203 Conn. 484 | Conn. | 1987
This is an appeal from the granting of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Superior Court. The petition alleged that, because the record of the plea hearing failed to include a factual basis for the crime of assault in the first degree, the petitioner’s plea of guilty to that offense was accepted in violation of his rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. We find error in the conclusion of the habeas court that such a factual basis is a constitutional requisite to a valid guilty plea.
On July 6,1976, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to each count of the substitute information, which charged him with attempted murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54 and larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-123. A second substitute information was subsequently filed, which added a third count of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-59.
At the August 11, 1976 proceeding, after the petitioner had pleaded guilty, the following interchange occurred between the trial court, Matzkin, J., the petitioner, and assistant state’s attorney Walter Scanlon:
“The Court: Have you had an opportunity to discuss with [Raymond, J.] Quinn, your attorney, this particu*487 lar offense that you are now being charged with and are you satisfied with his advice and assistance?
“Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I am.
“The Court: And, do you understand that by pleading guilty to assault in the first degree, you are admitting that you committed that particular offense with which you are charged in the information?
“Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I do.
“The Court: Have you been advised by Mr. Quinn of the maximum penalty provided by law for this particular offense?
“Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I have.
“The Court: Mr. Scanlon—listen to Mr. Scanlon give the Court a statement of the facts in this case. Please.
“Mr. Scanlon: Yes, your Honor. If your Honor please, he was accompanying one David Collins at approximately 11:35 p.m. on June 25, 1976, at or near the Middlebury-Southbury town line and Route 1-84. They were stopped by the police officer as I mentioned, and the police officer was shot in the right arm by this man’s companion, Collins. The police officer returned fire and subsequently apprehended them.
“The Court: You agree with that statement of facts, Mr. Paulsen, that Mr. Scanlon has just given to the Court?
“Mr. Paulsen: Yes, I do.”
At the sentencing proceeding on September 10,1976, Paulsen moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but his motion was denied. After sentence had been imposed, he obtained several extensions of time to file an appeal, but no appeal was actually filed by Paulsen, who at that time was proceeding pro se. Paulsen, on July 25,1980, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that
At the outset we note that it is undisputed that the prosecutor’s summation of facts at the plea proceeding was insufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime charged. Indeed, as the habeas court stated, that “statement of facts failed to implicate [the] petitioner in the commission of any crime at all . . . .” While the elements of the crime of assault in the first degree, as set forth in § 53a-59, include the intent to cause, and the causing of, serious physical injury by means of a dangerous weapon, the prosecutor’s recitation merely placed the petitioner in the company of Collins, who shot the police officer who had stopped them. “One who is merely present when a crime is being committed by another is not necessarily a participant or accessory. State v. Teart, 170 Conn. 332, 336, 365 A.2d 1200 [1976] . . . State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469, 474, 365 A.2d 1100 (1976).
The habeas court relied upon this court’s rulings in State v. Battle, supra, State v. Marra, 174 Conn. 338, 387 A.2d 550 (1978), and State v. Cutler, 180 Conn. 702,
The United States Supreme Court has delineated standards determinative of the constitutional validity of a plea of guilty. The underlying premise has been indicated in the preceding paragraph. Because a guilty plea “is itself a conviction”; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S. Ct. 582, 71 L. Ed. 1009 (1927); entailing the simultaneous waiver by a defendant of several constitutional rights, the plea must be entered voluntarily and intelligently.
From these holdings, this court has attempted to extrapolate a position on the issue of whether a factual basis is a requisite to the validity of a guilty plea under the federal constitution. We noted in State v. Deboben, 187 Conn. 469, 475 n.4, 446 A.2d 828 (1982), that “it is not at all clear that such proof is constitutionally mandated.” We asserted, nevertheless, in State v. Eason, 192 Conn. 37, 43, 470 A.2d 688 (1984), that “[i]n order for a plea of guilty to be constitutionally valid, the record must affirmatively disclose that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the defendant entered the plea voluntarily and intelligently.” See also State v. Cutler, supra, 705 (“[t]he plea, therefore, was not supported by a factual basis and, thus, was not knowingly and intelligently made”); State v. Marra, supra, 340 (“[t]he plea must be supported by a factual basis”).
Recent federal case law, however, has provided a clarifying interpretation of due process requirements that is not in accord with that posited by this court in State v. Eason. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said in Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1082 (5th Cir. 1985): “The state court is under no constitu
In light of these federal precedents, we conclude that the habeas court erred in holding that “a plea not supported by an adequate factual basis is obtained in violation of due process and is, therefore, void.” To the extent that Eason, Cutler, Marra and Battle hold to the contrary, they are overruled.
At the initial habeas corpus hearings before Judge Hammer, the state’s attorney attempted to question the petitioner’s trial counsel about certain matters extrinsic to the plea proceeding in order “to get some background ... on the mental state of the petitioner
Although it is true that the petition raised solely the claim that the inadequate factual basis upon the record of the plea proceeding vitiated the petitioner’s guilty plea, the memoranda filed by the petitioner at the second habeas corpus hearing before Judge Satter, as well as the transcript of the first hearing before Judge Hammer, establish that the underlying issue was whether the guilty plea had been entered voluntarily and intelligently. Because the habeas court, Satter, J., concluded that the disposition of the case required only an inquiry into the adequacy of the factual basis of the plea, we deem this fundamental issue of voluntariness to be unresolved. Although ordinarily a complainant may prevail only upon the grounds that he has alleged; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Carnaan Oil Co., 202 Conn. 234, 244, 520 A.2d 1008 (1987); Lamb v. Burns, 202 Conn.
In accordance with these considerations, we remand this case to the habeas court for further proceedings on the issue of whether the petitioner entered his plea of guilty voluntarily and intelligently. We recognize that “it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.” Henderson v. Morgan, supra, 647. Nevertheless, we do not view the circumstances of the present case as warranting such a presumption.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the habeas court for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
“[General Statutes (Rev. to 1975)] See. 53a-59. assault in the first degree: class b felony, (a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (2) with intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person. . . .”
As the court noted, the petitioner properly did not challenge the acceptance of his guilty plea upon the basis of Practice Book § 713, which provides that “[t]he judicial authority shall not accept a plea of guilty unless he is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.” The petitioner entered his guilty plea on August 11, 1976, whereas Practice Book, 1963, § 2124, which was the predecessor of § 713, did not become effective until October 1, 1976. Cf. General Statutes § 1-1 (u); see generally Blue v. Robinson, 173 Conn. 360, 373-74, 377 A.2d 1108 (1977).
It must be emphasized that Practice Book § 713 now requires a factual basis as a precondition to the acceptance of a guilty plea. See footnote 2, supra. Section 713 was adopted in response to the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), that the record should disclose “an affirmative showing” that the guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary. See Blue v. Robinson, 173 Conn. 360, 373, 377 A.2d 1108 (1977). Thus, the mere fact that a defendant has conferred with his counsel could not currently be deemed to be a sufficient indicator that his guilty plea has been entered voluntarily and intelligently. Under the rule, the minimum requirement of a factual basis on the record must also be satisfied.