Mary COCCHIARELLA, Appellant, v. Donald DRIGGS, Respondent.
No. A14-1876.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 31, 2016.
621
Affirmed as modified.
Donald Driggs, Spring Park, MN, pro se.
Samuel Spaid, HOME Line, Minneapolis, MN; and Darryn C. Beckstrom, Benjamin L. Ellison, Lawrence R. McDonough, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Home Line.
Robin Ann Williams, Mark R. Bradfоrd, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Multi Housing Association.
OPINION
DIETZEN, Justice.
The question presented in this appeal is whether a person must physically occupy a dwelling in a residential building to qualify as a “residential tenant” under Minnesota‘s unlawful exclusion or removal statute,
In late January 2014, Cocchiarella observed a “for rent” sign and phone number attached to the façade of a three-unit residential building. Cocchiarella contacted Driggs, who informed Cocchiarella that all three units were available for rent. When viewing the units, Cocchiarella noticed that Driggs had personal property inside of Unit 3—the unit at issue here—but Driggs assured her that Unit 3 was available for rent. Cocchiarella informed Driggs that she was interested in renting Unit 3, and Driggs “agreed to rent [Unit 3] to [Cocchiarella] at that time.”
On February 1, 2014, Cocchiarella went to the premises to determine when Driggs would “fill out paperwork” and she could begin to move in. Driggs told Cocchiarella that “move-in would be a couple of days later” because he needed to varnish the floors. Later that day, Driggs requested that Cocchiarella return on February 3 to sign a lease and that she bring $2,400 in cash for her security deposit and the February rent. Cocchiarella returned to the premises on February 3, paid Driggs $2,400, and expected to move in at that time. Driggs gave Cocchiarella a receipt for her payment, told her that he was ill, and asked her to come back the following day.
When Cocchiarella returned to the apartment the next day, Driggs requested that Cocchiarella obtain a co-signer for her lease. Cocchiarella returned that evening with her roommate, J.B., who complеted “a co-signed rental application” with her. Cocchiarella asked Driggs when she could move into the apartment, and Driggs stated that he needed a “couple of days to remove his belongings” before she could move in. Two days later, Cocchiarella and J.B. returned to the premises and again asked Driggs when he would permit her to move in. Driggs “became angry” and “demanded” that Cocchiarella and J.B. leave, which they did. On February 10, Driggs left Cocchiarella a voicemail, stating that she should return to the premises so Driggs could give back the security deposit. After some discussion with Cocchiarella at the apartment, Driggs “changed his mind” and again told Cocchiarella that he would remove his belongings in a couple of days and that she could move in “later that week.” Driggs did not offer to return the $2,400 Cocchiarella had givеn him for the security deposit and February rent payment. On February 11, Cocchiarella left Driggs a voicemail stating that, unless Driggs provided her the keys for immediate move-in, she would file a “lockout petition” with the housing court. Driggs did not give Cocchiarella the keys to the premises.
Cocchiarella filed a petition with the housing court under
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a person is a “resi-
I.
Cocchiarella argues on appeal that she qualifies as a “residential tenant” under
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.2013). Our review of a district court‘s decision to grant a motion to dismiss is also de novo. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 2011). In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and [construing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” which in this case is Cocchiarella. See id. (quoting Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003)).
The object of all statutory interpretаtion is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012) (citing
At this stage of the proceedings, we accept as true Cocchiarella‘s contentions in her petition: that she entered into an oral lease with Driggs for the residential premises before February 1, 2014, was told on February 1 that she could move in “a couple of days later,” paid Driggs the security deposit and February rent on February 3, and was thereafter unlawfully excluded from exercising her legal right to occupy the premises.1 See Park Nicollet
Clinic, 808 N.W.2d at 831. The only issue for us to decide is whether Cocchiarella satisfied the definition of “residential tenant” under Minnesota Statutes chapter 504B when she held the present legal right to possess the premises but did not hold a key or otherwise physically occupy the premises.
Chapter 504B sets forth the remedies available to tenants for the violation of a lease coverеd by the chapter. See
a person who is occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract, whether oral or written, that requires the payment of money or exchange of services, all other regular occupants of that dwelling unit, or a resident of a manufactured home park.
Driggs does not dispute that Cocchiarella has satisfied the “payment of money” requirement for qualifying as a “residential tenant.” The crux of the dispute is whether Cocchiarella “is occupying” the leased premises within the meaning of the statute. The word “occupying” derives from the verb “to occupy,” which has a variety of meanings depending on the context in which it appears. Specifically, the dictionary definition of “occupy” includes: “1. To fill up (time or space)“; “2. To dwell or reside in“; “3. To hold or fill (an office or a position)“; “4. To seize possession of and maintain control over by or as if by conquest“; and “5. To engage or employ the attention or concentration of.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1215 (4th ed.2000). The derivative word “occupancy” is defined as “[t]he act, state, or condition of holding, possessing, or residing in or on something; actual possession, residence, or tenancy, esp. of a dwelling or land“; and “[t]he period or term during which one owns, rents, or otherwise occupies property.” Occupancy, Black‘s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014) (emphasis added). “Hold[ing],” in turn, can be defined as “[t]o be the legal possessor of,” lending some support to an interpretation of “occupying” that includes legal possession. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 836 (4th ed.2000).
These varied dictionary definitions, by themselves, do not resolve the question of whether the phrase “is occupying” refers only to physical occupancy, or whether it also includes the present legal right of occupancy. When a word has a variety of meanings, we examine the context in which the word appears. See Spaeth v. Hallam, 211 Minn. 156, 158, 300 N.W. 600, 601 (1941) (indicating that when a word and its derivatives have a variety of meanings, context is crucial). Both the statutory and legal context of the phrase “is occupying”
The context in which “is occupying” appears in the statute supports an interpretation that the phrase includes the present legal right to occupy. Specifically, the phrase “is occupying” refers to “a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract.”
Moreover, the common law meaning of the phrase “is occupying” in the context of the landlord-tenant relationship supports this interpretation: The creation of the landlord-tenant relationship involves the transfer of possession and occupation of the leased premises. At common law, a landlord-tenant relationship can be created orally, and requires only that the right to present possession of the premises be transferred from the landlord to the tenant. Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord and Tenant §§ 1.2, 2.1 (Am. Law Inst.1977); see Gates v. Herberger, 202 Minn. 610, 612, 279 N.W. 711, 712 (1938) (noting that “[a]ny words that show an intention of the lessor to divest himself of the possession, and confer it upon another, but in subordination of his own title, is sufficient” to create a tenancy (emphаsis added)); State v. Bowman, 202 Minn. 44, 46, 279 N.W. 214, 215 (1938) (noting that a “tenant is one who holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind of right or title“); see also Fisher v. Heller, 174 Minn. 233, 236, 219 N.W. 79, 80 (1928) (indicating that a tenancy was created solely from the payment and acceptance of monthly rent); Thompson v. Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 123-25, 119 N.W. 797, 797-98 (1909) (noting that a tenancy can be created, either by a lease agreement or by implication of law). Consequently, the right of possession is transferred when the lease agreement gives the tenant control over the property and the power to exclude all others.3 Re-
We conclude that a tenant who holds the present legal right to occupy residential rental property pursuant to a lease or contract satisfies the definition of “residential tenant” under
First, the word “occupying” has a definite and well-understood special or technical meaning in the context of the landlord-tenant relationship. See Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 72; In re Pamela Andreas Stisser Grantor Trust, 818 N.W.2d 495, 502 (Minn.2012); see also State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 484-85 (Minn.2013) (concluding that a technical meaning was reasonable given the statutory context). The dictionary definitions of “occupy,” the common law, and the meaning of the words “occupancy” and “tenancy” in the landlord-tenant context consistently refer to both physical occupancy and to the legal right of occupancy under a residential lease.
Second, Driggs‘s and the court of appeals’ proposed interpretation, which deems physical occupancy a condition precedent to quаlifying as a “residential tenant” under chapter 504B, is unreasonable.4 This interpretation not only adds a physical occupancy requirement that does not exist at common law, but also conflicts with other provisions of chapter 504B. For example, a consequence of the interpretation proposed by Driggs and the court of appeals is that a tenant who, prior to move-in, discovers a severe housing code violation—such as noxious conditions or the lack of heat or running water—would not qualify as a “residential tenant” in order to bring a tenant‘s remedies action in district court,
A physical occupancy requirement is also in conflict with the definition of “residential building.”
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of the petition and remand to the housing court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
Minnesota‘s lockout statute applies only to the “actual or constructive removal or exclusion of a residential tenant.”
“Residential tenant” means a person who is occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract, whether oral or written, that requires the payment of money or exchange of services, all other regular occupants of that dwelling unit, or a resident of a manufactured home park.
The housing court, the district court, and the court of appeals all determined that, based on the plain and unambiguous meaning of the word “occupying” in section 504B.001, subdivision 12, a “residential tenant” is an individual who has actually taken possession of a residential dwelling under a lease or contract. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn.App.2015). Although Cocchiarella and Driggs allegedly had an oral lease agreement,1 Cocchiarella never occupied the
leased dwelling, as she explicitly admitted before the housing court. She never gained actual possession by any means—she never obtained a key, entered the dwelling, or deposited any of her belongings. Her only connection to the dwelling was the oral lease agreement. Under that agreement, she never even gained legal possession, as the agreement did not specify any lease terms—including, most importantly, the effective date of the lease agreement. Therefore, all three courts that have considered Cocchiarella‘s claims have concluded that the lockout statute does not apply because she never took actual possession of the residential dwelling.
But the court has now determined that the plain meaning of “occupying” under section 504B.001, subdivision 12, merely requires a “present legal right” to actual possession of the residential dwelling. Such “present legal possession,” under the court‘s rule, may be established by the effective date of a lease agreement, even if a tenant never gained actual (or “physical“) possession. The court‘s reading of the word “occupying” is not reasonable. Rather, for the reasons expressed below, the plain and only reasonable meaning of the word “occupying,” as used in section 504B.001, subdivision 12, requires a “rеsidential tenant” to have actual, physical possession of the residential dwelling under a lease or contract. Therefore, the lockout statute is inapplicable to Cocchiarella, who never “occup[ied]” the dwelling that was allegedly subject to an oral lease agreement with Driggs. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether, on its face, the statute is ambiguous. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). A statute is ambiguous only when it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a statute is not ambiguous, we interpret the words of the statute according to their plain and ordinary meaning. See
I disagree with the court that the wоrd “occupying” is a technical word subject to a variety of meanings depending on context because it has one reasonable plain meaning. As the other courts involved in this case have concluded, the common and ordinary meaning of “occupying” refers to actual, physical possession or residence, not merely a legal right to possession. This is shown by definitions from numerous, common dictionaries. E.g., Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged (3d ed.2002) (defining “occupy” as “to take up residence in: settle in“; “to fill up (a place or extent) . . . <the center of the house was occupied by a magnificent mahogany staircase>“; and “to hold possession of <occupied a ridge from which they dominated the crossroads>“); Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.2009) (defining “occupy” as “to take up (a place or extent in space) <this chair is occupied> <the fireplace will [occupy] this corner of the room>“); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed.2011) (defining “oc-
But the court determines that the plain meaning of “occupying” under section 504B.001, subdivision 12, merely requires a “present legal right” to possession of the premises. Under the court‘s rule, a person may establish such “present legal possession” by proof of the effective date of a lease agreement, even if the person never actually possessed the dwelling.
To reach this conclusion, the court does not rely on the ordinary definitions of “occupy,” as cited above. Rather, the court recites ordinary definitions, concludes they “do not resolve the question of whether the phrase ‘is occupying’ refers only to physical occupancy,” and then appears to rely in part on technical definitions from Black‘s Law Dictionary and the creation of the landlord-tenant relationship at common law. In some cases, we have relied on Black‘s Law Dictionary as a useful aid in statutory interpretation. See Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 755, 759 n. 2 (Minn.2010). As a general rule, however, we are required to interpret statutory words “according to their common and approved usage.”
Here, there is no indication that the word “occupying” is used in a technical sense or has acquired a special meaning according to the language and context of section 504B.001, subdivision 12. “Occupying” is hardly a technical or legalistic
Additionally, the court‘s present-legal-possession approach to defining “occupying” is unreasonable because it violates our rule against surplusage. This rule of statutory construction requires us to “give effect to all [of a statute‘s] provisions,”
The court‘s decision also relies incorrectly on the common law meaning and the dictionary definition of “tenancy” to define “occupying.” Because the definition of a “residential tenant” is provided by statute, under section 504B.001, subdivision 12, we must look solely to that statutory definition to determine whether a residential “tenancy” exists for the purpose of applying the lockout statute, rather than turning to thе common law of tenancies and landlord-tenant relationships or dictionary definitions. See State v. Schmid, 859 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn.2015) (“We do not turn to the common law definition of a word if the statute provides its own definition.“); State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 373 (Minn. 2003) (“[U]nder a plain meaning analysis, we must examine the definition given by the statute for the term.... [W]e do not rely on [the dictionary] definition of [a word when] the statute provides a definition.“). It is not reasonable to ascribe a common law meaning or dictionary definition to a “residential tenancy” when the Legislature has provided a statutory definition for a “residential tenant.” Under the lockout statute, a residential “tenancy” by a “residential tenant” is established, of course, only if the statutory definition of “residential tenant” is satisfied. Without a “residential tenant,” there can be no residential “tenancy,” and vice versa.
Under the court‘s present-legal-possеssion approach, the “most natural and reasonable meaning of ‘is occupying‘” extends to the present legal right to occupy. Supra at 628. Under my approach, the residential tenancy begins at actual posses-
Thus, under either approach, typically there will be some period between executing the lease agreement and becoming a “residential tenant” with standing under the lockout statute. And as a practical matter, it is noteworthy that “legal possession” and “actual possession” оften will be established the same day—the move-in date arrives (“legal possession“), and the tenant picks up the keys and moves in (“actual possession“). Any gap in time between obtaining “present legal possession” and “actual possession” of a dwelling is minimal. Once the two elements are obtained, the tenant need not remain continuously present to initiate an action or report a violation under the lockout statute—merely obtaining physical access or control, e.g., picking up the keys, is sufficient.
Further, the court‘s hypothetical about severe violations of housing regulations before the move-in date, see
As a practical and policy matter,3 the court‘s decision introduces a host of potential problems and is inconsistent with the purpose of the lockout statute. Minnesota‘s lockout statute provides an extraordinary remedy to tenants, which is
Finally, the mere requirement of “present legal possession” to bring a lockout petition introduces a host of potential problems, especially in potential simultaneous “occupancy” disputes. For example,
there is a disputed lease agreement involving two tenants, who both allege the right to occupy the same unit: could each tenant bring an ex parte lockout petition for summary relief? Even worse, there is a dispute about the move-in date provided in a lease agreement and the previous tenant is physically occupying the unit. Could the new prospective tenant bring a lockout petition when his or her alleged move-in date arrives, requesting summary ex parte eviction of the previous tenant who claims a legal right to continue occupying, and is actually living in, the apartment?4 Such controversies are better suited for a civil lawsuit in which both parties are heard and disputes of factual and contractual issues may be resolved. An actual-possession approach avoids the threat of simultaneous occupancy because only one party has standing to bring a lockout petition based on current, physical possession of the residential dwelling.
For the above reasons, the only reasonable plain meaning of “occupying,” as used in section 504B.001, subdivision 12, requires a “residential tenant” to have actual, physical possession of a residential dwelling under a lease or contract. Therefore, the lockout statute is inapplicаble to Cocchiarella, who was never “occupying” the residential dwelling that was subject to an alleged oral lease agreement. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
GILDEA, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Anderson.