STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY MEADOWS, Defendant-Appellant.
Case No. 20CA3734
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY
2022-Ohio-287
[Cite as State v. Meadows, 2022-Ohio-287.]
APPEARANCES:
Roger Soroka and Joshua Bedtelyon, Soroka & Associates, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Assistant Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas Court judgment entry convicting Appellant, Jeffrey Meadows, of one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a second-degree felony in violation of
FACTS
{¶2} This matter stems from the traffic stop of Jeffrey Meadows by Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Atwood in Ross County, Ohio, on US 23 South during the afternoon of August 29, 2019. The record before us reveals that Trooper Atwood was sitting stationary on US 23 observing southbound traffic when he noticed Meadows’ vehicle pass by. The record indicates that the trooper noticed a loud and unusual sound emanating from the vehicle, and he also noticed Meadows sitting rigidly in the driver‘s seat, leaning up towards the steering wheel. Upon observing Meadows’ vehicle pass by, Trooper Atwood then observed Meadows’ vehicle travel over the solid white line by over a tire width until it was out of sight.
{¶3} Trooper Atwood pulled out and eventually caught up with Meadows. Upon catching up with him, he observed Meadows move from the left lane to the right lane without signaling. After confirming Meadows’ vehicle was, in fact, the vehicle that passed by that was making a loud noise, Trooper Atwood activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop. Upon stopping, Meadows can be seen on the
{¶4} In addition to Meadows, there were two female passengers in the vehicle. Trooper Atwood asked Meadows to step out of the vehicle and when he did, it appears from the video that something may have fallen, to which Trooper Atwood responded by asking Meadows if that was his “burner.” Meadows responded in the negative and could not produce a driver‘s license or identification card. Trooper Atwood thereafter took him to the front of his cruiser where he patted him down. He then placed Meadows in the front seat and proceeded to ask him for identifying information, including his social security number, in order to run it through the system. He also asked him who owned the vehicle. There was some confusion over who the owner was.1 As such, Trooper Atwood moved Meadows to the back seat, which he explained was a safety precaution. Meadows was not handcuffed at this time, although the door was shut and the window was open. Trooper Atwood then went to speak with the passengers in the vehicle. Both passengers denied ownership of the vehicle.
{¶6} After being bound over to the common pleas court, however, Meadows was only indicted on one count of aggravated possession of drugs on December 6,
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS VEHICLE.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Meadows contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained after what he describes as an unlawful search and seizure of his vehicle. He raises four arguments under this assignment of error. He first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained after a traffic stop
Standard of Review
{¶8} Generally, “appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained as follows:
When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
(Citations omitted.) Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶9} ”
{¶10} ” ‘[S]earches [and seizures] conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by [a] judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” (Citations omitted.) State v. Conley, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1091, 2019-Ohio-4172, ¶ 17, quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). “Once a defendant demonstrates that he or she was subjected to a warrantless search or seizure, the burden shifts to the state to establish that the warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally permissible.” State v. Dorsey, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 19CA3874, 2019-Ohio-3478,
The Initial Stop
{¶11} Meadows first argues under this assignment of error that the initial stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Meadows raises several arguments challenging the initial stop. First, he argues that Trooper Atwood‘s observation of him “sitting and leaning toward the steering wheel ‘rigidly[]’ ” did not give him reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. He next argues that Trooper Atwood‘s observation of a “noisy exhaust” failed to provide reasonable suspicion for the stop because “[t]here is no examination tool used to measure the noise level of an exhaust for this violation[,]” and thus, “Trooper Atwood‘s assertion that the exhaust was unusually loud is entirely based on his ‘knowledge, experience, and training.’ ” He argues that although officers have some discretion in their judgment regarding what constitutes a loud exhaust, the cruiser video failed to demonstrate the exhaust was loud or provide reasonable suspicion for the stop. Meadows further argues that although Trooper Atwood noted he observed Meadows’ vehicle travel over the “hashed line by an entire tire width” and also fail to signal before changing lanes, Trooper Atwood admitted that neither of these violations appeared on the cruiser video.
“To justify a traffic stop based upon reasonable suspicion, the officer must be able to articulate specific facts that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the driver has committed, or is committing, a crime, including a minor traffic violation.” State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-1231, 62 N.E.3d 591, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). The existence of reasonable suspicion depends on whether an objectively reasonable police officer would believe that the driver‘s conduct constituted a traffic violation based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the stop. Id.
Moreover, a police officer may stop the driver of a vehicle after observing even a de minimis violation of traffic laws. See State v. Williams, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3436, 2014-Ohio-4897, 2014 WL 5513050, ¶ 9, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), and Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus. “[A] traffic stop with the proper standard of evidence is valid regardless of the officer‘s underlying ulterior motives as the test is merely whether the officer ‘could’ have performed the act complained of; pretext is irrelevant if the action complained of was permissible.” See State v. Koczwara, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13MA149, 2014-Ohio-1946, 2014 WL 1877464, ¶ 22, citing Erickson at 7 and 11, 665 N.E.2d 1091.
Petty at ¶ 12-13.
{¶14} In State v. Bennett, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA4, 2021-Ohio-937, ¶ 12, this Court was confronted with an argument that a trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop when the initial behavior that caught the trooper‘s attention consisted of “the driver sitting too close to the steering wheel,” which is not a violation of any traffic law. This Court upheld the stop, in part, because along with noticing the driver being positioned very close to the steering wheel, the
{¶15} Here, Trooper Atwood specifically testified during the suppression hearing that Meadows’ vehicle was producing an excessive and unusual noise. During his testimony, he explained that he was stationary on US 23 when Meadow‘s vehicle passed by. He testified that as Meadows’ vehicle passed by, he “observed * * * an excessive and load [sic] and unusual exhaust violation coming from his vehicle.” Trooper Atwood also testified that at that time, he also noticed Meadows was “sitting rigid in his seat, he was leaned up towards the steering wheel.” He testified he believed that to be unusual compared to all the other traffic. Trooper Atwood further testified that once Meadows passed by, his vehicle “traveled over the solid white, fault [sic] line to the right by over a tire width[,]”
{¶16} Trooper Atwood then testified that as he caught up with Meadows’ vehicle, he observed Meadows change from the left lane to the right lane without signaling. After catching up with Meadows and confirming Meadows’ vehicle to be the vehicle with the loud exhaust, he initiated a traffic stop. On cross-examination, Trooper Atwood testified that the recording system in his cruiser starts when he activates his lights; however, he further testified upon cross-examination that although the sound of Meadows’ exhaust could not be distinguished on the video, that it was a lot louder than the other vehicles, based upon his training and experience, and that it was actually making “a loud gurgling” sound. As set forth above, Trooper Atwood was entitled to rely on his experience and training in making determinations regarding a loud exhaust violation. Further, the trial court was in the best position to make a credibility determination regarding this testimony.
{¶17} Additionally,
{¶18} However, “[t]he trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness[.]” State v. Hammond, 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CA3662, 2019-Ohio-4253, ¶ 56. Further, we must accord deference to the trier of fact on credibility issues because “it is in the best position to gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and to use these observations to weigh their credibility.” Id. Moreover, while the video footage does not support Trooper Atwood‘s testimony about the traffic violations, the footage also does not contradict his testimony. See generally State v. Shisler, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-050860, C-050861, C-050878, and C-050879, 2006-Ohio-5265, ¶ 2-3, 6 (deferring to trial court‘s finding that officer‘s testimony that she observed a marked lanes violation at a particular intersection was credible even though the video footage did not show the violation due to the camera angle, the officer‘s report did not mention the violation, the officer only cited the driver for weaving at a different intersection, and the video footage did not reflect that the driver had been weaving at that location).
Investigatory Detention
{¶20} After arguing that the initial stop was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, Meadows goes on to argue on appeal that he was unreasonably detained when Trooper Atwood expanded the scope of the initial
{¶21} “It is well settled that issues not raised in an original motion to suppress cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Highland No. 04CA9, 2005-Ohio-768, ¶ 18. See also State v. Markins, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 10CA3387, 2013-Ohio-602, ¶ 25; State v. Daboni, 4th Dist. Meigs Nos. 18CA3, 18CA4, 18CA5, 2018-Ohio-4155, ¶ 16. As we stated in Jones, this is no mere technicality. Jones at ¶ 18.
Suppression of Statements
{¶23} He points to additional factors present as well, including the fact that Trooper Atwood removed him from his vehicle and patted him down less than two minutes after initiating the stop, as well as the fact that the trooper then placed him in the front seat of the cruiser with the door closed and began asking him questions. Meadows contends that a reasonable person in his situation would have understood himself to be in custody during this questioning from the trooper. He further argues that he was in custody when Trooper Atwood moved him to the back seat of the cruiser, with an open window but with doors that only open from the outside, and left him guarded by a second trooper while he was searching the vehicle. Meadows argues that Trooper Atwood made further “accusations” about
{¶24}
{¶25} However, Miranda does not protect every individual who is subjected to police questioning. See State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 26; State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440, 678 N.E.2d 891 (1997); citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). ” ‘Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because * * * the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’ ” Biros at 440, quoting Mathiason at 494. Instead, “[o]nly custodial interrogation triggers the need for Miranda warnings.” (Citations omitted). Biros at 440. (citations omitted).
{¶27} However, in a more recent decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio has now held that the test is not whether a reasonable person believes himself or herself to be free to leave, but rather the relevant inquiry is “whether a reasonable person in the suspect‘s position would have understood himself or herself to be in
This nuance is important and well reasoned. If the inquiry were whether the driver felt free to leave, then every traffic stop could be considered a custodial interrogation because “few motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so[.]” [Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).] And a law-enforcement officer, in the midst of investigating a traffic stop and performing all its attendant procedures, would not consider a driver free to leave unless given permission. But ‘not free to leave’ and ‘in custody’ are distinct concepts.
{¶28} The Court further reasoned as follows:
For purposes of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the test is not whether the individual feels free to leave but whether the situation “exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.”
Id. at ¶ 31; quoting Berkemer at 437.
Ultimately, in Cleveland v. Oles, based on the totality of the circumstances the court found that the suspect was not in custody and that no constitutional violation occurred. Cleveland v. Oles at ¶ 33. In that case, the suspect was stopped, was asked to step out of the vehicle and sit in the front seat of the patrol car, and was questioned regarding his destination and how much alcohol he had consumed that evening. Id. at ¶ 2-4. He was also directed to perform field
sobriety tests, failed the tests, and was arrested, all without receiving Miranda warnings. Id.
{¶30} Further, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that an individual temporarily detained as part of a routine traffic or investigatory stop ordinarily is not in custody and is therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings. See State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 13, citing Berkemer, supra, at 439-440 (noting that investigative stops are not subject to
{¶31} However, as explained in Farris, supra, during a traffic or investigative stop circumstances may change and render an individual “in custody” for practical purposes and, thus, ” ‘entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.’ ” Farris at ¶ 13; quoting Berkemer at 440. “The determination of whether a suspect is in custody presents a mixed question of fact and law.” State v. Dukes, 4th Dist. Scioto Nos. 16CA3745 and 16CA3760, 2017-Ohio-7204, ¶ 45, citing In re R.H., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 22352, 2008-Ohio-773, ¶ 15. Thus, ” ‘[w]e defer to the court‘s findings of fact, when articulated, but evaluate de novo whether on those facts, [the suspect] was in custody.’ ” Id. Here, the trial court denied Meadows’ motion to suppress without providing findings of fact or conclusions of law and without setting forth its reasoning. However, implicit in the trial court‘s denial of the motion is the trial court‘s determination that Meadows was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda.
{¶32} We initially note that during a valid traffic stop, officers may order the occupants out of a vehicle pending completion of the stop without violating the Fourth Amendment. State v. Dorsey, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 19CA3874, 2019-Ohio-3478, ¶ 15, citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, fn. 6, 985 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). As set forth above, we have already determined that the traffic stop at issue was valid. As such, Trooper Atwood was permitted to remove Meadows from the vehicle. We also note that once a lawful traffic stop has been made, law enforcement officers may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons if an officer reasonably believes that a suspect may be armed or a danger to the officer or to others. See State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 414, 618 N.E.2d 162 (1993). Here, Trooper Atwood testified that upon initiating the stop of Meadows’ vehicle, he observed Meadows making what were essentially
{¶33} Meadows contends, however, that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda essentially from the point Trooper Atwood initially approached him in light of the fact that Trooper Atwood‘s initial encounter with him consisted of asking Meadows what he was “shoving” and whether something he dropped as he was exiting the vehicle was his “burner.” He further argues that he was in custody when he was placed in the cruiser and questioned about his identity, where he was heading towards and coming from, the ownership of the vehicle, and whether there were any weapons in the vehicle.3
{¶34} Contrary to Meadows’ arguments, in light of the foregoing case law coupled with a review of the record before us, we conclude that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing failed to establish that Meadows was in custody at any point during the encounter with law enforcement until he was
{¶35} Because we have determined that Meadows was not in custody for purposes of triggering a Miranda warning, and further because we have found that he made no incriminating statements during the encounter in question until after he had already been Mirandized, we find no merit to this argument raised under his first assignment of error. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress based upon the ground that his statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Issuance of Search Warrant for Cell Phones
{¶37} A review of the record indicates that Meadows was initially charged, through the filing of a criminal complaint in the Chillicothe Municipal Court, with one count of drug trafficking and one count of possession of drugs. It further appears that although Meadows was initially charged with drug trafficking in the Chillicothe Municipal Court, he was not indicted for drug trafficking in the common pleas court after he was bound over. Instead, he was only indicted for one count of aggravated possession of drugs. Furthermore, when he entered into a
{¶38} Thus, in our view, arguments related to whether the issuance of the search warrant was justified, as well as arguments related to the scope and breadth or lack of particularity of the search warrant are not relevant to the crime in which Meadows was eventually indicted and convicted. Further, there is no indication from the record before us what evidence resulted from the search of the cell phones or what, if any, impact that evidence had on Meadows’ aggravated possession of drugs conviction. Simply put, the evidence, if any, that was recovered from Meadows’ cell phones had no relevance to his indictment and conviction for aggravated possession of drugs, which is the only conviction presently before us on appeal. In fact, completely removing the seizure and subsequent search of the cell phones from the picture, Meadows’ conviction for aggravated possession of drugs would still be sufficiently supported by the evidence in the record, which includes the fact that 90 grams of methamphetamine were recovered from the vehicle Meadows was driving, coupled with his statement which we have already addressed above indicating he is a drug user.
“In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review.” Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 26. A claim is not ripe if it rests on contingent events that may never occur at all. State v. Booker, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-42, 2015-Ohio-5118, 2015 WL 8481555, ¶ 21; U.S. Bank, N.A. v. 2900 Presidential Drive, L.L.C., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013 CA 60, 2014-Ohio-1121, 2014 WL 1339643, ¶ 32-35.
{¶40} Thus, because these arguments are completely irrelevant to Meadows’ aggravated possession of drugs conviction which he is currently appealing, and because any other possible pending charge for drug trafficking is not presently before us, we believe the arguments related to the issuance and scope of the search warrant for the cell phones are not ripe for review. Accordingly, we will not address them.
{¶41} In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Meadows’ motion to suppress. Thus, we find no merit to the arguments raised under his first assignment of error and, accordingly, it is overruled.
IN HIS SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR, MEADOWS CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING HIM TO AN INDEFINITE PRISON TERM PURSUANT TO THE REAGAN TOKES ACT IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. HE RAISES THREE ARGUMENTS UNDER THIS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. HE ARGUES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING HIM TO AN INDEFINITE PRISON TERM PURSUANT TO THE REAGAN TOKES ACT 1) IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY; 2) IN VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS; AND 3) IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Reagan Tokes Law
{¶42} ” ‘Senate Bill 201, commonly known as the
The
Reagan Tokes Law requires that a court imposing a prison term underR.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) or(2)(a) for a first or second-degree felony committed on or after March 22, 2019, impose a minimum prison term under that provision and a maximum prison term determined underR.C. 2929.144(B) .R.C. 2929.144(C) . There is a presumption that the offender “shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender‘s minimum prison term or on the offender‘s presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier.”R.C. 2967.271(B) . A presumptive earned early release date is a date determined under procedures described inR.C. 2967.271(F) which allow the sentencing court to reduce the minimum prison term under certain circumstances.R.C. 2967.271(A)(2) . The ODRC may rebut the presumption if it determines at a hearing that one or more statutorily numerated factors applies.R.C. 2967.271(C) . If ODRC rebuts the presumption, it may maintain the offender‘s incarceration after the expiration of the minimum prison term or presumptive earned early release date for a reasonable period of time, determined and specified by ODRC, that “shall not exceed the offender‘s maximum prison term.”R.C. 2967.271(D)(1) .
State v. Halfhill, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 20CA7, 2021-Ohio-177, ¶ 8.
Constitutional Review
{¶43} “The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law we review de novo.” Id., at ¶ 11, citing Hayslip v. Hanshaw, 2016-Ohio-3339, 54 N.E.3d 1272, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.). “However, ‘[i]t is well settled that this court will not reach constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary.’ ” Halfhill at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 9. Ripeness is a prerequisite to deciding the merits of a constitutional challenge. See State v. Ramey, 4th Dist. Washington Nos. 20CA1 and 20CA2, 2020-Ohio-6733, ¶ 20. “Ripeness ‘is peculiarly a question of timing.’ ” State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 1998-Ohio-366, 694 N.E.2d 459, quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). Generally, “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
Legal Analysis
{¶44} This Court has repeatedly held that the constitutionality of sentencing pursuant to the
{¶45} In reaching its decision, the Daniel court acknowledged that the director of the ODRC issued policy number 105-PBD-15, effective on March 15, 2021, “establishing procedures for the ‘Additional Term Hearing Process’ under the Reagan Tokes Law.” Daniel at ¶ 42. However, finding that the policy was not
Because our district precludes constitutional review of the Reagan Tokes Law for lack of ripeness - and because the ODRC and the Ohio Legislature may adopt additional procedures before any case ripens - we see no need to re-examine our decisions in light of Daniel and Sealey. To the contrary, the fact that the ODRC promulgated rules that will impact the Eighth District‘s future constitutional analysis post-Daniel further convinces us that our conservative approach is prudent.
{¶47} Thus, consistent with our most recent reasoning in Long, we conclude Meadows’ constitutional arguments regarding the prison sentence imposed under the
{¶48} Having found no merit in either of the assignments of error raised by Meadows, they are both overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to Appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.