STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MARK YOUNG
AC 40581
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued September 17, 2018—officially released January 1, 2019
Lavine, Sheldon and Norcott, Js.
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Syllabus
Convicted, on guilty pleas, of the crimes of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs and evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, and of previously having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw and vacate his guilty pleas. Specifically, he claimed that there was no factual basis that he had a prior conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs to support his guilty plea to operating while under the influence as a second offender pursuant to statute (
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant‘s motion to withdraw and vacate his guilty pleas:
- The trial court‘s plea canvass established an adequate factual basis for the defendant‘s guilty pleas; the state provided the court with a part B information that alleged that the defendant previously had been convicted, on a plea of nolo contendere, in Rhode Island of driving while under the influence, which the court and clerk read aloud to the defendant, and which specified the date of the prior conviction, the town in which it was entered and the name of the prior charge of which he was convicted, the defendant indicated that he understood the allegations and admitted that he was a second offender when asked by the court clerk, and the defendant agreed with the state‘s factual recitation in which the prosecutor expressly stated that the defendant previously had been convicted of operating under the influence in Rhode Island.
- The defendant could not prevail in his claim that the final disposition of his Rhode Island case was not a conviction for operating while under the influence on the basis of which he could be convicted as a second offender in Connecticut: the Rhode Island statute under which the defendant was convicted defines the offense of driving under the influence as a misdemeanor, indicating that it is a criminal offense subject to criminal penalties, the Rhode Island criminal complaint indicated that the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of a $100 fine, ten hours of public community restitution, a thirty day loss of his driver‘s license, alcohol counseling, costs, fees, and assessments, and the defendant‘s claim that the Rhode Island disposition should be interpreted as a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation, which, if successfully completed, would not be considered a conviction under Rhode Island law, was unavailing, as he did not prove the Rhode Island disposition resulted in the imposition of a probationary sentence on him, much less that he had completed such a sentence, and thus he never became entitled not to have his plea and resulting sentence considered a criminal conviction; moreover, the subsequent expungement of the defendant‘s Rhode Island conviction did not affect the trial court‘s consideration of that conviction for the purpose of imposing an enhanced penalty on him, as the relevant time for sentence enhancement purposes was the time of the defendant‘s criminal conduct in Connecticut in March, 2016, and at that time the Rhode Island conviction had not been expunged.
- The defendant‘s claims that the trial court erred because insufficient evidence was presented to that court at the time of his guilty pleas to establish that the essential elements of the Rhode Island statute under which he was convicted were substantially similar to those of the Connecticut statute,
§ 14-227a , and that the trial court erred by never making such a finding were unavailing; even though the court was under no duty to question the similarity of the two statutes without a challenge from the defendant that they were dissimilar, the court properly found that the essential elements of the two statutes were substantially the same at the hearing on the defendant‘s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, as the essential elements of the two statutes both required that the accused operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, and the level of blood alcohol content at or above which a diver‘s operation of a motor vehicle is criminalized is identical under both statutes, and the court properly rejected the defendant‘s claims that the statutes were dissimilar on the basis of their definitions of operation and motor vehicle, and the lack of a pretrial alcohol education program under the Rhode Island statute.
- The trial court imposed an illegal sentence on the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence as a second offender: although this court rejected the defendant‘s claim that the trial court relied on materially inaccurate information during sentencing, the three year sentence imposed for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence as a second offender exceeded the statutory maximum prescribed by law of two years of incarceration.
Argued September 17, 2018—officially released January 1, 2019
Procedural History
Two part information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crimes of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs and evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, and with speeding and operating a motor vehicle without minimum insurance, and, in the second part, with previously having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Windham, where the defendant was presented to the court, J. Fischer, J., on guilty pleas to the charges of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs and evading responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle, and to previously having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs; judgment of guilty in accordance with the pleas; thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the charges of speeding and operating a motor vehicle without minimum insurance; subsequently, the court denied the defendant‘s motion to withdraw and vacate his guilty pleas, and the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.
Jonathan R. Sills, for the appellant (defendant).
Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state‘s attorney, with whom were Bonnie R. Bentley, senior assistant state‘s attorney, and, on the brief, Anne F. Mahoney, state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant‘s claims. On March 24, 2016, the Connecticut State Police arrested the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs in violation of
“The Court: Okay. You understand that the prosecutors here in Danielson Superior Court charge that you‘ve been formerly convicted, having committed the offense of operating—driving under the influence on October, 19, 2011, in Rhode Island Superior Court in Providence in violation of the Rhode Island general statutes. You understand that.
“The Defendant: Yes.
“The Court: Okay.
“The Clerk: Mark Young, on or about March 24th of 2016, you‘re charged with operating under the influence in violation of 14-227a. How do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
“The Defendant: Guilty.
“The Clerk: And on that charge, you‘re being charged by the second part information as a subsequent offender for operating under the influence in that you were previously convicted of this charge in
Rhode Island Superior Court on October 19, 2011. To being a second offender for operating under the influence how do you plead, guilty or not guilty? “The Defendant: Guilty.
“The Clerk: Anything else?
“[The Prosecutor]: Evading.
“The Clerk: And on or about March 24 of 2016, you‘re charged with evading responsibility in violation of § 14-224 (b) (3). How do you plead, guilty or not guilty?
“The Defendant: Guilty.”
The state then recited the following facts regarding the incident that led to the defendant‘s arrest: “On March 24, 2016, in the late evening hours, this defendant was clocked at a hundred and three miles per hour in a fifty mile an hour zone on Route 32 in Windham. He was pulled over. [The] [o]fficer detected an odor of alcohol. When he spoke with this defendant, who had originally switched places with his passenger, but then admitted that he was actually the driver—[he] failed to perform [the] standard field sobriety test; admitted consuming alcohol; [and] refused chemical tests. It was learned during this time that the defendant had been involved just a short time earlier in a motor vehicle incident where he struck another vehicle from behind causing minor damage, no injuries, but then fled the scene. We have an agreement in this matter. I would note that he had previously been convicted of operating under the influence in Rhode Island in 2011.” The court proceeded with the plea canvass, during which it asked the defendant, “And you heard the state‘s attorney recite the facts which led to your arrest on the date in question; also a prior conviction. Is that all pretty much what happened?” The defendant answered in the affirmative.
The court accepted the pleas and the state informed the court that the plea agreement called for “a total effective sentence of three years, execution suspended after five months—120 days of which are the mandatory minimum for . . . operating under the influence—two years’ probation and a $1,000 fine with numerous special conditions . . . .” The court then set a date for sentencing and ordered a presentence investigation. At the next scheduled court date on December 14, 2016, new counsel for the defendant entered his appearance and filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas the defendant had entered on October 11, 2016.
In his motion to withdraw, the defendant argued that there was no factual basis for his guilty plea to the charge of operating while under the influence as a second offender, as alleged in the part B information, because (1) his 2011 Rhode Island case did not result in a conviction, (2) even if his Rhode Island case did result in a conviction, that conviction was expunged on December 19, 2016, between the date of his guilty pleas in this case and the date of sentencing, so that it could no longer be considered a conviction for sentence enhancement purposes under
After a hearing on the motion to withdraw, the court found that (1) the disposition of the defendant‘s 2011 Rhode Island case was in fact a conviction, (2) the later expungement of the defendant‘s Rhode Island conviction did not negate the fact that he had a prior conviction for operating while under the influence at the time of the conduct underlying his present conviction, and (3) the essential elements of the statute under which the defendant was convicted in Rhode Island,
I
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw because his guilty plea to operating a motor vehicle while under the influ-ence as a second offender was not supported by a factual basis, and thus it was not entered voluntarily or intelligently or in compliance with the rules of practice. Specifically, he contends that there was no factual basis that he had a prior conviction for operating while under the influence to support his guilty plea to operating while under the influence as a second offender in violation of
“As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. It is well established that [t]he burden is always on the defendant to show a plausible reason for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty. . . . To warrant consideration, the defendant must allege and provide facts which justify permitting him to withdraw his plea under [Practice Book § 39-27]. . . . Whether such proof is made is a question for the court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been abused. . . . In determining whether the trial court [has] abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action. . . . Our review of a trial court‘s exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did. . . .
“Furthermore, in assessing the adequacy of the trial court‘s consideration of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we do not examine the dialogue between defense counsel and the trial court . . . in isolation but, rather, evaluate it in light of other relevant factors, such as the thoroughness of the initial plea canvass.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 838.
Practice Book § 39-27 provides in relevant part: “The grounds for allowing the defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty after acceptance are as follows . . . (5) there was no factual basis for the plea . . . .” “A factual basis exists where the facts before the court are sufficient to establish each and every element of the crime charged.” State v. Pena, 16 Conn. App. 518, 523, 548 A.2d 445, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 830, 552 A.2d 1217 (1988). “In determining whether a factual basis exists, the court may consider the facts recited by the state‘s attorney as well as any other facts properly submitted to the court which support a conviction.” Id. Moreover, “[a] court is permitted to rely on a defendant‘s responses during a plea canvass.” State v. Hanson, 117 Conn. App. 436, 449, 979 A.2d 576 (2009), cert. denied, 295 Conn. 907, 989 A.2d 604 (2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986, 131 S. Ct. 425, 178 L. Ed. 2d. 331 (2010). “The [trial] court is under no constitutionally imposed duty to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea prior to its acceptance unless the [trial] judge is put on notice that there may be some need for such an inquiry . . . A factual basis inquiry . . . is merely one way of satisfying the constitutional requirement that a plea be voluntary and intelligent.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paulsen v. Manson, 203 Conn. 484, 490–91, 525 A.2d 1315 (1987).
“[T]he constitutional stricture that a plea of guilty must be made knowingly and voluntarily . . . requires not only that there be a voluntary waiver during a plea canvass of the right to a jury trial, the right of confrontation and the right against self-incrimination, but also that the defendant must be aware of and have an understanding of all of the elements of the crime or crimes with which he is charged. . . . [T]he plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Heyliger, 114 Conn. App. 193, 197, 969 A.2d 194 (2009).
The purpose of establishing a factual basis for a defendant‘s guilty plea is to ensure that he has notice of the charges to which he is pleading. To establish a factual basis for the defendant‘s plea to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence as a second offender, the state provided the court with the part B information alleging
Although the plea canvass alone furnished an adequate basis for the court‘s conclusion that his plea to the part B information was supported by a sufficient factual basis for the denial of his motion to withdraw, the court heard the defendant fully on his motion and made detailed factual findings as to each claim presented in that motion. Because he reasserts those claims on appeal, we address them each in turn.
A
First, the defendant claims that the final disposition of his Rhode Island case was not a conviction for operating while under the influence on the basis of which he could be convicted as a second offender in Connecticut. Specifically, he argues that (1) the Rhode Island criminal complaint is unclear as to the nature of his final disposition, making it impossible to determine if that case actually resulted in a conviction, (2) under his Rhode Island disposition, which was ordered after he entered a plea of nolo contendere, he was required to complete several special conditions, suggesting that he must have been placed on probation in order for those conditions to be monitored, and thereby raising the possibility that, upon successful completion of his probation, he may have been entitled not to have his disposition considered a conviction under Rhode Island law, and (3) the record of his alleged Rhode Island conviction was expunged after he pleaded guilty to the charges in Connecticut, but before he was sentenced on those pleas, assertedly making the expunged conviction unusable as a prior conviction under
The following additional facts are necessary for our disposition of these claims. In support of his motion to withdraw, the defendant submitted a copy of the criminal complaint from the Rhode Island District Court in Providence to which he had pleaded nolo contendere on October 19, 2011. The court examined that document at the hearing on the motion to withdraw. The document indicates that the defendant was initially charged with one count of violating “[Rhode Island] General Laws
The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in finding that his plea of nolo contendere in Rhode Island was a conviction because the criminal complaint he proffered to the court was unclear as to the sentence he received for that offense. As an initial matter, we note that “our appellate courts have determined that the trial court‘s conclusions as to the meaning and effect of documents are best characterized as conclusions of law and are therefore subject to plenary review.” State v. Tenay, 156 Conn. App. 792, 809–10 n.11, 114 A.3d 931 (2015).
“(b) (1) Any person charged under subsection (a), whose blood alcohol concentration is eight one-hundredths of one percent (.08%) . . . shall be guilty of violating subsection (a) . . . .
“(d) (1) (i) Every person found to have violated subsection (b) (1) shall be sentenced as follows: for a first violation whose blood alcohol concentration is eight one-hundredths of one percent (.08%) . . . shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) . . . shall be required to perform ten (10) . . . hours of public community restitution, and/or shall be imprisoned for up to one year . . . and his or her driver‘s license shall be suspended for thirty (30) days . . . .”
We first note that
The defendant argues that it is not clear from reading the complaint whether the handwritten entry of “$100” on that document means the defendant received a $100 fine or some other cost imposed in connection with the case since it is not explicitly labeled as a fine or otherwise. We agree with the trial court‘s conclusion that the $100 in the “sentence imposed” section of the complaint was a fine because that amount is equal to the mandatory minimum fine imposable under the statute, all other mandatory minimum requirements are accounted for in other parts of the handwritten entry under “sentence imposed,” and the order requiring that “costs, fees, and assessments” be paid as well would be redundant if the $100 entry reflected an order to pay court costs rather than a fine. Finally, the defendant was ordered to attend alcohol treatment, another mandatory sanction imposed on those convicted under the statute. Therefore, we conclude that the Rhode Island criminal complaint indicates that the defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of a $100 fine, ten hours of public community restitution, thirty day loss of driver‘s license, alcohol counseling, costs, fees, and assessments. We further conclude that nothing about this sentence suggests that the final disposition of the case was not a conviction. Rhode Island General Laws and Connecticut General Statutes both consider a plea of nolo contendere followed by the payment of a fine to be a conviction. See State v. Palkimas, 116 Conn. App. 788, 795, 977 A.2d 705 (2009) (nolo contendere plea has same effect as guilty plea); see also
The defendant next argues that because the aforementioned special conditions were ordered by the court, they must have been subject to some period of probationary monitoring and supervision and, thus, that the Rhode Island disposition should be interpreted as a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation, which, if successfully completed, is not considered a conviction under Rhode Island General Laws pursuant to
There is nothing on the face of the criminal complaint that indicates that the defendant was sentenced to a period of probation following his nolo contendere plea in Rhode Island, and the defendant presented no evidence from any source, including his own testimony, to the contrary. In addition, the fact that the court sentenced the defendant to several special conditions is not intrinsically indicative of a probationary sentence because the statute criminalizing driving under the influence in Rhode Island creates an agency within the division of motor vehicles to supervise such conditions. Moreover, the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in
Last, the defendant argues that since the Rhode Island conviction was expunged on December 19, 2016, it could no longer be used to enhance the penalty in the present case. The defendant contends that a contrary finding would bring about the unjust result of convicting him as a second offender although he had no record of a previous conviction at the time he was sentenced. We disagree.
It is, therefore, irrelevant whether the defendant‘s Rhode Island conviction was expunged at the time of his plea, his motion to withdraw, or his sentencing. The relevant time for sentence enhancement purposes was the time of the defendant‘s criminal conduct, March 24, 2016. It is uncontested that the Rhode Island conviction had not been expunged by that time. We, thus, conclude that the subsequent expungement of that conviction does not affect the court‘s consideration of the conviction for the purpose of imposing an enhanced penalty upon him.10
B
The defendant next claims that the court erred because insufficient evidence was presented to the trial court at the time of his guilty pleas to establish that the essential elements of
The defendant first argues that the part B information and the language used by the state in the plea canvass to establish the factual basis for his alleged prior conviction were insufficient because they lacked the specificity required for the court to find that the essential elements of the two statutes were substantially the same. He argues that the part B information should have referenced a specific Rhode Island statutory provision and subsection of such section to enable the court to make the requisite comparison. He further argues that the trial court failed to make that comparison or to place such a finding on the record.
As our Supreme Court stated in Paulsen, however, “[t]he [trial] court is under no constitutionally imposed duty to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea prior to its acceptance unless the [trial] judge is put on notice that there may be some need for such an inquiry . . . A factual basis inquiry . . . is merely one way of satisfying the constitutional requirement that a plea be voluntary and intelligent.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paulsen v. Mansen, supra, 203 Conn 490–91. In State v. Greene, 274 Conn. 134, 149, 874 A.2d 750 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926, 126 S. Ct. 2981, 165 L. Ed. 2d. 988 (2006), the defendant challenged the adequacy of the factual basis of his pleas that were subsequently used against him in a trial with similar factual allegations. Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had no knowledge at the time it accepted the pleas that the state would seek to introduce them at a subsequent trial, so it was under no duty to question the adequacy of the factual basis. Id. Here, as in Greene, the trial court was under no duty to question the similarity of the two statutes at issue without a challenge from the defendant that they were dissimilar. This is consistent with the purpose of establishing a factual basis for the plea, which is to put the defendant on notice of the charges to which he is pleading so that he does so voluntarily and intelligently.
The court, however, did make a finding that the essential elements of the two statutes were substantially the same at the hearing on the motion to withdraw. The defendant argued that such elements were not substantially the same because (1) the definitions of “operation” in the two states are not identical, (2) the definitions of “motor vehicle” in the two states are not identical, and (3) Rhode Island does not offer an alcohol education program for first offenders. We disagree.
“The issue of whether the elements of the [Rhode Island] and Connecticut statutes under which the defendant was convicted were substantially the same calls for the comparison and interpretation of those statutes, which is a question of law.” State v. Commins, 276 Conn. 503, 513, 886 A.2d 824 (2005), overruled on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014). Therefore, our review is plenary. Duperry v. Solnit, 261 Conn. 309, 318, 803 A.2d 287 (2002).
The defendant first argues that these essential elements are not substantially the same because the definition of operation differs between the two statutes. Specifically, he argues that Connecticut law requires an intentional act to prove operation, where the Rhode Island‘s statute is silent as to the mens rea required, which creates the potential that certain conduct could be considered operation under Rhode Island law that would not be considered operation in Connecticut.
“Our case law provides that [a] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of [
The omission of language clarifying the intent requirement in the Rhode Island statute does not render the two statutes dissimilar because Rhode Island does not criminalize conduct that is less active or dangerous if performed while under the influence than that which Connecticut defines as operation. Indeed, the conduct found insufficient to constitute operation in Rhode Island in Capuano would likely be considered an act which alone or in sequence would set in motion the motive power of a vehicle, as required to establish operation in Connecticut. Therefore, we conclude that the essential element of operation is substantially the same under both statutes.
The defendant next argues that the essential elements of the statutes at issue are not substantially the same because the definitions of motor vehicle are not identical in the two statutes. Specifically, the defendant notes that certain types of vehicles are excluded from the definition of motor vehicle under Connecticut law that are not expressly excluded from the parallel definition under Rhode Island law.
The defendant‘s final argument, that Rhode Island‘s lack of a pretrial alcohol education program renders the statutes at issue dissimilar, is also unpersuasive. ”
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Rhode Island conviction was a qualifying conviction for the purposes of sentence enhancement under
II
The defendant next claims that the manner in which he was sentenced was illegal and that the three year sentence imposed upon him for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence as a second offender was illegal. Specifically, he claims that the court relied on materially inaccurate information during sentencing, that he
On June 26, 2017, the court sentenced the defendant as follows: on the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence as a second offender, the defendant was sentenced to a term of three years of incarceration, execution suspended after five months, 120 days of which is a mandatory minimum, followed by two years of probation, and on the charge of evading responsibility, he was sentenced to a term of one year incarceration, execution suspended after thirty days, followed by two years of probation. The court ordered these sentences to be served concurrently.
Practice Book § 43-22 provides that “[t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner.” “An illegal sentence is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant‘s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory. . . . We previously have noted that a defendant may challenge his or her criminal sentence on the ground that it is illegal by raising the issue on direct appeal or by filing a motion pursuant to . . . § 43–22 with the judicial authority, namely, the trial court. . . . [B]oth the trial court, and this court, on appeal, have the power, at any time, to correct a sentence that is illegal. . . . [T]he issue is one of law, and we afford it plenary review.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruiz, 173 Conn. App. 608, 617, 164 A.3d 837 (2017).
A
The defendant claims that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the court relied on materially inaccurate information during sentencing, specifically, that the defendant had a previous conviction for a substantially similar offense. On that score, the defendant repeats the same arguments that he advanced in support of his motion to withdraw and that form the basis of his appeal from the denial of the same, namely, that his October 19, 2011 Rhode Island disposition was never a conviction and that, in the alternative, it was not a conviction at the time of sentencing because it had been expunged, and that the essential elements of the statutes are not substantially the same as required by
“A sentence is invalid if it is imposed in an illegal manner . . . . Within the definition of sentences imposed in an illegal manner, our jurisprudence includes sentences which violate [a] defendant‘s right . . . to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information. . . . To prevail on a claim that a sentence is invalid because a sentencing court relied on inaccurate information, a defendant must show . . . that the judge relied on that information . . . . A sentencing court demonstrates actual reliance on misinformation when the court gives explicit attention to it, [bases] its sentence at least in part on it, or gives specific consideration to the information before imposing sentence.” (Emphasis omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martin M., 143 Conn. App. 140, 144–45, 70 A.3d 135, cert. denied, 309 Conn. 919, 70 A.3d 41 (2013).
B
Finally, the defendant claims that the three year sentence imposed by the trial court for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence as a second offender exceeded the statutory maximum prescribed by law. The state concedes that the challenged sentence was illegal. We agree.
The judgment is reversed only as to the defendant‘s sentence and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
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(g) (2) Any person who violates the provisions of subdivision (3) of subsection (b) . . . shall be fined not less than seventy-five dollars or more than six hundred dollars or be imprisoned not more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned . . . .”
(b) Any person convicted of violating any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars or more than one thousand dollars . . . .”