Tyler Halva, Appellant, vs. Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, Respondent.
A19-0481
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS
December 16, 2019
Worke, Judge
Ramsey County District Court, File No. 62-CV-18-3910
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kathryn M. Woodruff, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.*
S Y L L A B U S
The Minnesota official records act (MORA),
O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim for damages under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA),
FACTS
In March 2015, respondent Minnesota State Colleges and Universities (MnSCU) posted a request for proposal (RFP) for a professional/technical services contract—software for an online registration system for continuing education and customized training. The RFP included general selection criteria upon which proposals would be evaluated, and explained that proposals failing to address the RFP requirements may be disregarded.
Four vendors submitted proposals, including appellant Tyler Halva. During a WebEx video meeting, the selection committee evaluated Halva’s proposal and electronically highlighted Halva’s proposal’s cover letter using Adobe Acrobat Reader’s highlight function. When the document was closed on the computer, the committee’s highlights were not saved. The committee disqualified Halva’s proposal because he failed to provide required information.
In January 2017, an administrative-law judge (ALJ) determined that MnSCU failed to comply with the MGDPA and ordered MnSCU to provide Halva a copy of his original RFP submission and a copy of the highlights made to Halva’s cover letter if it had retained a copy. MnSCU provided Halva documents in response to the ALJ’s order. But Halva objected, claiming that the data was insufficient because he submitted his proposal on a CD and MnSCU provided him a paper copy, and MnSCU determined that it had not retained the highlighted copy of Halva’s cover letter. In response to Halva’s objections, the ALJ determined that MnSCU was not obligated to provide data that was not recorded in physical form, or required to acquire particular software to create a permanent record of an electronic conversation or meeting.
MnSCU moved to dismiss under
The district court granted MnSCU’s motion to dismiss counts one and two.1 The district court also granted MnSCU’s motion to dismiss counts three and four, but only to the extent that Halva purported to state a claim under the MGDPA. The district court concluded that because Halva commenced his MGDPA action in the OAH, he could not relitigate the MGDPA matters in district court. But to the extent that counts three and four
MnSCU then moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the MORA does not create a private cause of action. On February 1, 2019, the district court granted MnSCU’s motion, concluding: “Halva’s claim is that [MnSCU] either did not create an official record in the first place or that it did not preserve an official record which had been created. The MORA does not provide a remedy, which would require [MnSCU] to go back and create or recreate an official document.” Judgment was entered, and this appeal followed.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss appellant’s claim for damages under the MGDPA?
II. Did the district court err in granting respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for appellant’s claims for remedies under the MORA?
ANALYSIS
Damages under the MGDPA
The district court granted MnSCU’s motion to dismiss Halva’s MGDPA claim under
Halva argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claim for damages under the MGDPA after concluding that he could not commence an action in district court after prevailing in the OAH. Halva claims that, under the MGDPA, an action to compel compliance may be commenced in the OAH, and then damages may be sought in district court. Whether the district court properly applied the MGDPA presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which this court reviews de novo. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).
Under
MnSCU argues that even if Halva is correct, Halva failed to sufficiently plead damages in district court. We agree. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff cannot allege mere “labels and conclusions.” Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010). He
Halva argues that this court cannot consider an alternative basis to affirm the district court’s decision because MnSCU did not file a notice of related appeal (NORA). But a NORA is required when a respondent seeks review of a district court ruling that was adverse to respondent. Day Masonry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 347, 781 N.W.2d 321, 332 (Minn. 2010). Here, although MnSCU argued to the district court that Halva failed to adequately allege damages, the district court did not decide that issue. Thus, there is no ruling adverse to MnSCU on that issue, and a NORA was not required. Further, in reviewing an order dismissing a claim under
Remedies under the MORA
The district court granted MnSCU’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Halva’s claims for compliance and damages under the MORA. This court reviews a district court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings “to determine whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Burt v. Rackner, Inc., 902 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). In doing so, this court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.
Interpretation of the MORA is an issue of statutory interpretation, which this court reviews de novo. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624; see also Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Minn. 2007) (stating that whether a statute creates a private cause of action is a question of statutory interpretation). The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.
Halva claims that MnSCU violated the MORA, and that he may bring an action against MnSCU for that violation because, as an unsuccessful bidder, he may bring a claim against an entity that violated a statute in awarding a public contract. In count three of his complaint, Halva asserted that the MORA requires that official activity be recorded and
A statute gives rise to a private cause of action only if “the language of the statute is explicit or it can be determined by clear implication.” Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 207. Courts are reluctant to recognize a cause of action under a statute when one does not clearly exist. Krueger v. Zeman Constr. Co., 781 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Minn. 2010). Courts are equally reluctant to imply a cause of action when a statute explicitly provides for an alternative remedy. Becker, 737 N.W.2d at 207. Here, there is no indication, based upon a review of the plain statutory language of
The MORA provides that public officers “shall make and preserve all records necessary to a full and accurate knowledge of their official activities.”
D E C I S I O N
Because Halva did not adequately plead damages, the district court did not err in granting MnSCU’s motion to dismiss Halva’s claim for damages under the MGDPA. And because the MORA does not create a private cause of action, the district court did not err in granting MnSCU’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for Halva’s claims under the MORA.
Affirmed.
