Burt v. Rackner, Inc.Burt v. Rackner, Inc.
Lead Opinion
Appellant Rackner, Inc. d/b/a Bunny’s Bar & Grill challenges a court of appeals’ opinion reversing the dismissal of respondent Todd Burt’s complaint alleging a violation of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA),
FACTS
Rackner employed Burt as a bartender from January 2007 to July 2014. In December 2014, Burt sued Rackner, claiming that Rackner terminated his employment in violation of
Rackner answered the complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the MFLSA “does not contemplate an action for wrongful discharge” because the statute does not contain specific language prohibiting an employer
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the MFLSA “unambiguously provides that the employee may seek wrongful-discharge damages, including back pay and other appropriate relief as provided by law.” Burt v. Rackner, Inc.,
We granted Rackner’s petition for review and the amicus motions of the Minnesota Restaurant Association, the Minnesota Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association, and the Minnesota Management Attorney’s Association.
ANALYSIS
On appeal from a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under
At issue is whether the MFLSA provides a cause of action for an employee who is terminated for failing to share gratuities. Rackner argues that the MFLSA does not provide such a cause pf action because (1) although the statute prohibits an employer from requiring an employee to share gratuities, it does not prohibit an employer from discharging an employee who refuses to do so, and (2) the statute does not contain any language thqt specifically allows an employee to sue for wrongful discharge in the context of tip sharing. By contrast; Burt contends that he may sue under the MFLSA because an employer violates
We agree with Burt, and hold that the language of the MFLSA expressly provides a cause of action for an employee who is terminated for failing to share tips. We consider each of Rackner’s arguments in turn.
Rackner first contends that Burt does not have a claim under the MFLSA because, although
“The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.” Christianson v. Henke,
Minnesota Statutes
The parties agree that this provision is unambiguous. And as Burt correctly states, to “require” means “[t]o impose an obligation on.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1492 (5th ed.); see, e.g., Larson v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
Nevertheless, Rackner contends that, although the statute prohibits employers from requiring or coercing employees to share gratuities, it allows employers to terminate employees who refuse to share tips. This interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. Here, “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” on a
Indeed, were we to follow Rackner’s logic, employers could lawfully circumvent other MFLSA protections by terminating employees who do not follow the employers’ illegal requirements, For example, according to Minn. Stat. §■ 177.254, subd. 1, “[a]n employer must permit each employee who is working for eight or more consecutive
Therefore, because
II.
Rackner next argues that Burt may not sue under the MFLSA because the statute does not expressly provide a cause of action for wrongful discharge arising out of an employee’s refusal to share tips. Rackner argues that when the Legislature creates an exception to the common-law employment-at-will doctrine, it always does so “explicitly by prohibiting, or granting a cause of action for, discharge,” such as in other provisions of the MFLSA or other statutes forbidding wrongful discharge. Therefore, according to Rackner, absent express statutory language to that effect, the MFLSA does not provide a causé of action for an employee who refuses to share tips. We disagree.
To be sure, the MFLSA does not use the words “wrongful discharge” in connection with the sharing of tips. But, as explained above,
.In Minnesota, employment relationships are generally at-will, meaning “that an employer may discharge an employee for any reason or no reason and that an employee is under no obligation to remain on the job.” Dukowitz,
We have recognized a narrow common-law public-policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, allowing an employee to bring an action for wrongful discharge
It is true that although the MFLSA does not explicitly prohibit or punish wrongful discharge with regard to tip sharing, it does expressly prohibit or punish wrongful discharge in other contexts. Specifically,
It is also true that the Legislature has explicitly prohibited discharging employees in some circumstances, or specifically provided a cause of action for wrongful discharge, in other statutes. See
Nevertheless, we conclude that the MFLSA expressly provides a cause of action for an employee who is terminated for failing to share gratuities through the broad cause of action explicitly provided by
None of the MFLSA provisions that Raekner identifies as explicitly prohibiting or punishing wrongful discharge undermines our conclusion that the Legislature also intended, to create a cause of action for wrongful discharge in the context of tip sharing. Raekner argues that the explicit prohibitions on discharge in those provisions clearly indicate that the Legislature only meant to prohibit discharge when plainly stated in specific provisions. However, there are other reasons for the explicit prohibitions on discharge in certain provisions. For . example,
' Rackner argues that the only remedy available for a violation -of the tip-sharing próvisión is that “the employer may be compelled ‘to pay restitution in the amount of the gratuities diverted,’ Minn. Stat. §' 177.24, subd. 3, and that the employee may seek double damages and attorneys’ fees remedies, se'e
Rackner also contends that recognizing a cause of action for an employee who is discharged for failing to share tips will expand the common-law exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, contrary to our holding in Dukomtz. But Dukowitz is inapposite because the unemployment-insurance statutes under which the employee applied for unemployment benefits do not provide' a broad, private cause of action like the one in the MFLSA, see Minn. Stat. ch. 268 (2016);
Furthermore, our holding today is consistent with our characterization of
Similar to the MFLSA, the polygraph statute does not specifically prohibit an employer from discharging an employee for refusing to take a polygraph test, but it does forbid an employer from “directly or indirectly solicit[ing] or requiring] a polygraph,
Accordingly, we hold that the MFLSA, by express wording, provides a cause of action for an employee who is terminated for refusing to share tips, because
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
Notes
. We agree with the dissent that the Legislature has not provided a cause of action by necessary implication for an employee who is terminated for refusing to share gratuities. Rather, the Legislature has,expressly provided such a cause of action in
. The dissent contends that it is "surprising[ ]” for us to hold that the Legislature has expressly provided a cause of action for wrongful discharge in the context of tip sharing because we also acknowledge that the statute does not explicitly prohibit or punish wrongful discharge arising out of a failure to share tips. But the Legislature need not use specific language when drafting legislation in general, or, as it did here, when expressly abrogating the common-law employment-at-will rule through
The dissent also mischaracterizes our holding by stating that (1) we conclude thatMinn. Stat. § 177.24 , subd. 3, abrogates the common-law employment-at-will rule, and (2) we are essentially "using the remedies provision to expand the scope of actionable violations under the MFLSA,” implying that we reach this decision by relying on the remedies provision in the MFLSA. To the contrary, our position is thatMinn. Stat. § 177.27 , subd. 8 — notMinn. Stat. § 177.24 , subd. 3 — expressly provides a cause of action that abrogates the common-law rule here. And our conclusion stands on a firm foundation: the broad and all-inclusive language ofMinn. Stat. § 177.27 , subd. 8 — not simply the remedies available underMinn. Stat. § 177.27 , subd. 7.
. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion", we do not "distinguish!] Dukowitz on the basis that the discharged.employee was not arguing that the Legislature had created a statutory cause of action in the. unemployment context.” Rather, as stated above, Dukowitz is inappo-site because the statute at issue- títere — unlike the MFLSA — did not provide a broad, private cause of action. .
Dissenting Opinion
DISSENT
(dissenting).
Minnesota has long recognized the common-law rule of employment at will. Consistent with this principle, an employer may terminate an employee for any or no reason and cannot be sued for wrongful discharge. See Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd.,
I.
At issue in this appeal is whether the Legislature — through the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act (MFLSA),
The majority concludes that
No employer may require an employee to contribute or share a gratuity received by the employee with the employer or other employees or to contribute any or all of the gratuity to a fund or pool operated for the benefit of the employer or employees. This section does not prevent an employee from voluntarily sharing gratuities with other employees.
A.
We presume that “statutes are consistent with the common law, and if a statute abrogates the common law, the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary implication.” Ly v. Nystrom,
The Legislature has demonstrated time and time again that it knows how to abrogate the common-law employment-at-will rule through the “express wording” our standard requires. Id. For example, the Legislature has explicitly provided for a cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Whistleblower Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act, Human Rights Act, and Domestic Abuse Act, among many other acts. See, e.g.,
And even more importantly for this case, the Legislature has specifically addressed wrongful discharge in other provisions of the MFLSA. See
As the majority concedes, the tip-sharing statute provides nothing even remotely similar to the express language referencing “discharge” in all of these other statutes. The majority nevertheless concludes that there is an express overruling of the common-law employment-at-will rule because the MFLSA provides a broad remedy for violation of its provisions in
To support its reliance on the remedies provision in the MFLSA, the majority rewrites our “express wording” standard. Specifically, the majority asserts that no “specific language” , is needed for'the Legislature to abrogate the common law. The majority is wrong. We require that the statute make “express reference”. to the common-law principle at issue before we can conclude that .the Legislature has abrogated the principle. Brekke v. THM Biomedical, Inc.,
The remedies statute likewise says nothing about wrongful discharge,
This is so because' the statute at issue,
•Unconstrained by the plain language of the statutes or by our precedent, the majority supports its desired outcome by concluding that because the MFLSA “contains no language prohibiting an employee from suing an employer for wrongful- discharge resulting from the employee’s refusal to share tips,” the statute , must permit an employee to sue. (emphasis added). This conclusion — looking at whether there is specific language that expresses the Legislature’s intention to retain the common law rather than an intention to abrogate the common law — represents a drastic shift in our “express-wording” analysis.
I would not rewrite our standard; I would simply apply it. As we recognized in Dukowitz, after citing a variety of statutes that “explicitly furnished a civil remedy for retaliation,”, the “Legislature’s policy choice to create a civil cause of action for one group of employees .. but not another” demonstrates that.,“the Legislature ‘knows how" to accomplish a particular objective if it wishes to do so.” Dukowitz,
B.
Because the Legislature did not expressly abrogate the common-law employment-at-will
Our cases recognize the rigorous nature of the necessary-implication standard. For example, in Urban v. American Legion Dept of Minnesota, the issue was whether the Legislature abrogated the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior through passage of the Civil Damages Act,
In this case, the MFLSA does not specifically address discharge in the tip-sharing context, and maintaining the. common-law employment-at-will rule does not render any provision in the MFLSA superfluous or violate a .clear mandate in the Act. Even though employers cannot be sued for discharging employees who refuse to share tips, employers are still prohibited from requiring employees to share tips, and they can be punished for violating this statutory prohibition. • When an employer violates the tip-sharing provision,
Because there is no basis to conclude that the Legislature intended to abrogate the employment-at-will rulé in the tip-sharing context, I would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the district court.
II.
As set forth in section I above, the analysis in this case is relatively straightforward if one follows the plain language of the tip-sharing statute and our precedent. The majority takes a different path and in doing so makes policy judgments that belong to the Legislature. The majority holds that “
Instead of examining legislative intent to abrogate the common-law rule of employment at will, as our precedent requires, the majority opines that it would be unreasonable to allow employers to circumvent the protections of the MFLSA “by terminating employees who do not follow the employers’ illegal requirements,” such as requiring employees to share tips. Therefore, the majority holds that “
The majority effectively concludes that it is unreasonable for the Legislature to provide certain remedies when an employer unlawfully requires employees to share tips — such as the recovery of diverted tips and injunctive relief — but not provide a cause of action for employees who were terminated for failing to share tips. The Legislature’s choice to provide certain remedies, but not others (such as a cause of action for wrongful discharge), is a matter of legislative policy. According to the majority, it is unreasonable to interpret the statute in a way that would allow an employer to terminate an employee for refusing to share tips. But the employer’s freedom to terminate an employee for any reason — even “a bad reason” — is a key aspect of the common-law employment-at-will rule. 17 Stephen F. Befort, Minnesota Practice — Employment Law & Practice § 13:1 (3d ed. 2011) (“Briefly stated, employment-at-will means that an employer can fire an employee for a good reason, for a bad reason, or for no reason.”).
Our prior decisions have made clear that it is up to the Legislature — not our court— to establish any public policy limitations to the employment-at-will doctrine. Dukowitz,
Contrary to Dukowitz, the majority usurps the policymaking role of the Legislature by rewriting
Even more alarmingly, the majority’s rationale will result in the judicial creation of a cause of action for wrongful discharge for the violation of any MFLSA provision that imposes a requirement on an employer — and indeed, virtually any statutory provision that imposes a requirement on an employer — without the requisite showing of express wording or necessary implication to abrogate Minnesota’s employment-at-will rule.
III.
Applying the plain language of
. Although the majority distinguishes Dukow-itz on the basis that the discharged employee was not arguing that the Legislature had created a statutory cause of action in the unemployment context, the majority’s reasoning here is fundamentally at odds with the reasoning underlying our decision in Dukowitz. In Dukowitz, we indicated that the Legislature is better "equipped to balance the competing interests of employers, employees, and the public to determine whether, and when, an employer violates the public policy of the state by discharging an employee.”
. The majority points to the polygraph statute,
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Chief Justice Gildea.