Stephanie C. ARTIS, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
No. 15-CV-0243.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Feb. 2, 2016. Decided April 7, 2016.
135 A.3d 334
The difficulty arises because the weapon was not recovered by the police. This is far from unusual, and we have long recognized that the nature of a weapon may be shown by circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence. Moreover, the dangerousness of an object is assessed not only by the harm it may inflict directly (through the impact of a bullet or its use as a bludgeon), but also by the reaction it may provoke.
Thus, an unloaded handgun is a dangerous weapon because “a gun instills fear in the average citizen” and “creates an immediate danger that a violent response will ensue,” McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 18, 106 S.Ct. 1677, 90 L.Ed.2d 15 (1986) (bank robbery). “[E]ven an imitation or blank pistol used in an assault by pointing it at another is a “dangerous weapon” in that it is likely to produce great bodily harm.” Harris v. United States, 333 A.2d 397, 400 (D.C.1975) (assault with a dangerous weapon).
There may be a chance that the object in appellant‘s hand, if recovered and displayed in a still life image, would not be aptly described as a real or imitation firearm. But it was used in “a highly charged atmosphere” and it had the apparent ability to inflict great bodily injury when seen through the eyes of the victims. Harris, 333 A.2d at 400. In sum, the situation appellant created was fraught with danger. Any metaphysical shortcomings in the jury instruction defining an imitation firearm did not lead to an unjust conviction.
Donald M. Temple, Washington, DC, for appellant.
Donna M. Murasky, Senior Assistant Attorney General for the District of Columbia, with whom Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Loren L. AliKhan, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before FISHER and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges; and PRYOR, Senior Judge.
PRYOR, Senior Judge:
Appellant, Stephanie Artis, asks us to reverse the trial court‘s ruling on appellee‘s, the District of Columbia (the District), motion to dismiss because, she argues, it misinterpreted the word “tolling” in
I. Statement of Facts
Appellant‘s complaint arose from her November 15, 2010 termination from the District‘s Department of Health (DOH). Beginning in August 2007, appellant was employed, in a temporary status, as a DOH code inspector. A contentious relationship evolved with her supervisor, Gerard Brown, and she concluded he had singled her out for unfair treatment in the workplace. On April 17, 2009, appellant took her first administrative step against Mr. Brown and DOH by filing a discrimination claim before the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. While that claim was pending appellant also filed a series of grievances against Mr. Brown challenging several notices of proposed infractions against her and alleging that Brown violated other employee rights regulations.
On November 15, 2010, appellant discovered that DOH terminated her temporary employment as a code inspector. In January 2011, appellant filed a final grievance alleging her termination was retaliation for her strained relationship with the agency and Mr. Brown.
On December 16, 2011, appellant initiated a civil suit against the District in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Therein she alleged her termination violated Title VII of the Civil
On June 27, 2014, the court granted the District‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to appellant‘s federal employment discrimination claim. Id. at 139-141. The court further found that since it dismissed the sole federal claim as facially deficient, it had no basis to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims arising under District of Columbia law. Id. at 141-42 (discussing discretionary nature of pendent jurisdiction) (citing
On August 25, 2014, fifty-nine days after dismissal from federal district court, appellant filed her remaining claims in the Superior Court. In a motion for dismissal—or alternatively summary judgment—the District alleged appellant‘s claims were time barred based on the respective statutes of limitation and
II. Discussion
A.
It is necessary, in order to answer the question presented in this case, to resolve the meaning of “tolled” in
[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
There were nearly two years remaining on the statute of limitations when appellant filed her suit in the United States District Court, and she asserts she had that period (plus thirty days) to file her claims in the Superior Court.
Thus, appellant urges us to adopt the reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Turner v. Kight, 406 Md. 167, 957 A.2d 984 (2008), and find that “tolled” means to suspend the local statute of limitations at the point the federal suit was filed. The District, relying primarily on the California Supreme Court‘s decision in City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern, 59 Cal.4th 618, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 67, 328 P.3d 56 (2014), instead urges us to affirm the trial court‘s finding that, in the context of the statute‘s language, purpose, and history, “tolled” means a thirty-day “grace period” will apply if the limitations period for the state based claims expires while the claim is pending in the federal court. Here, according to the District, the limitations period had expired while the federal suit was pending, so appellant had only thirty days to file in Superior Court. The District argues this fulfills Congress‘s in
When interpreting statutory language, we must “look first to the plain language of a statute to determine its meaning, and favor interpretations consistent with the plain language....” Stevens v. ARCO Management of Washington, D.C., Inc., 751 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C.2000) (citing Francis v. Recycling Solutions, Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 72 (D.C.1997); Downs v. District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and Relief Bd., 666 A.2d 860, 861 (D.C.1995)). “Where the plain meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, the intent of the legislature is clear, and judicial inquiry need go no further.” Id.; see also United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03, 18 S.Ct. 3, 42 L.Ed. 394 (1897) (“The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that [it] has used.“). But, even if the words of a statute have “superficial clarity, a review of the legislative history or an in-depth consideration of alternative constructions that could be ascribed to statutory language may reveal ambiguities that the court must resolve.” Lincoln Hockey LLC v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Emp‘t Servs., 810 A.2d 862, 868 (D.C.2002) (citing Hively v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Emp‘t Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C.1996)); see also Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (if statute is ambiguous “our task is to search for an interpretation that makes sense of the statute and related laws as a whole[ ]“); Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006) (“A word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities“).
B.
As stated, the parties have advanced two respective positions which are consistent with the competing approaches that have evolved nationally relating to the tolling provision of the statute presented. One interpretation is illustrated by Turner. In adopting the “suspension” approach, the Turner court, relying largely on the California Court of Appeal‘s decision in Bonifield v. County of Nevada, 94 Cal.App.4th 298, 303-04, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 (2001) (quoting Woods v. Young, 53 Cal.3d 315, 279 Cal.Rptr. 613, 807 P.2d 455, 461 (1991)), likened tolling to a “clock that is stopped and then restarted[,]” Turner, supra, 957 A.2d at 991, and reasoned that the Bonifield suspension approach was more consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 992 (citing Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 661, 103 S.Ct. 2611, 77 L.Ed.2d 74 (1983) (interpreting tolling statute in
On the other hand, a different approach is that the statute provides a thirty-day “grace period” “allowing claims that would otherwise have become barred to be pursued in state court if refiled no later than
Additionally, federal circuit courts of appeal that have analyzed the tolling provision of
Turning to the legislative history, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 (the Act), Pub.L. No. 101-650 § 310 (Dec. 1, 1990), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-5114, was intended to provide “just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes[.]” Sen. Rep. No. 101-416, 2d Sess. p. 1 (Aug. 3, 1990). As part of the Act,
It is apparent that in drafting subsection (d) of the Act, Congress incorporated recommendations from the academic community, specifically the American Law Institute (ALI). H.R.Rep. No. 101-734, 2d Sess., pp. 15-17, 27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 6861-6862, 6873. Thus we are convinced subsection (d) was meant to reflect the ALI‘s recommendation that the Act should provide litigants relief from a time-bar to actions so long as “the state claim was (1) filed in federal court at time when it would not have been barred in state court and (2) refiled in state court within 30 days after dismissal, absent a longer state rule.” City of Los Angeles, supra, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 67, 328 P.3d at 63 (citing Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts (Am.Law.Inst.) (1969)).
Accordingly, we consider the grace period approach to be more consistent with the Act‘s legislative history and intent. And although both interpretations of the tolling provision are reasonable, we also find that the “grace period” approach better accommodates federalism concerns. We have previously held that “[i]f Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Jones v. District of Columbia, 996 A.2d 834, 842 (D.C.2010) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002)). Turning to the present statute under consideration,
This is not the first time we have been asked to interpret
We conclude that the “grace-period” approach reflects the legislative history and intent of the Act, conforms to our presumption against preemption, and is consistent with our previous treatment of that statute in Stevens. As such, we hold that the tolling provision of
Affirmed.