BUTLER, APPELLEE, v. JORDAN ET AL.; CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, APPELLANT.
No. 99-1816
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Submitted September 12, 2000—Decided July 25, 2001.
92 Ohio St.3d 354 | 2001-Ohio-204
APPEAL frоm the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 74509.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
- Within the meaning of
R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) ,R.C. 5104.11 does not expressly impose liability on a political subdivision for failure to inspect or for the negligent certification of a type-B family day-care home even where the political subdivision has completely ignored the obligations imposed upon it by the statute. - Within the meaning of
R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) , no other section of the Revised Code expressly imposes liability on a political subdivision for failure to inspect or for the negligent certification of a type-B family day-care home.
DOUGLAS, J.
{¶ 1} According to appellee‘s complaint, Geraldine Jordan was the operator and primary care giver at Guardian Angel Day Care (“Guardian Angel“). Guardian
{¶ 2} On the morning of April 6, 1995, Venisha Butler, appellee, placed her eight-month-old son, Aaron, and two-year-old son, Sam, in the care of Jordan and Guardian Angel. At approximately 3:15 p.m., that same day, Butler returned to Guardian Angel to pick up her children. When Jordan brought Aaron out to his mother, Aaron was not breathing and his body was cold. Butler noticed that there was a sticky substance around Aaron‘s nose and mouth. When Aaron failed to respond to CPR, an ambulance was called. Aaron could not be revived and was pronounced dead on arrival at University Hospitals Rainbow Babies and Children‘s Hospital. The sticky substance on Aaron‘s face was the residue of tape that had been placed over Aaron‘s nose and mouth.
{¶ 3} On January 22, 1997, Butler filed a complaint in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County, naming Jordan, Guardian Angel, and CCDHS as defendants. The complaint alleged that CCDHS, appellant, was negligent and/or reckless in the licensing and certification of Guardian Angel, and that its negligence or recklessness was the proximate cause of Aaron‘s death. On May 16, 1997, CCDHS filed a
{¶ 4} The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County reversed the judgment of the trial court. The court of appeals held that
R.C. Chapter 5104
{¶ 5}
{¶ 6} Former
“[A]fter receipt of an application for certification from a type-B family day-care home, the county director of human services shall inspect and, if it complies with this chapter and any applicable rules adopted under this chapter, certify the type-B family day-care home to provide publicly funded child day-care pursuant to this chapter and any rules adopted under it.” (Emphasis added.) Sub.H.B. No. 155, 144 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3317.
{¶ 7} Former
“The director of a county department of human services, as part of the process of certification of type-B family day-care homes, shall request the superintendent of the bureau of criminal identification and investigation to conduct a criminal records check with respect to any authorized provider of a certified type-B family day-care home and any person eighteen years of age or older who resides
in a certified type-B family day-care home.”3 (Emphasis added.) Am.Sub.H.B. No. 687, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6949.
{¶ 8} Butler alleged in her complaint that CCDHS “was negligent and/or reckless in licensing and certifying Defendant Guardian Angel to provide day care services to infants.” In support of her complaint, Butler argues that Guardian Angel was a certified type-B family day-care home subject to inspections by CCDHS and that CCDHS failed to perform the mandatory criminal background checks on Guardian Angel‘s day-care providers.4
R.C. Chapter 2744
{¶ 9}
“In addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1) to (4) of this section, a political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property when liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code * * *. Liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because a responsibility is imposed
upon a political subdivision or because of a general authorization that a political subdivision may sue and be sued.”
{¶ 10} Appellant argues that within the meaning of
{¶ 11} In order to determine the immunity of a political subdivision pursuant to the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, a three-tiered analysis of
{¶ 12} Within the meaning of
{¶ 13} Appellee, like the court of appeals, relies upon Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Cleveland (1994), 99 Ohio App.3d 674, 679, 651 N.E.2d 1015, 1018, to support the proposition that a statute, by imposing an express duty, also imposes express liability. However,
{¶ 14} The tragedy of this case is that appellant is able to shuck its clear duties and responsibilities, as are other political subdivisions, on the sole basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. What is this doctrine that permits the government to injure its citizens with impunity? How can a government be immune from liability for an act for which that same government would impose liability upon one of its citizens? The answer is that “government,” whoever that may be, has accorded itself the right to negligently injure its citizens with immunity, all in disregard of constitutional protections reserved by its citizens to themselves.
The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
{¶ 15} Appellee did not raise the constitutionality of
{¶ 16} However, given the allegations of this case, that a child was placed in the care of a person and her facility, that the facility was to be inspected and approved by the Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services, that the background of the care givers was to be checked, that the political subdivision entirely failed to comply with these statutory mandates before the facility was certified, and that when returned to his mother at the end of the work day, the child was dead, having been smothered with duct tape, it does seem that serious questions arise. This is especially true given the allegation that even though the political subdivision entirely failed to carry out its statutorily mandated duties, the political subdivision is found not to be liable, on the basis that it pleads that it is immune, pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It does, indeed, seem fair to ask, “How can this be the law?”
History
{¶ 17} The history of sovereign immunity and how we find ourselves where we do in Ohio today is most interesting. The history of the doctrine in this country is associated with the English common-law concept that “the king can do no wrong.” See Haas v. Hayslip (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 135, 140, 5 O.O.3d 110, 113, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (William B. Brown, J., dissenting).5 That concept evolved from the personal prerogatives of the King of England, who was considered the fount of justice and equity in the English common-law. In the English feudal system, the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in his own courts. See 1 Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2 Ed.1968) 518. The king, as highest feudal lord, enjoyed this protection on the theory that no court was above him. Id. Further, the king was considered the supreme power and was, thus, infallible. His person was considered sacred, and the law ascribed to him the attribute of sovereignty. Therefore, it was his personal
royal prerogative not to be subjected to suit in his own courts. See, generally, Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924), 34 Yale L.J. 1, 4. Accordingly, the king could do no wrong.
{¶ 18} Although the notion of sovereign immunity is best suited to a government of royal power, American courts nonetheless accepted the doctrine in the early days of the republic. See Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 1033. However, courts and commentators have remained mystified why the doctrine was ever accepted in this country. Borchard expressed his bafflement this way:
“Nothing seems more clear than that this immunity of the King from the jurisdiction of the King‘s courts was purely personal. How it came to be applied in the United States of America, where the [royal] prerogative is unknown, is one of the mysteries of legal evolution. Admitting its application to the sovereign and its illogical ascription as an attribute of sovereignty generally, it is not easy to appreciate its application to the United States, where the location of sovereignty—undivided sovereignty, as orthodox theory demands—is a difficult undertaking. It is beyond doubt that the Executive in the United States is not historically the sovereign, and the legislature, which is perhaps the depository of the widest powers, is restrained by constitutional limitations. The federal government is one of delegated powers and the states are not sovereign, according to the Constitution, as demonstrated forcibly by the Civil War and the resulting Amendments. That brings us to the only remaining alternative, that sovereignty resides in the American electorate or the people.” (Footnotes omitted.) Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. at 4-5. See, also, Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist. (1961), 55 Cal.2d 211, 214-216, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 90-92, 359 P.2d 457, 458-460.
{¶ 19} Indeed, the Declaration of Independence is an expression of why this country chose to sever ties with English rule. In the strongest terms the forefathеrs of this country stated that we are endowed with “certain unalienable Rights, that
{¶ 20} In his dissenting opinion in Haas, supra, 51 Ohio St.2d at 140, 5 O.O.3d at 113, 364 N.E.2d at 1379, Justice William B. Brown summed up the entire matter by stating, “It is something of an anomaly that the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity which is based on the concept that ‘the king can do no wrong’ was ever adopted by the American courts.” (Footnote omitted.) Further, the United States Supreme Court has also indicated that there is no rational justification in American jurisprudence for the English legal maxim “the King can do no wrong.” Specifically, in Langford v. United States (1879), 101 U.S. 341, 343, 25 L.Ed. 1010, 1011, the court stated, “We do not understand that either in reference to the government of the United States, or of the several States, or of any of their officers, the English maxim has an existence in this country.”
{¶ 21} The rule of county or local district immunity did not originate with the concept of sovereign immunity. Indeed, legal authorities agree that the concept of local governmental immunity can be traced to the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon (K.B.1788), 100 Eng.Rep. 359, and the misapplication of Russell by a Massachusetts court in 1812.
{¶ 22} In Russell, the plaintiffs’ wagon was damaged as a consequence of a bridge being out of repair. The plaintiffs sued the inhabitants of the unincorporated county for trespass on the case. However, the court denied recovery on the basis that the inhabitants were not incorporated and, thus, there was no fund from which a judgment could have been paid. In support of the holding, one member of the court said that “it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.” Id. at 362.
{¶ 23} The rule of Russell was first introduced into this country in Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester (1812), 9 Mass. 247, 1812 WL 927. In Mower, a stagecoach belonging to the plaintiff, Ephraim Mower, was traveling through the town of Leicester when one of his horses was fatally injured as a consequence of a bridge being out of repair. The plaintiff sued the inhabitants of Leicester, and a verdict was returned in his favor. In contrast to the county in Russell, the town of Leicester was incorporated and had a public treasury out of which any judgment could have been рaid. However, ignoring the fact that Leicester was incorporated and that Mower was thus clearly distinguishable from Russell, the Massachusetts court held that no recovery could be had against the townspeople unless the recovery was authorized by statute. Mower, 9 Mass. at 250. This rule of local government immunity then became the general American rule. See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. at 41-42; and Muskopf, supra. However, a reading of Mower demonstrates that there existed no logical reason in that case for recovery to have been denied. In the words of Justice William B. Brown, “[t]he common-law precedent for municipal immunity (Russell v. Devon [1788], 100 Eng.Rep. 359), denied recovery because of the absence of a ‘corporation fund’ from which satisfaction could be made. Since the Mower case did not deal with a lack of a corporate fund, it was essentially decided on the grounds of which party should bear the loss.” Haas, supra, 51 Ohio St.2d at 140, 5 O.O.3d at 113, 364 N.E.2d at 1380, fn. 3 (William B. Brown, J., dissenting).
{¶ 24} Ohio courts in the early 1800s did not share the view that local government units were immune from liability. Rather, “[d]uring the period immediately following Mower and, indeed, throughout the early 1800‘s, Ohio courts favored imposition of liability on local government units. Concerned primarily with establishing a rule that promoted ‘substantial justice,’ Ohio courts considered municipal corporations and individuals equally responsible in tort.
{¶ 25} The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first applied in Ohio in 1840 in State v. Franklin Bank of Columbus (1840), 10 Ohio 91, 1840 WL 18. See Celebrezze & Hull, The Rise and Fall of Sovereign Immunity in Ohio, supra, 32 Cleve.St.L.Rev. at 369. However, Franklin Bank of Columbus involved the liability of the state of Ohio—not a political subdivision of the state. It was not until the 1854 case of Dayton v. Pease (1854), 4 Ohio St. 80, 1854 WL 63, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was expanded to include political subdivisions (municipal corporations) of the state. See Celebrezze & Hull, The Rise and Fall of Sovereign Immunity in Ohio, supra, 32 Cleve.St.L.Rev. at 370. See, also, Comment, The Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, supra, 55 U.Cin.L.Rev. at 502. Prior to our 1854 decision in Pease, Ohio courts had imposed
{¶ 26} In the first of these, Goodloe v. Cincinnati (1831), 4 Ohio 500, 1831 WL 35, the defendant, Cincinnati, performed streеt repairs that included the excavation of the existing street that abutted the plaintiff‘s house and paved alleyway. The plaintiff brought an action alleging that the defendant, while grading an adjacent street, maliciously damaged his walls and basement. While the allegation of malice suggests some form of intentional act, the facts support nothing more than a claim of simple negligence. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff; however, on appeal the court of appeals reversed. On appeal, this court reinstated the trial court‘s judgment, holding, “When a corporation acts illegally or maliciously, we conceive it ought to be made directly responsible. Such is the plain dictate of justice, and we see no technical rule of law that forbids us to act upon it.” Id. at 514. In reaching our conclusion we reasoned that municipal corporations in this country were performing all manner of operations for their own benefit and that “[w]hatever may have been the ancient doctrines, with regard to liability of corporations, for wrongs done by their agents, courts have gradually departed from them, and adopted principles more congenial to the state and condition of the world.” Id. at 513.
{¶ 27} Smith v. Cincinnati (1831), 4 Ohio 514, 1831 WL 36, was decided on the same basis as Goodloe. However, in contrast to the decision in Goodloe, this court in Smith noted that the plaintiff did not allege that the actions of the city
{¶ 28} In Rhodes v. Cleveland (1840), 10 Ohio 159, 1840 WL 31, this court further clarified the law with regard to the liability of political subdivisions. Rhodes involved a political subdivision digging drainage ditches that later flooded the plaintiff‘s land. This court reversed a verdict in favor of the political subdivision, where the jury was charged that the plaintiff could sustain his claim only if he showed that the defendant acted illegally or, if within its authority, acted maliciously. We forthrightly held that “corporations [political subdivisions] are liable like individuals, for injuries done, although the act was not beyond their lawful powers.” Id. at 161. Thus, the court no longer confined its determinations of political subdivision liability to instances wherе the political subdivision had acted beyond the scope of its authority or had acted maliciously.
{¶ 29} Rhodes also stated that it did “not look so much for precedents as to the following out of incontestable principles; for the current of decisions, for a long time, has been to increase the liabilities of corporations.” Id. The court further reasoned that “justice and good morals require that a corporation should repair a consequential injury which ensues from the exercise of its functions.” Id. at 161. Chief Justice Lane wrote, “Every year furnishes new examples, of the extension of remedies against them, where injury is done, and remedies are applicable. It does not, therefore, appear to me to be a sufficient reason, against sustaining this suit, that in other states the remedy is not extended so far.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
{¶ 30} In McCombs v. Town Council of Akron (1846), 15 Ohio 474, 1846 WL 120, the plaintiff alleged that the political subdivision, while grading a street, damaged the plaintiff‘s house and property. As in Goodloe, the facts of this case reflect nothing more than what we refer to today as simplе negligence. The plaintiff asked the trial court to charge the jury that if the political subdivision caused injury
{¶ 31} On appeal to the Supreme Court en banc, the court reversed, relying on Rhodes, and held that a political subdivision is liable for injuries resulting to the property of others from its act, though strictly within its corporate authority. In reaching its conclusion, McCombs questioned the genesis of corporate immunity and stated, “A sort of transcendentalism which enveloped both the courts and the profession in a mist growing out of the airy nothingness of the subject matter, enabled corporations, like pestilence which walketh unseen, to do their mischief and escape the responsibility.” Id. at 480. This court further declared, “‘That the rights of one should be so used as not to impair the rights of another, is a principle of morals which, from very remote ages, has been recognized аs a maxim of law.‘” Id., quoting Rhodes, 10 Ohio at 160. The case was remanded to the trial court.
{¶ 32} Upon remand, the trial court issued jury instructions in accordance with the law set forth by this court, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Three years after the case was remanded it was appealed once again to this court. In Town Council of Akron v. McCombs (1849), 18 Ohio 229, 1849 WL 105, the political subdivision claimed that the first decision in McCombs v. Town Council of Akron (1846), 15 Ohio 474, 1846 WL 120, had introduced a new doctrine of “doubtful propriety.” Id., 18 Ohio at 230. In response, this court restated its reliance upon Rhodes as being the first decision in this state which recognized that an action “sounding in tort, would lie against a municipal corporation by name, for an act done within the powers granted by its charter.” Id. at 231. This court held once again that the political subdivision “will be held liable to the party injured, to make good his loss.” Id. at 232.
{¶ 33} The cases of Goodloe and Smith were ultimately tried before juries. See Smith v. Cincinnati (1831), 4 Ohio 514, 1831 WL 36, Reporter‘s Note. Rhodes and McCombs, too, were tried before juries. Each case involved an action sounding in negligence or, more particularly, an action for trespass on the case. It was not until Dayton v. Pease (1854), 4 Ohio St. 80, 1854 WL 63, that political subdivision immunity was discussed as a defense to the negligent acts of political subdivisions.
{¶ 34} In Pease, the defendant political subdivision, pursuant to a plan provided by the city engineer, began constructing a bridge over a canal. During the construction the bridge collapsed into the canal and blocked the water flow of the canal. The plaintiff owned a mill upstream from the fallen bridge, whose operation was prevented first by rising water, then by diversion of water upstream of the mill so that the wreckage could be cleared. The plaintiff sued the defendant for “wrongfully and injuriously” constructing a bridge that was so inartfully constructed that it fell into the canal and dammed up the water preventing the plaintiff from the use of his mill. In essence, the plaintiff claimed negligence. This court found that the political subdivision was liable for injuries resulting from the negligent acts of its agents, who were authorized and directed by the political subdivision.
{¶ 35} Pease distinguished Rhodes and both McCombs cases as holding that a political subdivision may be liable for acts through its agents, within the scope of its authority, and without malice or negligence. Pease, 4 Ohio St. at 94. Pease uses the term negligence to represent the carelessness of the city engineer in carrying out a task established by the political subdivision. The court in Pease distinguished Rhodes and both McCombs cases on the basis that, in Pease, the employee did not carry out the task carefully and skillfully, whereas in Rhodes and both McCombs cases, there were no allegations that the employees deviated from any directives placed upon them by the political subdivision, and, thus, the damages were not attributable to negligence. However, the facts as alleged in Pease, Rhodes,
{¶ 36} Additionally, and contrary to the assertions in Pease, Rhodes did not predicate a political subdivision‘s liability upon a finding of negligence, maliciousness, or lack of authority. Rhodes held only that “corporations are liable like individuals, for injuries done, although the act was not beyond their lawful powers.” Rhodes, 10 Ohio at 161. As a result of this discussion, it is clear that Pease failed to appreciably distinguish Rhodes and both McCombs cases, and did not even address Goodloe and Smith. Furthermore, Pease misused Rhodes to apply limitations on political subdivision liability that were clearly not intended.
{¶ 37} Pease, as a basis for reinvestigating the doctrines upon which Rhodes and McCombs were founded, had to distinguish those cases. Pease, 4 Ohio St. at 94. In furtherance of this, Pease discussed a number of New York cases that developed theories of political subdivision immunity and exceptions thereto, including governmental versus proprietary functions and ministerial versus discretionary acts. Yet in its discussion of these theories, Pease disregards the clear intention of Rhodes, which did not place any limitations on political subdivision liability beyond that which would apply to an individual. Finally, despite its discussions of political subdivision immunity, Pease ultimately found that the political subdivision was liable for the collapse of the bridge. Pease, 4 Ohio St. at 100-101.
{¶ 38} In addition to Goodloe, Smith, Rhodes, and McCombs, there is some evidence that the common law of this country at the time the Ohio Constitution was adopted in 1851 actually recognized no impediments to recovery against a corporate political subdivision of the state. In Hack v. Salem (1963), 174 Ohio St. 383, 392, 23 O.O.2d 34, 38, 189 N.E.2d 857, 862, Justice Gibson stated in a concurring opinion, “In the early reported American cases it apparently was assumed, without argument and as a matter of basic justice, that municipal
{¶ 39} Further, even if Ohio courts recognized immunity for corporate political subdivisions at the time of the adoption of the 1851 Ohio Constitution, such immunity apparently originated as an extension of the concept that “the King can do no wrong.” However, as shown above, it appears that the historic justification for that English maxim never existed in this country. Therefore, it follows that the common law of this country should never have recognized such an impediment to an action against a political subdivision. Alternatively, county or local district immunity could have been predicated on the 1788 case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng.Rep. 359. If so, any grant of immunity might have been the product of an enormous judicial mistake. Russell does not stand for the proposition that there exists county or local district immunity from liability for negligence. Indeed, just the opposite is true. That is, a careful reading of Russell indicates that recovery most likely would have been allowed had the defendants in the action been an incorporated governmental entity with a public treasury from which a judgment could have been paid. Therefore, the common law of this country actually recognizes no rational justification for extending immunity to political subdivisions of the state.
{¶ 40} Thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity for political subdivisions was judicially created. As such, the doctrine could be judicially abolished. This court did so in Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 2 OBR 572, 442 N.E.2d 749. In Haverlack we recognized that sovereign or governmental immunity was judicially created and, thus, could be judicially abolished:
“As aptly stated by Justice William B. Brown in Haas, supra [51 Ohio St.2d 135, 145, 5 O.O.3d 110, 116, 364 N.E.2d 1376, 1382], ‘the judicially created doctrine of sovereign immunity is a legal anachronism which denies recovery to injured individuals without regard to the municipality‘s culpability or the individual‘s need for compensation.’ * * * Because Ohio‘s sovereign immunity for municipalities was judicially created (see State v. Franklin Bank of Columbus [1840], 10 Ohio 91; Western College of Homeopathic Medicine v. Cleveland [1861], 12 Ohio St. 375 [1861 WL 41]; and Thacker v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. [1973], 35 Ohio St.2d 49, 67-68 [64 O.O.2d 28, 38, 298 N.E.2d 542, 552-553] [William B. Brown, J., dissenting]), it can be judicially abolished. * * * When we considered sovereign immunity last year, we nоted that only six other states adhered to the traditional common law immunity doctrines. Schenkolewski v. [Cleveland] Metroparks System (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 38 [21 O.O.3d 19, 24, 426 N.E.2d 784, 788-789]. Stare decisis alone is not a sufficient reason to retain the doctrine which serves no purpose and produces such harsh results. Therefore, we join with the other states in abrogating the doctrine.” Haverlack, 2 Ohio St.3d at 30, 2 OBR at 575, 442 N.E.2d at 752.
{¶ 41} Haverlack implies that sovereign immunity for municipalities was accepted in this state by 1840 in Franklin Bank of Columbus, supra. However, Franklin Bank of Columbus actually says that no suit can be brought against the state—not a political subdivision of the state. The other early case cited by the Haverlack court as creating sovereign immunity for municipalities was W. College of Homeopathic Medicine v. Cleveland (1861), 12 Ohio St. 375, 1861 WL
{¶ 42} Although the court found no justification for sovereign immunity for municipalities, it went on to state, “We hold that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available, in the absence of a statutе providing immunity, to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the negligent operation of a sewage treatment plant. A municipal corporation, unless immune by statute, is liable for its negligence in the performance or nonperformance of its acts.” (Emphasis added.) Haverlack, 2 Ohio St.3d at 30, 2 OBR at 575, 442 N.E.2d at 752; see, also, paragraph two of the syllabus. These statements, however, were made without citation to any authority and without consideration of Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 43} The abolishment of “sovereign immunity” by this court set in motion activity by the General Assembly. In 1985, the General Assembly enacted
{¶ 44} Since the enactment of
{¶ 45} Accordingly, the only cases that are pertinent for discussion on political subdivision tort liability are those which interpret
{¶ 46} Thus, as recently as March of this year, this court decided Muenchenbach v. Preble Cty. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 141, 742 N.E.2d 1128, holding that a four-wheeled tractor equipped with a street-sweeping brush on the front and a scraper blade on the back, and being used in construction work, might be a motor vehicle “employed in general highway transportation.” In writing for the court, Justice Resnick said that “for purposes of
{¶ 47} In 1999, this court decided Perkins v. Norwood City Schools (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 191, 707 N.E.2d 868, with Chief Justice Moyer writing for the court. There we held that a school district was not entitled to immunity, pursuant to
{¶ 48} In Cater v. Cleveland (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 697 N.E.2d 610, syllabus, we held, “The operation of a municipal swimming pool, although defined as a governmental function in
{¶ 49} In Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 139, 624 N.E.2d 704, a nearly unanimous court found that a wave pool is not a swimming pool: “In the present case, the Surf‘s Up Aquatic Center operated by the city was not merely a “swimming pool.” The wave activation device at this facility materially transformed the pool from a placid body of water, commonly known as a swimming pool, to a potentially hazardous body of churning water. A wave pool is more akin to an amusement ride, which is not an immunized municipal function according to
{¶ 50} In 1997, Hill v. Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 679 N.E.2d 1109, was decided. Therein, an independent contractor was hired to assist Urbana in improving its water distribution system. The project was under the supervision of Urbana‘s Water Department supervisоr. Hill, an employee of the independent contractor, was injured when the water pressure blew the valve off the pipe being worked on by Hill. The water was turned on prior to Hill‘s completion of his task, contrary to his specific requests. We held that because maintenance and operation of a municipal corporation water supply system is a proprietary function of a political subdivision under
{¶ 51} The forgoing sample listing of cases is by no means all-inclusive. There have been, and continue to be, many more. We have not, of course, been alone in this struggle. Courts of appeals all across this state continue to confront fact patterns presenting claims of sovereign immunity when the results of so finding would be inequitable at best and disastrous at worst.
{¶ 52} In Groves v. Dayton Pub. Schools (1999), 132 Ohio App.3d 566, 725 N.E.2d 734, a disabled student sued a school district seeking damages for injuries she suffered as a result of a district bus driver‘s alleged negligence in failing to secure her in her wheelchair when helping her off the bus. The statute being construed,
{¶ 53} In Hunsche v. Loveland (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 535, 729 N.E.2d 393, a political subdivision owned a park outside its corporate limits. On this land the city deposited a large pile of dirt. The city failed to maintain effective erosion control measures, thus dramatically increasing the amount of water and sediment draining from the park into the pond of neighboring property owners. The First District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court‘s determination that the political subdivision was not immune from suit and that the city engaged in willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. Id. at 542, 729 N.E.2d at 397-398.
{¶ 54} As recently as December of last year, the Tenth District Court of Appeals decided Hunter v. Columbus (2000), 139 Ohio App.3d 962, 746 N.E.2d 246, discretionary appeal denied (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1493, 745 N.E.2d 439. For purposes of summary judgment there was evidence that a driver of an emergency vehicle, driving sixty-one m.p.h. in a thirty-five m.p.h. speed zone and driving left of center, crashed into a vehicle operated by plaintiff‘s decedent, thereby causing the death of plaintiff‘s decedent. The court held that the city was not entitled to immunity, because the driver‘s conduct could be found to be willful and wanton misconduct under
{¶ 55} Once again, the foregoing examples are just that—examples.7 They are but a few examples of necessity being the mother of invention and resulting in
{¶ 56} A review of these cases indicates that the exceptions to the rule of sovereign immunity are so numerous as to threaten to subsume the rule itself. The reason should be clear. This usually happens when a rule itself is faulty, i.e., is not soundly based in legal history or the law. That is the case of the concept of sovereign immunity for political subdivisions. We have already reviewed, above, the legal history of the doctrine. That leaves yet to be discussed why the doctrine is also faulty when the Ohio Constitution (the law) is examined.
Trial by Jury
{¶ 57} The right to trial by jury derives from the Magna Carta. It is reasserted in both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Ohio. Even before the adoption of a state constitution, the first laws governing the territory of Ohio provided for the right to a trial by jury, stating, “No man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Article 2, Ordinance of July 13, 1787. For centuries, the right to a jury trial has been held to be a fundamental constitutional right. See Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday (1933), 127 Ohio St. 278, 284, 188 N.E. 1, 3. It is a substantive right, not a mere procedural privilege. See id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, and Kneisley v. Lattimer-Stevens Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 354, 356, 533 N.E.2d 743, 746.
{¶ 58} The right to trial by jury is one of the most fundamentally democratic institutions in the history of the human race. Throughout history, the right to trial by jury has been considered the crown jewel of our liberty. “For 500 years, trial by jury has been praised as the most cherished institution of free and intelligent
{¶ 59} The founders of this great nation held the right to trial by jury in very high esteem. Prior to the ratification of our nation‘s Constitution, in a letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson expressed concern regarding the omission of a right to trial by jury in the proposed bill of rights. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Padover Ed.1967) 312. In particular, Jefferson recognized that several states had been “so incautious as to dispense” with the right to trial by jury and that to go forward without the right would reduce the more prudent states to the same level of “calamity” as those states that had dispensed with it. Id. Jefferson considered the exclusion of the right by other states and found it “much more just and wise to have concluded the other way, that as most of the States had preserved with jealousy this sacred palladium of liberty, those who had wandered, should be brought back to it; and to have established a general right rather than a general wrong.” Id. Following the ratification of our nation‘s Constitution, while presenting the proposed Bill of Rights to the House of Representatives, James Madison stated that the civil jury is “one of the best securities of the rights of the people [which] ought to remain inviolate.” 1 Few, In Defense of Trial by Jury (1993) 74. Thomas Jefferson lauded the right to a jury trial as among the principles that “[t]he wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes” had been devoted to attain. He urged, “[S]hould we wander from them in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety.” The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Padover Ed.1967) 274. Our forefathers were willing to sacrifice their very lives to preserve for the people of the United States of America the inestimable right to trial by jury.
{¶ 60} In the words of United States Supreme Court Justice (now Chief Justice) William J. Rehnquist, “The fоunders of our Nation considered the right of
{¶ 61} The Ohio Constitution recognizes the fundamental right to trial by jury in
“The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less than three-fourths of the jury.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 62} It is difficult to imagine a more forceful way of saying that the right to trial by jury should in no way be infringed.
{¶ 63}
{¶ 64}
{¶ 66} Additionally, the concept of sovereign immunity is applicable in this country (if at all) to the federal and state governments—not to the political subdivisions of the state. See, generally, Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts (5 Ed.1984) 1033, 1043 and 1051, Section 131. Corporate political subdivisions of the state are not sovereign powers. By definition, a “sovereign” is “[a] person, body, or state vested with independent and supreme authority.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 1401. “Sovereignty” means “[t]he supreme political authority of an independent state.” Id. at 1402. In this regard, a political subdivision of a state government cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered a sovereign power.
{¶ 67} Finally, a review of the constitutional and statutory provisions with respect to sovereign immunity is instructive.
{¶ 69} Therefore, pursuant to
2. Conclusion
{¶ 70} The fаcts of this case are tragic. Nevertheless, unless
{¶ 71} We leave this subject for now with three additional thoughts. First, we do not say, and we do not mean to say, that CCDHS was negligent or did anything wrong in this case. The case was dismissed on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion which, of course, requires us to view all of the allegations of the complaint as true. The only issue before us is whether CCDHS is statutorily immune regardless of any negligence on its part.
{¶ 72} Second, a finding that the concept of sovereign immunity is anathema to the thoughts of the founding fathers of our republic or is unconstitutional on the basis of the right to trial by jury or the right to remedy would not be the end of the world. If a political subdivision has an array of reasonable rules and regulations for dealing with its citizens in the performance of its duties, and it and its employees follow those rules, then actions they take that cause injury would not be negligence and, accordingly, there would be no liability—and no need for immunity. If the rules are ignored and negligence ensues and injury results, then the political subdivision can (and most now do) insure itself to compensate those who have suffered as a result of the negligence. This is no different from what, in many instances, the political subdivision requires of its citizens.
{¶ 73} Third, and maybe most important, applying such broad immunity to governmental wrongdoers gives no encouragement to do right, and no liability or penalty for doing wrong. When there is no accountability for failure, failure is sure to follow.9
{¶ 75} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
Judgment accordingly.
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur in syllabus and judgment.
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., separately concur in syllabus and judgment.
SUSAN BROWN, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J.
COOK, J., concurring in judgment.
{¶ 76} Because I agree that
{¶ 77} The constitutionality of
{¶ 79} As instructive and important as the history of political subdivision immunity may be, however, it is of diminished significance when assessing the continued viability of the doctrine today. The General Assembly responded to Haverlack, Enghauser Mfg., and Zents by enacting the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, declaring that political subdivisions would be liable in tort only as set forth in
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Sandra Curtis-Patrick and Arline M. Zehe, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
Novak, Robenalt, Pavlik & Scharf, L.L.P., William J. Novak, Thomas D. Robenalt and David W. Skall, for appellee.