Staab v. Diocese of St. CloudStaab v. Diocese of St. Cloud
Lead Opinion
OPINION
This appeal requires us to interpret the meaning of
According to the complaint, on April 9, 2005, appellant Alice Ann Staab and her husband, Richard Staab, attended a social event at the Holy Cross Parish School in Kimball, Minnesota. The school is owned and operated by respondent Diocese of St. Cloud’s Holy Cross Parish. Appellant relies on a nonmotorized wheelchair for mobility. As appellant was leaving the school, Richard Staab pushed her wheelchair through an open doorway, and the wheelchair went over what has been described as an unmarked 5-inch drop-off. Appellant fell forward out of her wheelchair onto a cement sidewalk and was injured as a result of her fall.
After her fall, appellant brought an action against the Diocese, alleging that the Diocese failed to use reasonable care to protect her from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by the conditions at the school. Richard Staab was not named as a party to the lawsuit by the appellant or the respondent. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Respondent requested and the district court approved a special verdict form that asked the jury to separately determine whether the Diocese was negligent when appellant was injured and, if so, whether the negligence of the Diocese directly caused appellant’s injuries. Similarly, the jury was asked to determine whether Richard Staab was negligent when appellant was injured and, if so, whether the negligence of Richard Staab directly caused appellant’s injuries. Finally, the special verdict form asked the jury to attribute to the Diocese and to Richard Staab a percentage of the negligence that directly caused appellant’s injuries.
The jury found that the Diocese and Richard Staab each were negligent and that the negligence of each directly caused appellant’s injuries. The jury attributed 50% of the negligence that directly caused appellant’s injuries to the Diocese and 50% to Richard Staab. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $224,200.70: $50,000 for past pain, disability, disfigurement, embarrassment, and emotional distress; and $174,200.70 for past health care expenses.
The Diocese moved for amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, asking the district court to reduce the judgment against the Diocese to 50% of the damages award. The Diocese argued that
The Diocese appealed, and the court of appeals reversed. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud,
I.
This appeal presents the court with its first opportunity to interpret
The goal of all statutory interpretation is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”
Our first step in interpreting a statute is to examine the statutory language to determine whether the words of the law are clear and free from all ambiguity. Id. The words are not free from ambiguity if, as applied to the facts of the particular case, they are susceptible to
Generally, statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC,
II.
Minnesota Statutes
When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award:
(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent;
(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan that results in injury;
(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or
(4)a person whose liability arises under [certain environmental laws].
The language of subdivision 1 presents two fundamental challenges that must be resolved in order to ascertain its meaning. First, subdivision 1 does not explain the meaning of “[w]hen,” that is, the point in time the statute is applicable to determine whether “persons are severally liable.” Specifically, subdivision 1 does not explain whether liability for purposes of the statute is determined at the time the tort is committed, at the time of judgment in a civil action, or at some other point in time. The answer to the question of when liability is determined for purposes of the statute directly impacts whether a sole defendant in a lawsuit must pay more than its equitable share of a judgment as measured by the percentage of fault apportioned to it by the jury. Thus, in order to interpret the statutory phrases “persons are severally liable” and “persons are jointly and severally liable,” we must examine when “persons are ... liable” at common law and determine whether the statute modifies the common law rule.
At common law, “liability is created at the instant [a] tort is committed.” White v. Johnson,
Second, the statute does not define the phrases “severally liable” and “jointly and severally liable.” Each phrase does, however, have a special meaning at common law. Pursuant to the canons of construction, words and phrases that have acquired a special meaning or definition are construed according to their special meaning or definition.
Pursuant to Minnesota common law, “several liability” means “[l]iability that is separate and distinct from another’s liability, so that the plaintiff may bring a separate action against one defendant without joining the other liable parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 998 (9th ed.2009). Moreover, whether a person is “[an]other liable partly]” for the purposes of several liability is a separate question from whether that person is joined as a defendant in a plaintiffs lawsuit. In contrast, “joint liability” is “[liability shared by two or more parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 997 (9th ed.2009). Additionally, at common law, tortfeasors whose concurrent negligence produces a single, indivisible injury are jointly and severally liable to the person harmed. Flaherty v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
More importantly, the common law provides that “two or more persons are severally liable” at the instant multiple tortfeasors commit an act that causes a single, indivisible injury to a plaintiff.
A.
Subdivision 1 contains three additional words or phrases that are important to understand its meaning. First, we examine the meaning of the word “persons.” The plain and ordinary meaning of the word “persons” is very broad. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1257 (9th ed.2009) (defining “person” as “[a] human being” or “[a]n entity ... that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties of a human being”); see also American Heritage Dictionary 1310 (4th ed.2006) (recognizing the legal definition of “person” as “[a] human or organization with legal rights and duties”). We discern no legislative intent to limit the word “persons” to the parties to the lawsuit. Had the Legislature intended to do so, it could have done so expressly. Further, a broad interpretation is consistent with the common law principle that several liability is examined at the time the tort is committed. Therefore, we interpret the word “persons” to mean not only “parties to the lawsuit,” as urged by appellant and the dissent, but also to extend to the “parties to the transaction,” as urged by respondent.
Second, the next clause of subdivision 1 provides that “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each.”
Third, a tortfeasor’s liability— whether joint, several, or both — arises and exists independently of the tortfeasor’s participation in a lawsuit and, therefore, is independent of the tortfeasor’s obligation to contribute to any judgment entered in such a lawsuit. Accordingly, the third clause providing “except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award” need not be read to imply that an award is enforceable against the persons identified in the enumerated exceptions. Instead, it stands for the unremarkable proposition that the limitation on the extent of contribution established by the second clause of subdivision 1 does not apply to anyone who falls within the enumerated exceptions (l)-(4). In other words, a person who falls within one of the exceptions is subject to the traditional joint and several liability rule. As a result, the definition of “persons” in subdivision 1 does not exclude parties to the transaction who are not parties to the lawsuit.
Notably, subdivision 2, which provides for the reallocation of uncollectible judgments, states:
Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
The dissent’s interpretation that “person” in subdivision 1 is limited to “parties to the lawsuit” creates a conflict with our decision in Hosley. It is illogical to conclude that “persons” in subdivision 1 has a
We conclude that whether “two or more persons are severally liable” for purposes of
B.
Alternatively, it is possible to interpret the phrase “[w]hen two or more persons are severally liable” to mean that liability is determined at the time of the judgment. Essentially, this is the interpretation proposed by the dissent. The predicate to this proposed interpretation is that the Legislature modified the common law rule that several liability is created at the moment the tort is committed.
Because the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we must examine prior versions of the statute to ascertain legislative intent. See
Notably, until the Legislature adopted the 2003 amendments, the statute provided that tortfeasors’ “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to [their] percentage
The dissent correctly points out that joint and several liability survived within Minnesota’s statutory comparative fault scheme at least through 1988. See Johnson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
Moreover, the dissent suggests that it is fair to apply common law joint and several liability and deny application of
Schneider also does not support the dissent’s argument. At issue was a version of
Finally, the dissent’s proposed interpretation that “persons” means named parties to the lawsuit is flawed and will lead to unreasonable results in the application of the exceptions in the statute. See
We hold that “persons” includes all “parties to the transaction,” and therefore
Affirmed and remanded.
Notes
. In Minnesota, the doctrine of interspousal immunity no longer presents a bar to an action in negligence between a husband and wife. Beaudette v. Frana,
. Thus, the district court was incorrect to conclude that “[(liability arises only where there is a judgment.” Moreover, the court of appeals was incorrect to conclude that "both [tortfeasors] are 'severally liable' because they were found to share a portion of the fault.” Staab,
. This is so because several liability is a component of joint and several liability. It is not logically possible for a tortfeasor to be jointly and severally liable without being severally liable, so several liability for an indivisible harm necessarily arises at the same instant as joint and several liability for that harm.
. The dissent correctly observes that cases stating and applying the rule regarding the time of creation of common (i.e., joint and several) liability involved disputes over contribution between jointly and severally liable tortfeasors. This observation has no bearing, however, on the validity of the rule that such liability arises at the time of commission of the tort, or on our conclusion that
. It is settled that a judgment may not be enforced against persons who are not parties to an action. See Hurr v. Davis, 155 Minn.
. As the dissent correctly notes, a plaintiff cannot recover an entire award from a person whose fault is greater than 50% unless that person is a party to the lawsuit. But the dissent is not correct to conclude that this fact renders the second clause of subdivision 1 ineffective unless "persons” is read to exclude "parties to the transaction” who are not also "parties to the lawsuit.” Minnesota Statutes
. The dissent relies on Schneider to support its argument that
. Put differently, the defendant was required to pay 100% of Schneider's damages because he was jointly and severally liable for the entire award under the common law rule as applied through subdivision 1; here, the Diocese is not required to pay 100% of Staab's damages because it is not jointly and severally liable for the entire award under subdivision 1. Neither the holding in Schneider nor our holding in this case relies upon the reallocation procedures of subdivision 2, and our holding in this case in no way alters our previous decisions regarding subdivision 2.
.Consider, for instance, a scenario in which a plaintiff, P, is injured on the negligently-maintained premises of a bar owner, A, as a result of the negligent conduct of customers B and C. P sues A, and A brings a third-party claim against B. During the trial, A discovers and presents evidence that B had acted in a common scheme with nonparty tortfeasor C. The judge properly submits the fault of P, A, B, and nonparty C to the jury, which returns a special verdict determining that B and C "act[ed] in a common scheme or plan that resulted] in injury” to P, and apportioning no fault to P, 15% of the fault to A, 45% of the fault to B, and 40% of the fault to C.
The dissent's interpretation, however, will create confusion and inconsistent results. Initially, it is unclear how the dissent would deal with nonparty C’s fault in this scenario. Specifically, under the dissent's interpretation, subdivision 1 would apply, but it is not clear whether it would require A and B to pay, respectively, 15% and 45% of the award, thus leaving C's 40% unpaid, or if it would instead divide nonparty C’s share between them based upon their relative fault, such that A would pay 25% and B would pay 75%. But it is the dissent’s failure to deal with the application of subdivision 1(2) that is the most troubling. Specifically, the dissent’s interpretation that "persons” means named parties to the lawsuit results in the conclusion that because C is not a party to the lawsuit, the case lacks "two or more [parties to the lawsuit] who act in a common scheme” and therefore subdivision 1(2), which provides for joint and several liability for participants in a common scheme, does not apply. Clearly, this outcome is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute. It is unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended participants in a common scheme to be jointly and severally liable if more than one of the participants is a party to a lawsuit, but merely severally liable if only one participant is a party to the lawsuit and the jury apportions some fault to a defendant tortfeasor who did not participate in the scheme.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Following the 2003 amendments,
A.
The issue in this appeal concerns how much of the $224,200.70 jury award Alice Ann Staab can recover from the Diocese of St. Cloud, the only defendant in this case. Resolving this issue involves the interpretation of
The majority acknowledges that we “do not presume that the Legislature intends to abrogate or modify a common law rule except to the extent expressly declared or clearly indicated in the statute.” Therefore, before proceeding to the language of the statute, I first examine the common law that applies in this situation. Under Minnesota common law, joint and several liability is the general rule in cases involving multiple tortfeasors that have caused a single, indivisible injury to a plaintiff. See Flaherty v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
The focus here is on the 2003 amendments to
When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award:
(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent;
(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan that results in injury;
(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or
(4) a person whose liability arises under [certain environmental laws].
The majority concludes that the Legislature modified the common law here based primarily on the Legislature’s perceived intent “to limit joint and several liability in Minnesota.” The 2003 amendments to
When amending the statute in 2003, the Legislature framed the several liability provision as a conditional statement—“[w]hen two or more persons are severally liable.”
In a previous interpretation of the comparative fault statute, we recognized that although a jury may determine the fault of nonparties, the jury’s allocation of fault to nonparties is “of no practical consequence” when “there is but one defendant against whom judgment can be or has been entered.” Schneider,
The majority purports to be relying on legislative intent to support an expansive interpretation of
Moreover, contrary to our rule requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law, the majority interprets
B.
The majority essentially rewrites
The majority’s construction of the triggering clause — “[w]hen two or more persons are severally hable” — to include nonparties as “persons” results in an ineffective remedial clause — “contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each.”
To avoid holding nonparties liable for an award, the majority effectively rewrites
The majority’s construction of the statute appears to be motivated by a concern
C.
Notwithstanding the majority’s attempt to limit the payment of the Diocese to the innocent plaintiff, the majority’s interpretation of the reallocation provision in
Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party’s equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
D.
Construing the plain language of the statute, I conclude that the several liability provision in MinmStat.
. The majority’s efforts to distinguish these cases fail. The majority indicates that Schneider does not support my argument because prior to the 2003 amendments,
. The majority misapprehends the common law rule that "[cjommon liability 'is created at the instant the tort is committed.’ " Spitzack v. Schumacher,
. To avoid a result that requires nonparties to contribute to the award, the majority also ascribes meaning to the Legislature’s choice of the passive voice in the contribution provision. The majority implies that the result here would be different if the Legislature had said, “each shall contribute to the award,” as opposed to "contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each,”
In addition, the majority uses strained logic to avoid a result that finds nonparty "persons” jointly and severally liable for the whole award. The majority indicates that the statutory language providing that certain "persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award,”Minn.Stat. § 604.02 , subd. 1, does not necessarily mean liability for an award that is "enforceable.” It is not reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended to assign responsibility for unenforceable awards.
. See generally Nancy A. Costello, Note, Allocating Fault to the Empty Chair: Tort Reform or Deform?, 76 U. Det. Mercy L.Rev. 571, 581-82 (1999) (noting multitude of constitutional challenges to statutory "empty chair” provisions, a couple of them successful). See, e.g., Plumb v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Meyer.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Meyer.