delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, the State of Texas, appeals from the judgment of a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia. The State had sought a declaratory judgment that the pre-clearance рrovisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, do not apply to implementation of certain sections of the Texas Education Code that permit the State to sanction local school districts for failure to meet state-mandated educational achievement levels. This appeal presents the question whether the controversy is ripe.
I
In Texas, both the stаte government and local school districts are responsible for the public schools. There are more than 1,000 school districts, each run by an elected school board. In 1995, the Texas Lеgislature enacted a *298 comprehensive scheme (Chapter 39) that holds local school boards accountable to the State for student achievement. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§39.021-39.131 (1996). Chaptеr 39 contains detailed prescriptions for assessment of student academic skills, development of academic performance indicators, determination of accreditatiоn status for school districts, and imposition of accreditation sanctions. It seeks to measure the academic performance of Texas schoolchildren, to reward the schools and school districts that achieve the legislative goals, and to sanction those that fall short.
When a district fails to satisfy the State’s accreditation criteria, the State Commissioner of Educаtion may select from 10 possible sanctions that are listed in ascending order of severity. §§39.131(a)(1)-(10). Those include, “to the extent the [C]ommissioner determines necessary,” § 39.131(a), appointing a master to oversee the district’s operations, § 39.131(a)(7), or appointing a management team to direct the district’s operations in areas of unacceptable performance or tо require the district to contract for services from another person, § 39.181(a)(8). When the Commissioner appoints masters or management teams, he “shall clearly define the[ir] powers and duties” аnd shall review the need for them every 90 days. § 39.131(e). A master or management team may approve or disapprove any action taken by a school principal, the district superintendеnt, or the district’s board of trustees, and may also direct them to act. §§ 39.131(e)(1), (2). State law prohibits masters or management teams from taking any action concerning a district election, changing the number of members on or the method of selecting the board of trustees, setting a tax rate for the district, or adopting a budget which establishes a different level of spending for the district from that set by the board. §§ 39.131(e)(3)-(6).
Texas is a covered jurisdiction under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (1997), and consequently, before it can implement changes affecting vot *299 ing it must obtain preclearanee from thе United States District Court for the District of Columbia or from the Attorney General of the United States. 42 U. S. C. § 1973e. Texas submitted Chapter 39 to the Attorney General for administrative preclearanee. The Assistant Attorney General * requested further information, including the criteria used to select special masters and management teams, a detailed description of their powers and duties, and the difference between their duties and those of the elected boards. The State responded by pointing out the limits placed on masters and management teams in § 39.131(e), and by noting that the-actual authority granted “is set by the Commissioner at the time of appointment depending on the needs of the district.” App. to Juris. Statement 99a. After receiving this information, the Assistant Attorney General concluded that the first six sanctions do not affect voting and therefore do not require preclearanee. He did not object to §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8), insofar as the provisions are “enabling in nature,” but he cautioned thаt “under certain foreseeable circumstances their implementation may result in a violation of Section 5” which would require preclearanee. Id., at 36a.
On June 7, 1996, Texas filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaration that § 5 does not apply to the sanctions authorized by §§ 39.131(a)(7) and (8), because (1) they are not changes with respect to voting, and (2) they are consistent with conditions attached to grants of federal financial assistance that authorize and require the imposition of sanctions to ensure accountability of loсal education authorities. The District Court did not reach the merits of these arguments because it concluded that Texas’s claim was not ripe. We noted probable jurisdiction.
*300 H-i 1 — 4
A claim is not ripе for adjudication if it rests upon “ ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or
indeed
may not occur at all.’”
Thomas
v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co.,
Even if there were greater certainty regarding ultimate implementation of paragraphs (a)(7) and (a)(8) of the statute, we do not think Texas’s claim would be ripe. Ripeness “re-
*301
quir[es] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the partiеs of withholding court consideration.”
Abbott Laboratories
v.
Gardner,
And as for hardship to the parties: This is not a ease like
Abbott Laboratories
v.
Gardner, supra,
at 152, where the regulation at issue had a “direct effect on the day-to-day business” of the plaintiffs, because they were compelled to affix required labeling to their products under threat of criminal sanction. Texas is not required to engage in, or to refrain from, any conduct, unless and until it chooses to implement one of the noneleared remedies. To be sure, if that contingency should arise compliance with the preclearance procedure could delay much needed аction. (Prior to this litigation, Texas sought preclearance for the appointment of a master in a Dallas County school district, and despite a request for expedition the Attorney Genеral took 90 days to give approval. See Brief for Appellant 37, n. 28.) But even that inconvenience is avoidable. If Texas is confident that
*302
the imposition of a master or management teаm does not constitute a change affecting voting, it should simply go ahead with the' appointment. Should the Attorney General or a private individual bring suit (and if the matter is as clear, even at this distance, as Texas thinks it is), we have no reason to doubt that a district court will deny a preliminary injunction. See
Presley
v.
Etowah County Comm’n,
In sum, we find it too speculative whether the problem Texas presents will ever need solving; we find the- legal issues Texas raises not yet fit for our consideration, and the hardship to Texas of biding its time insubstantial. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that this matter is not ripe for adjudication.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
The authority for determinations under §5'has been delegated to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. 28 CFR §51.3(1997).
