*1 LLC AGROSCIENCES al. v. DOW BATES et 27, 2005 April January 2005 Decided Argued No. 03-388. *3 Stevens, J., Court, delivered the opinion Rehnquist, of the in which J., O’Connor, C. Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ., and joined. Breyer, J., Thomas, filed a concurring opinion, post, p. J., 454. filed an opinion concurring judgment the in part dissenting part, and Scaua, J., in which joined, post, 455. p.
David C. Frederick the cause for argued petitioners. Attaway Kimberly on the briefs were Scott K. him With and S. Keller.
Seth P. Waxman the cause for With argued respondent. Ogden, him on the brief were David Paul R. Q. son, W. Wolf Joseph Dean T. Barnhard, R. Alberts.
Lisa S. Blatt the cause for United States as argued Acting amicus curiae the brief were affirmance. On urging Attorney Clement, Solicitor General Assistant General Deputy Hungar, Deputy Sansonetti, Solicitor General As Attorney Jeffrey sistant Clark, Minear, General P. James C. Schaumburg* Kilbourne, and Kenneth Von *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Texas Abbott, Cruz, by Greg Texas, et al. Attorney General of R. Ted Solicitor General, McBee, General, Barry R. Attorney First Assistant Edward D. Burbach, Jordan, General, Deputy Attorney and Sean D. Assistant Solici- General, by tor Attorneys respective General for their States as Troy Alabama, California, follows: of King Lockyer Bill of Richard Blu- opinion delivered the of the Court. Justice Stevens peanut allege that Petitioners are 29 Texas farmers who severely growing crops in the their were dam- season aged by application respondent’s newly of marketed pesticide “Strongarm.” question presented named Fungicide, whether Federal Insecticide, and Rodenticide (2000 (FIFRA), II), seq. Supp. Act 7 U. S. C. 136 et ed. and pre-empts damages. their state-law claims for
HH authority Pursuant to its FIFRA, under Environmen- (EPA) Agency conditionally registered tal Protection Strongarm thereby granting respondent 8, 2000, March (Dow) permission to sell this weed killer1—in —a menthal of Connecticut, Madigan Lisa Thomas J. Miller of Illinois, of Iowa, Reilly Thomas F. Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, of Jere- (Jay) miah W. Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Eliot Spitzer of New Jim Petro of York, W.A. Drew Ohio, Edmondson Okla- of Mark L. homa, Utah, William H. Sorrell Vermont, Jerry Shurtleff Kilgore W. Gregoire Christine 0. Virginia, of Washington; for the Association of America R. C. Westmoreland and Todd Lawyers Trial by Smith; A. for the Natural Patti Gold- by Resources Defense Council et al. man, Brueckner; Cope, Wolfman, Grant Brian and Leslie for the Western Peanut Growers Association et al. by Sean H. Donahue and David T. Goldberg; and for Herbert Samuel Harrison Mikal C. Watts. amici curiae
Briefs of urging affirmance were filed for the American Faulk; Jones; Council Richard Chemistry Bruce Corp. by for BASF *4 for the Chamber of Alan Untereiner by Commerce the United States Conrad; and Robin S. Lawrence S. Ebner Croplife by for America et al. Nelson; Douglas T. for E. I. Du Pont de by Nemours and Co. et al. Dinh; Viet D. Council, for by Kenneth Liability Advisory Inc., the Product Nemetz; S. Getter and Miriam R. the Texas Chemical Council Wil- Powers, Jr., Gunn, Post; liam David M. and Russell S. for the Washington Popeo; Daniel J. Legal Foundation by Johnson David and for L. Edwin E. Menotti. Moore, Shu, Caligur, James L. Glen W. Lysaught and Patrick Matthew filed a brief for the Defense Research Institute as amicus curiae. 1 herbicide, Strongarm commonly would more be called a but it is classi (u). fied as a pesticide for'purposes §§136(t), of FIFRA. See 7 U. S. C. the United registration States. Dow obtained this in time Strongarm to market normally to plant Texas farmers, who peanut crops May their According around petition- ers—whose version of the facts we assume to be true at this stage knew, or should Strongarm have known, that —Dow growth peanuts would stunt the pH in with soils levels of greater.2 7.0 or Strongarm’s Nevertheless, stated, label Strongarm “Use of is recommended pea- in all areas where grown,” App. nuts are agents equiva- 108, and Dow’s made representations lent pitches petitioners. their sales petitioners applied Strongarm When on their farms —whose pH soils have higher, typical levels of 7.2 or isas in western pesticide severely Texas—the damaged peanut crops their failing while growth to control the of weeds. The farmers reported problems these experts to Dow, which sent its inspect crops. reregistered
Meanwhile, Dow Strongarm its label with prior EPA growing to the approved season. EPA “supplemental” “[distribution label [u]se that was for [o]nly in the states of New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas,” id., at peanut 179,the three experi- States which farmers crop damage. enced This new following label contained the warning: apply Strongarm “Do not pH to soils with a of 7.2 greater.” or Id., at 181.
After negotiations unsuccessful petitioners Dow, with gave Dow notice bring of their required by intent to suit as Deceptive the Texas Trade Practices-Consumer Protection (hereinafter DTPA). Act3 response, Texas Dow filed declaratory judgment action in Federal District Court, as- serting petitioners’ expressly impliedly claims were or pre-empted by brought FIFRA. Petitioners, turn, coun- including sounding terclaims, tort liability claims in strict negligence. They alleged also fraud, breach of war- “pH,” The term pondus hy which stands for hydrogenii, “potential drogen,” acidity refers to the of the soil. (West 2002). Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 17.01 et seq. *5 436
ranty, DTPA. The District Court the Texas and violation of rejecting summary judgment, one granted for Dow’smotion dismissing grounds the remainder as claim on state-law 136v(b), provides expressly pre-empted which 7 U. S. C. any impose in effect re- or continue “shall not that States packaging quirements in addition to or differ- subchapter.” required from those under ent pre- Appeals affirmed. It read Court judgment against Dow empt any “a claim in which state-law product 323, 3d label.” 332 F. it to alter its would induce (CA5 2003). petitioners’ that because The court held 331 practices warranty, deceptive claims focused trade fraud, agents from that did not differ Dow’s on oral statements product’s those label, success on made on the statements change “strong its give incentive” to claims would Dow pre-empted. Id., at 331-332. thus label. Those claims were liability petitioners’ claim strict The court also found essentially “disguised” alleging design defective was pre-empted. Id., at 332. claim and therefore failure-to-warn escape the heart of the farmers’ cannot It reasoned: “One peanut crops Strongarm dangerous grievance: soil pH not disclosed to 7.0, over and that was with a level inescapable on this claim would It is that success them. ... Strongarm necessarily label.” again to alter the induce Dow reasoning employed similar at The court Id., 332-333. testing negligent negligent manufacture claims find the pre-empted Id., as well. majority of those of a consistent with
This decision was
high courts,5
Appeals,4
state
as well of several
the Courts of
and with
of other courts6
with the decisions
but conflicted
4
Inc.,
the views of set forth an amicus Supreme granted with the California Court 2000.7 We (2004). certiorari to resolve this 542 U. 936 conflict. S. II provided primary possibly Prior to 1910the States the and regulatory the source of the exclusive control over distribu- poisonous tion of substances. Both the Federal Govern- regulation area, ment’s first effort at in this the Insecticide originally Act 1910, 331, of 36 and as enacted Stat. FIFRA primarily licensing in 1947, 61 125, 163, ch. Stat. dealt with labeling. original pes- and the FIFRA, Under version of all registered ticides sold interstate commerce had to be with Secretary Agriculture. Secretary register the The would pesticide complied labeling a if it with the statute’s standards and was 1970, determined to be efficacious and safe.8 In responsibility registration process. EPA assumed for this spurred by growing safety In 1972, environmental and con Congress adopted cerns, the extensive amendments9 comprehen “transformed FIFRA from a law into a regulatory Co., sive Ruckelshaus Monsanto 467 statute.” v. (1984). regulated 986, U. S. 991 amended, “As FIFRA labeling, pesticides; regulated use, as well as the sale and pesticides produced and sold in both intrastate interstate and provided suspension commerce; review, cancellation, registration; gave greater EPA enforcement author ity.” imposed Id., at 991-992. The 1972 amendments also Etcheverry Tri-Ag See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae v. (Cal. Serv., Inc., No. S072524 Ct.) (hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae Sup. Etcheverry). for United States in The Solicitor has since Acting General adopted a contrary position. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8 If the Secretary registration, declined and the manufacturer refused changes, Secretary to mate required register pesticide was 1964, however, protest.” “under Congress procedure, eliminated this required disappointed challenge registra manufacturers a denial tion through administrative review. 78 Stat. 190. Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 86 Stat. 973. safety. Id., registration a criterion for new —environmental generally on Environ- Grad, Treatise F. at 992. See (2004) statutory §§8.02-8.03 (tracing FIFRA’s mental Law evolution). currently seek stands, FIFRA as it manufacturer
Under proposed pesticide label ing register must submit a supporting data. 7 U. S. C. as certain to EPA as well (F). 136a(c)(1)(C), register pesticide §§ agency will (with ca efficacious that the if it determines 136a(c)(5)(A); below), that it will not cause veat discussed *7 the environ on humans and adverse effects unreasonable (D); 136(bb); § 136a(c)(5)(C), §§ com and that its label ment, misbranding, prohibition plies with the statute’s 152.112(f) (2004). § 136a(c)(5)(B); pesticide § A is 40 CFR “false or a statement that is if its label contains “misbranded” misleading including misleading any particular,” or a false concerning efficacy pesticide. 7 U. S. C. statement 156.10(a)(5)(ii). § § pesticide A is also 136(q)(1)(A);40 CFR adequate instructions if does not contain misbranded its label cautionary necessary warnings or for or if its label omits use, (G).10 §§136(q)(1)(F), 7 U. C. statements. S. pesticide to sell a unlawful under the statute
Because manufactur registered misbranded, but nevertheless that is continuing obligation label to adhere to FIFRA’s ers have 136a(f)(2) § (a)(1)(E); (reg § 136j ing requirements. see also pesticide its prima that the facie evidence istration is regis requirements, but labeling comply the statute’s with of the provide to the violation a defense does not tration (a 136a(f)(1) may approval statute); seek manufacturer or any statement display conspicuously label must also A regu implementing statute or its by the specifically required information examples, only a few To mention 136(q)(1)(E). C. lations. 7 U. S. prod producer, of the name and address contain the label must 40 CFR statement. number, ingredient an registration uct (vi) (2004). 156.10(a)(1)(ii), (iv), §§ label). Additionally, duty amend its manufacturers have a report involving pesticide’s incidents toxic effects that may adequately warnings, not be reflected in its label’s (b) §§159.184(a), (2004), may CFR EPA institute cancel- § 136d(b), proceedings, lation 7 U. S. C. and take other en- forcement registered pesticide action if it determines that a is misbranded.11
Section 136v, which was added in the 1972 amendments, continuing pesticide regulation. addresses the States’ role in currently provides: As codified, 136v “(a) general may regulate
“A any federally State the sale or use of registered pesticide only or device but if State, regulation and to permit any the extent the does not prohibited by sale or subchapter. use “(b) Uniformity impose any
“Such State shall not or continue in effect requirements packaging in addition to or required different from subchapter. those under this “(c) Additional uses “(1) may provide A registration State for additional
n federally registered pesticides uses of formulated for special distribution and use within that State to meet purposes subchap- local needs in accord with the of this registration previously ter and if for such use has not disapproved, by been denied, or canceled the Adminis- registration registration trator. Such shall be deemed purposes under section 136a of this title for all of this subchapter, only but shall authorize distribution and use within such State. ...”
11 may sale, use, EPA issue “stop or removal” orders and may seize of (b). fending products. 136k(a), Further, §§ 7 U. S. C. may manufacturers subjected be to civil penalties and criminal for violating require FIFRA’s ments. 1361. 440 FIFRA, 92 Stat. amended once 1978, again
In Congress that its evalua- EPA’s concern to time in 819, response this di- process the registration efficacy during tion of pesticide the of assessing its task resources from too many verted pesticides. health dangers posed environmental EPA to authorizing this problem addressed Congress thus efficacy, permit- data pertaining waive requirements confirming without pesticide the register agency ting 136a(c)(5). 1979, its label. made on the claims efficacy and issued general EPA invoked this grant permission limited review, qualifications with only of efficacy waiver 40 CFR (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. here. See applicable 1996, later (2004). 158.640(b) In a notice years published ef- pesticide evaluating it had “stopped EPA confirmed two ago,” almost decades for routine label approvals ficacy (June 1996), avail- 3, 96-4, Notice p. Pesticide Registration able at http://www.epa.gov/opppmsdl/PR_Notices/pr96-4.html, aof that “EPA’s approval and clarified 232, App. of EPA the on determination part
label does not reflect any will not damage crops will be efficacious the pesticide id., 5, at damage,” App. or cause other property EPA in which statement to an earlier notice also referred “ they are aware that producers observed ‘pesticide if user community suits by damage subject potentially Id., at use.’” in actual ineffective their prove products 2) (1982)). (col. This 47 Fed. Reg. App. (quoting time of regis- Strongarm’s was in waiver place general the state- thus, accuracy never tration; EPA passed recommending prod- ment label original Strongarm’s are grown.” “in areas where uct’s use all peanuts over FIFRA was enacted version of modern Although whether never addressed has three decades Court ago, *9 claims other common-law tort and that statute pre-empts tort litigation entertained under law. Courts state arising well pas- since before manufacturers against pesticide
441
sage of FIFRA in 1947,12and
litigation
such
was a common
feature
legal
of the
landscape at the time of the 1972amendm
ents.13
Indeed, for at least a decade after those amend
arguments
ments,
that such tort suits
pre-empted
were
§136v(b) either were not advanced or were unsuccessful.
g.,
See, e.
Ferebee v. Chevron
Co.,
Chemical
This Court has addressed FIFRA pre-emption in a differ
ent context.
In Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,
501
(1991),
U. S. 597
we
§136v(b)
considered a claim that
pre-empted a small town’s
requiring
ordinance
special per
mit for the
application
aerial
pesticides.
Although the or
imposed
dinance
required
restrictions not
any
FIFRA or
regulation,
EPA
unanimously
we
rejected the pre-emption
claim.
opinion
our
we noted that FIFRA was not
“a sufficiently comprehensive
justify
statute to
an inference
Congress
occupied
had
the field to the exclusion of the
12See, e.g.,
Lee,
Mossrud v.
229,
163 Wis.
authority review to requirements.14 labeling state and federal ply with both from prevent a State would FIFRA of Nothing text the labeling packaging re- or federal of a making violation the sanc- imposing its thereby own offense, quirement a state law. federal violate who pesticide manufacturers tions violating rules state for sanctions imposition state of The equally con- requirements duplicate federal merely that' §136v. of the text with sistent
) I—IM —i petitioners whether background, we consider Against this 136v(b), again, as reads which, pre-empted claims15 selling before requires law “Federal explains, Website EPA’s As must States, company or person a United the pesticide a distributing or review conduct states Most license, EPA.... from registration, obtain labeling re with federal complies that it ensure to label pesticide EPA, Pesti of use.” restrictions state any additional and quirements Pesticides New Evaluating Potential Pesticides, Regulating cides: (as Apr. visited Uses, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/index.htm Grad, file). F. also 4 See case of Court’s in Clerk 6, 2005, and available (“All (2004) state[s] §8.05, 8-140 p. Law on Environmental Treatise paral generally these pesticides, for requirements labeling have some stat (reviewing the to 1947”);id., 8-218 at 8-143 lel [FIFRA] States). of the 50 utes precise to what as confusion some leave record and the briefing The case, appro we find posture light of are at issue. claims fraud, warranty, express breach of claims: following address priate to design defective liability (including DTPA, strict Texas of the violation address will also testing. We manufacture), negligent and defective petitioners’ read Appeals warn, the Court since failure negligent press do not petitioners because But such claim. support allegations whether to determine court below here, leave it we a claim such no course, express we Of on remand. a claim on such they may proceed
follows: “Such State impose shall not or continue in effect any requirements or packaging in addition to or different required from those under this subchapter.” §136v(b) introductory words of ap- —“Such State” — pear to limit the coverage of that subsection to the States *11 that are described (a). in preceding subsection Texas is such a State regulates because it the sale and use federally registered pesticides permit and does any not sales or uses prohibited by FIFRA. It is beyond therefore dispute that (b) subsection applicable to this case. prohibitions 136v(b)
The in apply only “requirements.” An merely occurrence that optional motivates an decision qualify does not requirement. aas Appeals Court of was quite wrong therefore when it any assumed that event, jury such as a verdict, might that “induce” a manu- change facturer to its label should be require- viewed as a ment. The Court of Appeals did, however, correctly hold that the “requirements” §136v(b) term in beyond reaches positive enactments, such as brace common-law duties. Our decision Cipollone ports this conclusion. See regulations, statutes and to em-
in sup- S., 505 U. (plurality opin- ion) (“The phrase ‘[n]o requirement prohibition’ or sweeps broadly suggests no distinction positive between enact- ments and common law; contrary, to the those easily words encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules”); see also id., at 548-549 concurring in (Scalia, J., judgment part in dissenting part). While the use of “requirements” in pre-emption may clause not invariably carry this meaning, we think this is reading the best §136v(b).
That may pre-empt judge-made rules, as well as regulations, statutes and says nothing scope about of view as to whether any of these claims are viable as a matter of Texas we, law. Nor do given the early stage of litigation, this opine on whether petitioners can adduce sufficient evidence in support of their claims to survive summary judgment. pre-empted, to be rule particular state aFor
pre-emption. require- abe must it First, satisfy conditions. two it must the de- governing rules packaging”; or ment “for Second, pre-empted. example, not product, for sign of a that is requirement packaging labeling or impose a must required under those to or “in addition from different “poi- requiring the word regulation subchapter.” A state pre- be would not instance, letters, appear red son” to requirement. same imposed the regulation empted EPA if an rules many common-law of the perfectly clear It is satisfy condition. first rely do not petitioners upon which reasonably safe design require manufacturers Rules testing appropriate conducting due care products, to use manufacturing products free products, to market their con- other express warranties honor their and to defects, requirements qualify as plainly do commitments tractual *12 common-law these of “labeling packaging.” None or for package their or label requires that manufacturers rules petitioners’ for claims way. Thus, any particular products in testing, negligent manufacture, design, defective defective warranty pre-empted. express breach on warranty was located express sure, Dow’s To be express on an of action a Strongarm’s But cause label.16 good on the make only warranty a manufacturer that asks voluntarily undertook that it commitment contractual product.17 Because warranty its on placing that product con that this warrants AgroSciences “Dow label stated: reasonably fit for label and description forms to the chemical with the in strict accordance used when on the label stated purposes App. forth below.” set risks directions, to the inherent subject are based fraud claims warranty petitioners’ the extent To the text they fall outside agents, by Dow’s made representations on oral labeling defines Because FIFRA reason. independent for an that accom matter” graphic written, or printed, other labels and “all all as to a sales applied any requirement §136(p)(2), pesticide, pany a “labeling for or requirement a not be would agent’s oral representations packaging.” require rule
common-law does not the manufacturer to make express an warranty, or in the event that the manufacturer say elects anything to do particular so, to warranty, in that impose rule requirement does not pack- “for aging.” (plurality id., See at opinion).18 525-526 arriving at a different conclusion, the below court rea- finding soned that a liability on these claims would “induce [its] Dow to alter label.” 332 F. at 3d, 332.19 This effects- based test finds support 136v(b), no in the text of which speaks only “requirements.” requirement A is a rule of law that obeyed; must be an jury such as event, verdict, merely optional motivates an require- decision is not a proper ment. The inquiry calls for an examination of the elements of the duty common-law Cipollone, issue, see (plurality U. opinion); S., at 524 it specula- not call does for tion jury as to whether a prompt verdict will the manufac- (a any turer particular to take question, any action event, depend that will variety on a of cost/benefit calculations best accountants). left to the manufacturer’s The inducement unquestionably test is overbroad because impeach “genuine” would many design defect claims that Dow pre-empted. concedes are not design A defect claim, if surely successful, would induce a manufacturer to alter its change label ingredients reflect a in the change list of or a in the instructions improvement use necessitated 18The of Appeals Court held that petitioners’ claim under Texas DTPA was pre-empted as provides insofar the Act a remedy for the breach *13 (CA5 of an express warranty. 2003) law). F. 332 3d 332 (citing Texas Because petitioners’ warranty claim is not pre-empted, claim their under the Act is not to pre-empted that extent. 19Other of Appeals g., e. Courts have taken a approach. See, similar Netland, 3d, 284 F. (“Thus, 900 our task to is determine whether Net- land’s claims are essentially a challenge to Bovinol’s label or the overall design of pesticide. the To guide our analysis, we must in ask whether seeking to liability error, avoid for any would the to manufacturer choose alter the product”). label or the 446 is test inducement Moreover, the design. product’s the
in the §136v(a), confirms which with entirely consistent not pesti- use and regulate the sale authority to broad State’s sale the may ban 136v(a), agency state a Under cides.20 pesticide’s the one instance, that finds, for if a might induce well ban This unsafe. is label-approved uses against this warn change label its manufacturer the however, such test, inducement the Under use. questioned “labeling” re- aas anomalously qualify would a restriction Congress endeavored unlikely that highly It is quirement. caused pressure indirect type of the between line a to draw and restrictions use impose sales power to by a State’s by common-law exerted pressure attenuated more even the the either supported not is test inducement suits. statute. of the structure or the text fraud petitioners’ claims, other their Unlike common- premised claims negligent-failure-to-warn pack- labeling or for “requirements qualify as rules that law product’s standard set rules aging.” These by con- violated alleged to have Strongarm is label the that warnings. While inadequate taining statements false Cipol- guidance rightly found appeals have courts the courts of those some “requirements,” interpretation of lone’s pre- were claims failure-to-warn that quickly concluded too Cipollone, without they were as FIFRA, empted under differences textual obvious rather to the paying attention pre-emption clauses.21 two the between (1991), we Mortier, 597 U. S. v. Intervenor Public Wisconsin States authority that declaratory of 136v(a) merely is noted to the back hand “serve did FIFRA; provision after retained Id., at 614. usurped.” impliedly had the statute powers States (CA9 555, 559 Pure-Gro, 54 F. 3d v. AG Industries Taylor g., e. See, in the language between difference 1995) (“There no notable Inc., Brands, Dow v. FIFRA”); Shaw language Act and Cigarette hair-splitter dedicated most 1993) (“Not (CA7 even 364, 371 2d 994 F. statements”). these distinguish could *14 pre-emption Unlike the Cipollone,22 clause at issue in § 136v(b)prohibits only labeling state-law packaging re- quirements that are “in addition to or different from” packaging requirements under FIFRA. Thus, a labeling requirement state-law pre-empted not §136v(b) equivalent if it is fully to, and consistent with, misbranding provisions. FIFRA’s argue Petitioners their claims based on fraud and pre- failure to warn are not empted because these equivalent common-law duties are requirements, FIFRA’s that a label not contain § “false misleading” or 136(q)(l)(A), statements, or inade- quate (G). §§ warnings. or 136(q)(l)(F), instructions We agree petitioners with insofar as we hold law state need explicitly not incorporate FIFRA’s standards as an element of a cause action in order to pre-emption. survive As we will discuss below, however, we leave it Ap- to the Court peals to decide in the first particular instance whether these equivalent common-law are duties misbranding FIFRA’s standards. “parallel requirements” reading of that we
adopt today
strong
finds
support in Medtronic,
Lohr,
Inc. v.
(1996).
Dow, 136v(b) reading would requirements” of “parallel the give authority to content the juries “give in 50 States crazy-quilt establishing a misbranding prohibition, FIFRA’s one de- requirements from anti-misbranding different by Congress inter- to be and intended FIFRA itself fined Respondent 16; authoritatively by Brief for EPA.” preted 25-27. Amicus Curiae as States for United also Brief see 136v(b) the au- text of the clear however, view, In our Conspicu- easily be so avoided. thority cannot of Medtronic and the United Dow ously submissions from the absent interpretation “in addi- any plausible alternative States phrase mean- give that would different from” tion to or reading out those words they appear to ing. favor Instead, following: “Such State would leave statute, which of the requirements for any effect impose continue in or shall rules the federal from’ ‘different might be requirement a narrower such reason strange surely provide sense, a difference would such in a literal federal duplicates as insofar rule state finding pre-emption S.,U. at 495. rule.” amputated packaging.” version of This succinctly clearly commanded have
would no doubt concerning labeling. requirements pre-emption of all state provision Congress of the is evi- added the remainder That label- a distinction between state dence of its intent to draw ing requirements pre-empted not. that are and those that are plausible reading if Dow had offered us a alternative
Even §136v(b) just as'plau- if its alternative were indeed, even — reading text —we nevertheless sible as our of that would duty accept reading pre-emption. that disfavors have a independent sovereigns “[B]ecause fed- the States are our *16 system, long presumed Congress that does not eral we have cavalierly pre-empt Medtronic, state-law causes of action.” regulation, S., 518 U. at 485. In areas of traditional state supplanted we assume that a federal statute has not state “ Congress law unless such an intention ‘clear and has made ” manifest.’ New York State Blue Cross & Conference of Co., 645, Blue Plans Travelers Ins. 514 U. 655 Shield v. S. (1995) Corp., (quoting Fe Elevator 331 Rice v. Santa U. S. (1947)); Medtronic, 230 518 218, S., see also U. 485. Our reading only makes of each is at once the one that sense 136v(b) phrase in- in and the one favored our canons of nonambig- terpretation. The contains a notion FIFRA pre-empt types par- uous command to of tort claims that misbranding requirements particularly allel FIFRA’s years ago given just ad- dubious five United States adopt today.24 interpretation vocated the that we history litigation against long of tort manufacturers poisonous presumption of substances adds force to the basic deprive against pre-emption. Congress If had intended to compensation, injured parties long form of of a available clearly. surely expressed would have that intent more See Etcheverry Curiae for United States 33-35. See Amicus Brief States as Amicus Curiae its subse (explaining Brief for also United view). quent change (1984).25 Corp., 464 U. S. Kerr-McGee v. Silkwood provid- importance emphasizes of history Moreover, this care in the utmost to use ing to manufacturers an incentive dangerous inherently items. distributing the business (stating 1972 amend- that the S., at 613 Mortier, 501 U. See require- existing “strengthen goal was to ments' requirements followed were that these ensure ments and Congress amended Particularly given that practice”). newly reg- efficacyreview of EPA to waive to allow FIFRA (and those amendments pesticides course of in the istered 136v(b)), unlikely that changes it seems technical made provision relatively like obscure Congress considered immunity give pesticide virtual manufacturers liability. tort Overenforcement forms of from certain n imposing prohibition a risk of misbranding creates FIFRA’s under- unnecessary manufacturers; financial burdens only consumers, financial risks creates not enforcement safety as well. the environment their risks that affect but against objections our policy Finally, raised find the we §136v(b) unpersuasive. Dow reading to be uniformity degree greatly overstate States United fact, the stat- FIFRA. that characterizes centralization pre- relatively scheme decentralized authorizes a ute regulation. ibid. Most See role for state a broad serves *17 pes- may the uses of significantly, or restrict ban States 136v(a); reg- § they may also approved, that EPA has ticides pesticides be- for uses subject restrictions, to certain ister, 136v(c). 136w-l approved also yond EPA, See those re- primary (authorizing grant enforcement EPA to States violations). reading sponsibility A literal for use pre-empted that, if label-related claims even all It is no answer in remain claims would tort reading, other non-label-related under Dow’s safety most pesticides, nature of inherently dangerous Given the tact. im but design, modifying pesticide’s through not gains are achieved Brief label. See on its instructions contained warnings proving Curiae as Amicus Chemistry American Council authority fully of the Fed- consistent with concurrent sphere.
eral in this and State Governments misbranding enforce federal re- Private remedies that quirements the func- aid, hinder, would seem to rather than tioning cigarette labeling at of FIFRA. Unlike the law Cipollone, prescribed immutable issue in which certain warning contemplates pesticide la- statements, FIFRA gain will evolve over as manufacturers more infor- time, bels products’ performance mation about their in diverse set- tings. explained, as a As one court tort suits can serve catalyst process: in this
“By bring injuries encouraging plaintiffs to suit for previously recognized pesticides as such as traceable [the issue], there at a state tort action of the may exposure new dan- kind under review aid gers pesticides. actions of associated with Successful may petition EPA to this sort lead manufacturers to labelling products; allow more detailed of their alterna- tively, may re- EPA itself decide that revised labels are quired light has been of the new information that brought through to its attention common law suits. specter damage may provide addition, the actions dynamic con- manufacturers with added incentives to injuries stemming keep possible tinue to abreast of all product to forestall such actions from use of their so as through product improvement.” Ferebee, 2d, 736 F. 1541-1542. exaggerate disruptive ef-
Dow and United States prohibition using to enforce the fects of common-lawsuits prohibited representa- misbranding. inaccurate FIFRA has warnings inadequate enactment in tions and since its alleging were common tort suits failure-to-warn claims while beyond amend- the 1972 well before that date and continued pointed such tort have to no evidence that ments. We been *18 “crazy-quilt” otherwise standards or suits led to a of FIFRA any hardship created real for manufacturers or for EPA. period appears EPA for much of this to have wel- Indeed, properly true that comed these tort suits. While it is in- juries contrary might conclusions structed on occasion reach misbranding, on a similar issue of there is no reason to think frequent they such occurrences would be or that would result beyond regularly experienced by in difficulties those man- products every day ufacturers of other bear the risk conflicting jury noting it Moreover, verdicts. bears lay juries are in no sense anathema to FIFRA’s scheme: prosecutions provi- In criminal for violation of FIFRA’s 136£(b), juries necessarily pass allegations sions, see misbranding. interpretation, sum, under our retains a nar- important, pre-empts but
row, still role. In the main, competing labeling imagine state 50 different la- standards — beling regimes prescribing wording color, size, font warnings significant would create inefficiencies for —that provision pre-empts any manufacturers.26 The also statu- tory impose or common-law rule that would re- quirement diverges in from those set out FIFRA and implementing regulations. pre- its It not, however, does empt any fully state rules that are consistent with federal requirements. legislative history suggests of the 1972 amendments that Con
gress conflicting had state labeling regulations crafting mind when 136v(b). industry As one representative might testified: “Some States ‘flammable,’ want the word might some ‘inflammable.’ . . . Some States lettering; yellow, want red orange, others another and so forth. We ask committee, therefore, this recognize, Congress as the has a number statutes, regulatory industry’s of similar uniformity by pro need for viding for Hearings the act.” on Federal Pesticide Control Act Agriculture, 1971 before the House Committee on 92d 1st Cong., (1971) (statement Sess., contrast, Ackerly). By 281-283 of Robert L. the lengthy legislative history any Congress is barren of indication that abrogate meant to most of the common-law duties owed long manufacturers. *19 136v(b), § it still interpretation of
Having on our settled pre-empts provision that decided whether to be remains Because we claims. petitioners’ and failure-to-warn fraud which briefing issue,27 on this sufficient have not received Court it to the we remand questions law, Texas of involves labeling require- emphasize that a state-law Appeals. We of requirement under equivalent to a be in fact ment must example, were pre-emption. For to survive in order FIFRA falsity the element of Appeals to determine that of the Court imposed a broader of fraud Texas’ common-law definition contain requirement that labels not obligation FIFRA’s than ac- cause misleading state-law statements,” that “false § that extent of pre-empted to the tion would be requirements also be measured must State-law difference. give to regulations content that against any relevant EPA example, a failure- misbranding standards. For FIFRA’s should given pesticide’s label alleging that a to-warn claim more subdued instead of “DANGER” have stated it is pre-empted inconsistent because would be “CAUTION” (2004), assigns specifically these which 156.64 with 40 CFR their pesticides based warnings particular classes of to toxicity.28 terms, fraud that, Texas’ argue to their not seem Dow does misbrand- to FIFRA’s equivalent are not causes of action
failure-to-warn further that any regulations EPA has identified Nor Dow ing standards. to petitioners’ relevant way any standards general refine those on the a broader attack to Rather, chosen mount Dow has allegations. pre for seeming argue thus interpretation, “parallel requirements” expressly incorporates of action that cause a state-law of even emption 38, n. 25. Respondent See Brief misbranding provisions. FIFRA’s 136v(b), Dow our construction the benefit of not have Since Dow did remand. matters on these to address should be allowed refine regulations relatively few appear be present, At there To misbranding standards. broadly phrased FIFRA’s upon or elaborate future, they will in the regulations such promulgates EPA extent 136v(b). under scope pre-emption necessarily affect the undertaking pre-emption analysis pleadings at the stage concept ease, of a a court should bear mind the equivalence. require- pre-emption, To the state-law survive phrased language ment need not be in the identical as its corresponding requirement; indeed, FIFRA it would be sur- prising requirement phrase- if a common-law used the same ology proceeds jury If a the court’s trial, as FIFRA. case *20 nominally equivalent labeling instructions must ensure that requirements genuinely equivalent. If a defendant so requests, jury a court should instruct the on the relevant (cid:127) misbranding any regulations as standards, FIFRA as well that add content to those For a manufacturer standards. labeling requirement should not be held liable under a state subject to unless the manufacturer is also liable for misbranding as defined FIFRA. judgment Appeals
The vacated, of the Court proceedings case is remanded for further consistent with opinion.
It is so ordered. Breyer, Justice concurring. separately practical importance
I write
of the
to stress the
requirements
Court’s statement
that state-law
must “be
against”
measured
relevant Environmental Protection
(EPA)
Agency
regulations
give
[the
“that
Federal
content
(FIFRA)]
Fungicide,
Insecticide,
and Rodenticide Act’s
mis
branding
Ante,
Medtronic,
Inc. v.
standards.”
at 453.
(1996), pointed
Lohr,
agency with to which the extent are courts to determine ter able than requirements. liability federal mirror or distort rules state may prove are courts to de able than the EPA better Thus, help liability simply general rules state tort termine whether "" “ pesticides, ante, expose dangers with ‘new associated (quoting Co., 736 F. 2d at 451 Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical (CADC 1984)), bring about a counter or instead 1529, 1541 ” “ anti-misbranding requirements, ‘crazy-quilt productive 16). (quoting Respondent within And, ante, at 448 Brief for appropriate legal it can act constraints, and administrative Hillsborough County accordingly. Automated Medi v. Cf. (1985)(agencies can Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. cal requirements dynamic between federal and local monitor the legislation regulations pre-empting promulgate local impor goals). Emphasizing the that interferes with federal overseeing agency’s future im role in FIFRA’s tance of opinion. plementation, join I the Court’s *21 con- with whom Justice Scalia Thomas, joins, Justice in in and in the dissenting part. curring judgment part “requirements” in agree that the term I with the Court 24(b) Fungicide, Insecticide, Rodenticide of the Federal 136v(b), (FIFRA), du- includes common-law Act U. S. C. agree labeling packaging. I also Ante, at 443. ties for impose requirements may damages not claims that state-law Ante, at 452- from” FIFRA’s. “in to or different addition liability predicated impose free to While States are in FIFRA and set forth the federal standards a violation of promulgated any accompanying regulations the Envi- in liability may impose Agency, they not ronmental Protection predicated stand- labeling requirements on distinct state for 136v(b)permits reme- to add States of care. Section ards govern- augment rules the substantive to alter or dies—not labeling. Medtronic, Lohr, Inc. v. ing liability for See (1996) U. S. concurring part 470, 513 in J., (O’CONNOR, dissenting part). in parties argued Because the have not that labeling Dow majority violated FIFRA’s standards,* properly remands for the District Court to consider whether Texas law mirrors the federal standards. majority step
However, reasoning omits a in its explicit: should be made A state-law cause of even action, if specific labeling, imposes labeling nevertheless re- quirement “in addition to or different from” FIFRA’s when liability attaches to statements on the label that do not produce liability under FIFRA. The state-law cause of ac- supplemental tion then requirement adds some of truthful- requirement ness to FIFRA’s statements not be misleading.” “false or 136(q)(l)(A). 7 U. S. C. That is why the properly fraud claims here are remanded to deter- mine whether the state and liability- federal standards for incurring application are, statements in their case, same. ante, See at 453-454. reasoning,
Under that majority mistreats two sets of petitioners’ petitioners’ claims. First, breach-of-warranty claims should be pre-emption analysis, remanded for con- trary majority’s to the disposition, see ante, at 444-445. To the extent warranty that Texas’ law imposes liability statements on the label where FIFRA would not, Texas’ law pre-empted. Cipollone Liggett Group, See v. Inc., 505 (1992) U. 504, S. concurring judgment J., (Scalia, part dissenting part). majority Second, the holds petitioners’ claim under Deceptive the Texas Trade (DTPA) Practices-Consumer pre- Protection Act is not empted to the breach-of-warranty extent it is a Ante, claim. at (and, n. 18. However, the DTPA claim is also in fact, perhaps exclusively) *22 misleading represen- claim for false or App. tations on the label. aspects 185-186. all Therefore, of the DTPA claim should be remanded. The DTPA claim, * Petitioners’ counterclaim expressly disclaims that any Dow violated provision (First of Counterclaim). FIFRA. App. 192 Amended pre-empted insofar petitioners’ should be claims,
like fraud liability imposes content where FIFRA for label as it would not. majority’s despite to a the reference that,
I also note petitioners 442-443, claim, ante, 15, at n. failure-to-warn Instead, claim. have not advanced an actual failure-to-warn negligent petitioners’ Appeals claims for the of treated Court “disguised testing design and manufacture as and defective (CA5 claim[s] failure warn.” 332 F. 3d 332-333 2003). petitioners on remand that If offer no evidence Dow Strongarm, testing, design, or manufacture of erred in the point, I take these claims will fail on the merits.' On majority agree. Ante, 442-443, at n. 15. the ordinary go The need no further to resolve this case. We 136v(b)’s § peti- plain meaning terms makes that some of may pre-empted. be Yet tioners’ state-law causes of action tip majority arguments designed to the the advances several against scales in favor the Federal Govern- States unnecessary, being arguments, These in addition to ment. majority unpersuasive. states that the instance, For choosing presumption against pre-emption requires in- 136v(b) terpretation pre-emption. Ante, that disfavors apply, presumption however, when 449. That does express pre- Congress an has included within a statute Group, Cipollone Liggett emption provision. Inc., v. See concurring judgment part supra, in J., at 545-546 (Scalia, Preemption, dissenting part); L. Rev. Nelson, Va. (2000). 136v(b) explicit is an 225, 291-292, 298-303 Section pre-empts state-law claims. some statement that FIFRA claims which state-law Thus, our task is determine inquiry slanting pre-empts, favor without either the States. Federal Government against history litigation is also manufacturers of tort know, without Ante, at 449-450. We cannot irrelevant. 136v(b), preserved looking FIFRA whether to the text of majority displaced notes that Con- it. The that tradition or *23 458 preserve suits, be- common-law
gress must have intended Congress history legislative not indicate does cause the see also abrogate Ante, 452, 26; at n. suits. such meant dissenting) J., ante, at 406 States, v. United Small (Thomas, legisla- relying in the (criticizing practice on silence novel Nigh, 543 history); GMC, Inc. v. Pontiac Koons Buick tive (same). (2004) dissenting) For J., 73-74 50, U. S. (SCALIA, provision not enacting pre-emption Court, then, specificity speak Congress added enough: must with Either (to pre-emption) against presumption avoid the in the statute congressional Congress or or some individual Members preference pre-emption in display for their must committees (to congressional legislative a new canon of record avoid silence). test, own for not believe its But the Court does many abrogate' agrees common-law stands to may example, petitioners remand, for causes of action. On pursue suit under a traditional common-law be unable to allowing Finally, additional while Texas’ law of fraud. likely enforcing FIFRA’s mis- aids in remedies state-law Congress, requirements, branding ante, 451, it is for suits and state tort a balance between Court, to strike regulation. federal ordinary meaning of only determine the
Because we need respond- § 136v(b), majority rightly declines to address subject petitioners’ to other argument claims ent’s Respondent in- For types pre-emption. Brief for 36-37. regula- majority FIFRA’s not ask whether does stance, interest pervasive,” the federal tory is “so scheme is no room States labeling that there dominant,” “so Elevator Fe provide Rice v. Santa remedies. additional (1947). majority ask Corp., does 218, Nor 331 U. S. would claims of state-law whether enforcement accomplishment execution “stan[d] an obstacle to the as enacting Congress” objectives purposes of the full (1941). Davidowitz, U. S. Hines v. FIFRA. Today’s comports with this increas decision thus Court’s beyond ing expand terms reluctance to federal statutes their Camps through implied pre-emption. New doctrines of See *24 Harrison, Inc. v. Town U. S. found/Owatonna, 564, dissenting). This reluctance reflects (1997) (Thomas, J., analysis freewheeling judicial “[a] pre-emption in is not quiry into whether a state is in tension with federal statute objectives,” Management Gade v. National Solid Wastes concurring Assn., (1992) U. S. J., (Kennedy, part concurring judgment), inquiry into but an ordinary meanings and federal law whether the of state conflict.