*1 KRUEGER, Appellant, Pamela Contracting, Dust
LLC, Plaintiff, COMPANY,
ZEMAN CONSTRUCTION
Respondent. A08-206.
No. Court Minnesota.
Supreme
April *2 Muller, Muller,
Andrew P. Muller & As- soc., PLLC, Klassen, John A. A. John Klassen, PA, MN, Minneapolis, appel- for lant. Weber, Lapicola,
Michael Charles F. Oort, Prokott, Aaron Daniel Von G. LLP, MN, Faegre & Minneapolis, Benson respondent. Lienemann, L. Leslie Culberth & Liene- mann, LLP, Paul, MN, St. Dorene R. Sar- Office, noski, Dorene R. Sarnoski Law MN, Minneapolis, for amicus curiae Na- Association, Employment Lawyers tional Chapter. Minnesota Swanson, General, Attorney Angela Lori Behrens, General, Attorney Assistant St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Commissioner Department of Minnesota of Human Rights. Thomson, Stein,
Dean B. Hannah R. Westra, Thomson, Fabyanske, Hart & P.A., MN, Minneapolis, for amici curiae Associated General Contractors of Minne- and Minnesota of Com- sota Chamber merce. claim to Wa- mond Dust’s discrimination
OPINION County, Dust’s me- where Diamond basha MAGNUSON, Chief Justice. foreclosure action chanic’s lien (Krueger) Pamela Appellant *3 court pending. The district Zeman Diamond Dust Contract- company, and her of Zeman’s motions. granted both Dust) (Diamond respondent sued LLC ing, dismiss, the motion to the district As to (Zeman) for Company Zeman Construction Krueger lacked concluded that court on the ba- discrimination business unlawful plain language of the standing under Human the Minnesota under sis of sex Dust, not Diamond statute because (MHRA), Minn.Stat. Act Rights 363A.17(3) (2008). to the Krueger individually, was The district court claim and Krueger’s personal Based on that de- contract with Zeman. dismissed granted appeals affirmed. We termination, the court of court dismissed the district review, for further Krueger’s petition Krueger ap- claim. Krueger’s personal we affirm. ruling dismiss- pealed the district court’s claim. ing her individual discrimination
Krueger is sole owner-member Dust, Diamond a operator plaintiff of panel af- appeals A divided court of liability company limited en- Minnesota firmed, plaintiff that a must have a holding drywall and sheetrock busi- gaged in the relationship with defendant contractual 2005, Diamond Dust ness. In December a claim standing to have to initiate of Zeman, with entered into subcontract in the business discrimination materials and labor for agreeing supply under Minn.Stat. of contract pro- construction a multi-unit residential 363A.17(3). Krueger v. Zeman Constr. began Diamond Dust ject in Wabasha. Co., (Minn.App.2008). 758 890 N.W.2d January in 2006. the contract performing Krueger’s company had contractu- Since personally worked on the Krueger, who Zeman, relationship alleged with al managers that Zeman’s project, alleges discriminator, not, Krueger did but in regularly engaged various forms sex- affirmed the district appeals court ual and sex discrimination di- harassment Krueger’s personal court’s dismissal of alleged harassment rected at her. appeals’ majority claim. Id. The court of abuse, included and discrimination verbal main opinion articulated three reasons intimidation, exposure genitals physical that section supporting its conclusion worksite, and the managers male on the 363A.17(3) applies only where a contractu- Krueg- assignment demeaning tasks relationship parties. al exists between the alleges reported Krueger er. she First, the court that the determined statu- management and allegations to Zeman’s tory language, light of the need for a owners, but Zeman did not take action limit” under “discernible result, rectify the situation. As a 363A.17(3), support Krueger’s did not in- stopped performing Dust under its con- terpretation Krueger, of the statute. 758 Krueger, tract Zeman. Both in her with Second, capacity, and Diamond Dust at the court individual N.W.2d was Zeman, seeking damages sued for unlawful of the MHRA guided interpretation business discrimination. analyzing federal cases the “similar lan- statute, 42 guage” analogous of the federal suit, brought
In to the Zeman response (2006).Krueger, 758 N.W.2d U.S.C. 1981 (1) two motions before the district court: Finally, at the court concluded 887-88. Krueger’s a motion to dismiss business alone could not that fairness considerations claim for failure to state a claim, of action for support personal a motion to transfer Dia- cause
861 Dakota, Krueg- County LLC v. Krueger under section 693 N.W.2d er, (Minn.2005) 889-90. 419 (citing Minn.Stat. 645.08(1) (2004)). possible, When “‘no appeals’ The court of dissent asserted word, phrase, or sentence should be plain language that the statute does void, superfluous, deemed insignifi- requirement specifi- a privity not include — ” cant.’ Id. at (quoting Owens v. Fed- cally, is no “[t]here erated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. that Ms. statute Co., (Minn.1983)); direct, ac- employee personal of or in a cord Amaral v. relationship general Hosp., contractual with the Saint Cloud *4 (Minn.1999). J., 379, (Minge, contractor.” Id. at 892 dissent- N.W.2d 384 Furthermore, ing). rejected the dissent A ambiguous statute is when the majority’s reliance on federal cases language lends itself to more 1981, § than one
interpreting asserting 42 U.S.C. Tower, interpretation. reasonable distinctly that the statutes “are different.” Am. Krueger, 758 at 892. The dissent 636 at N.W.2d N.W.2d 312. When we conclude reasoned that the Minnesota statute focus- that a statute ambiguous, is we use the perpetrator, es on the while 1981 statutory rules of construction to ascertain relationship. focuses on the contractual the intent of the legislature. ILHC Ea of Krueger, 758 at 892-93. N.W.2d gan, However, 693 at N.W.2d if the statutory clear, give we must I. effect plain meaning. MinmStat. Minnesota Rule of Civil Proce (2008). § circumstances, In 645.16 such 12.02(e) permits party dure to move to “statutory construction is neither neces for failure to a claim upon dismiss state Tower, sary permitted.” nor Am. 636 granted. which relief can be In consider disregard N.W.2d 312. We will not “the motion, 12 ing accept a Rule we the facts letter of the ... pretext law under the of alleged complaint as true and 645.16; pursuing spirit.” nonmoving party the benefit of all Anderson-Johanningmeier see also v. favorable inferences. Bodah v. Lakeville Ctr., Inc., Mid-Minnesota Women’s 637 Inc., 550, Express, Motor 663 N.W.2d 553 (Minn.2002). 270, N.W.2d 276 (Minn.2003). We conduct a de novo review 12 Additionally, of a Rule dismissal. Id. II. statutory interpreta
we review issues of tion, including construction of the MHRA’s Standing general jurispru provisions, Ray de novo. v. Miller Mees dential It concept. party that a Inc., 404, ter Adver. 684 407 N.W.2d personal must have sufficient interest in a (Minn.2004). legal dispute appropriate so that it is party pursue allow that litigation. interpret When State, Inc., by Humphrey Philip v. Morris provision, must first determine “[we] (Minn.1996). 490, 551 N.W.2d 493 Stand face, language, whether the statute’s on its exists, if, ing among things, par other Tower, L.P. ambiguous.” City Am. v. ty injury-in-fact. has suffered an Id. To (Minn.2001). Grant, 309, 636 N.W.2d 312 injury-in-fact, suffer an must al phrases according “construe words and We “a concrete lege particularized inva grammar according to rules of to their legally protected sion of a interest.” Lorix usage most natural and it obvious unless 619, Crompton Corp., 624 would be inconsistent with the manifest (Minn.2007). legislature.” Eagan, intent of the ILHC of
862
However, legal sense when has ability grieved” to assert a she MHRA differs. In Potter infringement suffered the denial or claim under Club, Sports & Health Court ag- v. LaSalle legal right, and MHRA allows that when an individual court held this grieved person to seek “redress for an law, rights a civil “the act violates company discriminatory practice.” unfair Minn. suffi itself constitutes of discrimination (2008). 363A.33, 1 subd. Stat. provide law to a reme injury for the cient discriminatory practice” is de- “Unfair statutory language dy, in the absence of “any act described in sections fined as 873, 875 requiring more.” N.W.2d 363A.28, 363A.08 to 363A.19 and subdivi- added) (citation (Minn.1986) (emphasis sion 10.” Minn.Stat. subd. 48. omitted) (internal quotation marks omit “aggrieved” per- Consequently, the set Stores, ted); Snyder’s Drug Inc. see also differently variety in a sons is defined Pharmacy, Bd. v. Minn. State particular form of settings based on (1974) Minn. See, targeted. Minn. e.g., test, injury-in-fact absent (adopting the unfair (proscribing Stat. contrary). intent to the There legislative *5 against persons employment practices fore, injury-in-fact generally although an color, “race, creed, religion, based on na- standing, to establish an act of sufficient sex, status, marital origin, tional status satisfy alone will not the discrimination assistance, regard public disability, with standing requirement if the lan orientation, age”); sexual or Minn.Stat. of the MHRA more. See guage (2008) § (defining property 363A.09 real Potter, In other 384 N.W.2d discrimination to include discrimination words, injury-in-fact, an may there but “race, color, creed, religion, based on na- recognized by claim the statute. legal no sex, status, origin, tional marital status question legal right here is what assistance, regard disability, to public with infringement provide, does the statute orientation, status”); sexual or familial gives begin rise to a claim. We of which (2008) § (defining 363A.11 dis- Minn.Stat. the text MHRA. our with of the in public crimination accommodations to 363A.17 does not ex- Although section “race, color, protection include on based identify plicitly who sue under its creed, religion, disability, origin, national provisions, other sections of the MHRA status, orientation, sex”); marital sexual or First, provide guidance. “person” can (2008) § (defining Minn.Stat. 363A.12 dis- “ag- the MHRA if bring a claim under public crimination in the context of ser- grieved by chapter.” a violation of this “race, protection vices to include based on (2008). 363A.28, § subd. 1 Un- Minn.Stat. color, creed, religion, origin, national dis- MHRA, “person” part- der the includes a sex, orientation, ability, or status association, nership, corporation, among or assistance”). regard with to public 363A.03, others. Minn.Stat. subd. 30 (2008). Dust, LLC, quali- an as purpose of the Minnesota Human “person” purposes fies as a of this Rights Act is to “secure for in this section. state, freedom from discrimination.” 1(a) (2008). subd. “aggrieved” party Who is —a In interpreting standing bring who has a claim under MHRA, has directed that expressly the statute —is not stated in sec- provisions liberally “shall be construed tion 363A.17 or otherwise in the MHRA. (2008) accomplishment purposes for the (defining See Minn.Stat. 363A.03 terms). (2008); However, person “ag- other thereof.” Minn.Stat. (Minn.2007) (“A Koehnen, Cummings statute does not rise also see (Minn.1997). However, 418, 422 to a civil cause of action lan unless the by purpose spe- achieves this the MHRA guage of the statute explicit or it can be in cifically par- certain conduct prohibiting by implication.” (citing determined clear contexts, by varying providing ticular Dunn, Larson v. 47 n. 4 460'N.W.2d particular form of remedies based on (Minn.1990))); Bruegger see also v. Fari targeted. County Dep’t, bault 497 N.W.2d Sheriff’s (Minn.1993) (concluding prin III. judicial ciples preclude restraint courts’ in general principles these With ability to create additional causes of action mind, specific language turn to the we outside those evident a statute’s ex at issue. Minnesota Statutes the statute terms). press implied or The “remedial part: § 363A.17 justify nature” of statute does not discriminatory practice an unfair It is adoption meaning of “a not intended engaged in a trade or busi- for a Groe, legislature.” Beck v. 245 Minn. of a service: provision ness or 28, 44, (1955).1 interpreting a statute to de When intentionally refuse to do busi- action, if it termine creates a cause of with, with, to refuse to contract or ness imposes do not ask whether the statute terms, the basic con- to discriminate in claim, limitation on an otherwise unlimited ditions, the contract but instead determine whether the statute race, person’s of a national ori- because *6 actually provides a cause of action to a sex, orientation, color, gin, or dis- particular persons. class of Greene Cf. ability, alleged the refusal or dis- unless Servs., Dep’t Minn. Human Comm’r of of of a legitimate crimination is because (Minn.2008) (inter 713, 722 755 N.W.2d purpose. business preting denying statute as individual tribal added.) (Emphasis right members “either the to decline re The before us is the issue whether ceiving employment through services the grant to to legislature intended individual right Tribe or the to receive those services employees party of a to a contract through County” where the statute did personally an action right bring to any language expressly “not contain performance discrimination grants” rights). such specific grant contract. There is no We hold that Minn.Stat. a of the statute. right such the terms 363A.17(3) it unambiguous, does is a remedial statute While person a cause of action for a provide not construed, broadly and is see Minn.Stat. contract, a to a party not court has been reluctant to this of which affected discrimina business recognize causes of action under a statute 363A.17(3) plain reading tion. A of section they clearly where do not exist. See Beck Found., legislature prohibited that the sex Mayo er v. 207 reveals analysis, broadly provision disagreeing the dissent to construe does not In with our naturally suggests, a force us to conclude that the statute there is clear indication "[U]nless legislature persons to all un- that the intended a cause of action cause of action creates, majority language pro- there is that narrows as narrow as the one the less broad, plain language tected There must still be a cause of should effect to the classes. Krueger pur- expressed implied language in the 363A.17 and allow to action or of section legislature’s the statute. sue her claim." The command admits, Dust, Thus, as Zeman making perform- in the or a claim under the statute. has Only a to the party a contract. ance of or be held the contract make contract can any cannot read into the statute But we “perform” pursuant to responsible legally rights rights. additional “Performance” is defined to the contract. not in the claims for herself are of a con- completion successful as “[t]he Instead, plain of section usu[ally] resulting in the duty, tractual supports the conclu- reading of the statute fu- any past from or release performer’s legislature pro- that the intended to sion Dictionary liability.” Black’s Law ture to contracting parties right with the vide 2009) added). (9th (emphasis ed. perform make and their contracts without a contractual presupposes subject “Performance” being illegal to discrimination. corporate perform; not, however, while obligation provide legislature did employees to use than persons to a contract other the con- remedies contract, employees have no cannot tracting parties, provi- those and we add fulfill under the contract.2 sions to the statute. rights obligations Thus, only provides a cause of the statute if Even we were to conclude who is denied a con- action to the ambiguous, application statute is tract, per- or discriminated rules of construction leads us conditions) (or terms or formance of accept Krueg- If we the same conclusion. because of sex discrimination. contract case, theory er’s in this then there is virtu- performed Diamond Dust its ob- Although limit who can ally no on the sue through contract under the ligations per- sex discrimination affects the when only including Krueger, Dia- employees, of a See formance contract. legally obligated satisfy mond Dust is 645.16(6) (2008) that intention (providing of its contract with Zeman. the terms can consider- be ascertained Dust can assert its contrac- Only Diamond particular inter- ing consequences “the only can rights, just tual as Diamond Dust theory, pretation”). Krueger’s Under ev- breach the contract. ery employed by woman Diamond Dust *7 have an of action could individual cause
Here, Diamond Dust had a because of Zeman’s conduct. There is no the contract without right perform be- that the indication intended ing subject to discrimination expansive reading such an of the statute. employees. Minn.Stat. Dis- briefs, criminatory parties treatment of Diamond Dust’s In their the discuss employees length Supreme is a violation of the statute. the United States Court’s accurately performance by original par 2. We do not believe the dissent ferent than the language (internal omitted)). our of the in ty.” Additionally, characterizes citation rely We do not on the use of the this section. agent corporation an officer or of a is not "terms” and "conditions” to conclu words personally corporation’s liable for that non sively relationship a contractual re establish performance of a contract. Furlev & Sales Rather, quirement. our decision in this case Assoc, Warehouse, Inc., v. N. Am. Auto. 325 language "performance the rests on 20, Therefore, (Minn. 1982). N.W.2d 26 the Only parties contract.” to a contract can "performance language the in contract” See, legally perform e.g.,Epland the contract. prescribe only the statute does not when it is Assoc., 203, Agency v. Meade Ins. person a unlawful for to discriminate. It also (Minn. 1997) ("In 207 the absence of an ex "aggrieved” who is based on the establishes press agreement contrary, party may to the specific language of section 363A.17—it is the delegate duty perform ... his or her under performance whose of the contract is contract, original party but the remains by affected the discrimination. performance substantially if the dif- liable
865 Pizza, policy v. Mc- of the holding reading in Domino’s Inc. reasons behind its Donald, 470, 1246, instructive.3 546 126 S.Ct. 163 1981 U.S. (2006), 1069 which L.Ed.2d Pizza, In Domino’s the Court confront- rights to have under a contract to
plaintiff
argument
ed a similar
by a shareholder
a claim under 42
1981’s
assert
U.S.C.
“[a]ny person
that
who is an
target’
‘actual
“make and enforce contracts” clause. Sec-
discrimination,
and who loses some ben-
tion
with-
“[a]ll
1981
efit that would otherwise have inured to
jurisdiction
of the United States
him
had
contract not been impaired”
right
every
shall have the same
in
state
should be entitled to sue under section
Territory
to make and enforce con-
478,
1981.
867 conditions, fulfilling performance worker con- or of the con- present as a was race, Diamond Dust and Zeman. person’s tract between tract because of a national color, sex, origin, orientation, claim brought a discrimination Krueger disability, alleged unless the refusal or MHRA. The district court dis- under the legitimate discrimination is because of a action on a Rule mo- Krueger’s missed purpose. business Zeman, concluding Krueger tion pursue her business standing lacked § By Minn.Stat. its lan- plain she was not a discrimination claim because 363A.17(3) guage section forbids discrimi- A to a contract with Zeman. divided against person performance nation appeals of the court of affirmed. panel Here, of a contract on the basis of sex. it Co., Krueger v. Zeman Constr. 758 N.W.2d is Krueger alleged uncontested that suffi- (Minn.App.2008). Krueger ap- 889-90 cient discrimination on the basis sex to our court for relief. pealed during Zeman of a con- Krueger appealing Because her party. tract to which Zeman was a Sec- pursuant claim’s dismissal to a Rule 363A.17(3) require tion does not more. motion, allega- we assume the truth of the point majority The on and I which pleadings. tions set forth her There- disagree whether fore, only ap- issue before us on this 363A.17(3) interpreted should be as re- Krueger has a claim peal is whether stated quiring relationship a contractual between §§ under Minn.Stat. 363A.17 363A.28 person suffering the discriminator and the (2008). from discrimination. Because the MHRA Statutory question is a interpretation contractual-relationship never mentions a law, v. which we review de novo. Frieler I requirement, impose would not such a Inc., Mktg. Group, Carlson requirement. (Minn.2008). goal The of statuto- provisions Section 363A.28 contains the legisla- to ascertain the ry interpretation is of the that tell us who make MHRA (2008). § 645.16 ture’s intent. Minn.Stat. standing claim for discrimination. To have plain meaning When the of a statute is pursue a discrimination claim under the clear, plain lan- apply a court must MHRA, “the act of discrimination itself guage. Id. injury constitutes sufficient for the law to purpose The of the MHRA is to “secure provide remedy, in the absence of statu- state, in this freedom from for tory language requiring more.” Potter discrimination.” Minn.Stat. Club, 384 Sports LaSalle Court & Health 1(a) (2008). The of the Act subd. (citation (Minn.1986) specifically directs us to construe the Act omitted) (internal quotation, marks omit- MHRA broadly by providing that ted). bring a “aggrieved” person may An liberally “shall be construed for the accom- claim under the MHRA when she has been Minn. plishment purposes of the thereof.” injured by Minn. unlawful discrimination. (2008). princi- these Stat. With specific question Stat. 363A.28. mind, of construction in I turn to an ples MHRA for- us to consider is whether the provisions of the relevant type bids the of discrimination MHRA. alleges.
The MHRA that: majority at the use of the looks discriminatory practice It is an unfair trade, and the words “terms” and “conditions” in a person engaged for a or busi- of the contract” phrase “performance ... provision ness or in the of a service 17(3) terms, quickly concludes to discriminate in the basic section 363A. *10 injured by plain language it. The relationship with the a contractual that limits, entity required places for an MHRA no further and we discriminating them, bring to a claim for busi- injured person artificially impose should not seek to under the MHRA. especially given legislature’s ness the mandate fundamentally flawed. analysis is This liberally. to construe the MHRA 363A.17(3) only the addresses Section mandate, majority the Counter to this rather of the discrimination perpetrator reaches its construction of section 363A.17 makes it the victim. The section than “[tjhere because is no indication that the discriminate in the basic “to unlawful legislature expansive intended such conditions, terms, the reading majority of the statute.” But the I contract.” its construction of this section approaches majority with the that the inclusion agree interpret We are to the backwards. “terms,” “conditions,” “performance liberally purpose MHRA to affect its 363A.17(3) in section al- of the contract” people of this from protecting the state only against claims of discrimination a lows there a clear discrimination. So unless a But the use of party to contract. indication that the intended a “terms,” “conditions,” “performance” cause of action as narrow as the one the only indicates when it is unlawful for creates, majority we should effect to Those words tell person to discriminate. broad, plain language of section the victim of the discrimi- nothing us about pursue allow her 363A.17 and They place nation. do not a limit on who claim.1 may “aggrieved” such conduct. majority’s limited con- Therefore, I that the use of these conclude appears struction is too narrow and place may a limit on who words does not majority’s provide veneer for the true a claim for discrimination under the bring my interpretation concern with of section section. my interpretation 363A.17—that would reason, majority’s For the same defi- slippery slope create some sort of for busi- “performance” nition the term is una- ness discrimination claims under majority only vailing. The asserts Krueger’s MHRA. But claim does not can perform to the contract con- slope, slippery stand on a much less a one. 363A.17(3) tract, and therefore section re- Rather, alleges she that while working quires relationship a contractual with the contract, fulfill a construction she was dis- discriminating entity. again, plain But against parties criminated one of the 363A.17(3) language only of section de- contract, contract. Without conduct; scribes what constitutes unlawful Krueger, employee, as Diamond Dust’s may pursue it does not address who site, job not would have been on the injury claim for related to such conduct. not opportunity Zeman would have had the unlawful, By making conduct Indeed, to discriminate her. right MHRA person creates a for a to be majority joba vast of workers on site are during per- free from discrimination in a contractual ag- relationship formance of a contract. A not direct contractor, grieved by such discrimination when she is general with the but well majority plain language asserts in a footnote that of section 363A.17 that "[t]he should legislature's Krueger’s broadly recognize command to construe force us to claim. The naturally legislature's the [MHRA] does not force us to mandate for broad construction merely conclude that the statute a cause of reinforces what should be clear from persons.” agree. action to all I It is the in the statute. *11 and against discriminating parties majority The subject to discrimination. oc- able to discriminate reality. Discrimination some businesses are this minimizes people true, to real level personal impunity. allegations on a If her are curs with statuses, or traits personal on based who right has a as has only perform contracts companies against discriminated to seek redress been beings per- human the work of through discriminating party. Her — the statute. sons under ability perform to work and under contingent ability contract on her Further, majority correctly though the should stat- work free from discrimination. She 1981 of the federal that section states claim; Minn. go different from be allowed to forward with her significantly utes 363A.17, majority appears therefore, I would reverse the district Stat. the United unnecessarily grafted have so. court and allow her do policy Supreme Court’s States majority The the Minnesota statute. onto PAGE, (dissenting). Justice contin- Krueger’s claim to to allow declines Paul H. join I in the dissent of Justice read do be to so would
ue because Anderson. peculiarly “in a bounded” McDonald, Pizza, Inc. v. way. Domino’s MEYER, (dissenting). Justice 470, 476, 126 S.Ct. 546 U.S. omitted). (2006) (emphasis L.Ed.2d join in Paul H. I the dissent Justice boundary majority’s it stark But Anderson. de- Although the MHRA peculiar.
that is entities, entities “person” to include fines color, race, origin, national
do not have orientation, disability.
sex, See (de- 363A.03,
Minn.Stat. subd. Only persons human
fining “person”). Given the real-
have these characteristics. site, majority
ity of a construction deny Minnesota, for entities but preserve Respondent, would claims STATE beings. to human them directed legislature specifically The has HER, Appellant. Moua liberally to the MHRA interpret us to accomplish purpose. No. A06-1743. the MHRA is to purpose 363A.04. Supreme Court of Minnesota. in em- freedom from discrimination
secure accommodation, housing, public ployment, 6, 2010. May services, and education. Minn.Stat. public 1(a). rec- subd. that discrimination “threatens ognized privileges of the inhabitants
rights state and menaces the institutions
this Id., democracy.” subd.
foundations
1(b). contractual-relationship Imposing a gap creates a the law such
requirement subject are to discrimi-
that some remedy workplace
nation in the without