction Appeals judgment of Accordingly,

Reversed. Justice Blackmun, concurring. today

The Court holds that evidence obtained in violation of the by Amendment acting officers in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued a neutral magistrate detached need not be excluded, as a matter of federal law, from the case in chief of federal and state crimi- prosecutions. nal In doing, so the Court writes another chapter in the volume of Fourth opened law Weeks v. United States, 232 (1914). U. S. 383 join I opinion Court’s in this case and the one in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, p. 981, I because believe that the rule an- today nounced legitimate advances the interests of the crimi- justice nal system without sacrificing the rights individual protected by the Fourth Amendment. I write separately, however, to underscore regard what I as the unavoidably provisional today’s nature of decisions.

As the opinion Court’s in this case makes clear, the Court has scope narrowed the of the exclusionary rule because of an empirical judgment that the rule appreciable has little effect in cases where officers act objectively in reasonable reliance on search warrants. See ante, at 918-921. I Because share the view that exclusionary rule is not a constitutionally compelled corollary of the Fourth Amendment itself, see ante, at way I 905-906, see no making avoid empirical judgment of this sort, and I am satisfied that the Court has made the correct one on the information before it. Like all courts, we face institutional limitations ability on our gather information “legislative about facts,” and exclusionary rule itself has shortage exacerbated the of hard concerning data behavior of officers in the absence of such a rule. See United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 448-453 Nonetheless, we escape cannot respon- sibility question decide the before imperfect us, however our may information prepared be, I join and am the Court on the information now at hand. empirical any is that however, stressed, be must What par- exclusionary rule effect about

judgment By one. provisional necessarily ais cases class ticular proceed we assumptions on which very nature, their they now contrary, To stone. cast today cannot law federal state world real tested bewill If results. to the attend will enforcement, and ex- contrary our that, experience emerge from should exclusionary rule exception to the good-faith the pectations, the compliance with change in material in a results we what to reconsider have shall we Amendment, Fourth on rests that logic a decision here. undertaken have less. no demands police conduct about predictions untested exclu- Court’s may from drawn principle single If a Mapp Ohio, through v. Weeks from decisions, sionary rule today, isit down handed (1961), the decisions S. 367U. change in subject to exclusionary rule scope the understanding the effects about judicial changing light of incum- It is courtroom. confines outside rule must who officers, enforcement law Nation’s bent wake to observe continue double-edged nature recognize the decisions, today’s principle. of that joins, Marshall Justice with whom Brennan,

Justice dissenting.* S. 414 U. Calandra, v. States ago United years Ten “may decision Court’s fear expressed the

(1974), I positioned them- colleagues my have majority of signal by official secured [to evidence reopen the door selves ex- altogether abandon further lawlessness] still Id., cases.” clusionary in search-and-seizure rule I case, after in case then, opinion). Since (dissenting strangulation determined gradual but Court’s witnessed Sheppard, 82-963, Massachusetts to No. applies also opinion *[This 981.] p. post, of the rule.1 appears It now that the victory Court’s over the Fourth complete. Amendment is today’s That decisions represent piece de resistance of the past Court’s efforts cannot be today doubted, the Court sanctions the use in prosecution’s case in chief of illegally obtained evidence

against the individual rights whose have been violated—a result that had previously thought been to be foreclosed. The Court justify seeks to this result ground on the the “costs” of adhering to the exclusionary rule in cases like those before us exceed the “benefits.” But the language of deterrence and of analysis, cost/benefit if used indiscrimi- nately, can have a narcotic effect. It creates an illusion precision technical and ineluctability. suggests It that not only principle constitutional but empirical also support data majority’s result. When the analysis Court’s is exam- carefully, ined however, it is clear that we have not been treated to an honest assessment of the merits of the exclu- sionary rule, but have instead been drawn into a curious world where the “costs” excluding illegally obtained evi- dence loom exaggerated to heights and where the “benefits” of such exclusion are disappear made to with a mere wave of the hand. majority ignores the fundamental constitutional im-

portance of what is at stake here. While the machinery of law enforcement and indeed the nature of crime itself changed dramatically since the Fourth Amendment became part of the Nation’s fundamental law in 1791,what the Fram- ers understood then remains today true the task of —that combating crime convicting guilty every will era seem of such pressing critical concern may we be by lured temptations expediency forsaking into our 1 See, e. g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. (Bren 531, (1975) 544 nan, J., dissenting); United States Janis, 428 U. S. 433, (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 629 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). privacy. liberty It individual protecting to commitment Bill of Framers very reason for that

was permanently efforts law enforcement Rights insisted personal preserve to in order unambiguously restricted they ordained, the scheme constitutional In freedoms. government’s ensuring unpopular task sometimes fixed boundaries strict within remain efforts enforcement As courts. to entrusted Amendment by the Fourth Congress First address in his predicted Madison James 1789: June Constitution, incorporated into rights] are [these “If themselves justice consider will tribunals independent they rights; guardians of those manner peculiar ain assump- every against impenetrable bulwark anbewill they will Executive; Legislative or power in the tion upon every encroachment naturally resist led be rights by the in the Constitution stipulated for expressly Cong. 439. Annals rights.” 1 declaration however, resolve, lose their independent tribunals those If call way give the seductive today, and done has the Court Amend- Fourth guarantees of the vital expediency, the of words.” nothing “form more than reduced ment 385, 392 U. S. States, v. United Co. Lumber Silverthorne sought to be purposes understanding of the broad proper A that the demonstrates served upon a far exclusionary rest rule in the embodied principles shifting of sands than the foundation constitutional firmer accept if I were But even rationale. deterrence Court’s posed question analyzing method chosen the Court’s decision the Court’s conclude still I cases, would these justified. cannot

I by police seized physical evidence holds that Court The by a de- upon issued relying a warrant reasonably officers tached and magistrate neutral is admissible prose- in the cution’s case in though chief, even reviewing court has sub- sequently determined either that the warrant was defective, No. 82-963, or that those officers failed to demonstrate when applying for the warrant that probable there was cause to conduct the search, No. 82-1771. I have no doubt that these prove decisions will in time to grave have been a mistake. But, troubling as important today’s as new may doctrine be for the administration of justice criminal country, analysis mode of generate used to that doctrine also requires critical may examination, for it prove long in the run pose greater threat to our civil liberties.

A At bottom, the Court’s decision proposition turns on the that the exclusionary rule merely a “‘judicially created remedy designed safeguard Fourth rights Amendment generally through its deterrent effect, personal rather than a right.’” constitutional Ante, at quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at germ 348. The of that idea is found in v. Colorado, 338 (1949), U. S. 25 Wolf although thought I had that such a conception narrow of the rule had put been forever to rest our Mapp decision in v. Ohio, (1961), U. S. it has been present revived full reaches flower today’s with decision. The essence expressed this view, as initially in the opinion Calandra today, reiterated is “purpose the sole of the prevent Amendment is to governmental unreasonable in- trusions privacy into the person, of one’s papers, house, or wrong effects. unjustified condemned is govern- mental invasion of these areas of an individual’s life. That wrong . fully . . is accomplished by original search with- probable out cause.” 414 U. (emphasis S., at 354 added); see also ante, at 906. reading This implies proscriptions that its solely directed government at those agents may actually who invade an individual’s constitution- 932 any subject to not are courts The privacy.

ally protected evi- illegally obtained duty exclude constitutional direct evi- admissibility such of the of question the dence, because the of view This by Amendment. the addressed not dence scope pe- the judiciary to relegates the Amendment the of injury cognizable constitutionally only the riphery. Because by the by the accomplished” “fully already been has is not Constitution courts, the the before comes a case time evi- the tainted admit judge decides if the violated itself wring his hands judge isdo can the most Indeed, dence. can he evidence excluding such perhaps hope that police. by the transgressions future deter critics as because, plausible, reading appears Such repeating,2 of tire exclusionary never rule of exclusion for provision express no makes short A commands. of its violation secured many Constitu- course, claim, to this answer terms general are stated imperatives vital most tion’s left is therefore precepts meaning to these giving the task con- decisionmaking context judicial subsequent Justice Chief Constitution, our nature The cases. crete great only its “requires that explained, ago long Marshall designated, objects important marked, be should outlines objects compose those ingredients which minor objects themselves.” nature from deduced be (1819). Maryland, Wheat. McCulloch recognizing that supplied may answer more direct A Rights, of Bill provisions of other like Amendment, it does whole; aas government power restrains exempt others. all agency particular only specify executive, than less no responsible, judiciary is The respected. rights ensuring constitutional Evi Valid Why Suppress Exclusionary Rule: Wilkey, g., See, e. Injustice Exclusionary Sehlesinger, (1978); S. dence?, Judicature When that kept fact is in mind, the role of the courts and possible their involvement in the concerns of the Fourth Amendment comes into sharper focus. Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence generally utility has legal system our only in the context of a supervised trial by judge, apparent it is the admission illegally obtained. implicates evidence same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of that evi dence. by Indeed, admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary part becomes a of what is in single fact a govern prohibited mental action by the terms of the Amendment.3 Once that connection between the evidence-gathering role of police and the evidence-admitting function of the courts is acknowledged, plausibility interpretation Court’s suspect. becomes more Certainly nothing in language or history of the Fourth suggests Amendment recognition of this evidentiary link police between the and the courts was meant to be foreclosed.4 It is give difficult to any meaning 3In deciding to enforce the exclusionary rule aas matter of law, state the California Supreme Court clearly recognized this point:

“When, as in the present case, the very purpose of an illegal search and seizure get is to evidence to introduce trial, at a the success of the lawless venture depends entirely on the court’s lending aid allowing the evi- dence to be introduced. It is no say answer to that a distinction should be drawn between the government acting as law enforcer and the gatherer of evidence government and the acting as judge.” People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 434, 2d 445, 282 P. 905, 2d (1955). For a thoughtful examination of point, see Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 289-307 4Examination of the early state declarations of rights which formed the

models for the Fourth Amendment reveals that they were aimed as much at explicitly limiting the manner in government gather could evi dence as at protecting individual privacy. For example, the Massachu setts Constitution of provided: “Every subject right has a to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, houses, his his papers, and his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or founda- they if Amendment imposed limitations toall policebut by the only conduct certain proscribe read advantage take government the same agents of other allow requirem its violation by the secured con read must therefore ents.5 pri invasion unconstitutional initial only the demn securing purpose all, for done, after vacy —which so any evidence use subsequent also evidence—but obtained. if the affirmation; and or by oath supported previously not be of them

tion places, suspected in search make Officer, to civil to a the in order be property, their seize or to persons, suspected more one or arrest toor of objects or persons of designation special awith accompanied not eases, in issued, but to be ought no warrant and arrest, seizure: or search, Dec- of the XIV Art. laws.” by the prescribed the formalities with and 1780. of Rights of laration Interpretation in Constitutional Studies Two Taylor, T. generally See Fourth of Development History and Lasson, The N. (1969); 41-43 Lanynski, (1970);J. 51-105 Constitution States United to the Amendment In- Constitutional Study in A Court: Supreme and Seizure and Search Beyond: v. Ohio Mapp Stewart, Road The (1966); 30-48 terpretation Search- in Exclusionary Rule of the Future Development, Origins, The 1365, 1369 L. Rev. Cases, Colum. and-Seizure (1920), the S. States, U. v. United Co. Lumber In Silverthorne con Government’s rejecting point this recognized expressly Court knowledge obtained use make permitted be should it tention Amendment: Fourth violation condemning the repudiating in form while now “The Government knowledge itself avail right to maintain seizure, seeks illegal had. not it would otherwise means by that obtained al- It is nakedly. more presented be not could proposition “The re- now the Government outrage which anwas its seizure of course though then them, and them, copy it returns before study papers may it grets, more in a the owners upon call gained it has knowledge that may use It law. not the such opinion In our .... them produce form to regular pro- essence words. formato reduces not way is that a certain acquisition forbidding vision but used shall acquired before so merely evidence omitted) (emphasis (citations 391-392 Id., at all.” be used shall not added). The Court evades principle by drawing an artificial line between the rights constitutional responsibilities engaged that are by actions police of the and those that engaged are when a appears defendant before the courts. According to the Court, the protections substantive of the Fourth Amendment wholly are exhausted at the moment when unlawfully invade an individual’s privacy and thus no substantive force remains to protections those at the time of trial government when the seeks to use evidence police. obtained

I submit that such a reading crabbed of the Fourth Amend- ment casts aside teaching of those Justices who first formulated the exclusionary rule, and rests ultimately on an impoverished understanding judicial responsibility in our constitutional my scheme. part, For “[t]he right peo- ple to be secure in persons, their papers, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and comprises seizures” personal right to exclude all evidence secured means of unreasonable searches and right seizures. The to be free from the initial privacy invasion of right and the of exclusion components coordinate of the central embracing right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. conception

Such a rights of the by secured the Fourth Amendment was unquestionably original the basis of what has come to be called exclusionary the rule when it was first formulated Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 There the Court considered whether seized viola- tion of the Fourth Amendment a United States Marshal could be admitted at trial after the defendant had moved that the evidence be returned. Significantly, although the considered the Marshal’s initial invasion of the defendant’s home to be unlawful, it went on to question consider a right “involves the of the court prosecution criminal to retain for purposes the of evidence the letters and cor- respondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence authority, by without his a United States holding Marshal no 393. Id., at premises.” his of search . the . . unan- Day, speaking for a question, Justice answering that In of the commands the recognized that expressly Court, imous and courts the both addressed were Amendment Fourth Branch: Executive the put the is to Amendment Fourth of effect

“The in the officials, Federal and States United of courts authority, limitations under power and their of exercise power au- and such of the exercise toas restraints and thority, persons, people, their secure forever and unreasonable against all effects papers and houses, pro- This guise law. of under seizures and searches or crime of accused whether alike, all reaches tection obliga- and giving to duty effect and not, force system with Federal our under upon entrusted tory all tendency who of those The laws. enforcement country con- to obtain laws the criminal execute no find . . should . seizures of unlawful means viction courts of the judgments in the sanction charged support Constitution times with all at ap- right to people all conditions to which rights.” fundamental such maintenance peal for the 391-392. Id., beginning for me opinion, and the Weeks heart meaning, proper Amendment’s about

of wisdom passage: following in found seized be ... can private documents letters “If an against accused a citizen in evidence used

held and declar- the Fourth protection of offense, sei- against searches such right secure ing his placed are thus as those so far and, value, no is of zures Constitu- from the might be stricken as well concerned, officials [federal] courts efforts tion. they praiseworthy as punishment, guilty to bring the great of those by sacrifice aided to be not are, principles years by established of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the funda- mental law of the land. The United States Marshal only could have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a warrant required issued as by the Con- stitution. . . . Instead, he acted without sanction of law, prompted doubtless by the desire bring proof further to the aid of the Government, and under color of his office undertook to make a private seizure papers in direct violation of the prohibition constitutional against such action. ... To sanction such proceedings would be by judicial to affirm decision a neglect manifest if not an open prohibitions defiance of the of the Constitution, protection intended for the people against such unauthorized action.” Id., at 393-394.

What passage succinctly captures is the essential recognition, ignored by present Court, that seizures are generally purpose executed for the of bringing “proof to the aid of the Government,” id., at 393, that utility of such prosecution criminal arises ultimately in the context of the courts, and that the courts therefore cannot be absolved responsibility for the means which evidence is obtained. As the Court in Weeks clearly recognized, the obligations upon government cast by the Fourth Amendment are not merely confined police. to In the words of Justice Holmes: “If the search and seizure are unlawful personal invading rights secured the Constitution those rights would infringed yet further if the evidence were allowed Dodge be used.” v. United States, 272 U. S. As the Court explained further in Olmstead v. United (1928): States, 277 U. S. striking

“The outcome of the Weeks case and those followed was the sweeping declaration that the although Amendment, referring to or limit- ing the use of evidence in really courts, forbade its in- troduction if by government obtained through officers many had Theretofore Amendment. the of violation if the rules, ordinary law common the under supposed of obtain- method the pertinent, was evidence tendered case, Weeks in the . But . . unimportant. ing was it great em- with decided Court followed, those courts, federal the law the as established phasis, and would Amendment Fourth the of protection the only was not held that was impaired unless much be Amendment the rights under the of violator official the defendant, injured the suit at the subject action an be thereby could obtained evidence the also but 462-463. Id., received.” faithful more my view, is rule, in conception the That Amendment Fourth the purpose meaning and the people’s constitu- the guardian of the as judiciary’s role

the restric- present Court’s the contrast In liberties. tional the if that, recognized in Weeks reading, Court tive courts meaning, any is to Amendment other; each strangers to constitutional regarded as be cannot directly police is role evidence-gathering because an courts, evidence-admitting function linked may undermined rights individual’s other. as one completely B question whether why the foregoing, it is clear From police miscon- future deter would evidence exclusion early concern relevant considered never was duct deci- formative those In Olmstead.6 to Weeks from cases ille- exclusion plainly understood sions, by judicially fash- compelled not gally obtained Exclusionary Rule (Should) (Did) Kamisar, Does generally See Proposition”?, “Empirical than Rather Basis” “Principled aon Rest Wasserstrom, The & (1983); Mertens 566, 598-599 Rev. L. Creighton Police Deregulating Exclusionary Rule: to the Exception Faith Good 365, 379-380 J.L. Law, Geo. Derailing the ioned purposes, remedial by but rather a direct constitutional phase command. A new in the history of the rule, however, opened with the Court’s decision in v. Colorado, 338 Wolf U. S. 25 Although that decision held that the secu- rity of person one’s privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment “implicit was concept ‘the of liberty’ ordered and as such against enforceable the through States the Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment, id., at quoting 27-28, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937),the Court went on, in only what can regarded as a tour de of constitutional force say obfuscation, to that the “ways of enforcing right such a basic questions raise of a dif- ferent order,” 338 U. S., at 28. Notwithstanding the force of the Weeks doctrine that the Fourth required Amendment exclusion, a state court was free to admit illegally seized evi- according dence, to the Court in long soWolf, as the State had devised some other “effective” means vindicating defendant’s Fourth rights. Amendment 338 U. S., at 31. years Twelve in Mapp later, v. Ohio, 367 U. (1961), S. 643 however, the Court original restored the understanding of the by Weeks case overruling holding the repudi- andWolf ating its rationale. Although in the course reaching conclusion the Court Mapp responded points at certain to question, the first raised in of Wolf, whether the exclusionary rule was an remedy “effective” compared to alternative means of enforcing right, the see 367 U. S., at 651-653, expressly nevertheless held that “all by obtained searches and seizures in violation of by Constitution is, that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” Id., at (emphasis added). In the Court’s view, the exclusionary rule was among range one options to be selected judges; discretion of it was “an part essential of both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Rejec- Id., at 657. tion of approach was constitutionally required, Wolf explained, because “the admission of the new constitu- right by tional could not consistently tolerate Wolf denial of namely, ex- privilege, constitutional important most its forced been had accused the evidence clusion otherwise hold To seizure. unlawful reason give privilege reality withhold right but grant the explana- no other Indeed, 656. atS.,U. enjoyment.” Mapp, since holding in Court’s for the account tion suffices conclusion Court’s predicate possible only honor Fourteenth bound were States “part exclusionary rule doctrine the Weeks upon limitation Amendment’s parcel of privacy.” individual encroachment [governmental] 651.7 S., at U. Court however, pronouncement, clear Despite this ration- pressed the deterrence gradually has Calandra since g., United e. See, stage. center back rule ale v. (1975); States United 531 U. S. 422 Peltier, v. States 465 S.U. 428 Powell, (1976); v. Stone 433 S.U. 428 Janis, in by the Court advanced arguments various that my conviction strengthened only campaign have this First, unworkable. misguided and theory both deterrence consider 7 “factual that noted Mapp expressly in Indeed, the Court remedies alternative effectiveness concerning the raised Wolf ations” rule exclusionary that a decision relevant basically not “are It is S., at 651. U. 367 Amendment.” the Fourth ingredient essential that holding (1965), in 618 Walker, U. S. v. Linkletter that true exclu described retroactively, applied to be not Mapp action,” 381 to lawless deterrent “only effective rule as sionary a deterrence rested rule that suggesting thereby S., at U. emphasis occasion, “[t]he on another explained I have But, as rationale. crucial light of the in the understood must Linkletter deterrence upon ,.. upon 1949to from Wolf. relied justifiably had the States that fact the whole required have Mapp would application consequently, could of whom few prisoners, convicted innumerable release sale only held not circumstance, Linkletter In successfully retried. been deter goal further not Mapp would application retrospective justice ‘the administration further would also but rence States United S., at 637.” U. process.’ judicial integrity opinion). (1974) (dissenting 338, 359-360 Calandra, U. S.

the Court frequently has bewailed the “cost” of excluding reliable evidence. large In part, this upon criticism rests a refusal acknowledge the function of the Fourth Amend- ment itself. nothing If else, the plainly oper- Amendment ates to government disable the gathering from information securing evidence in ways. certain practical In terms, of course, this restriction of power official means that some incriminating evidence inevitably gowill undetected if the government obeys these constitutional restraints. It is the loss of that evidence “price” that is the society our pays for enjoying the freedom privacy safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some go criminals will free not, in Jus- (then tice Judge) Cardozo’smisleading epigram, “because the constable has People blundered,” v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. (1926), 585, 587 but rather because official compliance with Fourth requirements Amendment makes it more difficult to catch criminals. Understood in way, directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating evidence will be lost to government; there- fore, it is not the exclusionary rule, but the Amendment itself imposed that has this cost.8 8Justice Stewart has explained point this in detail in a recent article: “Much of the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected; it is more properly directed at the Fourth Amendment itself. It is true that, as many observers charged, have the effect of the rule is to deprive the courts of extremely relevant, often direct evidence of guilt the defendant. But these same critics fail to acknowledge that, in many

instances, the same extremely relevant evidence would not have been obtained had police the officer complied with the commands of the fourth amendment in place. the first . . . . . The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of the

police. The fourth amendment does. The inevitable result of the Con- prohibition stitution’s against unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is that police officers obey who its strictures will catch fewer criminals. . . . [T]hat price is the the anticipated framers and willing were pay to to ensure the sanctity of person, the home, the and property against 942 have decade past the over decisions the Court’s addition, In assess to attempting of enterprise entire the that plain

made con- various in rule exclusionary the of costs and benefits the perform judiciary for the task virtually impossible ais texts in language Court’s the Although accurately. or honestly may basis empirical specific some that suggests cases those opin- Court’s the reality the analyses, support intuition, of compounds unstable inherently represent ions inconclusive often partial pieces occasional hunches, considering Court, the Calandra, example, In data. pro- jury in grand apply should rule exclusionary the whether concern- whatever concrete it no before had ceedings, proceedings such rule the application impact the ing ex- the or costs long-term in terms either have would available are data empirical extent To the benefits. pected exclusionary benefits costs the general regarding hand, as one on shown, have data such rule, as substantial costs today, acknowledges 6,n. 907-908, ante, at see the past, asserted have critics may rule exclusionary that while hand, other on and, extremely difficult it is effects, deterrent certain have well incidence whether of precision degree any with determine prior than lower is now conduct unlawful 449-453, at S., U. Janis, v. States United Mapp. See The 32.9 n. 492, at S.,U. Powell, Stone 22; n. Rev., at L. Stewart, Colum. power.” governmental unrestrained 1392-1393. Sword, aas Constitution The and Remedies: Rights Of Dellinger, also See court rule exclusionary (“Under (1972) 1532, 1563 Rev. L. 85 Harv. if prevailed would quo status maintain attempts obeyed”). had been requirement constitutional Know We What Look Davies, A Hard point, generally See Exclusionary Rule: Learn) “Costs” About (and Need Still J. Res. F. A. B. Arrests, “Lost” Studies Other Study and NIJ Exclusionary over Debate Reality in Ideology Canon, 627-629; 559, J.L. Tex. Retention, 23 S. its Argument A Conservative Rule: Evaluations Empirical Limitations theOn (1982); Critique, 561-563 sought Court has to turn this uncertainty to advantage

by casting the proof burden upon proponents of the rule, g., e. see, United States v. supra, Janis, at 453-454. “Obvi- ously,” however, assignment “the of proof burden of on an issue where evidence does not exist and cannot be obtained is outcome [The] determinative. assignment of merely burden is way of announcing predetermined conclusion.”10 By remaining within its empiricism redoubt of bas-

ing solely the rule on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of legitimacy. A doctrine explained that is as if it empirical were an proposition but for which there is only empirical support limited is both inherently unstable and easy mark for critics. The extent of this fidelity Court’s to Fourth requirements, Amendment however, should not turn on such statistical uncertainties. I share the view, ex- pressed by Justice Stewart for the Court in Faretta v. Cali- fornia, (1975), U. S. 806 “[pjersonal liberties are not rooted in the averages.” law of Id., at 834. Rather than seeking give effect to the liberties secured the Fourth through guesswork about deterrence, the Court should restore proper to its place principle framed 70 years ago in Weeks that an individual privacy whose has been invaded violation of the right Amendment has a grounded in prevent Amendment to government subsequently from making any use evidence so obtained. the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. (1974). U. L. Rev. 740 10Dworkin, Style Fact Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 L. 329, Ind. J. 332-333 See also White, Forgotten Points in the “Exclusionary Rule” Debate, 81 Mich. L. Rev. (1983) 1281-1282 (balancing of deterrent benefits and costs is an “in quiry [that] can never performed in an adequate way and the reality is thus decision must rest upon those grounds, upon prior but dispositions or unarticulated intuitions that are never justified”); Canon, supra, 564; Kamisar, 16 Creighton Rev., L. at 646.

HHH-t m affirmance requires clearly principle of that Application States United first, the In today. decided cases two the ac- Government the by is conceded it 82-1771, No. Leon, offi- police the by filed affidavit the that Court the by cepted failed warrant a search for their application of in support cers detached neutral on basis a sufficient to provide cause probable was there that conclude could magistrate offi- the that conceded it is Specifically, warrant. the issue informa- in part based was application cers’ reliabil- unproven of informant confidential aby supplied tion relayed it was time the by old five months over was ity independent an conducted police Although police. to the District both tip, of this basis on the investigation in- additional concluded Appeals of the Court corroborate failed the officers gathered formation in- with consistent “as was tip the informant’s of details 10a. for Cert. Pet. App. . . with guilt.” .as nocence of Stripped issued. have never therefore, should warrant, officers these of conduct warrant, of authority less nothing amounted unconstitutional —it plainly was homes respondents’ privacy invasion naked than a demanded justification requisite without po- to the the Government to restore In order Amendment. search unconstitutional this had occupied it would sition necessary therefore, occurred, not Hampshire, Newv. Coolidge said weAs be suppressed. inconve- “an Clause Warrant (1971), 403 U. S. claims against ‘weighed’ somehow nience working part important be, an should or is, It efficiency. matter aas operating government, machinery our over- mistakenly but ‘well-intentioned to check course lawof system any are part who officers’ executive zealous omitted). (footnote at Id., enforcement.” reveals case of this the facts examination close A step. costly very indeed a nor extraordinary neither The warrant had authorized a search for methaqua- cocaine, lone tablets, and miscellaneous paraphernalia narcotics several locations: a condominium at Magdalena 7902 Via Angeles; Los a residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank; a residence at 716 Canyon South Sunset in Burbank; and four automobiles respectively owned by respondents Leon, San- chez, Stewart, and Del Castillo. App. 31-33. Pursuant to this warrant, the officers seized approximately pounds four cocaine and over methaqualone 1,000 tablets from the Via Magdalena nearly pound condominium, one of cocaine from Canyon the Sunset residence, about an ounce of cocaine from the Price Drive residence, and paraphernalia certain from Del Castillo’s and Stewart’s automobiles. On the basis of this and other evidence, the respondents four charged were violating with § 21 U. S. C. 846 conspiring for possess § distribute 841(a)(1) cocaine, and possessing for methaqua- lone and cocaine with intent to distribute. The indictment specifically alleged respondents that had maintained the Via Magdalena condominum storage as a area for controlled sub- they stances which prospective distributed to purchasers. App. 27-28. suppression

At the hearing, the District Court determined that none respondents of the had a expectation sufficient privacy to contest the search of Magdalena the Via condomin- respondents ium, Stewart and Sanchez could challenge the search of their home at Price respondent Drive, that Leon was challenge entitled to the search of his home at Sun- Canyon, set respondents and that Del Castillo and Stewart could contest the search of their cars. Given finding probable cause to issue the lacking, warrant was the District Court ruled that the evidence from the Price Drive residence against could not be respondents used Stewart and Sanchez, that evidence from Canyon the Sunset residence could not against be used Leon, and that evidence obtained from both Del Castillo’s and Stewart’s automobiles could not be used against App. them. to Pet. for Cert. 10a-13a. this order suggests that opinion Court’s tenor unjustifiable cost presumably grave and imposed a somehow exag- gross ais however, suggestion, society. Such conspiracy upon a focused indictment

geration. Since Magdalena condomin- the Via respondents to use among all since substances, and controlled storage area aas ium condominium from was seized the evidence bulk order, Court’s District under plainly admissible strong present clearly able still would Government I suppression order. following court’s jury case suggest how Government’s details emphasize these point clarify a jury rather but before fare case would costs over excesses rhetorical the Court’s is lost of suppression namely, the that exclusionary the of rule— the Government’s certainly weaken to tend will evidence abandon to rarely the Government force it will position but my view, In n. 11. and 950-951, infra, Cf. prosecution. a rights of constitutional the intact preserves that doctrine to sufficiently limited time, the same and, at accused, the permit criminal pressing interest legitimate and society’s recklessly dis- not be so should served to be enforcement law “very of heart the gives to life that a doctrine It is carded. governmental that... directive: the the efforts both represent should and seizure search judgment wrongful acts gather evidence to officer sufficient collected magistrate that States premises.” United private a citizen’s justify invasion (1972). 407 U. S. Court, District States v. United Massachusetts Court, before case second In the concedes the State 82-963, Sheppard, No. respondent’s home search issued accepts things particularity the with state completely failed particularly expressly and the warrant Indeed, seized. be substance[s]” “other things “controlled such described unlawful with in connection or for, in, used paraphernalia police any substance” controlled or use possession found to be were believe whatsoever reason no had respondent’s App. home. 17a. Given the Fourth Amend- requirement ment’s that “no Warrants shall upon issue, but probable cause .. . particularly describing the . . . things to be seized,” this warrant should never have been issued. police The who respondent’s entered home, therefore, were without authority constitutional to do so. Although the opinion Court’s tends to overlook this fact, requirement of particularity is not a mere “technicality,” express it is an constitutional command. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. (1979); S. 85, 92 Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. (1979); S. 319 v. Texas, 379 U. S. (1965); Stanford Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 196 purpose of requirement prevent is to precisely the kind governmental conduct that faulty warrant at issue here grave created a risk of permitting namely, a search that — narrowly and particularly limited to things that a neutral and magistrate detached had reason might to believe respondent’s found at home. Although it is true, as post, observes, see Justice Stevens at 964, that the affida vit submitted set forth with particularity those they items sought authority to search for, it is neverthe less clear that the warrant itself—the document which actu ally gave the legal officers authority respondent’s to invade privacy no mention —made these items. although And, it particular true that the officers applied who for the happened warrant also to execute it and did inso accordance with the proposed limits in their affidavit, happenstance should have bearing no question the central whether these officers prior judicial secured that authority to conduct their required search by the Fourth Amendment. As we made clear in United States v. United States District supra, Court, (footnote at omitted), “[t]he Fourth Amendment contem plates prior judicial a judgment, not the risk that executive may discretion be reasonably exercised.” See also Katz v. United States, 389 U. (1967)(“this S. 347, 356-357 Court has never upon sustained a search ground the sole that officers reasonably expected to find particular evidence of a crime intrusive least the to activities their voluntarily confined and actually end”). warrant the Had that with consistent means prepared who those than by other officers enforced been indeed, occured; might not have result the same affidavit, such led might have warrant nature wholly erroneous respondent’s throughout liberty roam to feel to officers S.U. Whiteley Warden, drugs. Cf. search home pursuant to search a how see to fail therefore I characterized be can warrant fundamentally defective such “reasonable.” sought accom- to Rights Bill of Framers What Amend- Fourth theof requirements express through the plish gov- which under the conditions precisely to define ment was citizens that so property private search agents could ernment re- upon solely discretion depend to have not would privacy. of their protection agents for those straint officers exhibited care Although the self-restraint a suffi- never can alone commendable, that case in this convinced I am liberties. constitutional protection for cient magistrate an attentive that ask to much too not it is that every necessary that to ensure steps minimum those take things that particularity with describes he issues warrant application convinces warrant independent review his equally I am And premises. likely found to be are him well-trained ask much not too it is convinced check moment take police officers experienced those describes at least issued they been have the things These sought search. leave they criminal sound my view own from spring convictions compelled instead policy, but law enforcement history led language adoption. Ill approach to general accept the Court’s Iif were Even today’s result. agree with exclusionary could I rule, question There is no that in the present hands of the Court the deterrence rationale proved has powerful to be a tool for confining scope of the rule. In example, Calandra, for the Court concluded that “speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in the police deterrence of misconduct,” was insufficient outweigh “expense of substantially imped- ing the role grand jury.” 414 U. S., at 351-352. In Stone v. Powell, the Court found that “the additional con- any, tribution, if of the consideration of search-and-seizure claims prisoners of state on collateral review is small in rela- tion to the costs.” 428 U. S., at 493. In United States v. Janis, 428 (1976), U. S. 433 the Court concluded that “exclu- sion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully by seized a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a sufficient deterring likelihood of the conduct the state so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclusion.” Id., at 454. opinion And handed today, down the Court finds that the “balance between costs and benefits against comes out applying the exclusionary rule in deportation civil hearings by held the [Immigration and Naturalization Service].” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, post, at 1050.

Thus, in judicial this bit of stagecraft, while the sets some- change, times always actors have the same lines. Given pattern, well-rehearsed might one predicted with some assurance present how the case would unfold. First there is the ritual incantation of the “substantial social costs” exacted the exclusionary rule, followed virtually foreordained conclusion given that, marginal benefits, application of the rule in the circumstances of these cases is not Upon warranted. analysis, however, such a result justified cannot even on the Court’s own terms. At the outset, the suggests society has been pay asked to high price terms either setting guilty —in

persons free or of impeding proper functioning of trials— as a result excluding physical relevant evidence in cases 950 seizing evi- conducting searches police, the

where mistake reasonable” “objectively only an made have dence, ante, at See constitutionality actions. their of concerning the claim? support such there But what 907-908. the indeed, and, none, points to Court the Significantly, stud- recent 6,n. 907-908, at ante, acknowledges, see exclusionary the of “costs” the that demonstrated have ies lost prosecutions dropped of terms rule—calculated of claims Contrary quite low. convictions—are countless of release “the leads exclusion that critics rule’s Narcotics Federal Unknown v. Six Bivens criminals,” guilty dissent- J.,C. (1971) (Burger, 416 388, S.U. Agents, state federal demonstrated have studies ing), these search potential of drop because rarely cases very prosecutors prepared study example, 1979 For problems. seizure Accounting Office by the General Congress of request at pros- for actually declined cases of all only 0.4% reported that be- primarily declined were prosecutors by federal ecution Comptroller Report of problems. illegal search of cause Exclusionary Impact of States, United of General If Prosecutions Criminal Federal Rule arrests, all of percentage as a restated are data GAO declined felony arrests all only of 0.2% study shows prob- exclusionary rule potential of because prosecution for (and Know We What Look Hard A Davies, See lems. Exclusionary of Learn) “Costs” About Need Still Arrests, “Lost” Studies Study and Other NIJ Rule: de- data these course, Of 635.11 J. Res. F.B. A. quantify attempted studies, researchers recent series aIn study Justice Institute National recent A rule. costs actual California gathered 1976-1979 period 4-year for the on data based de were cases all 4.8% showed Statistics of Criminal Bureau because rejected were prosecutors by California prosecution clined Justice Justice, Criminal Institute National evidence. seized illegally in Cali- Study A Exclusionary Rule: Effects Report Research —The only scribe the costs attributable to the exclusion of evidence in all cases; the costs due to the exclusion of evidence in the category narrower of cases where objec- have made tively reasonable mistakes must necessarily be even smaller. ignores Court, however, this distinction and mistakenly weighs aggregated costs exclusion in all cases, irre- spective of the circumstances that led to exclusion, see ante, against at 907, potential benefits only associated with those cases in which evidence is excluded because reasonably mistakenly but believe that their conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment, see ante, at 915-921. When such faulty scales are used, it is little wonder that the tips balance in favor of restricting application of the rule. fomia 1 However, if these data are calculated as a percentage of all arrests, they show only that 0.8% of all arrests were rejected pros- ecution because of illegally seized evidence. See Davies, 1983 A. B. F. J., Res. at 619. In another measure of the rule’s impact number prosecutions —the

that are dismissed or result in acquittals in cases where evidence has been excluded —the available again data show that the Court’s past assessment of the rule’s costs has generally exaggerated. been For example, a study based on data from nine midsized counties Illinois, in Michigan, and Penn- sylvania reveals that motions suppress physical evidence were filed approximately 5% 7,500 cases studied, but that such motions were only successful in 0.7% of all these cases. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: Empirical An Assessment, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J. 585, 596. The study also shows only that 0.6% of all cases resulted in acquittals because evidence had been Id., excluded. at 600. In the GAO study, suppression motions were filed in 10.5% of all federal criminal cases surveyed, but of the motions filed, approximately 80-90% were denied. Report, GAO 8,10. Evidence was actually in only excluded 1.3% of the cases studied, only 0.7% of all cases resulted in acquittals or dismissals after evidence was excluded. Id., at 9-11. See Davies, supra, at 660. And in another study based on data from cases during 1978and 1979in San Diego and Jacksonville, it was shown that only 1% of all cases resulting in nonconvietion were caused illegal searches. F. Feeney, Dill, F. & Weir, A. Arrests Without Conviction: How They Often Occur and Why (National 1983). Institute of Justice See generally Davies, supra, at 663. evi- that this insistence the Court’s supports then What only is answer Court’s Apparently, admitted? be dence very substan- exclusion though costs even that circumstances in these effect potential deterrent tial, key to justified. The cannot marginal exclusion so respect its belief conclusion the Court’s operates exclusionary rule effect of prospective deterrent decid- when police officers, only situations in those search, particular some go with forward ing whether re- violate will planned conduct their know reason at 919-921. ante, See Amendment. Fourth ofthe quirements (or un- reasonably should understand in fact officers these If settled) proposed their is well the law because derstand conse- that, offend will conduct quently, suppressed court, in they bewill seize any evidence In search. planned conducting the from they refrain will by the system created incentive circumstances, those effect. hoped-for deterrent have exclusionary will rule (but reasonably mis- police officers where in situations But takenly) Fourth satisfies planned conduct their believe (a) because either requirements presumably Amendment — warrant, valid apparently of an acting basis they are be to only determined later (b) conduct their because or or the change the law subsequent aof result aas invalid officers such question of law—then an unsettled resolution conducting the search from to refrain reason no have will effect. no exclusionary have will rule position. Un- logic to is some there blush, first At by Court, the hypothesized doubtedly, the situation expected to have be exclusionary cannot rule existence moment at the particular officers on the effect any deterrent the search. go with forward deciding they whether any seized subsequent exclusion Indeed, “unfair” appears somehow circumstances such under suggests, these the Court As involved. officers particular appropriate thought they what acted officers and constitutionally authorized manner, but then the fruit of their efforts is nullified application of the exclusionary rule. Ante, at 920-921. The flaw in the argument, Court’s however, logic that its captures only one comparatively minor element gener- ally acknowledged purposes deterrent of the exclusionary rule. To be operates sure, the rule to some extent to deter future misconduct individual officers who have had evi- suppressed dence in their own cases. But what the Court overlooks is that the deterrence rationale for the rule is not designed to be, nor should it thought of as, “pun- a form of ishment” of individual officers for their obey failures to imposed restraints by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S., at 556-557 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, the chief deterrent function of the rule tendency is its promote compliance institutional with requirements part on the of law enforce- agencies ment generally.12 Thus, as the Court previ- has

12As Justice Stewart has observed:

“[T]he exclusionary rule is not designed to serve a specific deterrence function; is, it is not designed punish particular police officer for violating person’s fourth rights. amendment Instead, the rule is designed produce ‘systematic deterrence’: the exclusionary rule is intended to create an incentive for law enforcement officials to establish procedures by which police officers are trained to comply with the fourth amendment because the purpose of the criminal justice system bringing — justice criminals to be achieved —can only when evidence guilt of may be used against defendants.” Stewart, 83 Colum. L. Rev., at 1400. See Oaks, also Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. 665, Rev. (1970) (“The 709-710 exclusionary rule is not aimed at special deterrence since it does impose not any punishment direct on a law enforcement official who has broken the rule. . . . The exclusionary rule is aimed at affecting the wider audience of all law enforcement officials and society at large. It is meant to discourage violations individuals who have experienced never any sanction for them”); Mertens & Wasser strom, 70 J., Geo. L. at 399-401; Kamisar, 16 Creighton L. Rev., 597, at n. 204. [the] demonstration long term, the recognized, “over ously society attaches rule] our exclusionary by the [provided rights is constitutional of violation consequences to serious enforcement law formulate encourage who those thought to incorporate to them, implement who the officers policies, and Stone system.” value their into ideals Amendment Fourth in- through such only It 492. at S.,U. Powell, concerning Fourth information mechanism stitutionwide effectively communicated be can standards Amendment officers.13 rank-and-file of effect deterrent systemic the on data empirical specific 13Although in law involved actually those testimony of conclusive, the rule

the had the Mapp decision least, the very that, the suggests enforcement requirements Amendment Fourth of awareness increasing police of effect edu towards work commanders police prosecutors prompting of York Police New former example, For officers. cating rank-and-file “I can Mapp decision: of the impact explained Murphy Commissioner which enforcement of law field in times in recent no decision of think caught immediately I was effect.... traumatic a dramatic had such fol had procedures, our reevaluating program entire up in policies creating new amending, and modifying, rule, and lowed Defore Retraining . . . Mapp. implementation instructions and new each of down administrators top very from held to be had sessions of Police Review Murphy, Judicial patrolmen.” foot thousands Police Compliance Problem Enforcement: in Law Methods 939, 941 Rev. L. Texas Departments, in found can Mapp decision impact testimony about Further awas Mapp case “The Reisman: Commissioner Deputy statement this, frankly. Before thinking, our reorganize hadWe us. shock U. S. Con- Although the warrants. out search to take nobody bothered had Supreme cases, S. the U. most warrants requires stitution will—was you if illegally, without warrant — obtained ruled Well, once why was, bother? feeling So courts. state admissible about teaching men our start better hadwe knew changed we rule States United former A1. 50, col. 1965, p. Times, Apr. Y. it.” N. Sachs, de- has Stephen Maryland, Attorney General Attorney now “I have terms: similar practices rule impact scribed prosecu- years as my throughout routinely, deter, rule watched cases customary in our all consultation [P]olice-prosecutor . . . tor. Maryland three at least In ... arise. concerns when If the overall educational effect of the exclusionary rule is application considered, of the rule to even those situations in which police individual officers have acted on the basis of a reasonable but mistaken belief that their conduct was author- ized can expected still be to have a long-term considerable deterrent effect. If evidence is consistently excluded in these police departments circumstances, surely will prompted be instruct their officers to greater devote care and attention to providing sufficient information to probable establish cause when applying for a warrant, and to review with some atten- tion the form of the warrant they have been issued, rather than automatically assuming that whatever document magistrate signed has will necessarily comport with requirements. Amendment today’s

After decisions, however, that institutional incen- tive will be lost. Indeed, the Court’s “reasonable mistake” exception to the exclusionary rule will put tend to premium police ignorance of the law. Armed with the assurance provided by today’s decisions that evidence will always be admissible whenever an officer has “reasonably” upon relied police warrant, departments will be encouraged to train officers that if a warrant simply has been signed, it is rea- sonable, without rely more, to on it. Since in close cases there longer will no any incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior, would every reason adopt a approach “let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided” in situations in question there is a about a warrant’s validity or the basis for its issuance. Cf. United States v. Johnson, U. (1982).14 S. 537,

jurisdictions, for example, prosecutors are on twenty-four hour call to field search and questions seizure presented by police officers.” Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor’s Defense, 1 Crim. Justice Ethics 28, 30 (Summer/Fall 1982). See also LaFave, The Fourth in Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra, at 394-401. 14The authors of a recent study of the warrant process in seven cities concluded that application good-faith of a exception where an officer relies of host a aside, concerns these brushes Although Court the deci- from result to expected be can consequences grave exclusionary rule. the of exception out new this carve to sion convey tobe will today’s decisions of consequence chief A de- their that magistrates message to unambiguous and clear subsequent from insulated now warrants issue to cisions good- exception new Creation judicial review. that magistrates implicitly tells upon warrant reliance faith applica- reviewing warrant in care much take they not need virtually no on now from will mistakes their since tions, correct, was a warrant issue to decision their If consequence: incorrect decision if their admitted; bewill the evi- warrant, good faith police relied but atten- Inevitably, care admitted. be also will dence dwindle. will chore inconsequential an such to devoted tion do magistrates that note to correct Although Court case a criminal outcome in the stake same share not their appreciate to need they nevertheless police, performing to continue in order moment of some role applications. reviewing warrant carefully task important incentive.15 effectively remove Today’s decisions less out seek to officers encourage further “would a warrant upon thereby lessen- formulae, boilerplate rely on to magistrates inquisitive benefits Consequently, overall. warrants search value ing the few additional aof in terms exception faith good broad aof adoption of the quality harm by the outweighed to be appears prosecutions general.” system justice criminal process search entire Process: Warrant Carter, The Search Sutton, C.& Duizend, L. Van R. Draft, National (Review 8-12 Practices Perceptions, Preconceptions, Rev., L. Stewart, 83 Colum. 1983). also See Courts, for State Center 1403. (1983), the Gates, S.U. Illinois Term last 15 Just noted: to allow magistrate to the presented be must information “Sufficient ratification a mere cannot cause; his action probable determine official ab- such ensure In order others. conclusions bare continue must occur, courts duty does magistrate’s dication

Moreover, the good-faith exception will encourage police provide only the bare minimum of information in future war- rant applications. The police will now know that if they can secure a warrant, so long as the circumstances of its issuance are not “entirely unreasonable,” ante, at 923, all police con- duct pursuant to that warrant will be protected from further judicial review.16 The clear incentive that operated in the past to establish probable cause adequately because review- ing courts would examine the magistrate’s judgment care- g., fully, see, e. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 169-170 (1978); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 271-272 (1960); Giordenello United States, 357 U. S. 480, 483 (1958), has v.

now been so completely vitiated that the police need only show that it was not “entirely unreasonable” under the cir- conseientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are Id., issued.” at 239.

After today’s decisions, there will be little reason for reviewing courts to conduct such a review; conscientious rather, these courts will be more likely to focus simply on question good faith. Despite the Court’s prediction confident that such review will continue to be con- ducted, ante, see at 924-925, it is difficult to believe that busy courts faced with heavy dockets will take the time to render essentially advisory opinions concerning the constitutionality of the magistrate’s decision before considering the good officer’s faith. 16 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed in this

regard: “If a magistrate’s issuance of a warrant be, were to as the government would have it, an all but conclusive determination of the validity of the search the admissibility of the evidence seized thereby, police offi- might cers have a substantial incentive to submit their applica- warrant tions to the least demanding magistrates, since once the warrant was is- sued, it would be exceedingly difficult later to any exclude evidence seized in the resulting search even if the warrant was issued probable without cause. . . . For practical purposes, therefore, the standard probable cause might be diluted to that required by the least demanding official authorized to issue warrants, even if this fell well below what the required.” United States v. Karathanos, 531 F. 2d to believe for them case particular aof cumstances 923. ante, See valid. they issued were warrant undermine be will unquestionably long-run effect process. warrant integrity appar- Court believe, were one if Finally, even hyper- by inflexible hobbled police are ently does, cannot today’s decisions procedures, warrant technical as- standard relaxed given the because, This justified. Illinois Term just last established cause probable sessing newly fashioned (1983), Court’s S.U. Gates, context, in the applied exception, when good-faith policethan flexibility for greater any offer rarely, ever, if will Gates, In supplies. already standard Gates simply to magistrate issuing “[t]he task held given all whether, decision common-sense practical, amake . . . him, before affidavit forth set circumstances aof or contraband that probability fair ais there 238. Id., at place.” particular ain found bewill crime determining whether is confined reviewing court aof task concluding]’ . . . for basis ‘substantial a had magistrate “the relaxed a such Given Ibid. existed.” cause probable that reviewing court, that virtually inconceivable is standard, it first could suppress, motion defendant’s awith faced when stand- Gates new under invalid was a warrant find officer’s police find time, same at then, but ard, “ob- nevertheless invalid an such reliance today.17 announced test under reasonable” jectively un- is it completely, overlap so standards two Because Gates under invalid found be could likely a warrant objectively seen be upon it could police reliance yet the mind- entertain would otherwise, we reasonable; Beyond, Faith,” and Cause,” “Good Gates, “Probable Kamisar, See Shrinking Incredible Wasserstrom, The (1984); 551, 588-589 Rev. L. Iowa Pitt. U. LaFave, 43 (1984); L. Rev. Crim. 21 Am. Amendment, Fourth Rev., 307. at L.

boggling concept of objectively reasonable upon reliance an objectively unreasonable warrant. paradox, This as Justice suggests, post, see Stevens perhaps 961-962, explains unwillingness Court’s remand No. 82-1771 for light reconsideration in of Gates, for quite likely that on remand the Appeals Court of would find no violation of the Fourth thereby Amendment, demon- strating that supposed need good-faith for the excep- tion in this context is apparent more than real. Therefore, although the Court’s decisions clearly limited to the situa- tion in police reasonably officers rely upon appar- ently valid warrant in conducting a I search, am not at all confident that exception today unleashed will remain so confined. impact Indeed, the full regrettable Court’s decisions will not be felt until the attempts to extend this rule to situations in which the have conducted a warrantless solely search on the basis of judgment their own about the probable existence of exigent cause and circum- stances. question When that finally posed, I for one will surprised my if colleagues again decide once that we simply cannot protect afford to rights.

IV public, When the quite as it properly has past done in as well as in present, demands government those increase their efforts to combat crime, it easy is all too government those officials expedient to seek solutions. In to costly contrast such and difficult measures building prisons, more improving law enforcement hiring methods, or prosecutors more judges and to relieve the overburdened systems court in country’s the metropolitan areas, the re- laxation of Fourth Amendment standards tempting, seems a costless means meeting public’s the demand for better law enforcement. long In the run, however, society we as pay heavy price for expediency, such because as Justice Jackson rights observed, guaranteed the in the Fourth Amendment catalog of belong the in rights but second-class mere not “are States, Brinegar v. United freedoms.” indispensable such lost, opinion). (dissenting Once (1949) 160, U. S. that hope, however, is There recover. to rights difficult are precious these restore will later Court some or time in for protection primary place aas rightful their to freedoms overreaching officialdom. against citizens our I dissent. 82- No. in judgment in the concurring Stevens, Justice 82-1771. No. 981, dissenting post, p. and language plain begin with appropriate

It Amendment: Fourth per- their secure people be right “The against unreasonable effects, papers, and houses,

sons, no War- violated; and be not seizures, shall and searches supported cause, probable upon but issue shall rants place describing the particularly affirmation, and or Oath things seized.” to be persons or searched, and to be vio- cases in these searches that assumes Court The ex- apply the yet refuses Amendment, Fourth lated “rea- it was concludes clusionary because rule opinion my In them. conduct police sonable” and “unreasonable” both cannot seizure search official vice doctrinal The time. same at the “reasonable” purposes separate consider holding failure Court’s Amendment. in the prohibitory Clauses two sei- searches prohibits unreasonable Clause first of warrants issuance prohibits the second zures particu- not do or by probable cause supported are persons or place searched to be larly describe repeatedly held course, have, of We things seized. to be unreasonable,1 presumptively searches warrantless (1980); Chimel v. York, 445 U. 573, 586 S. New Payton g., e. 1 See, 752, 762-763 California, S.U. and that only there are a carefully few exceptions delineated

to that basic presumption.2 But when exception such an has been recognized, analytically we have necessarily concluded that the activity warrantless was not “unreasonable” within the meaning of the first Clause. any Thus, Fourth Amend- ment may present case separate two questions: whether the search was pursuant conducted to a warrant issued in accord- ance with the second Clause, and, if not, whether it was nevertheless “reasonable” within the meaning of the first. On these questions, the constitutional requires text that we speak with one voice. We cannot intelligibly assume, arguendo, that a search was constitutionally unreasonable but that the seized evidence is admissible because the same search was reasonable.

I In No. Supreme 82-963, the Judicial Court of Massachu- setts determined that a warrant purported to author- ize a search respondent’s home had been issued violation of the Warrant Clause. In its haste to make new law, this tarry does not to consider holding. this as I Yet, will demonstrate, holding clearly wrong; I would reverse judgment ground on that alone. In No. 82-1771, there is also question substantial whether the complied warrant with the Fourth Amendment. There strong was a probable-cause dissent on issue when Leon was before the Court Appeals, and that dissent has given been added force this Court’s intervening decision in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983), which constituted significant development in the law. probable, It is though admittedly not certain, that the Appeals Court of would now conclude that the in Leon satisfied the Amendment if given it were the opportunity to reconsider light issue in of Gates. Adherence to our normal 2See, e. g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, U. S. (1971); 474-475 Vale v. Louisiana, U. S. 30 would new rule aof following the announcement practice the for need obviate, the probably postpone, therefore announces Court the rule new broad the of promulgation today.3 one case chooses Court disturbing the that course, of is, It Amendment, Fourth of violation nowas there which

in in question, grave doubt is there in another Fourth exception to the “good faith” promulgate to order explanation Court’s The exclusionary rule. Amendment’s theof merits decide to failure its for little of issue factbound it “is a is 82-963 in No. question 5. 988, n. post, at Sheppard, v. Massachusetts importance,” could case acknowledges Court 82-1771, the No. In in reconsideration Appeals for Court to the remanded do why fails to explain it to bother yet not does light Gates, decide to power” our “within it is except note to so ante, Leon, v. States United case. in the question broader cases these decide to determined seems Court 905. at determination grounds; such possible broadest on utterly well as practice traditional Court’s with odds made Decisions judicial restraint. notion any principled of time. test unlikely withstand to are manner value understand should most, than Judges, more fair set By adopting a procedures. to settled adherence ensure lawof them, courts adhering then procedures, “These hand. even with administered justice is con- what ingredients they concern for matters, subtle appear- satisfy the justice must Therefore, justice. stitutes S. U. States, United v. justice.” ance Offutt questions of duty face ahas Court course, this Of disposition anof necessary to the when law constitutional 1 Cranch Madison, Marbury v. controversy. or case actual seek not did General Leon, the Solicitor certiorari petition In his appropriate of as disposed “be petition only that review, but plenary in United Cert. Gates,” Pet. for v. in Illinois decision Court’s light of the 82-1771, 10. p. Leon, No. States 137, 177(1803). goesbeyond But necessary when what is only it, encourage thecase before decide that it perception can pursuing its policy, notionsof wise so-cial own adhering judicial rather than role. do believethe I Court should edly reach out decidewhatis undoubt-a question profoundconcerning justice of the criminal administration assuring before question itself tually this that and ac- necessitypresented by of facts the before the concrete Court. Although appear may holding Court’sbroad that the will public enforcing the interest serve obedience the to part, law, firmly rule my for preservation convinced I remain “the that in our communities order will be best ensured respected adherence proce- established and to Groppi dures.” v. 331, 1971) 436 Leslie, (en 2d (CA7 336 banc) (Stevens, F. J., dissenting), (1972). rev’d, (1972). S. 496 404 496 U. II In No. 82-963, there is no contention that the offi- cers did not appropriate receive judicial authorization for their search respondent’s residence. A neutral and de- judicial tached officer had correctly determined that there probable was cause to conduct a search. Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial suppressed the fruits of the search because the warrant did not particularly place describe the to be searched things and the to be seized.

The particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment has purpose&emdash;to prevent general manifest limiting By searches. the specific to things search to authorization the areas for and probable there search, quirement cause the to ensures re- carefully justification, the searchis tailored and wide-ranging general not resemblethe does searches prohibit.4 the Framers intended In 4 See 4 See ndresen Maryland, v. 463, 427 Stanley S. 480(1976); U. Georgia, v. 557, (Stewart, S. (1969) 569-572 J., U. concurring Stanford result); v. 476,481-482, Texas, S. (1965); U. Go-BartImporting Co. v. States, 344, United 282 S. States, (1931); 357 Marrón U. United U. S. Opinion 195-196 897 general authorizing a close come did the case search.5 the warrant for application the supporting affidavit the face on its seized, things to be the correctly identified judge the presented been it had indicated affidavit police officers the Both the warrant.6 issued had who affidavit, the contents fully aware judge were author- were officers what precisely knew therefore after- available affidavit Since for. to search ized readily as- could courts Massachusetts review, the-fact authority the warrant. under officers’ limits certain police offi- warrant, the judge issued who short, In able were all reviewing courts it, executed who cers authorization scope precise easily ascertain warrant. provided a de- contain a warrant require is cases our All that it to as- execute who officers the enable to scription sufficient they search to are where effort reasonable with certain executing whether test The seize.7 they are what way forbids that ain limited been has discretion officers’ that question no was there Here general search.8 a mis 5 authorized —albeit was warrant Indeed, the “defect” sub seized,” controlled to be “things particular quite for takenly search —a supporting affidavit described the evidence than stances, rather On search. general aof risk no posed “defect” This application. warrant Thus, searched. to be place correctly identified warrant face, the home —was respondent’s into privacy entry invasion threshold — corners Moreover, four authorized. specifically properly search authorize intended not it was indicate plainly warrant caption warrant cover theOn substances. controlled for to the “addendum” out, crossed had been Substances” “Controlled ammunition, a rifle and seizure search authorized warrant substances. controlled limited was indicating affidavit. on the 6 signature the affiant’s attested judge issuing The (1925). 498, 7 503 States, U. S. 267 United v. Steele See (1979); Andresen 319, 8 325 York, U. 442 S. New Sales, Inc. v. Lo-Ji See Warrant, U. S. 367 v. Search 480-482; Marcus S., at U. 427 Maryland, v. (1961). 717, 732-733

965 executing officers’discretion had been they, as well limited— reviewing courts, precise knew the limits of their authorization. There simply was no “occasion opportu- or nity for officers to rummage large,” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, (1978).9 436 U. S. 547, 566 only Fourth Amendment interest that is arguably implicated by the “defect” in the warrant is the citizen’s being interest in able to ascertain the limits the officers’ authorization examining the warrant.10 Respondent, however, was not home at the time the warrant was exe- cuted, and therefore had no occasion to see the warrant. persons The two present who were when the warrant was respondent’s executed, mother and sister, did not read the warrant or ask to have it “[T]he read. general [is] rule that Fourth rights personal rights which, like some other rights, constitutional may not vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174 (1969). respondent, Thus, who standing has only assert his own Fourth Amendment interests,11 complain cannot his interest in ascertaining the limits of the officers’ author- ity under the search warrant infringed.12 In short, our 9See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 S.,U. at 467. 10 See Illinois Gates, v. 462 S. 213, U. 236 (1983); United States Chadwick, 1, U. S. (1977); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, (1967). 11See, g., e. Rawlings v. Kentucky, U. S. (1980); 104-106 Rakas v. Illinois, U. S. 128 12Even if respondent had standing to assert right his to be able to ascer tain the officers’ authority from the four of corners the warrant, it is doubt ful that he could succeed. On its face the warrant authorized a search of respondent’s residence, “42 Deckard Street.” respondent Had read the warrant he would have had no question reason to the right officers’ to enter the premises. Moreover, the face of the warrant indicated that the cap tion “Controlled Substances” had been stricken, and at the bottom of the warrant an addendum authorized the search for and seizure of a rifle and ammunition. The supporting affidavit, which the had with them they when executed the warrant, and which was by attested the same judge who had issued the warrant, described in detail the items which the police were authorized to search for and to seize. of requirement particularity construing the

precedents this that unambiguously demonstrate Clause Warrant the Amendment. Fourth the violate not did warrant I I I of violation technical awas there that assumed it be if Even by means no it 82-963, No. in requirement particularity the “un- was case that search “warrantless” the that follows Amendment. Fourth meaning the of the within reasonable” the which dangers to posed none search this For by a neu- justified It was addressed. is Amendment Fourth created and probable cause magistrate’s determination tral eminently “reasonable.” It was search. general aof risk no admits—at now the Government however, 82-1771, No. In regards as it achieving what purpose of the tactical least letter, as well substance, greater benefit—that therefore Court violated. was Amendment Fourth by supported not was case in that that assumes probable ob- suppress the refuses but cause, to sat- police conduct thereby considers because tained reasonable- standard “newfangled” nonconstitutional isfy a there assumption correct —if is if Court’s Yet ness.13 “unreasonable” it was follow must probable cause—it no characterized so Clark, who Justice from adjective 13 Iborrow Court, Municipal v. Camara by the Court authorized warrants In itself. the Constitution by authorized (1967), but S.U. Stewart, wrote: he Justice and Harlan by Justice joined opinion back dates experience, municipal renders Court “Today the S.U. [359 Maryland Frank overruling naught days, for to Colonial throughout city ordinances hundreds striking down (1959)] and safety of welfare, and health, thereby the jeopardizing country people. literally millions Amend- command prostitutes It is not all. “But this up sets cause’ probable upon issue, but shall ‘no Warrants ment system ‘warrant’ newfangled inspection area safety codes the health regrettable It standards. to Fourth foreign entirely practice accepted widely long and such a out wipes

967 for the authorities to make unheralded entries into and private searches of dwellings and automobiles. The Court’s conclusion that such searches undertaken probable without cause can nevertheless be “reasonable” totally without support in our Fourth jurisprudence. Just last Term, the explained probable what cause to issue a warrant means: “The task of issuing magistrate simply to make practical, common-sense decision given whether, all

the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and the ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found particular in a place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 238. Moreover, in evaluating the probable existence of cause, reviewing courts give must substantial deference to the

magistrate’s determination.14 In doubtful cases the warrant creates in its place such enormous confusion in all of our towns and metro- politan cities in one fell swoop.” See v. City Seattle, 387 U. 541, S. (1967) 547 (dissenting in both See). Camara The kind of doctrinal difficulties in the two lines of engendered cases by the Court’s creation of a newfangled warrant, compare Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), with Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. (1981), 594 can expected to grow out of the Court’s creation of a new double standard of today. reasonableness Ironically, as I have previously suggested, the failure to consider both Clauses of the Amendment infects both lines of decision. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. 287, S. 301-303 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Dewey, S., U. at 606- 608 (Stevens, J., concurring); Michigan v. Tyler, U. S. 499, (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Barlow’s, S., 436 U. (Stevens at 325-339 J., dissenting). 14See Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U. 727, S. (1984) (per 732-733 curiam); Illinois v. Gates, S.,U. at 236; United States Harris, 403 U. 573, S. (1971) 577-583 (plurality opinion); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. 410, S. 419 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. 108, S. 111 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 968 there whether to judgment as The sustained.15 be should nontechnical practical and ain made be must

probable cause gives law therefore standard probable-cause The manner.16 any reasonable engage in to ample room officers enforcement has the standard more, activity. isWhat enforcement law centur for profession enforcement law familiar been by the and endorsed 1949, in opinion written In ies.17 explained: Gates, we Term last safeguard seek standards long-prevailing “These with interferences unreasonable rash from citizens They charges crime. unfounded from privacy and enforcing law leeway for give fair seek also many situations Because protection. community’s executing their course officers confront al- be must room ambiguous, less or more duties mis- part. But their on mistakes some for lowed acting facts men, reasonable those must be takes probability. sensibly conclusions their leading concep- practical, nontechnical is a cause probable rule found been has compromise affording best tion Re- opposing interests. accommodating often these hamper enforcement. law unduly would more quiring law-abiding at citizens leave to less would allow To Brinegar v. caprice.” or whim officers’ mercy the 160, 176. S. U. 338 States, United even correct, assumption is majority’s if the Thus, finding magistrate’s to the heavy deference paying after probable cause no there favor, in its

resolving doubt all law— of constitutional matter by definition—as then here, v. 10; States United 15 n. S., at Gates, U. 462 v. Illinois See 102, 109 S. Ventresca, 380 U. curiam); Illinois (per S., at 466 U. Upton, v. Massachusetts 16 See S., 108. Ventresca, U. v. States 231; United S., at Gates, U. 1847). (1st Am. ed. of the Crown Hale, Pleas 2 M. 17 See, g., e.

the officers’ conduct was unreasonable.18 The Court’s own hypothesis is that there was no fair likelihood that the offi- cers would find evidence of a crime, and hence there was no reasonable law justification enforcement for their conduct.19 The majority’s contrary conclusionrests on the notion that it must be reasonable for a officer rely magis on a finding. trate’s Until today that plainly has not been the law; has been well settled that even magistrate when a is sues a warrant there guarantee is no that ensuing search and seizure is constitutionally reasonable. Law enforcement officers long have been on notice despite that magis trate’s decision a warrant will be invalidated if the officers provide did not sufficient facts to magistrate enable the to evaluate the probable existence of cause responsibly and independently.20 Reviewing courts always inquired into whether magistrate properly acted in issuing the merely warrant —not whether the officers properly acted executing it. See Jones v. United 362 States, U. S. 257, (1960).21 271-272 just Indeed, last Term, in Gates, after not- 18“[I]f nothing said under oath in the warrant application demonstrates the need for an unannounced search by force, the probable-cause require ment is not satisfied. In the absence of some other showing of reasonable ness, the ensuing search violates the Fourth Amendment.” Zurcher v. Daily, 436 U. 547, S. Stanford (1978) 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 19As the majority recognizes, United States v. Leon, ante, 915, 13, n. an good officer’s faith cannot make otherwise “unreasonable” conduct reasonable. See Terry Ohio, v. 392 U. 1,S. 22 (1968); Beck Ohio, v. 379 89, U. S. 97 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. (1959). 102 The majority’s failure to appreciate the significance of that recognition is inexplicable. 20See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 165, 169-170 (1978); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 564 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, S.,U. at 415-416; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S., at 108-109; Aguilar Texas, 378 U. S., at 113-115; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 21In making this point in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978), Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court: “We see no principled basis for

distinguishing between question of the sufficiency of an affidavit, which “ simply ensure to reviewing court duty aof ‘the ing that concluding]’ for basis a ‘substantial had magistrate that ” (quoting at 238-239 S.,U. existed,’ probable cause added: 271), the Court at S., U. Jones, magis- presented must be information “Sufficient probable cause; to determine official allow trate bare ratification mere abe cannot action his such ensure In order others. conclusions occur, courts duty does magistrate’s theof abdication sufficiency conscientiously review continue must S.U. issued.” warrants on affidavits at 239.22 “reasonable” been never it has cases our under Thus, issued; has that a fact rely mere police to supply the they fail if always known police have bewill the warrant information, sufficient with magistrate excluded.23 fruits its invalid

held magistrate’s aon reliance police officer’s notion The of Framers is one appropriate automatically is warrant in- its of question examination, post-search ato subject also is part holding in justifies today the Court Yet 171. Id., at tegrity.” 922-923, ante, at Leon, v. States claims, United veracity distinguishing distinguished be not could held previously we what distinguishing thereby innocent for an reasonable less be why should Just basis. principled aon for him than fraud officer’s by another obtained a warrant rely on officer entirely cause by probable supported not rely aon to me. unclear necessary more 22 is all determinations magisterial of review Judicial his presentation; adversarial benefit without acts magistrate since pro parte any ex unreliability inherent partakes determination S., 169. at Delaware, 438 U. v. Franks ceeding. See invalidating courts 23 vision by a captivated be seems majority The violations “technical” because conduct reasonable perfectly a “technical” thing such is no there my view In Amendment. Fourth uncon can be seizure or No search Amendment. Fourth violation Amendment By definition “unreasonable.” isit unless stitutional illustrates 82-963 of No. analysis My reasonable. cannot violation point.

971 the Fourth Amendment would have vehemently rejected. precise problem that the Amendment was intended to address was the unreasonable issuance warrants. As we have often observed, the actually motivated practice of issuing general warrants —warrants which did satisfy the particularity probable-cause requirem ents.24 The resentments which led to the Amendment were directed at the issuance of unjustified warrants by par ticularized evidence of wrongdoing.25 Those sought who amend the Constitution to include a Rights Bill of repeatedly voiced the view that the evil which had to be addressed was the issuance of warrants on insufficient evidence.26 As Taylor Professor has written: 24See, g., e. Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 220 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 S.,U. at 583-584; Sales, Lo-Ji Inc. v. York, New S.,U. 325; at Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S., at 327-328 (Stevens,

J., dissenting); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S., at 7-8; Chimel v. California, S.,U. at 760-762; v. Texas, Stanford S.,U. at 480-485; Marcus v. Search Warrant, S.,U. at 727-729; Henry v. United States, S.,U. at 100-101; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. 56, S. (1950) 69-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Marron v. United States, S., 275 U. 195-196; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. 383, S. 390-391 (1914); Boyd United States, 116 U. S. 624-630 25See J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 19-47 (1966); N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amend ment to the United States Constitution 53-98 (1937); R. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of (rev. Rights 11 ed. 1983); Marke, The Writs of Assist ance Case and the Fourth Amendment, in Essays in Legal History in Honor of Felix (M. Frankfurter 351 1966). Forkosch ed. 26 1 See The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 473, 488-489, 508 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971); 2 id., at 658, 665, 730, 733-734, 805-806, 815, 841-842, 913, 968. In fact, the original version of the Fourth Amendment contained only one clause providing that right the protected be against unreasonable searches and seizures “shall not be violated by warrants issuing . . . .” The change to present form broadened the coverage of the Amendment but did not qualify the unequivocal prohibition against the issuance of warrants probable without" cause. See 2 id., at 1112; N. Lasson, supra n. at 101-103. 972 about concerned not were fathers constitutional

“[O]ur overreaching warrants. about searches, but warrantless war the they feared say that much too perhaps isIt enough that plain it but search, the than more rant Far concern. object their of prime the was warrant against protection aas warrant looking at from authority for anas they saw searches, unreasonable Taylor, T. . .”.. searches oppressive unreasonable Interpretation in Constitutional Studies Two were Amendment Fourth of Framers short, In paradigm minds their in warrants; suspicious of deeply not based a warrant of execution was search an abusive of magis- had officers colonial fact cause. probable on engaged in they when conduct their for authorization terial “reason- conduct their make surely not did searches general Con- our with consistent isit view The Court’s able.” reasonable presumptively it is adopt rule a stitution constitutional product is the rely a defective amnesia.27 IV “[i]ndi- observing that after Jackson, Brinegar, Justice In freedoms Fourth wanting that not are

cations a relegated to rights, be secondary tacitly as marked are opinion), (dissenting S.,U. position,” deferred continued: rights but second-class mere protest, I “These, Among freedoms. indispensable catalog of

belong the in cowing effective so rights, none deprivations individual spirit crushing the population, a search Uncontrolled every heart. putting terror recognizes one whether world difference all makes “It safeguard it namely, that Amendment, about fact central one as to Colonies by the felt deeply so abuses recurrence against require merely a itof thinks one Revolution, or causes potent U, S., at 69 Rabinowitz, States United paper.” piece ment dissenting). J., (Frankfurter, seizure is one of the first and most weapons effective the arsenal every arbitrary government. And one only need briefly to have dwelt and among worked peo- ple possessed many qualities admirable deprived but rights these to know that the human personality de- teriorates dignity and self-reliance disappear where persons homes, possessions subject any hour to unheralded search and seizure police. “Only occasional and flagrant more abuses come to the attention of the courts, and only then those where the search and yields seizure incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a home, an stop office, or and search an automobile but nothing find incriminating, this invasion personal liberty of the innocent too often practical finds no redress. may There be, I am convinced that there many are, unlawful searches of homes and automobiles of people innocent up turn nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which courts nothing, do and about which we never hear. protect “Courts can against innocent such inva- only sions indirectly and through the medium of exclud- ing against obtained those who frequently are guilty. ... So a against search Brinegar’s car must be regarded as a search of the car Everyman.” Id., at 180-181.

Justice Jackson’s reference experience to his at Nuremberg should remind importance us of the of considering the conse- quences today’s decision “Everyman.” The exclusionary designed rule is prevent violations of the Fourth Amendment.28 purpose “Its is to deter —to com- 28For at least two reasons, the exclusionary rule is a better remedy than a civil action against an offending officer. Unlike the personal fear of liability, it should not create excessive deterrence; moreover, it avoids the obvious unfairness of subjecting the dedicated officer to the risk of mone- 974 only effec the in guaranty constitutional the respect for

pel disregard to incentive removing the way, tively available (14960).29If 217 206, U. S. 364 States, United v. Elkins it.” through warrants obtained evidence use police cannot the incentive they less have cause, probable than less on issued incentive less magistrates and warrants, those seek them. issue func- deterrent damage to grave do Today’s decisions police the when even rule, new majority’s the Under tion. they insufficient, probably is application their know chance the magistrate, a it to to submit incentive retain and they hesitate longer must No bait. may the take he we what Thus, cases. doubtful in evidence additional seek Society, law. enforce endeavoring to misstep while a liability for tary for responsibility accept officer, should individual than rather police hazardous in engaged officers supervision or training inadequate remains ago, decades two wrote, some Justice Chief The What work. today: true masters are people society that democratic aof claim proud is the “It so, the being That people. servants are state officials and all and direct simple, awith us furnishes superior respondeat rule ancient of con- violation in secured evidence refusing admit for basis reasonable serv- society’s is policeman Since statutory provisions. or stitutional or master attributable duty are his execution in the acts ant, his ‘penalized’ is society and responsible thus is whole aas Society employer. This action. illegal by the secured benefit refusing it me it seems because explanations other than more me satisfies what for responsible involved country like ours—is society —in 1930’s Germans Unlike agents. by its name done amI doing. Leader’s all ‘it is say ’40’s, we cannot early whether responsible, democracy we representative In a responsible.’ sense inis each involved isusof each so And not. it or like we our established lawof rules breaks officer when responsible Watchman?, Am. 14 Watch Will Burger, Who protection.” common omitted). (footnote original) (emphasis (1964) 1, 14 L. Rev. U. Janis, v. States (1976); United 29 465, 484 Powell, 428 U. S. v. Stone See 338, Calandra, 414 U. S. v. States (1976); United 443, n. S. 428 U. States United v. 29; Tehan S., at Ohio, U. Terry v. (1974); 347-348 643, 656 S.U. Ohio, (1966); Mapp 406, 413 S.U. Shott, ex rel. said ago two Terms about a rule that prevent would exclusion

except in cases in which the authorities violate well-settled applies law fully to the rule the adopts today:

“If, as the argues, Government all rulings resolving unsettled Fourth questions Amendment in should be non- retroactive, then, close cases law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of constitu- tional behavior. Officialawareness of the dubious con- stitutionality practice of a would be by counterbalanced officialcertainty long so that, as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained unsettled, evidence obtained through questionable the practice would be excluded only in the one case definitively resolving the unsettled question. Failure to any accord retroactive effect to Fourth rulings Amendment would ‘encourage police or other disregard courts to plain purport of our decisions and adopt a let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided approach.’” United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, (1982) (emphasis (footnote original) in omitted) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 277 (1969)(Fortas, J., dissenting)).30

The Court is of course correct that the exclusionary rule cannot deter when the authorities have no reason to know that their conduct is unconstitutional. But probable when lacking, cause then definition a person reasonable under the circumstances would not believe there is a fair likelihood produce a search will evidence of a crime. Under such circumstances professionals well-trained must know they violating are the Constitution. The approach— Court’s 30See LaFave, also The Fourth in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. Pitt. L. 807, Rev. (1982); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio Beyond: Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Seareh-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1401-1403 (1983); Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. 257, Rev. 395-397 even seek police to encourages the effect, which, is doubtful—can probable cause of existence they know if violations. constitutional of number increased only lead reason- standard double aof creation the Court’s Thus, rationale deterrence inevitably erode must ableness ig- we should But exclusionary rule. supports the still enforcing judiciary theof role way it tarnishes nore exclu- original rationale For Constitution. relevance: its aswell force sionary retains rule laws criminal execute tendency who those “The unlawful means conviction country to obtain judgments sanction no find . should .. seizures with times charged all courts all people to which the Constitution support of maintenance for the appeal right to conditions States, v. United rights.” Weeks fundamental such (1914).31 S.U. and cannot Constitution our under sit which

Thus, “Courts constitu the of invasions lawless to party made be not will 31 continued: The Court punish- guilty bring the officials their courts the of “The efforts those of sacrifice by the aided be are, they as ment, praiseworthy have suffering which endeavor of by years established great principles land. of law fundamental embodiment in their resulted accused of house invaded only have could Marshal States United Constitution, upon by the required issued awith armed when things particularity reasonable describing with information sworn sanction without Instead, acted he made. to be search for aid proof bring further by the desire prompted law, doubtless seizure to make undertook his office color under Government, and against prohibition constitutional theof violation direct papers private information sworn circumstances, without such Under action. such such justified would of court order an not even description, particular judi- by affirm to would proceedings such sanction To .... procedure prohibitions open defiance if not neglect a manifest decision cial such against people protection Constitution, intended S., 393-394. at 232 U. action.” unauthorized

977 rights tional citizens permitting govern unhindered mental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . Terry v. (1968).32 Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 13 As the Court correctly notes,33 we have apply refused to the exclusionary rule to collateral contexts in which marginal its efficacy questionable; until today, every however, time the have violated the applicable commands of the Fourth Amendment a court has prepared been to vindicate that preventing the use of evidence so prosecution’s obtained in the case against in chief those rights whose have been violated.34 Today, for the first time, this Court holds although Constitution has been violated, no court should anything do any about it at any time and in proceeding.35 my In judg 32See United States v. Peltier, 422 531, U. S. (1975); 536 Lee Florida, v. 392 U. 378, S. 385-386 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. 41, S. 50 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 S.,U. at 647-650; Byars v. United States, S.,U. 33-34. 33 United States Leon, ante, at 908-913. v. 34Indeed, we have concluded that judicial integrity is not compromised by the refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to collateral contexts precisely because defendant is able to vindicate rights his in the primary con text —his trial and appeal direct therefrom. See Stone v. Powell, S.,U. at 485-486. 35As the majority recognizes, United States v. Leon, ante, at 922-923, 23, and n. in all cases which “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule would operate, there will also be immunity from civil damages. See also United States Ross, v. 456 U. S. 823, n. 32 (1982); Stadium Films, Inc. v. Baillargeon, (CA1 F. 2d 577, 578 1976); Madison Manter, (CA1 441 F. 2d 1971). See generally Pierson v. Ray, U. S. 547 The Court amazingly suggests that in some cases in which suppression would not be appropriate courts should nevertheless adjudicate the merits of Fourth Amendment claims to provide guidance to police and magistrates but not a remedy. United States v. Leon, ante, at 925. only Not is the propriety deciding of questions constitutional in the absence of the strict necessity to do open so question, serious see Bowen v. United States, 916, 422 U. S. 920 (1975), but such a in proceeding, which a court would declare that the Constitution had been violated but that it was unwilling to do anything it, about seems almost a mockery: “[T]he against assurance unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be 978 simply cannot Courts requires more. Constitution

ment, the viola redressing constitutional for responsibility escape their through unreasonable obtained evidence they admit if tions police conduct point of entire the since seizures, and searches evidence obtain is to Fourth violates the courts then admitted, evidence such If trial. at use uncon necessary in an link merely final not become motivating force. actual but events, chain stitutional attorneys to permit district not does existing code “If permit the not it does dirty business in such hand a have v. Olmstead iniquities to succeed.” such allow judge to (Holmes, dissent (1928) J., 470 S.U. 277 States, United con aof existence easily concede sowe ing). should Nor sodo remedy.36 To nois there for which violation stitutional code honor unenforced an Rights into ofBill a convert tois The Constitu discretion. their may follow Court’s remedy.37 If requires a more; requires tion should Rights Bill followed, to be rule new renamed.

ter ‘a also individual injury.” Schrock my more Constitutional under ments ment, 1983 States U. S. is, form of 37 See The opinion, Segura Exclusionary inestimable than unenforceable were does Stewart, 83 Colum. very essence & words,’ valueless honor obtained v. Marbury been (1961), which same however, the v. United Welsh, Up From intended S. not claim Requirement, Ct. system. decided compel authority, inadmissible human by searches Rule: Rev. Madison, 1 Craneh States, protection civil liberties.” create use as.it guiding 283. An framers The L. majority liberty 59 Minn. Essential ante, proscriptions undeserving of was. Rev., legal In Calandra: principles did fact, if of the seizures at exclusionary Mapp v. certainly rights and at not See does 838-840 L. Ingredient 1383-1384 in a intend Rev. laws, whenever 137, 163 the Constitution id., —no The not U. Ohio, state consists mention violation 251, 350-372 (Stevens, purport duties”). more Exclusionary guarantees rule, (footnotes court”). (1803). See ofBill than ain Mapp (“We hold 655. S., at perpetual See J., Rights to he receives question, right of in the of the code omitted) (“In Constitution dissenting). also Rule as Ohio, generally Amend amend United Ervin, every ethics nobe char- could See an all It is of course true that the exclusionary rule high exerts a price probative loss of —the guilt. evidence of price But that is one courts have often required been pay impor serve tant goals.38 social price That is also one the Fourth Amend requires ment pay, us to assuming as we must that the Fram ers intended that its strictures “shall not be violated.” For in all such cases, as Justice Stewart has observed, “the same extremely relevant evidence would not have been obtained had police complied officer with the commands of the fourth amendment in place.”39 the first “[T]he thought forefathers this was great not too price pay for that decent privacy of papers home, and ef- fects which indispensable to individual dignity and self-respect. They may have privacy, overvalued but I am disposed to set their command naught.” Har- ris v. United States, 331 U. S. (1947) 145, 198 (Jackson,

J., dissenting).40 We could, of course, process facilitate the of administering justice to those who violate the criminal laws ignoring the commands of the Fourth indeed, ignoring Amendment —

38Theexclusion of probative evidence in order to serve some other policy is by no means unique to the Fourth Amendment. In his famous treatise on evidence, Dean Wigmore devoted an entire volume to such exclusionary rules, which are common in the law of evidence. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evi (J. dence McNaughton 1961) rev. (discussing, inter alia, marital privilege, attorney-client privilege, communications among jurors, state secrets privilege, physician-patient privilege, priest-penitent privilege). 39Stewart, 83 Colum. L. Rev., (footnote at 1392 omitted). See also Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L. J. 322 (“Ah, but surely the guilty should not go free? However grave the question, it seemed improperly directed at the exclusionary rule. The hard answer is in the United States Constitution as well as in state con They stitutions. make it clear that the guilty go would if free the evidence necessary to convict could only have been obtained illegally, just they would go free if such evidence were lacking because had observed the constitutional them”). restraints upon 40See also United States Re, v. Di 332 U. S. 581, Bill aof purpose very it is Rights ofBill entire —but sacrificed may identify values Rights to as well govern, society who those just In a expediency. obey law. must governed, who those 82-963, No. in judgment the Court’s in I concur While remand 82-1771 No. judgment vacate I would reconsideration Appeals for the case from dissent respectfully Accordingly, I light of Gates. 82-1771. No. disposition

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Leon

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Sep 18, 1984

Citation: 468 U.S. 897

Docket Number: 82-1771

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS