*1 DOLAN v. UNITED POSTAL STATES SERVICE et al.
No. 04-848. Argued 22, 2006 November February 2005 Decided *2 Kennedy, J., the opinion delivered Court, Roberts, J.,C. and Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and JJ., joined. Breyer, Thomas, J., filed dissenting opinion,post, p. Alito, J., 492. took part no in the consideration or decision of case.
James R. Radmore the cause for argued With petitioner. Kirkpatrick. him on the T Michael briefs was argued respondents. A. Millett Patricia the cause for her Clement, With on the brief were Solicitor General Deputy Kneedler, Solicitor General D. Robert Kamen Mary Dym, Stephan shine, Gibbons, Anne Lori J. J. Boardman.* opinion delivered the of the Court. Kennedy
Justice
day, according
Each
here,
Government’s submissions
the United States Postal Service delivers some 660 million
pieces
many
delivery points.
of mail to as
as 142 million
delivery point petitioner
This case involves one such
Bar-
—
porch
by postal employees
bara Dolan’s
mail left
al-
—where
legedly
trip
injuries
her
Claiming
caused
fall.
as a
result, Dolan filed a claim for administrative relief from the
*3
Postal Service. When her claim was denied, she and her
(whose
husband
claim loss
for
of consortium the
later
Dolans
conceded was barred for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies) filed suit in the United States District Court for
Pennsylvania,
the Eastern
asserting
District of
that
the
negligent placement
Postal Service’s
of mail at their home
subjected
the Government to
under the Federal Tort
§§
(FTCA),
1346(b)(1),
Claims Act
28 U. S.
The
C.
2674.
Dis-
Appeals
trict Court dismissed Dolan’s
and
suit,
the
Court
Third
the
affirmed,
Circuit
I Reorganization Under Postal 39 U. S. C. 101 Act, seq., independent et the Postal Service is “an establishment executive branch the Government of the United Krent,
* Harold D. Popeo, Daniel J Paul Kamenar filed a brief for curiae amici al. as Washington Legal urging Foundation et reversal. 484 letters, a over §201.
States,” carriage Holding monopoly the Postal has Service “significant governmental powers,” to domain, eminent the authority including power in the laws make searches and seizures enforcement of pro- mails, regula- tecting authority promulgate postal tions, and, State’s Secretary supervision, subject international to enter See power agreéments. (USA) Flamingo Ltd., Industries Postal Service v. 540 U. S. (2004) §§ 736, 101, 401, 407, 39 U. S. C. 601- (discussing 606). status, with this the Postal Consistent Service enjoys ibid.; federal absent a waiver. See immunity sovereign Meyer, cf. FDIC v. (1994) (“Absent waiver, shields the Federal Government sovereign immunity suit”). and its from agencies the Postal Act
Although Reorganization “waives generally of the Postal Service from suit it the immunity by giving ” Flamingo ‘to sue and be sued in its official power name/ supra, Industries, at 741 39 U. S. C. §401(1)), (quoting statute also the FTCA “shall to tort provides apply 409(c). claims out of activities of the Postal Service,” FTCA, turn, The waives in two dif- sovereign ferent sections of the United States The first Code. confers federal-court in a defined of cases jurisdiction category committed federal involving negligence employees the course of their This employment. jurisdictional grant covers: *4 States,
“claims for the United against money damages, 1,1945, on and after or loss for accruing January injury or or death caused injury property, personal or act or omission of wrongful any negligent employee his while within the Government acting scope where the under office or circumstances employment, liable to the States, if a would be United private person, where in accordance with the law of place claimant 1346(b)(1). § occurred.” U. S. C. the act or omission As to claims within falling this jurisdictional grant, FTCA, in a second provision, makes the United States liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” not “for though inter- est prior to judgment for or punitive damages.” §2674; see generally United States v. Olson, ante, at 44. The FTCA qualifies its waiver of sovereign
certain categories (13 claims all). If one of the excep- tions applies, the bar of sovereign immunity remains. The categories exempted claims are set forth in 28 U. S. C. §2680, and the relevant subsection for our purposes, pertain- ing postal operations, 2680(b). It states:
“The provisions of this chapter and 1346(b) section this title shall not apply ... [a]ny out the loss, miscarriage, negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.”
As a consequence, the United States may be if liable employees commit torts under law, local but not for claims defined by this exception. This was the provision relied upon by District Court
and Court of Appeals to dismiss Dolan’s suit. The Court of
Appeals’ decision created a conflict with a decision of the
Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. See Raila v.
United States,
II We assume that under the applicable state law a person injured by over a tripping package bundle of papers negli- gently left on the porch of a residence aby private party would have a cause of action for damages. See 28 U. C.S. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. The question is whether, when mail left Postal Service causes the and fall, slip 2680(b) exception for “loss, miscarriage, transmission of letters or matter” preserves sovereign immunity despite FTCA’s more general statements of waiver. *5 486 the transmis- isolation,
If in phrase “negligent considered acts com- of a wide could embrace range sion” mail, in the course of delivering the Service mitted Postal hazards from leaving pack- creation including slip-and-fall in all, After the of a residence. and on porch ets parcels mail is not and transmission of the usage, ordinary meaning g., See, e. Web- arrives at the destination. until it complete (de- (1971) 2429 Third New International Dictionary ster’s instance of act, or trans- “an process, “transmission” fining cause to be “transmit” as “to or go conveyed and mitting” inference— or In this place”). part to another person large the and District Court includes delivery transmission —led 3d, the 377 F. to rule for Government. See Court Appeals words 5a-6a. The definition of at to Pet. for Cert. 288; App. in however, statu- isolation, in is not necessarily controlling or not ex- may A word in a statute may construction. tory In- limits definitional tend to the outer of its possibilities. the of a word or upon reading phrase depends terpretation and context of text, statutory considering purpose whole authorities that statute, and consulting any precedents and Here, we conclude both context inform analysis. so that a narrower require reading, precedent mail causing does go beyond transmission” negligence at the condition, in late, be lost to arrive damaged supra, Raila, address. See (holding wrong material delay covers “damages therefrom”). The phrase and consequential damages itself course occurring all not comprehend negligence does mail delivery. transmission” context, words “negligent Starting §2680(b) terms, “miscarriage.” “loss” two other follow reach “transmission.” think, we limit terms, Those rule that it keeps” known by company word is “[A] —a many is capable a word where “is often wisely applied breadth of unintended to avoid in order giving meanings Co., & D. Searle v. G. Jarecki the Acts Congress.” *6 (1961); 303, 307 see also Steelworkers, Dole v. 494 U. S. (1990)(“[Wjords grouped 26, 36 given in a list should be re- (internal omitted)). meaning” quotation lated marks Here, parties acknowledge, both destroyed mail is “lost” if it is misplaced goes and “miscarried” wrong if it ad- dress. Since both failings those terms refer to in the obligation timely to deliver mail in right a manner to the address, it would be if swept odd transmission” broadly far injuries more alleged include like those here— injuries happen that by postal employees be caused but involve neither failure to damage transmit mail nor to its contents. interpretation
Our
would be less secure were it not for a
precedent we
weight
deem to have decisive
here. We refer
to Kosak v. United States,
“[a]ny respect of the assessment or col- any lection of tax or duty, customs or the detention of any goods by any or merchandise officer of customs or any excise other Id., law-enforcement officer.” (internal omitted). quotation 852, n. 6 marks opinion In its concluding apply did and thus sovereign immunity, United States retained gave specific Court postal exception. consideration to the part opinion In a holding, central to its con- the Court 2680(c)” trasted what “generality it called with §2680(b),” “specificity of id., at 855. The Court observed: principal “One of purposes of the Federal Tort Claims was to Act waive the Government’s injuries from resulting from auto accidents employees System which Postal were at fault. 2680(b), governs In order to ensure that torts did not have of bar- mailmen, committed the effect ring precisely of suit the sort was most provision authorize, the concerned to draftsmen of the types carefully delineated the misconduct for which assuming responsibil- the Government was financial ity namely, miscarriage, loss, ‘the trans- — thereby excluding, mission of letters or matter’ — by implication, negligent handling of motor vehicles.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). *7 present party suggests
In the case neither conclu- Kosak’s regarding negligent operation postal sion motor vehicles ignored light should be In discussion, dictum. of Kosak’s interpret phrase “negligent we cannot transmission” 2680(b) negligence to cover all in the course of deliv- mail ery. Although may postal delivering trucks well be —and transmitting they thus when collide with other vehi- —mail cles, States, nonetheless, Kosak indicates the United retains immunity. no
Séeking distinguish postal to auto from accidents Dolan’s argues negligent driving fall, the Government relates only circumstantially Dolan’s mail, whereas accident by statutory Nothing was caused mail itself. in the text contrary, supports placing this if distinction. mail Quite slip-and-fall so as to a risk create constitutes driving should transmission,” the same be true endangers In trucks in a manner that others on the road. postal employee negligently cases the acts while trans- both recognized mitting In addition, mail. as the Second Circuit acknowledged argument, fo- at oral and as the Government injury cusing would whether the mail itself caused on perhaps making yield turn on whether a anomalies, slip-and-fall empty or causing full, or was sack a mail sideswiped passing hit pedestrian truck a was whether a Raila, dangling parcel. or See the side-view mirror 3d, 355 P. at 122-123. likely it retain
We think more intendedrto directly injuries arising, only immunity, general rule, as a consequentially, at mail fails to arrive all because either wrong damaged late, in at the address. condition, arrives operation, exception’s then, Illustrative instances personal would be or financial harms from nondeliv- ery delivery or late materials or information sensitive (e. notice) g., mortgage foreclosure or from medicines or a (e.g., shattering negligent handling parcel of a mailed china). primarily shipped all, are the sort harms, Such after transporting with the function of identified Postal Service’s throughout mail the United States. emphasizes
Resisting conclusion, the this Government daily operations mail- Postal vast 660 million Service’s —the delivery ings points and 142million mentioned the outset. Respondents delivery As mailboxes and See Brief for 36. to doorsteps undertaking, is essential to this nationwide Con- gress insu- intended, asserts, must have to Government delivery-related liability. If, however, from door- late torts enterprise, step delivery then is essential any driving postal while event, trucks is no less And in so. protect exceptions designed “[t]he it is cer- true are *8 prerogatives important governmental and tain functions disruption,” 301, States, 502 U. S. from v. United Molzof § (1992), 2680(b), supra, specificity Kosak, at 311 see Congress to immunize all did not intend indicates postal activities. exceptions paint far broader brush. FTCA with a
Other They example: “[a]ny damages cover, for claim for caused regulation operations Treasury fiscal 2680(i);“[a]ny § monetary system,” claim aris- C. U. S. military ing or naval out of the combatant activities of §2680(j); during forces, Guard, war,” time of the Coast §2680(k); “[a]ny country,” “[a]ny arising foreign claim in a claim from arising activities of the Tennessee Au- Valley thority,” §2680(Z), or “the Panama Canal Company,” §2680(m); and “[a]ny from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for 2680(n). § cooperatives,” Had Congress intended to preserve for all immunity torts related to postal delivery— torts including hazardous mail placement at customer homes —it could have used similarly sweeping language 2680(b). instead By “carefully delineat[ing]” three just of harm types’ (loss, miscarriage, transmis- Kosak, sion), see S.,U. at 855, Congress expressed the intent to immunize a subset of only wrongdoing, all torts committed in the course of mail delivery.
Further our supporting interpretation, losses of the type for which retained 2680(b) under are least to some degree avoidable or compensable through postal registration and insurance. See United States Postal Service, Mailing Standards, Domestic Mail Manual 609.1.1 (Nov. 10, 2005), available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/ (as 609.htm visited Jan. 9, 2006, and available in Clerk of file) Court’s ease (allowing indemnity claims for loss or dam- age “insured, collect on delivery (COD), registered with insurance, or Express Mail”); 39 CFR (2005) § 111.1 (incorporating by reference the Domestic Manual). Mail The same was true when enacted the FTCA in 1946. See 39 (1940 §245 C. V) ed. and Supp. (setting rates and conditions for mail (1946 insurance); ed.) §381 (“For the greater security valuable mail matter the Postmaster General may establish a uniform system registration, as a of such part system he may rules provide under which the senders or owners of any registered matter shall be indemnified loss, rifling, thereof damage ”). As Kosak mails . . . one explains, purpose the FTCA exceptions was to avoid “extending of coverage Act to suits for remedies adequate were avail- already able,” 465 S., U. at 858—an objective consistent with retain- *9 ing immunity damage delay as to claims of mail covered postal registration and While insurance. the Government suggests injuries falling other outside FTCA'are also subject to assuming administrative relief, true, even that is provision permits only the Government cites discretion- ary remedy relief, not an automatic like insurance. (indicating “may See 39 U. S. C. 2603 the Postal Service adjust personal-injury property-damage and settle” cognizable” claims “not under the FTCA’s administrative re- (1940 (indicat- ed.) §224c provision); lief see also 31 U. S. C. ing any “[w]hen damage person property that is done to through operation Depart- of the Post Office ment .. . power the Postmaster General is invested with adjust any damage settle claim for such when his award damage any $500”); for such in Legisla- case does not exceed Reorganization §424(a), tive 1946, Act of 60 Stat. 846-847 §224c (repealing negligence as to cognizable claims under FTCA). The specter slip-and- Government raises of frivolous inundating fall claims the Postal true in that, Service. It is addition to other considerations we have identified, Kosak “avoiding exposure describes of the United States to principal excessive or fraudulent claims” as a aim of the exceptions, liability, Slip-and-fall FTCA S., 465 U. at 858. imposes however, to the extent it, state tort law ais risk by any shared business makes that home Given deliveries. light transmission,” viewed context and in sweep broadly Kosak, cannot as as the Government ordinary protections claims, against litigation frivolous must just they here, suffice do in case motor vehicle collisions.
Finally, implicate should it be noted this does case general rule that “a waiver of the Government’s sover- eign immunity strictly construed, be in terms of .will scope, sovereign,” Peña, favor of the Lane v. 518 U. S. explains, principle “unhelpful” As Kosak this *10 “unduly the generous interpreta context, FTCA where exceptions
tions of the run the defeating risk of the central purpose of the statute,” 465 S.,U. 9, at n. 853, immunity “waives the Government’s sweeping from suit in language,” United States v. Yellow Co., 543, Cab 340 U. S. (1951); 547 see also Village, United States v. Inc., Nordic 503 (1992)(observing 30, 34 “[w]e narrowly have on occasion exceptions construed sovereign immunity of waivers where was Congress’ consistent with intent, clear inas ‘sweeping the of language’ context [FTCA]” (quot 547)). ing supra, Co., Yellow Cab proper Hence, “the ob jective of attempting a court to construe one of the subsec § tions of identify 28 U. 2680 S. C. tois ‘those circumstances which are within the exception’ words and reason of the —no supra, less and no more.” Kosak, (quoting at 853, n. 9 (1953)). Dalehite v. States, United 346 U. Having S. inquiry made that here, we conclude Dolan’s claims fall out 2680(b). side
[*] [*] [*] postal exception The inapplicable, and Dolan’sclaim falls general within the FTCÁ’s sovereign of waiver federal im- munity. judgment The Appeals Court is reversed, and the case is remanded proceedings for further consistent opinion. with this
It is so ordered. part took no in the consideration or deci- Alito Justice sion of this case. Thomas,
Justice dissenting. (FTCA) The Federal Tort Claims Act waives Govern- sovereign seeking money ment’s for civil suits damages injury personal injury
“for or property, loss or or death negligent wrongful caused act or or omis- any employee acting sion of while Government cir- employment, scope under office or of his within private person, States, if a where the United cumstances in accordance the claimant liable to would be occurred,” place where act omission law the 1346(b)(1), U. S. C. §2680. here, As relevant exceptions found
save several sovereign immu- to the Government reserved loss, miscar- “[a]ny nity respecting out postal matter.” riage, of letters transmission *11 2680(b) exception). (postal personal have suffered claims to Barbara Dolan Petitioner period- and packages, injuries tripped letters, over she when Postal employee Service States of the United icals that an Service) Today, (Postal porch. negligently left on her may proceed because lawsuit that concludes Dolan’s Court disagree. exception. I within the not fall her claim does “negligent Service’s the Postal out of claim arises Dolan’s of the the terms thus covered of mail and is transmission” ambiguous, exception this exception. is if the postal Even scope of the ambiguities require as to Court’s cases in favor. its be resolved waiver Government’s respectfully Accordingly, dissent. I
I every therein, exception, term The text v. meaning. ordinary See FDIC its should be ascribed (1994) interpret a (noting that we Meyer, 471, 477 meaning ordinary its statutory term in accordance statute). in The term in the not defined when term is The crux “negligent transmission.” controversy here is assign majority its failure is my disagreement with the meaning. de- That term plain its “transmission” term transmitting.” process, of operation, or “[a]ct, fined as the (2d 1934, Dictionary ed. International New Webster’s 1945). alia, as, is defined inter republished “Transmit” as another; to place to person or “[t]o one from send or transfer post, forward rail, [t]o pass wire, etc., . . . cause ... conveyed.” or be Id., at 2692-2693. There is no cause to Congress conclude that ordinary was unaware of the defini- tion of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” when it enacted FTCA and the in 1946. Nor is there textual indication that intended to deviate ordinary from the meaning of Accordingly, these terms.1 interpret I would the term “transmission” consistent with ordinary meaning, ante, see at 486, and conclude that the postal exception exempts the Government from any arising out of the delivery of the mail to patron, a Postal including Service slip-and-fall Dolan’s claim. Rejecting “ordinary meaning usage” “negligent majority transmission,” the concludes that the term covers only injury arising “directly consequentially” “negli- from gence causing mail to be lost or to damaged late, arrive condition, or at the wrong Ante, address.” 489. majority’s Thus, view, transmission” covers injury direct to the personal mail injury as well injury from to the mail, personal injury but does not cover damage that does not arise from example, For mail. majority’s in the view, if a mail negligently drops carrier *12 containing glassware box patron’s doorstep, on a causing the contents to patron shatter, and injures the later himself attempting while to glass, handle the shards postal of the bar damages would a claim for destroyed for the item as well a personal as related claim injury. for That 1 fact, In this reading is supported by Congress’ routine use definitional of the terms “transmission” and “transmit” in both criminal and civil postal statutes to refer to the handling, processing, and delivery of mail to a final See, g., e. destination. 3,1845, 43, 6,5 Act of Mar. ch. 734 Stat. (respecting deputy postmasters authorized “to to any person transmit place” official 1696(b) letters or packages, free of charge); §§ 18 U. S. C. and (c) (referring to letters); unlawful 1716(b), (c), §§ of (d), “transmission” (e) (regulating and proscribing “transmission in dangerous the mails” of (e. medicines) g., items except “to,” “from,” when the “transmission” entities). specified “between” individuals or
495 major- goes. the However, under as far as it correct, view is places heap negligently mail ity’s a view, if mail the carrier trips porch patron over patron’s and falls front and the on a personal in- door, his mail he walks out of his front the as may the jury go is no in text claim forward. There basis majority’s majority. Indeed, the the line drawn excep- language of the view is at odds with the broad applies “[a]ny expressly out tion, to matter.” . of letters or of . . transmission added). 2680(b) (emphasis by concluding majority that The rationalizes view “miscarriage” necessarily term “loss” and limit terms Applying of nosci- Ante, the rule “transmission.” at 486. keeps— company it tur a is known a sociis—that word majority “miscar- both “loss” and reasons that because riage” “failings postal obligation to deliver refer to in the timely right odd it would be address, mail a manner broadly.” swept Ante, ‘negligent far more if transmission’ interpreting nothing about But there is “odd” 487. encompass ground more to term transmission” “miscarriage.” decidedly than narrower terms “loss” prevent ascrib- to The a is intended rule noscitur sociis ing meaning expansive it a conflicts to one word so gives provision “‘unin- other terms of the a manner Congress.’” v. tended breadth to the Acts Gustafson (1995) (quoting v. G. D. Alloyd Co., Jarecki 513 U. S. (1961)). however, rule, That Co., 303, 367 U. S. Searle & every Court] in a require [the term construe “does not just meaning given narrowly one of series because nothing text demands in the where, here, terms,” supra, at more construction. Gustafson, limited deleted). to read dissenting) (emphasis Indeed, J., (Thomas, . limiting the mean- Congress’ in a list as terms use narrow defy common ing same list “would in the broad terms *13 giving Congress prevent from effect doing sense; so would they expansive whenever are combined in a list to words with one word with a more meaning.” restricted 513 S.,U. at 587.
Nor opinion does this Court’s in Kosak v. United States, (1984), support U. S. 848 majority’s narrow construc- postal tion exception. of the In Kosak, suggested this Court postal exception that the apply does not suits from negligent handling of motor vehicles Postal Service employees. Specifically,the Court stated: principal
“One of the purposes [FTCA] was to waive Government’s immunity from for in- juries resulting from auto accidents .... In order to 2680(b)... ensure that did not have the effect bar- ring precisely the sort Congress of suit that was most concerned to authorize, the provision draftsmen of the carefully types delineated the of misconduct for which the Government was assuming responsibil- financial ity namely, ‘the miscarriage, loss, trans- — mission letters or matter’ . . . .” Id., at 855 added). (emphasis
That observation import beyond has no recognition postal scope may be—was care- —whatever fully crafted so as not to undisputed undermine an principal purpose of the FTCA—to waive the Government’s injuries arising from auto says accidents. It nothing further about the acts capture intended to when enacting postal exception, and, thus, is unremarkable for purposes construing exception.2 2In an attempt to reconcile Kosak case, this the majority argues purpose “one of the FTCA exceptions towas avoid ‘extending the coverage of the Act to suits for adequate already remedies were available,’... an objective consistent with retaining immunity as to [some] claims of damage mail or delay covered registration and in Ante, surance.” Kosak, 858). at 490-491 (quoting S.,U. The ma jority, however, ignores that, cases, fact most such insurance covers only sender, not the recipient, in which recipients case have no means of obtaining compensation for damage heirlooms, loss money, gifts, *14 it case, does this inform the outcome Even if Kosak does trans- of the “negligent not majority’s interpretation support does above, pur- As discussed the majority mission.” fall under that to of act may limit the negligent type port the the of excep- rather it limits scope the postal exception; act the on that negligent tion based the of type consequence etc.). But Kosak's mail, late delivery, causes (damage of of the act of driving regardless exclusion — the of act mail whether the that is damage consequence the scope injury person —from dis- envisioned if that the Kosak Court implies, anything, the nature of covered, of crete acts as being independently ibid, han- their “negligent See consequences. (excluding for motor from the of misconduct” of vehicles” dling “types such, the As which is barred by postal exception). an of Kosak does not support interpretation that is caused transmission” based upon injury type the mail. Postal Service’s negligent handling as the that Assuming postal exception ambiguous, ante, 486-487, see settled majority suggests, principles medicine, documents. See papers, delayed time-sensitive valuable Standards, Service, Domestic Mail Manual Mailing States Postal United n 2005). (rev. 609.4.3(f) majority’s justi- (ae), 1129,1130 The pp. Jan. patrons fact cannot also take into account the fication fails to 609.4.3, gener- See loss of items of value. against insure sentimental cover- and insurance ally. depiction registration With a accurate more that, negli- hand, arising from injuries like age in Government’s mail, FTCA the reach injuries other outside gent transmission of easily is not so dismissed. to administrative relief are also amenable Ante, §2603, argues, as the Government Specifically, at 491. 39 U. S. C. claims, United discretion of the for within the provides the settlement States, are not otherwise the Postal Service that injuries caused discretionary Dolan’s. The include claims like cognizable, would §2603 fact undermines nature of such does not alter settlements unavailability of administrative purported that the position Court’s proposed interpretation. recovery supports Dolan’s for claims such as governing interpretation sovereign waivers of immu- nity require us to rule in favor of the Government. may only
A court
jurisdiction
exercise
over the Govern-
pursuant
ment
to “a clear statement from the United States
waiving sovereign immunity
together
...
falling
claima
within the terms of the waiver.” United States v. White
Apache
Mountain
Tribe,
Thus, the incorrect conclude that “this case implicate does not general rule that ‘a waiver of the sovereign Government’s immunity strictly will be construed, scope, terms sovereign.’” in.favor Ante, at 491. As clearly this case illustrates, the Government’s amenability only to suit can be ascertained after construing both the immunity waiver of exceptions. and its The well- established rationale construing a waiver in favor of sovereign’s immunity, applies equal thus, force to the construction of an to that waiver. Accord- ingly, even if I were to conclude majority’s interpre- tation plausible transmission” as my were own, I would still resolve this case in favor of the Govern- sovereign ment’s as mandated our canons of construction.3 3There is no canon of construction that counsels favor of construing the ambiguity against the Government. Although we have “on occasion
narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity,” we *
*
*
a tort claim for
reasons, I
hold that
per-
For these
would
of mail
sonal
out
delivery
injury
2680(b),
the postal
is barred
28 U. C.
S.
postal patron
I would affirm the
Accordingly,
judgment
exception.
Court
Appeals.
*16
waived
Government’s
plainly
done so
eases where
have
question before
issue,
only
claim at
particular
for
United,
States
v.
form the suit.
permissibility
was the
the Court
v. Yellow
(1992)
Inc.,
United States
30,34
Village,
(citing
Nordic
U. S.
Casualty &
Aetna
Co.,
and United States
(1951),
v.
Cab