THE STATE EX REL. HATTIE, APPELLEE, v. GOLDHARDT, ACTING CHIEF, ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY, APPELLANT.
No. 92-2057
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
April 27, 1994
69 Ohio St.3d 123 | 1994-Ohio-81
Submitted February 1, 1994. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 91AP-1117.
{¶ 1} Appellee, Terrence W. Hattie, was convicted in 1983 of aggravated robbery and felonious assault and is serving a four-to-twenty-five-year sentence. In this mandamus action, Hattie alleges that the Adult Parole Authority (“APA“) denied him parole on the basis of false information.
{¶ 2} Under the APA‘s “parole guidelines,” the APA fills out a “risk assessment/aggregate score” sheet (hereinafter “scoresheet“) on a candidate for parole. The scoresheet lists certain relevant factors, such as “Number of Prior Felony Convictions (or Juvenile Adjudications),” “Age at Arrest Leading to First Felony Convictions,” “Alcohol Usage Problems,” and “Other Drug Usage Problems.” Each factor is assigned a numerical score: the higher the score, the greater the risk of paroling the inmate. These scores are totaled and converted to a “risk score,” which is added to the “offense score” (based on the type of offense) and “institution score” (based on behavior in prison) to yield an “aggregate score.” The parole board then consults a chart, which recommends an outcome based on the aggregate score and the degree of the inmate‘s felony. These guidelines are not codified in the
{¶ 4} As to “Other Drug Usage Problems,” the APA placed Hattie in the category “Frequent abuse; serious disruption [of functioning]; needs treatment,” resulting in four points. APA records indicate that Hattie has abused drugs since age thirteen and admitted having a drug problem in 1989.
{¶ 5} Hattie‘s total score was thirty-two, yielding a risk score of three and an aggregate score of four. Parole was denied. Hattie has received identical scores on subsequent scoresheets.
{¶ 6} On October 7, 1991, Hattie filed this action in the court of appeals. He sought a writ of mandamus ordering the APA to “correct [his] risk assessment score sheet.” Hattie claimed that, because his 1983 aggravated robbery and felonious assault convictions are his only felony convictions, his scores for “Prior Felony Convictions (or Juvenile Adjudications)” and “Age at Arrest Leading to First Felony Conviction” are too high. Hattie further claimed that he has no drug problem causing “serious disruption in functioning.”
{¶ 7} The court of appeals overruled a motion to dismiss, holding that the APA has a clear legal duty, rooted in the
{¶ 9} The cause is before us on appeal as of right.
Terrence W. Hattie, pro se.
Lee Fisher, Attorney General, and Donald A. Cataldi, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Gloria Eyerly, Ohio Public Defender, and Kenneth R. Spiert, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender Commission.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 10} To obtain a writ of mandamus, the relator must show that he has a clear legal right to the relief requested, the respondent has a clear legal duty to grant it, and no adequate remedy at law exists to vindicate the claimed right. State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 6 OBR 50, 50-51, 451 N.E.2d 225, 226-227. The court of appeals found that respondent had a clear legal duty to “correct” Hattie‘s scoresheet, a duty derived from the Due Process Clause.1
{¶ 11} We cannot agree. The
{¶ 12} “There is no constitutional or inherent right * * * to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex (1979), 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2104, 60 L.Ed.2d 668, 675. A prisoner who is denied parole is not thereby deprived of “liberty” if state law makes the parole decision discretionary. State ex rel. Blake v. Shoemaker (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 42, 4 OBR 86, 446 N.E.2d 169; State ex rel. Ferguson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 355, 356, 544 N.E.2d 674, 675.
{¶ 13} Under
{¶ 14} Two federal cases do hold that a parole candidate has a due process right to have errors expunged from his records. See Paine v. Baker (C.A.4, 1979), 595 F.2d 197, cited by the court of appeals, and Monroe v. Thigpen (C.A.11, 1991), 932 F.2d 1437. However, we find neither case persuasive. Paine, a pre-Greenholtz case, did not consider whether the state‘s parole laws created a liberty interest. In Monroe, the court recognized that the state‘s law did not create a liberty interest in parole, 932 F.2d at 1441, yet held that the state behaved “arbitrarily and capriciously” in retaining concededly false information in the prisoner‘s file. Id. at 1442. The Monroe court simply failed to recognize that a state action cannot violate procedural due process unless it deprives someone of “life, liberty, or property.”
{¶ 15} Because Hattie is not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, he cannot invoke due process to challenge his scoresheet. Thus, he has failed to demonstrate that the APA has a clear legal duty to change his scores. It follows that he is not entitled to the writ of mandamus, and the court of appeals erred in granting it.
{¶ 16} We note that, even if Hattie had a due process right to an accurate scoresheet, he did not prove the scoresheet inaccurate. Instead, the court of appeals effectively required the APA to prove its accuracy, and thus misallocated the burden of persuasion. See State ex rel. Temke v. Outcalt (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 189, 190, 3 O.O.3d 248, 249, 360 N.E.2d 701, 702; Hill v. State (Ala.Crim.App. 1992), 594 So.2d 246, 248.
{¶ 17} The court of appeals found that “Hattie was never * * * adjudicated a juvenile delinquent based upon felony conduct.” That finding is not supported by evidence. Hattie‘s 1977 delinquency adjudication was for receiving stolen property, which can be either a felony or a misdemeanor. See
{¶ 18} Hattie has failed to show that the APA has a clear legal duty to alter his scoresheet. The Due Process Clause has no application here, for Hattie is not being deprived of liberty. Consequently, the court of appeals improperly awarded the writ of mandamus, and its judgment must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., A.W. SWEENEY, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
