THE STATE EX REL. ELYRIA FOUNDRY COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 95-1501
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
June 10, 1998
82 Ohio St.3d 88 | 1998-Ohio-366
Workers’ compensation—Mandamus action challenging Industrial Commission‘s award of temporary total disability compensation lacks ripeness, when. Submitted March 24, 1998. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD06-880.
EFC objected to this order. EFC objected to the allowance of the claim in its entirety because it believed that claimant had contracted his alleged silicosis with an earlier employer. EFC alternatively contended that even if it was the amenable employer, claimant‘s alleged temporary total disability was partially due to nonindustrial conditions.
EFC, pursuant to
EFC also commenced a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, challenging the commission‘s award of TTD. The court of appeals denied the writ, after finding that EFC‘s common pleas appeal provided it with an adequate remedy at law.
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Licata & Crosby Co., L.P.A., Elizabeth A. Crosby and Ellyn Tamulewicz, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Jeffrey B. Duber, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission.
Shapiro, Kendis & Associates Co., L.P.A., James D. Kendis and Rachel B. Jaffy, for appellee Woolbright.
Per Curiam.
Appellees successfully argued below that mandamus was inappropriate. We affirm the denial of the writ, but do so for a reason other than that given by the court of appeals.
We find that the controversy presented by EFC‘s mandamus action lacks ripeness. Ripeness “is peculiarly a question of timing.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (1974), 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 357, 42 L.Ed.2d 320, 351. The ripeness doctrine is motivated in part by the desire “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies * * *.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967), 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681, 691. As one writer has observed:
“The basic principle of ripeness may be derived from the conclusion that ‘judicial machinery should be conserved for problems which are real or present and imminent, not squandered on problems which are abstract or hypothetical or remote.’ * * * [T]he prerequisite of ripeness is a limitation on jurisdiction that is nevertheless basically optimistic as regards the prospects of a day in court: the time for judicial relief is simply not yet arrived, even though the alleged action of the defendant foretells legal injury to the plaintiff.” Comment, Mootness and Ripeness: The Postman Always Rings Twice (1965), 65 Colum.L.Rev. 867, 876.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
