STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON STIDAM, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 15CA1014
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ADAMS COUNTY
RELEASED: 11/21/2016
[Cite as State v. Stidam, 2016-Ohio-7906.]
Hoover, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio for appellant.
David Kelley, Adams County Prosecutor and Michele L. Harris, Assistant Adams County Prosecutor, West Union, Ohio for appellee.
Hoover, J.
{1} Defendant-appellant Aaron Stidam (“Stidam“) appeals from the Adams County Common Pleas Court the portion of his sentence classifying him as a Tier III sex offender. At the age of 22, Stidam was indicted on two counts of rape. The indictment alleged that Stidam committed these offenses when he was a juvenile. Through plea negotiations with the State of Ohio (“State“), Stidam pleaded guilty to two amended counts of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Stidam to an aggregate total of five years in prison. Also, the trial court designated him a Tier III sex offender.
{2} Here on appeal, Stidam asserts that his automatic classification as a Tier III sex offender for offenses he committed as a juvenile violates his due process rights and the
{3} In evaluating Stidam‘s claims, we determine that the facts here are distinguishable from those of In re C.P. At no time was Stidam tried for his crimes in the juvenile system. Accordingly, the reasoning and analysis presented in the Court‘s decision in In re C.P. is not applicable under the facts here. Therefore, for those reasons and the reasons discussed below, we overrule Stidam‘s sole assignment of error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. Facts and Procedural Posture
{4} In October 2014, the Adams County Grand Jury indicted Stidam on two сounts of rape, first degree felonies, in violation of
{5} Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, in September 2015, Stidam pleaded guilty to two amended counts of sexual battery, second degree felonies, in violation of
{6} The trial court never filed a separate entry overruling Stidam‘s motion. Instead, during the sentencing hearing on October 2, 2015, the trial court indicated that it declined Stidam‘s motion. The trial court stated:
I do find though, however, the arguments made to be very compelling of this exception that we have in this case as I see it, but otherwise the court sees that it is a tier 3 sex offender registrant and at this time I am not adopting either individually to constitutionally challenge the constitutionality or to challenge the jurisdiction of an unconstitutional statue [sic]. I am not going to at this time in this case adopt that invitation. While inviting, certainly inviting as I read the memorandum, at this time, the court will decline on that.
The trial court sentenced Stidam to an aggregate five-year prison term. Because of Stidam‘s viоlation of
{7} Stidam now asserts this timely appeal challenging his classification as a Tier III sex offender.
{8} Stidam assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred by requiring Aaron Stidam to register for life as a Tier III Sex Offender for an offense he committed as a child. Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Ohio Constitution;
R.C. 2950.01(G)(1)(a) and2950.07(B)(1) ; Sentencing Entry (Oct. 2, 2015); T.p. 15 (Oct. 2, 2015).
III. Law and Analysis
{9} In his sole assignment of error, Stidam contends that, as applied to him—an adult indicted for offenses he committed as a juvenile—his Tier III sex offender classification violates the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment and the due process protections contained in the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. Stidam primarily relies on the Ohio Supreme Court‘s recent decision In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that “[t]o the extent that it imposes automatic, lifelong registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system,
{10} Specifically, Stidam contends that based on the factors examined by the Court in In re C.P. we should declare his Tier III sex offender classification unconstitutional for the
{11} The State contends that Stidam‘s classification as a Tier III sex offender should be upheld because (1) he is not a juvenile offender because
A. Ohio‘s Sex Offender Registration
{12} In 2007, the General Assembly enacted the Adam Walsh Act, which “repealed Megan‘s Law, effective January 1, 2008, and replaced it with new standards for sex-offender classification and registration pursuant to the federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code.” Bundy v. State, 143 Ohio St.3d 237, 2015-Ohio-2138, 36 N.E.3d 158, ¶ 5. The implementation of the Adam Walsh Act transformed the nature of the sex offender registration statutes from remedial to punitive. State v. Metcalf, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-03-022, 2016-Ohio-4923, ¶ 19, citing State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 21. “Because the AWA is punitive, and thus imposes
{13} For Tier III sex offenders, the act requires registration and verification of the offender‘s address every 90 days for the remainder of their lifetime.
B. In Re C.P.
{¶ 14} In In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729 the Ohio Supreme Court determined:
To the extent that it imposes automatic, lifelong registration and notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system,
R.C. 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, and the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16.
{15} In In re C.P., 15 year old juvenile was charged in a multi-count indictment including charges of rape and kidnapping with sexual motivation. Id. at ¶ 2. The appellant remained in the juvenile system throughout the proceedings. Id. at ¶ 6. Eventually, the appellant entered an admission to each charge of the indictment. Id. at ¶ 7. The juvenile court found appellant to be a delinquent child and designated him as a serious youthful offender (“SYO“) pursuant to
{16} On appeal, appellant argued that
” ‘A juvenile charged as a potential serious youthful offender does not face bindover to an adult court; the case remains in the juvenile court. Under
R.C. 2152.11(A) , a juvenile defendant who commits certain acts is eligible for “a morerestrictive disposition.” That “more restricted disposition” is a “serious youthful offender” disposition and includes what is known as a blended sentence—a traditional juvenile disposition coupled with the imposition of a stayed adult sentence. R.C. 2152.13 . The adult sentence remains stayed unless the juvenile fails to successfully complete his or her traditional juvenile disposition.R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii) . Theoretically, the threat of the imposition of an adult sentence encourages a juvenile‘s cooperation in his own rehabilitation, functioning as both carrot and stick.’[State v. D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209] at ¶ 18. Only further bad acts by the juvenile as he is rehabilitated in the juvenile system can cause the stayed adult penalty to be invoked: Any adult sentence that the trial court imposes through
R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(i) is only a potential sentence—it is stayed pursuant toR.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(iii) “pending the successful completion of the traditional juvenile dispositions imposed.”R.C. 2152.13(D)(2)(a)(ii) requires the court to impose a juvenile disposition when it imposes an adult sentence; how the juvenile responds to that disposition will determine whether the stay is lifted on the adult sentence.
R.C. 2152.86 changes the very nature of an SYO disposition, imposing an adult penalty immediately upon the adjudication. The juvenile is not given the opportunity to avoid the adult portion of his punishment by successfully completing his juvenile rehabilitation. Instead, he must comply with all of S.B.10‘s reporting and notification requirements for Tier III sexual offenders contained in R.C. Chapter 2950 .
{17} The issue Stidam now presents is whether the holding of In re C.P. also applies to offenders who committed offenses as juveniles but were tried as adults because they were apprehended after they turned 21 years old. Stidam presents the same arguments for his contentions that the Tier III classification violates both constitutional due process protections and constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. However, we will address each constitutional argument separately.
C. Standard of Review
{18} Stidam‘s argument here on appeal challenges his Tier III sex offender classification pursuant to
{19} “[S]tatutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.” State v. Hoover, 123 Ohio St.3d 418, 2009-Ohio-4993, 916 N.E.2d 1056, ¶ 8. “A statute will be upheld unless the challenger can meet the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional.” Id. We use a de novo standard of review to assess errors based upon violations of constitutional law. State v. Burgette, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA50, 2014-Ohio-3483, ¶ 10.
{20} First, we will address Stidam‘s claim that his classification as a Tier III sex offender violates the due process clauses of both the United States and Ohio Constitution. “The right to procedural due process is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Rohrer, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3471, 2015-Ohio-5333, | 20. (Other citations omitted). In State ex rel. Hattie v. Goldhardt, 69 Ohio St.3d 123, 630 N.E.2d 696 (1994), the Ohio Supreme Court addressed due process rights as follows:
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * *.” Hence, the Due Process Clause applies “only if a government action will constitute the impairment of some individual‘s life, liberty, or property.” ” 2 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law (1992) 580, Section 17.2.
{21} It is clear that Stidam was approximately 15 or 16 years old when he committed the offenses of sexual battery, in violation of
If a person under eighteen years of age allegedly commits an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and if the person is not taken into custody or apprehended for that act until after the person attains twenty-one years of age, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction tо hear or determine any portion of the case charging the person with committing that act. In those circumstances, * * * the case charging the person with committing the act shall be a criminal prosecution commenced and heard in the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the offense as if the person had been eighteen years of age or older when the person committed the act. All proceedings pertaining to the act shall be within the jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the offense, and that court has all the authority and duties in the case as it has in other criminal cases in that court.
(Emphasis Added.) Accordingly, Stidam pleaded guilty in the general division of the common pleas court and was subject to an adult sentence.
{¶ 22} In In re C.P., the Ohio Supreme Court separately analyzed appellant‘s due process and cruel and unusual punishment claims. The Court found that ”
Again, we are dealing with juveniles who remain in the juvenile system through the decision of a juvenile judge—a decision made through the balancing of the
factors set forth in R.C. 2152.12(B) —that the juvenile at issue is amenable to the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system. The protections and rehabilitative aims of the juvenile process must remain paramount; we must recognize that juvenile offenders are less culpable and more amenable to reform than adult offenders.The requirement in
R.C. 2152.86 of automatic imposition of Tier III classification on a juvenile offender who receives an SYO dispositional sentence undercuts the rehabilitative purpose of Ohio‘s juvenile system and eliminates the important role of the juvenile court‘s discretion in the disposition of juvenile offenders and thus fails to meet the due process requirement of fundamental fairness. In D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d 540, 2009-Ohio-9, 901 N.E.2d 209, 59, we held that because of the central role of the juvenile judge in a juvenile‘s rehabilitative process, fundamental fairness did not require the same jury-trial rights for juveniles as we required for adults in Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470. In this case, we determine that fundamental fairness is not a one-way street that allows only for an easing of due process requirements for juveniles; instead, fundamental fairness may require, as it does in this case, additional procedural safeguards for juveniles in order to meet of the juvenile system‘s goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
{23} Here, Stidam was not determined to be a serious youth offender or even adjudicated within the juvenile system. Thus, the In re C.P. decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Nonetheless, Stidam contends the automatic, non-discretionary nature of
{24} As the aforementioned citations to In re C.P. demonstrate, the Ohio Supreme Court repeаtedly referenced the protections and rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile system, as well as the important role of the juvenile judge‘s discretion in sentencing. Because Stidam was indicted as an adult, those aspects of the juvenile system are simply not applicable here. It was C.P.‘s status as an SYO and his disposition in the juvenile system that led the Court to find that automatic, lifetime registration “undercuts the rehabilitative purpose of Ohio‘s juvenile system and eliminates the important role of the juvenile court‘s discretion in the disposition of juvenile offender.” Id. at ¶ 85. Fundamentally contrasting, Stidam was adjudicated in the general division of the common pleas court in the adult court. Although Stidam was indicted for crimes he committed as a juvenile, we find the fact that he was indicted at the age of 22 is crucial; and we decline to extend the reasoning articulated in In re C.P. to the facts here. Thus, we conclude that Stidam‘s Tier III classification does not violate his right to due process.
{25} Furthermore,
{27} The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the statutory amendments as constitutional. The Court determined that the statutes did not impair any substantive rights because Walls did not have a substantive right to a juvenile bindover proceeding under prior law. Walls at ¶ 19. The Court explained:
The 1997 changes to
R.C. Chapter 2151 did not impair any of Walls‘s vested rights within the meaning of our retroactivity jurisprudence. Although the 1997 amendments to the juvenile statutes allowed criminal prosecution without the bindover proceeding required under the 1985 law, we cannot characterize this change as anything other than remedial. Even under the law in effect in 1985, Walls was subject to criminal prosecution in the general division of a court ofcommon pleas if the juvenile court made certain determinations specified by statute. See former R.C. 2151.26(A) and(E) , 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 585–586. Thus, under either the 1985 law or the 1997 law, Walls was on notice that the offense he allegedly committed could subject him to criminal prosecution as an adult in the general division of **838 the court of common pleas. The 1997 law merely removed the procedural prerequisite of a juvenile-court proceeding. Even though they may have an occasional substantive effect on past conduct, “it is generally true that laws that relate to procedures are ordinarily remedial in nature.” Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 411, 700 N.E.2d 570; see, also, In re Nevius (1963), 174 Ohio St. 560, 564, 23 O.O.2d 239, 191 N.E.2d 166.
{28} In State v. Warren, 118 Ohio St.3d 200, 2008-Ohio-2011, 887 N.E.2d 1145, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether “due process is violated when the defendant receives a mandatory term of life imprisonment for forcible rape of a victim under age 13 when the defendant was 15 years of age at the time of the offense but not prosecuted until he had passed the age of 21.” Id. at ¶ 1. The defendant specifically challenged
Walls is not directly on point with this case because it did not involve a due process argument based upon principles of fundamental fairness. However, the similarities between the situation in this case and in Walls are substantial, and the essential principles that emerge from Walls make it impossible for Warren to prevail on his due process argument.
Most important, as in Walls, the application of the statutes requiring that Warren be tried as an adult in common pleas court (in this case,
R.C. 2152.02(C)(3) ,2151.23(I) , and2152.12(J) ) cannot be viewed as affecting a substantive right because under either the 1985 bindover law or the 1997 law that was applied to him, Warren was on notice that the offense[s] he allegedly committed could subject him to criminal prosecution as an adult in the general division of the court of common pleas. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, at ¶ 17.In addition, Walls stands squarely in the way of any argument that Warren might make about the lack of a bindover hearing in his case, because although Warren “perhaps remained eligible for retention within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court under a technical reading of the old statutes, the practical reality is that [he] had virtually no chance of being kept in the juvenile system.” Walls, at ¶ 31. As in Walls, any bindover hearing under the statute that was in place in 1988 would have been simply a procedural step in the process of transferring Warren for prosecution as an adult. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, at ¶ 41.
Warren does not explicitly argue that he was prejudiced by the absence of a bindover hearing or that the juvenile court should have retained jurisdiction over his case. Instead, he claims to have been prejudiced by the trial court‘s inability to consider his age at the time of the offenses in sentencing him for rape. Warren argues that he would have received more favorable treatment if he had been charged with rape while still a juvenile and that that favorable treatment should extend to the rape conviction in this case. Those arguments are significantly undercut by Walls, in which this court held that no substantive rights are affected in this situation. Id. at ¶ 19.
{30} Other Ohio appellate districts have rejected constitutional challenges to the statutes at issue in Warren and Walls. See State v. Scharr, 5th Dist. No. 2003CA00129, 2004-Ohio-1631, ¶¶ 27, 29 (rejecting defendant‘s claims that
{31} Therefore, considering the critical factual distinctions between this case and In re C.P. and the above authority rejecting due process challenges to
D. Stidam‘s Classification as a Tier III Sex Offender Does Not Violate Constitutional Protections Against Cruel And Unusual Punishment.
1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the United States Constitution.
{32} Stidam also argues that his mandatory lifetime Tier III sex offender registration requirements, for offenses he committed as a juvenile, violate the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments contained in both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” “Central to the Constitution‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is the ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, at ¶ 25, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). “As applied to juveniles, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and the imposition of life without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses.” State v. Long, 138 Ohio St.3d 478, 2014-Ohio-849, 8 N.E.3d 890, ¶ 8, citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). More recently, the Eighth Amendment was held to ban mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).
{33} Addressing challenges based upon cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
The United States Supreme Court has observed that its cases addressing proportionality fall into two categories. The first involves “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). The second involves categorical restrictions that, until Graham, applied only in capital cases. The second approach traditionally involves “cases in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty.” Id. These restrictions include a prohibition on the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes, for defendants who committed the crime before the age of 18, and for defendants with low mental functioning. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (prohibiting death as a punishment for nonhomicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for defendants who committed crimes bеfore turning 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for persons with low intellectual functioning).
Blankenship, 145 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015-Ohio-4624, 48 N.E.3d 516, at ¶ 18.
In sum, penological theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the severity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice under consideration is cruel and unusual. This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole. This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment. Because “[t]he age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood,” those who were below that age when the offense was committed may not be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime. Roper, 543 U.S., at 574, 125 S.Ct. 1183.
{35} In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The Court explained:
Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. Those cases relied on three significant gaps between juveniles and adults. First, children have a “‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,‘” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper, 543 U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1. Second, children “are more vulnerable * * * to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child‘s character is not as “well formed” as an adult‘s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1183.To start with the first set of cases: Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.
* * *
We therefore hold that the
* * *
Graham, Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the
Miller at 2464-2465, 2469, and 2475.
{37} The Court concluded:
In sum, the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders who remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the severity of lifetime registration and notification requirements of PRQJOR status, and the inadequacy of penological theory to justify the punishment all lead to the conclusion that the lifetime registration and notification requirements in
R.C. 2152.86 are cruel and unusual. We thus hold that for a juvenile offender who remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, theEighth Amendment forbids the automatic imposition of lifetime sex-offender registration and notification requirements.
{38} Two Ohio appellate courts have addressed whether automatic Tier III sex offender classification and registration requirements for juvenile offenders who were tried as adults violate due process rights and the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment. In State v. Reidenbach, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 2014CA0019, 2015-Ohio-2915, the 17 year old defendant,
{39} The Fifth District Court of Appeals declined to extend the reasoning in Graham, Miller, and In re C.P. to the facts of that case.1 The court stated, “The juvenile court provided appellant with due process, holding a probable cause hearing and amenability hearings before making its determination [to bind defendant over to the general division of the common pleas court.]” Reidenbach at ¶ 33. The Fifth District also distinguished In re C.P. from the facts in Reidenbach because “* * *the C.P. case applied to juveniles deemed juvenile offender registrants who remained in the juvenile system.” Reidenbach at ¶ 33.
{40} In State v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102783, 2016-Ohio-922, the Eighth District Court of Appeals also declined to extend the reasoning of In re C.P. to a case where a juvenile was bound over to the general division of the common pleas court. Id. at ¶¶ 27-29. The defendant, Martin, was 16 years old when he was indicted on two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of kidnapping, and two counts of rape. Id. at ¶ 4. The State filed a mandatory
{41} On appeal, Martin argued that automatic Tier III classification for a juvenile offender is unconstitutional because (1) it violated his due process rights and (2) it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. The Eighth District stated that the “* * *problem with Martin‘s arguments is that he was not in juvenile court.” (Emphasis sic). The court stated, “In enacting the mandatory bindover statutes, the legislature ‘single[d] out older juvenile’ offenders, ‘who are potentially more street-wise, hardened, dangerous, and violent.’ ” Id. at 18, quoting State v. Lane, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3144, 2014-Ohio-2010, ¶ 67. The court observed that Martin was not challenging the bindover and Ohio Courts have found the mandatory bindover statute to be constitutional. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20.
{42} The Eighth District found that the reasoning behind the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision of In re C.P., i.e, that the аutomatic, lifetime registration and notifications of
{43} In the case sub judice, we have already noted the distinguishing fact here compared to the facts of In re C.P., i.e. that Stidam was not adjudicated within the juvenile system, but was indicted as an adult for offenses he committed as a juvenile. This is a critical distinction. Although, considering Stidam‘s cruel and unusual punishment argument, the facts here present a close question. Because Stidam committed the offenses as a juvenile, he possessed a diminished culpability like the offenders of In re C.P., Graham, and Miller. However, in In re C.P., the Court relied heavily on the defendant‘s status within the juvenile system in regards to analyzing the severity of the punishment and the penological justifications under Graham.
{44} Regarding the severity of the punishment, the court in In re C.P. found:
For juveniles, the length of the punishment is extraordinary, and it is imposed at an age at which the character of the offender is not yet fixed. Registration and notification necessarily involve stigmatization. For a juvenile offender, the stigma of the label of sex offender attaches at the start of his adult life and cannot be shaken. With no other offense is the juvenile‘s wrongdoing announced to the world. Before a juvenile can even begin his adult life, before he has a chance to live on his own, the world will know of his offense. He will never have a chance to establish a good character in the community. He will be hampered in his education, in his relationships, and in his work life. His potential will be squelched before it has a chance to show itself. A juvenile—one who remains under the authority of the juvenile court and has thus been adjudged
redeemable—who is subject to sex-offender notification will have his entire life evaluated through the prism of his juvenile adjudication. It will be a constant cloud, a once-every-three-month reminder to himself and the world that he cannot escape the mistakes of his youth.
{45} Here, although Stidam committed his crimes as a juvenile, he was indicted as a 22-year-old adult. The legislature, pursuant to
{46} In examining the severity of the punishment in In re C.P., the Court noted the timing of the punishment and the impact on a SYO juvenile offender tried within the juvenile system. Here, the timing and the impact of the punishment differ because Stidam was indicted some six to seven years after he committed his crimes. Accordingly, the Tier III registration requirements have a distinguishing impact on him as a 22-year-old than the requirements did on a 15-year-old SYO offender tried within the juvenile system.
{47} Concerning the penological justifications, the court in In re C.P. examined the goals of juvenile disposition under
{48} The purposes of juvenile disposition in
{49} Still, the critical distinction between this case and the facts of In re C.P. remain significant. The goals of sentencing in the adult court differ, however minute Stidam contends that they are, with the goals of the juvenile system. The stated purpose of the tiered sex offender classification is “to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state.”
{51} In conclusion, we find that Stidam‘s Tier III sex offender classification is not cruel and unusual punishment under the
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment under Ohio Law
{52} The
The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and groups.
{53} In its own jurisprudence regarding
{54} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the appellant‘s challenges under the Ohio Constitution in In re C.P. stated:
For juveniles who remain in the juvenile system,
R.C. 2152.86 is striking in the disproportionate way it treats PRQJORs. In In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 72, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969), this court stated that “the decided emphasis [of juvenile courts] should be upon individual, corrective treatment.” We trust judges to make the important calls in imposing the adult portion of the SYO sentence. In discretionary SYO cases, juvenile judges determine whether an SYO denomination is appropriate. But underR.C. 2152.86 , the juvenile judge is given absolutely no discretion over the portion of the juvenile‘s penalty that could extend for a lifetime. There is none of the important, individualized work that juvenile judges do. Instead, a lifetime punishment is imposed with no chance forreconsideration of its appropriateness for 25 years. Compared to punishments for other juvenile offenders, whose cases are reevaluated when their juvenile disposition ends and at regularly scheduled intervals thereafter, this punishment is disproportionate. Lack of proportionality is also evidenced by the very public nature of the penalty. The punishment of lifetime exposure for a wrong committed in childhood runs counter to the private nature of our juvenile court system. Confidentiality has always been at the heart of the juvenile justice system. That core principle is trampled by any requirement of public notification. Timothy E. Wind, The Quandary of Megan‘s Law: When the Sex Offender is a Child, 37 J.Marshall L.Rev. 73, 117 (2003). Publicity is even more of a concern for PRQJORs, whose information is disseminated on the Internet.
{55} In holding that
S.B. 10 forces registration and notification requirements into a juvenile system where rehabilitation is paramount, confidentiality is element, and individuаlized treatment from judges is essential. The public punishments required by
R.C. 2152.86 are automatic, lifelong, and contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system. We conclude that they “shock the sense of justice of the community” and thus violate Ohio‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.”
{57} In Blankenship, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Tier II sex offender registration requirements for an adult, who also committed his offenses as an adult, did not violate the
We are also mindful that “reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.” State v. Weitbrecht, 86 Ohio St.3d 368, 715 N.E.2d 167 (1999). The General Assembly has seen fit to impose registration sanctions in cases involving sex offenses to protect the public. Indeed, such sanctions now are the norm. People v. Temelkoski, 307 Mich.App. 241, 262, 859 N.W.2d 743 (2014) (“all 50 states and the federal government have *231 enacted some form of sex offender registration and notification provisions“). They cannot be said to be shocking to the sense of justice of the community.
The stated legislative intent of the General Assembly in enacting S.B. 10 is to protect the public. While some may question whether the registration requirements are the best way to further public safety, questions concerning the wisdom of legislation are for the legislature. ” ‘[W]hether the court agrees with it in that particular or not is of no consequence. * * * If the legislature has the
constitutional power to enact a law, no matter whether the law be wise or otherwise it is no concern of the court.’ ” (Ellipsis sic.) Butler v. Jordan, 92 Ohio St.3d 354, 376, 750 N.E.2d 554 (2001), quoting State Bd. of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 20, 98 N.E. 1019 (1912). It is undisputed that the General Assembly is ” ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy’ ” and the only branch of government charged with fulfilling that rolе. Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 21. Blankenship has not met his burden to show that Tier II sex-offender registration requirements are cruel and unusual punishment.
{58} Similarly, we hold that the concerns that led the Ohio Supreme Court in In re C.P. to conclude that the requirements of lifetime registration for SYO juveniles violated the
{59} For the foregoing reasons, we overrulе Stidam‘s sole assignment of error. We find that the registration and address-verification requirements for Tier III offenders under
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds that reasonable grounds exist for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or thе failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and *Stautberg, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
By: ____________________
Marie Hoover, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.
*Peter J. Stautberg, Judge of the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment of The Supreme Court of Ohio in the Fourth Appellate District.