THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WEITBRECHT, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State v. Weitbrecht, 1999-Ohio-113.]
No. 98-2144
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
September 8, 1999
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 86 Ohio St.3d 368.]
Submitted May 26, 1999
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Holmes County, No. 97CA588.
{¶ 1} On July 17, 1997, defendant-appellee, Nancy Weitbrecht, was indicted on two counts of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of
{¶ 2} Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute (
{¶ 3} The court of appeals affirmed. Finding its decision in conflict with decisions of the Eleventh Appellate District in State v. Stanford (Sept. 23, 1996), Trumbull App. No. 95-T-5358, unreported, 1996 WL 537856, and the Twelfth Appellate District in State v. Garland (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 461, 688 N.E.2d 557, the court of appeals entered an order certifying a conflict.
{¶ 4} This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict exists.
Stephen D. Knowling, Holmes County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Kennedy, Cicconetti & Knowlton and David C. Knowlton, for appellee.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Kimberly L. Charles, Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, state of Ohio.
Harry R. Reinhart, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.
{¶ 5} The issue certified for our review is, “Does Ohio’s involuntary manslaughter statute [
{¶ 6}
“(B) No person shall cause the death of another * * * as a proximate result of the offender’s committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of the first, second, third, or fourth degree or a minor misdemeanor.
“(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. * * * Violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree.”
{¶ 7} A third degree felony carries the potential penalty of one to five years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000. (
{¶ 9} The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is couched in identical language. Historically, the Eighth Amendment has been invoked in extremely rare cases, where it has been necessary to protect individuals from inhumane punishment such as torture or other barbarous acts. Robinson v. California (1962), 370 U.S. 660, 676, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 1425, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, 768. Over the years, it has also been used to prohibit punishments that were found to be disproportionate to the crimes committed. In McDougle v. Maxwell (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 30 O.O.2d 38, 203 N.E.2d 334, this court stressed that Eighth Amendment violations are rare. We stated that “[c]ases in which cruel and unusual punishments have been found are limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person.” Id. at 70, 30 O.O.2d at 39, 203 N.E.2d at 336. Furthermore, “the penalty must be so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” Id. See, also, State v. Chaffin (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 59 O.O.2d 51, 282 N.E.2d 46, paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 10} The United States Supreme Court has also discussed the concept of whether the Eighth Amendment requires that sentences be proportionate to the offenses committed. An Eighth Amendment challenge on these grounds was initially applied only in cases involving the death penalty or unusual forms of imprisonment. Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140; Weems v. United States (1910), 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793. Then, in Solem v. Helm (1983), 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649, the court applied the Eighth Amendment to reverse a felony sentence on proportionality grounds, finding that “a criminal sentence must be
“First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. * * * Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive. * * * Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 290-291, 103 S.Ct. at 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649-650.
{¶ 11} More recently, in Harmelin v. Michigan (1991), 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of proportionality as it relates to the Eighth Amendment. In Harmelin, the court was asked to decide whether a mandatory term of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of six hundred seventy-two grams of cocaine violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. In finding no constitutional violation, the lead opinion rejected earlier statements made in Solem v. Helm and stated that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. However, this statement failed to garner a majority. The three Justices who concurred in part would refine the Solem decision to an analysis of “gross disproportionality” between sentence and crime. As stated by Justice Kennedy in his opinion concurring in part, “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. at 2705, 115 L.Ed.2d at 869.
{¶ 12} With these principles in mind, we now turn to the case at hand. Appellant contends that
{¶ 14} At the outset, we reject appellee’s reliance on the Collins decision. In Collins, we interpreted the statutory language of former
{¶ 15} We also reject the reasoning employed by those courts, which found that
{¶ 16} In reaching this decision, we are cognizant of the fact that reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-999, 111 S.Ct. at 2703-2704, 115 L.Ed.2d at 867 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We find that the General Assembly acted within its discretion in setting forth the penalties it did when the commission of minor misdemeanors results in the deaths of individuals.
{¶ 17} Accordingly, we hold that
{¶ 18} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 19} Dispassionate dissection of a legal conundrum is often required to achieve the correct result in matters that come before this court. In those instances, the facts of the case are secondary to the legal analysis. Here, where we are considering whether the sentence at issue would “shock the sense of justice of the community,” the facts must stand at the center of our consideration. The facts in this case tell the whole story.
{¶ 20} While driving on Highway 62 on April 27, 1997, Nancy Weitbrecht apparently suffered a cardiac event, lost consciousness, crossed left of center, and