State v. WeitbrechtState v. Weitbrecht
Criminal procedure—Involuntary manslaughter—
{¶ 1} On July 17, 1997, defendant-appellee, Nancy Weitbrecht, was indicted on two counts of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of
{¶ 2} Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute (
{¶ 3} The court of appeals affirmed. Finding its decision in conflict with decisions of the Eleventh Appellate District in State v. Stanford (Sept. 23, 1996), Trumbull App. No. 95-T-5358, unreported, 1996 WL 537856, and the Twelfth Appellate District in State v. Garland (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 688 N.E.2d 557, the court of appeals entered an order certifying a conflict.
{¶ 4} This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.
Kennedy, Cicconetti & Knowlton and David C. Knowlton, for appellee.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Kimberly L. Charles, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, state of Ohio.
Harry R. Reinhart, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
{¶ 5} The issue certified for our review is, “Does Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute [
{¶ 6}
“(B) No person shall cause the death of another * * * as a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of the first, second, third, or fourth degree or a minor misdemeanor.
“(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. * * * Violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree.”
{¶ 7} A third degree felony carries the potential penalty of one to five years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000. (
{¶ 8} Appellee successfully argued to the lower courts that the potential penalty imposed for a violation of
{¶ 9} The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is couched in identical language. Historically, the Eighth Amendment has been invoked in extremely rare cases, where it has been necessary to protect individuals from inhumane punishment such as torture or other barbarous acts. Robinson v. California (1962), 370 U.S. 660, 676, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 1425, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 768. Over the years, it has also been used to prohibit punishments that were found to be disproportionate to the crimes committed. In McDougle v. Maxwell (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 30 O.O.2d 38, 203 N.E.2d 334, this court stressed that
{¶ 10} The United States Supreme Court has also discussed the concept of whether the Eighth Amendment requires that sentences be proportionate to the offenses committed. An Eighth Amendment challenge on these grounds was initially applied only in cases involving the death penalty or unusual forms of imprisonment. Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140; Weems v. United States (1910), 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793. Then, in Solem v. Helm (1983), 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649, the court applied the Eighth Amendment to reverse a felony sentence on proportionality grounds, finding that “a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.” In so holding, the Solem court set forth the following tripartite test to review sentences under the Eighth Amendment:
“First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. * * * Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive. * * * Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 290-291, 103 S.Ct. at 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649-650.
{¶ 11} More recently, in Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of proportionality as it relates to the Eighth Amendment. In Harmelin, the court was asked to decide whether a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of six hundred seventy-two grams of cocaine violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. In finding no constitutional violation, the lead opinion rejected earlier statements made in Solem v. Helm and stated that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. However, this statement failed to garner a majority. The three Justices who concurred in part would refine the Solem decision to an analysis of “gross disproportionality” between sentence and crime. As stated by Justice Kennedy in his opinion concurring in part, “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids
{¶ 12} With these principles in mind, we now turn to the case at hand. Appellant contends that
{¶ 13} In contrast, appellee argues that the court of appeals’ decision was correct and urges us to follow the appellate decisions of State v. Campbell (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 762, 691 N.E.2d 711, and State v. Shy (June 30, 1997), Pike App. No. 96 CA 587, unreported, 1997 WL 381782, which used the tripartite test set forth in Solem to find that
{¶ 14} At the outset, we reject appellee’s reliance on the Collins decision. In Collins, we interpreted the statutory language of former
{¶ 15} We also reject the reasoning employed by those courts, which found that
{¶ 16} In reaching this decision, we are cognizant of the fact that reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-999, 111 S.Ct. at 2703-2704, 115 L.Ed.2d at 867 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We find that the General Assembly acted within its discretion in setting forth the penalties it did when the commission of minor misdemeanors results in the deaths of individuals.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we hold that
{¶ 18} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 19} Dispassionate dissection of a legal conundrum is often required to achieve the correct result in matters that come before this court. In those instances, the facts of the case are secondary to the legal analysis. Here, where we are considering whether the sentence at issue would “shock the sense of justice of the community,” the facts must stand at the center of our consideration. The facts in this case tell the whole story.
{¶ 20} While driving on Highway 62 on April 27, 1997, Nancy Weitbrecht apparently suffered a cardiac event, lost consciousness, crossed left of center, and collided with the Carroll vehicle. She lost her husband and a friend in the accident, and must live with the fact that she also caused the death of Vera Carroll. The state stipulated that there was no evidence of criminal recklessness or criminal negligence on her part. Nancy Weitbrecht now faces a potential five-year prison term. It would be hard to conjure up a situation more shocking to the community’s sense of justice, or a more inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. I accordingly dissent.