State v. D.H.State v. D.H.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 1} On December 28, 2004, D.H., a juvenile, fired a gun into a melee outside his friend Christopher Harris’s home. Harris was involved in a fight in his front yard, and other youths were also involved in the fracas or were watching. A bullet struck and killed Harris’s sister, Kiera. Preston Smith was shot in the leg.
{¶ 2} D.H. was indicted on two counts of murder with a firearm specification in violation of
{¶ 3} A juvenile who is tried as a serious youthful offender is entitled to a jury trial pursuant to
{¶ 4} Because of D.H.’s age and the nature of his crime, the imposition of the adult portion of the sentence was discretionary, rather than mandatory.
{¶ 5} “I have the discretion to order a blended sentence on this reckless homicide because a firearm was used and the law requires me to use graduated actions and services to provide for the protection, care and mental and physical development of the child involved in this case. That is just part of the juvenile [serious-youthful-offender] statute. And I need to consider the circumstances and facts, the juvenile’s history, the length of time level and juvenile history, and any adult sentence would be stayed or suspended pending any juvenile disposition.
{¶ 7} “ * * *
{¶ 8} “For the felony, I can sentence him to a minimum of one to five years on the felony. The underlying felony and the underlying gun specification, three years. So the total could be four to eight years. And then of course I have to jump the bridge of what [D.H.’s trial counsel] wants, which is not to impose the serious youthful offender portion of the sentence at all, because it’s now discretionary based on what the verdict was after the jury trial.
{¶ 9} “But one of the big factors is the seriousness of the offense. And * * * a firearm was used, and a little girl died. That is a big factor in the case.
{¶ 10} “* * * [B]ecause of the seriousness of this incident, I find that * * * the disposition should be that a serious youthful offender blended sentence should occur. It doesn’t necessarily mean that [D.H.] will never serve the adult portion of his sentence, but it will be hanging over his head, which I think in itself is a deterrent to any future potential crime that he might be involved in.”
{¶ 11} As for the juvenile disposition, the juvenile court committed appellant to the legal custody of the Department of Youth Services for three years on the gun specification, to be followed by a minimum term of six months to a maximum period not to exceed D.H.’s 21st birthday on the reckless-homicide charge. As for the adult sentence, the court imposed' a single three-year prison sentence for appellant’s reckless homicide, which is above the one-year, statutory-minimum prison sentence for such felonies.
{¶ 12} D.H. appealed to the Franklin County Court of Appeals. He asserted that the trial court had erred “when it imposed an adult sentence upon the defendant by making predicate findings that were constitutionally improper for the court to make under State v. Foster,
{¶ 13} The appellate court affirmed the trial court, holding, “[T]he juvenile court did not make the
{¶ 14} Further, the appellate court rejected D.H.’s assertion that the trial court had overstepped its constitutional bounds by imposing more than the minimum sentence in the adult portion of the sentence. On D.H.’s motion, the appellate court held that that aspect of its decision conflicted with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeals in In re Hill, Allen App. No. 1-05-65,
{¶ 15} “Do constitutional jury trial rights, as articulated under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections 5 and 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and as applied to an adult felony sentencing in accordance with State v. Foster,
{¶ 16} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a discretionary appeal and upon the certification of a conflict.
Lawr and Analysis
{¶ 17} We decide today whether this court’s decision in Foster implicates Ohio’s juvenile blended-sentencing statutes. We hold that
{¶ 18} A juvenile charged as a potential serious youthful offender does not face bindover to an adult court; the case remains in the juvenile court. Under
{¶ 19}
{¶ 20} “(A) * * * If the complaint, indictment, or information charging the act includes one or more of the following factors, the act is considered to be enhanced, and the child is eligible for a more restrictive disposition under this section;
{¶ 21} “(1) The act charged against the child would be an offense of violence if committed by an adult.
{¶ 22} “(2) During the commission of the act charged, the child used a firearm, displayed a firearm, brandished a firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm and actually possessed a firearm.
{¶ 23} “(3) The child previously was admitted to a department of youth services facility for the commission of an act that would have been aggravated murder, murder, a felony of the first or second degree if committed by an adult, or an act that would have been a felony of the third degree and an offense of violence if committed by an adult.”
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} “If the juvenile court on the record makes a finding that, given the nature and circumstances of the violation and the history of the child, the length of time, level of security, and types of programming and resources available in the juvenile system alone are not adequate to provide the juvenile court with a reasonable expectation that the purposes set forth in section 2152.01 of the Revised Code will be met, the juvenile court may impose upon the child a sentence available for the violation, as if the child were an adult, under Chapter 2929. of the Revised Code, except that the juvenile court shall not impose on the child a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole.”
{¶ 27}
{¶ 28} “(A) The overriding purposes for dispositions under this chapter are to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender’s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender. These purposes shall be achieved by a system of graduated sanctions and services.”
{¶ 29} Leaving the considerations set forth in
{¶ 30} Any adult sentence that the trial court imposes through
{¶ 31}
{¶ 32} “(E)(1) The juvenile court may invoke the adult portion of a person’s serious youthful offender dispositional sentence if the juvenile court finds all of the following on the record by clear and convincing evidence:
{¶ 33} “(a) The person is serving the juvenile portion of a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence.
{¶ 35} “(c) The person engaged in the conduct or acts charged under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section, and the person’s conduct demonstrates that the person is unlikely to be rehabilitated during the remaining period of juvenile jurisdiction.”
{¶ 36} The conduct that can result in the enforcement .of an adult sentence includes committing, while in custody or on parole, an act that is a violation of the rules of the institution or the conditions of supervision and that could be charged as any felony or as a first-degree misdemeanor offense of violence if committed by an adult,
{¶ 37} Pursuant to
{¶ 38} The statutory scheme establishes that a juvenile subject to serious-youthful-offender status, despite the carrot/stick of the possible imposition of an adult sentence, remains squarely in the juvenile court system. The juvenile cannot be sent directly to an adult facility for the acts that led to his serious-youthful-offender status. The juvenile court retains jurisdiction. The juvenile would have to engage in separate conduct detrimental to his own rehabilitation in the juvenile system to be committed to an adult facility. The aims of the juvenile system — and its heightened goals of rehabilitation and treatment — control his disposition. To get the rehabilitative benefit of the juvenile system, the juvenile’s case must remain in juvenile court.
{¶ 39} We therefore next address what jury trial rights a juvenile has in a juvenile proceeding.
Juvenile Courts, the Sixth Amendment, and Due Process
{¶ 40} Juvenile courts “occupy a unique place in our legal system.” In re C.S.,
{¶ 41} This court has held that “numerous constitutional safeguards normally reserved for criminal prosecutions are equally applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings.” State v. Walls,
{¶ 42} For purposes of this case, an important difference remains. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971),
{¶ 43} We note that because D.H. faces the potential imposition of an adult sentence, his case differs in an important respect from the cases of the juveniles in McKeiver and Agler and thus merits separate consideration.
{¶ 44} Constitutional procedural safeguards in the juvenile context find their genesis in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. If D.H. is to find relief, it must be through the Due Process Clause.
{¶ 45} In C.S.,
{¶ 46} In McKeiver, the court considered the case through the prism of Due Process: “[Accepting ‘the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play,’ Gault,
{¶ 47} The court addressed the role of the Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings in Schall,
{¶ 48} “There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. ‘The problem,’ we have stressed, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings.’ In re Gault,
{¶ 49} Because of the state’s stake in the rehabilitation of the juvenile offender and the theoretically paternal role that the state continues to play in juvenile justice, a balanced approach is necessary to preserve the special nature of the juvenile process while protecting procedural fairness:
{¶ 50} “The State has ‘a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,’ Santosky v. Kramer,
{¶ 51} The standard as to whether due process requirements are met is inexact. In C.S.,
{¶ 52} “Because the juvenile’s right to counsel is predicated on due process, it is malleable rather than rigid. As the Supreme Court has explained, ‘For all its consequence, “due process” has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. * * * [D]ue process “is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria [ & Restaurant ] Workers [Union ] v. McElroy [1961],
{¶ 53} We therefore consider whether Ohio’s juvenile blended-sentencing scheme for juveniles meets the requirement of fundamental fairness.
Due Process and Serious-Youthful-Offender Status
{¶ 54} Juvenile courts are unique and are tied to the goal of rehabilitation. The contrast between the purposes of juvenile sentencing and criminal sentencing is illustrative.
{¶ 55} This state is committed to the mission of juvenile courts and should be open to innovation that may help the system reach its important objectives. Early data indicate that the type of blended-sentencing system employed by Ohio has worked well in Minnesota. Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Sentence Blending and the Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle (1999), 28 Hofstra L.Rev. 259, 285. Yet any innovation must meet the test of due process. We conclude that the Ohio statutes addressing discretionary serious-youthful-offender disposition do not offend due process.
{¶ 56} Should a juvenile exercise his right to a jury under
{¶ 57} “If, in its wisdom, any State feels the jury trial is desirable in all cases, or in certain kinds, there appears to be no impediment to its installing a system embracing that feature. That, however, is the State’s privilege and not its obligation.” McKeiver,
{¶ 59} Despite the jury’s role in the adjudicative phase, removing the jury from the dispositional process does not violate due process. The court’s dispositional role is at the heart of the remaining differences between juvenile and adult courts. It is there that the expertise of a juvenile judge is necessary. The judge, given the factors set forth in
{¶ 60} We need not transform juvenile proceedings into full-blown adult trials and dispositions to preserve a juvenile’s due process rights. As the court related in McKeiver, “If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.” McKeiver,
Conclusion
{¶ 61} The constitutional test to be applied in regard to whether a statute violates a juvenile’s jury trial rights is whether the statute meets the requirements of due process and fundamental fairness. We hold that due process does not require a jury determination on the imposition of a serious-youthful-offender dispositional sentence under
Judgment affirmed.