STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD LANGSTON
(SC 20734)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued November 17, 2022—officially released June 6, 2023
McDonald, D‘Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.
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The defendant appealed from the trial court‘s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant had been convicted of the crimes of criminal possession of a firearm and robbery in the first degree, but acquitted of assault in the first degree, in connection with an armed robbery and a shooting. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, relying on United States v. Watts (519 U.S. 148), requested that the sentencing court find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had committed the assault, notwithstanding his acquittal of that charge, and consider that finding for purposes of sentencing. The sentencing court reviewed the underlying facts of the defendant‘s conviction, as well as the assault charge of which the defendant was acquitted, noted that it found the evidence to be telling and the witnesses to be credible, and commented on the nature of the alleged assault and its impact on the victim. The court specifically stated that the victim “was shot in the back of both legs by the defendant.” The defendant received a lengthy total effective sentence, but the sentence for each count on which he was convicted fell within the statutorily prescribed range. In his motion to correct, the defendant argued that the sentencing court violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions when it considered the conduct underlying the assault charge, but the court rejected the defendant‘s claim and denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the sentencing court‘s consideration of the conduct underlying the assault charge of which he was acquitted violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and to a trial by jury. Held:
1. The sentencing court‘s consideration of the conduct underlying the assault charge of which the defendant was acquitted did not violate his rights to a trial by jury or due process under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, respectively:
Contrary to the defendant‘s argument that there was no binding precedent on whether the consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing violates a criminal defendant‘s federal constitutional rights to a trial by jury or to due process, in Watts, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that a long line of cases had established the broad range of information a sentencing court can consider in imposing a sentence and held that a sentencing court is not prevented from considering conduct underlying a crime or crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted, provided that such conduct is proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, since Watts, the United States Supreme Court has clarified that a sentencing court has discretion to consider a broad range of conduct, so long as the sentence imposed falls within the statutory range and the conduct does not serve as a basis to enhance that sentence, nearly every federal court of appeals has held that the consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing does not violate a criminal defendant‘s constitutional rights, including the right to a trial by jury or to due process, provided that the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum for the conviction, and, in State v. Huey (199 Conn. 121), which predated Watts, this court emphasized the broad discretion a sentencing court has within the federal constitutional rubric to consider matters that would not be admissible at trial and held that, as a matter of federal due process, a sentencing court can consider information that merely has some minimal indicium of reliability.
In the present case, the sentencing court considered testimony and evidence adduced at a jury trial over which it presided, it had sufficient opportunity to observe and judge the credibility of the witnesses, although it did not explicitly state that the evidence on which it was
Furthermore, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that neither Watts nor Huey was binding on this court, insofar as he argued that Huey did not explicitly address whether a sentencing court could consider acquitted conduct and that the holding of Watts was limited to the context of double jeopardy violations, as Watts explicitly stated that due process is generally satisfied when the acquitted conduct under consideration has been established by a preponderance of the evidence, and the rationale supporting Watts and Huey extended to a sentencing court‘s consideration of acquitted conduct, provided the requisite standards are met.
2. The sentencing court‘s consideration of the conduct underlying the assault charge of which the defendant was acquitted did not violate his rights to due process or to a trial by jury under
Notwithstanding the defendant‘s claim that the state constitution affords greater protection than the federal constitution with respect to a defendant‘s rights to due process and to a trial by jury in the context of a sentencing court‘s consideration of acquitted conduct, an analysis under the multifactor approach articulated in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) for construing state constitutional provisions led this court to conclude that the state constitution does not prohibit the consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing when the sentence is within the statutory range for the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted and the information relied on has a minimal indicium of reliability.
Specifically, the text of the relevant state constitutional provisions, related Connecticut precedent, and persuasive federal precedent all weighed heavily in favor of this court‘s determination that consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing is not unconstitutional, as
Moreover, the factor regarding the persuasive precedents of other state courts, which follow diverse approaches with respect to the consideration of acquitted conduct for purposes of sentencing, did not strongly favor either the state‘s or the defendant‘s position, the factor regarding the historical insights into the intent of the framers of the state constitution favored the state‘s argument that the state constitution grants the same rights as the federal constitution, insofar as the state right to trial by jury developed in a similar manner to the right to a trial by jury under the federal constitution, and, although contemporary norms and public policy weighed in favor of the defendant‘s position, on balance, the factors favoring the state‘s position outweighed the concerns embodied in the contemporary norms and public policy factor.
3. This court declined the defendant‘s invitation to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to impose a rule prohibiting a sentencing court‘s consideration of conduct underlying a charge of which a defendant has been acquitted, but it emphasized that sentencing courts should exercise caution if they do rely on such conduct:
Under Connecticut‘s sentencing system, a sentencing court has wide latitude to sentence a defendant within the established statutory range for each offense of which a defendant is convicted, it may consider any evidence that has a minimal indicium of reliability in imposing a sentence within that range, and it is not permitted to make findings of fact relating
Accordingly, limiting the information on which a sentencing court can rely would not provide any benefit and, instead, would discourage that court from articulating on the record a full and transparent basis for the sentence, which would prevent appellate courts from remedying those instances in which a sentencing court does rely on unreliable, inaccurate, or patently wrong information that falls short of a minimal indicium of reliability, and, as long as the evidence considered in this context satisfies the requisite standard of having a minimal indicium of reliability, it would not be appropriate for this court to interfere with a trial court‘s discretion in crafting proper sentences.
Nevertheless, this court emphasized that sentencing courts should undertake every effort to refrain from basing a sentence on facts that cast doubt, either directly or indirectly, on any aspect of a jury‘s verdict, and that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for a sentencing court to express or imply its disagreement with the jury‘s verdict, as such a practice may harm public confidence in the fairness of the judicial system and undermine the importance of the jury‘s role in fair adjudications, and, in the present case, although the sentencing court‘s declarative statement that the victim “was shot in the back of both legs by the defendant” was not unconstitutional or illegal, it was imprudent.
Argued November 17, 2022—officially released June 6, 2023
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with the crimes of assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and robbery in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the case was tried to the jury before Spada, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of criminal possession of a firearm and robbery in the first degree; thereafter, the court, Graham, J., denied the defendant‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence, and the defendant appealed. Affirmed.
John R. Weikart, assigned counsel, with whom was Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy F. Costello, senior assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state‘s attorney, and Vicki Melchiorre, former supervisory assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
MCDONALD, J. This case requires us to decide whether, following a jury trial, a trial court can properly consider conduct related to a charge of which a criminal defendant was acquitted, when the court sentences the defendant on other charges of which the defendant was convicted. We conclude that the practice is permissible under established law. We also conclude, however, that trial courts should be extremely cautious if they rely on such conduct during sentencing.
The defendant, Richard Langston, appeals from the trial court‘s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claims that the sentencing court‘s consideration of conduct related to a charge of which he was acquitted violated his rights to due process and to a trial by jury under the
The defendant was arrested in 1998 in connection with an armed robbery and a shooting. He was subsequently charged with assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and robbery in the first degree. Following a jury trial, the defendant was acquitted of assault in the first degree but convicted of all the other charges. During the sentencing proceedings, the prosecutor requested that the sentencing court find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the assault and consider that finding during the defendant‘s sentencing. In support of her request, the prosecutor cited the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S. Ct. 633, 136 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1997), which held that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct, so long as it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution. See id., 154–55, 157. Defense counsel argued, in response, that the sentencing court should acknowledge and take into account the fact that the defendant was acquitted of the assault charge.
The court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years of incarceration for the robbery in the first degree conviction, and five years of incarceration, to run consecutively, for the conviction of criminal possession of a firearm. In accordance with the jury‘s findings, the court also sentenced the defendant to a five year consecutive term of imprisonment as a mandatory sentence enhancement for committing a class A, B or C felony with a firearm pursuant to
In 2021, the defendant filed the motion to correct an illegal sentence at issue in this appeal, in which he argued that the sentencing court violated his rights under the
The defendant appealed from the trial court‘s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence to the Appellate Court, and the appeal was transferred to this court. On appeal, the defendant advances two claims. First, the defendant claims that the sentencing court‘s consideration of conduct underlying a charge of which he was acquitted violated his rights to a trial by jury and to due process under the
Before turning to the defendant‘s claims, we summarize the general principles applicable to a trial court‘s consideration of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. “[A] judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner.” Practice Book § 43-22. “[A]n illegal sentence is essentially one [that] . . . exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant‘s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory. . . . In accordance with this summary, Connecticut courts have considered four categories of claims pursuant to § 43-22. The first category has addressed whether
“A sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when it is imposed in a way [that] violates [a] defendant‘s right . . . to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record . . . . This principle emanates from the defendant‘s constitutional right to due process.” (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Francis, 338 Conn. 671, 679, 258 A.3d 1257, cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S. Ct. 292, 211 L. Ed. 2d 136 (2021). “[A] claim that the trial court improperly denied a defendant‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence is [typically] reviewed pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Tabone, 279 Conn. 527, 534, 902 A.2d 1058 (2006). However, when a motion to correct an illegal sentence involves questions of law, such as the constitutional claims raised here, our review over those questions is plenary. See, e.g., State v. Bischoff, 337 Conn. 739, 745, 258 A.3d 14 (2021).
I
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
We begin with the defendant‘s claim that the sentencing court‘s consideration of the conduct underlying his assault charge violated his rights to a trial by jury and to due process under the sixth3 and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, respectively. The defendant argues that no binding precedent has decided whether the consideration of such conduct violates a criminal defendant‘s rights to due process and to a trial by jury, and that two recent United States Supreme Court cases provide support for his position. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 and n.4, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The state counters that we are bound by a long line of precedent on this question from both the United States Supreme Court and this court, which established that a trial court may properly consider acquitted conduct at sentencing. See United States v. Watts, supra, 519 U.S. 157; State v. Huey, supra, 199 Conn. 126. The state also argues that the two recent United States Supreme Court cases relied on by the
The principles governing the constitutionality of sentencing practices are well established.4 In Watts, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether judges may consider acquitted conduct during sentencing. See United States v. Watts, supra, 519 U.S. 149. In that case, the police found two loaded guns and ammunition hidden in the home of the defendant Vernon Watts and cocaine in the home‘s kitchen cabinet. Id. The jury found Watts guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute but not guilty of using a firearm in relation to a drug offense. Id., 149–50. Notwithstanding Watts’ acquittal on the firearms charge, the sentencing court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Watts had possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense, and it considered that finding in its sentence. Id., 150. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the sentencing court‘s consideration of the conduct underlying Watts’ acquitted firearms charge did not violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy. See id., 154-55, 157. Relying primarily on prior case law and
Since Watts, the United States Supreme Court has twice had occasion to address a sentencing court‘s discretion at sentencing. First, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 490. The court made explicit, however, that “nothing in [the] history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion—taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender—in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.” (Emphasis in original.) Id., 481. The court in United States v. Booker, supra, 543 U.S. 220, reaffirmed Apprendi and reiterated that “[w]e have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 233. Thus, both Apprendi and Booker make clear that a sentencing judge may consider a broad range of conduct, so long as the sentence falls within the statutory range and the conduct does not serve as a basis to enhance the sentence.
As we will explain in part II of this opinion, nearly every federal court of appeals has held that considering acquitted conduct at sentencing does not violate a criminal defendant‘s constitutional rights, including the right to trial by jury or due process, so long as the conduct has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum for the conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 752 (11th Cir.) (holding that defendant‘s argument that consideration of acquitted conduct violated due process clause and his right to trial by jury was “without merit”), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 896, 131 S. Ct. 336, 178 L. Ed. 2d 147 (2010); United States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 799 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Booker did not change the sentencing court‘s ability to consider uncharged or even acquitted conduct during sentencing”), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1022, 130 S. Ct. 1923, 176 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2010); United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[s]o long as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory ceiling set by the jury‘s verdict, the district court does not abridge the defendant‘s right to a jury trial by looking to other facts, including acquitted conduct”), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1215, 129 S. Ct. 2071, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1147 (2009). We find particularly persuasive one such case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Turner v. Frowein, 253 Conn. 312, 341, 752 A.2d 955 (2000) (“[d]ecisions of the Second Circuit
More generally, and more than a decade before Watts was decided, this court had occasion to consider, within the federal constitutional rubric, the range of information a trial court may rely on at sentencing. In State v. Huey, supra, 199 Conn. 121, we emphasized the broad discretion of judges at sentencing and noted that, “if a sentence is within statutory limits it is not generally subject to modification by a reviewing court.” Id., 126. Although we did not specifically address the issue of acquitted conduct in that case, we noted that, in exercising their broad discretion, sentencing judges have wide latitude to consider matters that would not be admissible at trial. Id. Specifically, we held that, “[a]s a matter of due process, information may be considered as a basis for a sentence only if it has some minimal indicium of reliability.” Id., 127. We relied on the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Williams v. Oklahoma, supra, 358 U.S. 584, as support for our conclusion that the sentencing court may conduct a broad inquiry into the “circumstances of the crime and [into] the convicted person‘s life and circumstance” and may consider “responsible unsworn or out-of-court information,” without running afoul of the fourteenth amendment. State v. Huey, supra, 127. Citing the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decision in United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1982), we emphasized that, “[a]s long as the sentencing judge has a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on the information [that] he uses to fashion his ultimate sentence, an appellate court should not interfere with his discretion.” State v. Huey, supra, 127. Significantly, we also cited United States v. Sweig, supra, 454 F.2d 184, for the proposition that this discre-
In Huey, in which the sentencing judge relied in part on conduct that was outside the scope of the crime to which the defendant had pleaded guilty, we declined to limit the information a sentencing judge could consider because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to adopt an unrealistic view of both the plea bargaining and sentencing processes, a view that would only deter judges from articulating their reasons for a particular sentence fully and prevent correction when the sentencing judge relied on information which was truly unreliable, inaccurate or patently wrong. Trial judges ought not be reprimanded for acknowledging on the record the impact of information they have gained in the plea bargaining or sentencing processes unless the use of such information confounds reason and a just result. . . . Accordingly, when cases of this nature are heard on appeal, we should review the record to ensure that there is a persuasive basis for the conclusion reached by the sentencing court. . . . There is no simple formula for determining what information considered by a sentencing judge is sufficiently reliable to meet the requirements of due process. The question must be answered on a [case-by-case] basis.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 127-28.
In the present case, the sentencing court considered the testimony and evidence presented by witnesses at a trial over which it presided. It had sufficient opportunity to observe and judge the credibility of such witnesses, and their sworn testimony is exactly the kind of minimally credible evidence that we anticipate sentencing judges will rely on. In fact, the sentencing judge specifically explained that he found that “[t]he evidence was telling and the witnesses [were] credible.” Although the sentencing judge did not explicitly reference the quantum of evidence, his findings as to the sufficiency of the evidence he relied on was implicit in his explanation. Accordingly, we conclude that the sentencing court did not violate the defendant‘s right to trial by jury under the sixth amendment, or the defendant‘s right to due process under the fourteenth amendment, when it considered the conduct underlying the defendant‘s assault charge.6
The defendant, however, urges us to depart from our holding in Huey and the United States Supreme Court‘s holding in Watts because, he asserts, neither case is binding. He argues that Huey is not binding because, in that case, we addressed only whether a sentencing court may consider a defendant‘s denial of allegations and did not explicitly address whether a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct. Furthermore, he argues that Apprendi and Booker confined the holding in Watts to the context of double jeopardy violations. We disagree.
The defendant also asserts that, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court‘s holding in Watts, we should follow the principles articulated in Apprendi regarding the importance of the respective roles of juries and judges. Although we agree that Apprendi articulates important principles regarding the distinct roles of judges and juries, its holding centered on the concern that sentencing judges would use acquitted conduct to increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 491-97. Because the sentence imposed in the present case was within the statutory ranges for the counts of conviction authorized by the jury, our holding does not run afoul of the principles articulated in Apprendi and Booker. Indeed, Connecticut sentencing practices do not permit the sentencing judge to depart from the range authorized by the jury‘s verdict. Our statutes clearly define the requisite sentencing ranges for various crimes or enhancements. See, e.g.,
II
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
As the state correctly points out, this court reviewed a similar claim in State v. Pena, 301 Conn. 669, 22 A.3d 611 (2011). In Pena, the jury found the defendant guilty of carrying a pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a firearm but not guilty of murder and the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. Id., 671–72. During the sentencing proceeding, the trial court considered remarks made by the victim‘s family and other evidence related to the murder charge of which the defendant was acquitted. See id., 671, 678–79. On appeal, the defendant argued that “the trial court‘s reliance on this information deprived him of his state constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.” Id., 682. Relying on Huey, we disagreed with the defendant and applied the “minimal indicium of reliability” standard articulated in Huey. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 683. We concluded that the evidence relied on by the trial judge at sentencing—including the facts underlying the murder charge of which the defendant was acquitted—satisfied this standard and that the judge‘s reliance on the acquitted conduct did not run afoul of our state constitution. See id.
Although we ultimately agree with our holding in Pena, the defendant correctly notes that neither Pena nor Huey properly analyzed a claim that our state constitution affords greater protection than the federal constitution in this area under the factors articulated in State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. 685. Instead, Pena relied on Huey, which addressed only a federal constitutional challenge to the defendant‘s sentence. See State v. Pena, supra, 301 Conn. 680-82. As such, although Huey and Pena both indicate that the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing does not offend the federal constitution, that conclusion is not dispositive of the defendant‘s claim under our state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Skok, 318 Conn. 699, 708, 122 A.3d 608 (2015) (“federal constitution establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We begin with the first factor—the text of the relevant constitutional provisions. The defendant argues that the sentencing court violated his rights to due process and to a trial by jury under
Notwithstanding the similarities, the defendant argues that the term “inviolate” in
The second Geisler factor instructs us to consider related Connecticut precedent. As we explained in part I of this opinion, in Pena and Huey, we concluded, on similar records, that “[a] sentencing judge has very broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory limits and in exercising that discretion he may and should consider matters that would not be admissible at trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pena, supra, 301 Conn. 680; accord State v. Huey, supra, 199 Conn. 126. In Pena, we specifically concluded that, although we do not encourage the practice of commenting on acquitted conduct, it does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See State v. Pena, supra, 684. Similarly, in Huey, we determined that “[i]t is a fundamental sentencing principle that a sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, and largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider or the source from which it may come.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Huey, supra, 127. The defendant cites no Connecticut authority, and we have found none, that stands for the proposition that consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing amounts to a constitutional violation. This is particularly true when, as here, the sentence was within the permissible statutory range. Therefore, this factor also supports the state‘s position.
Persuasive federal precedent, the third Geisler factor, similarly lends strong support to the state‘s position. As we briefly discussed in part I of this opinion, the United States Supreme Court in Watts discussed the wide latitude afforded to sentencing judges in its conclusion that consideration of acquitted conduct did not raise double jeopardy concerns. See United States v. Watts, supra, 519 U.S. 151–55. The wide latitude afforded to sentencing judges predates Watts and has continued even in the wake of Apprendi and Booker, with every federal court of appeals8 that has addressed the issue allowing trial courts to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 857 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir. 2017) (“a sentencing court may
We acknowledge, however, that, although the courts of appeals allow the practice under federal law, many federal courts of appeals have been reluctant to do so and have expressed displeasure with the practice. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 808 F.3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[a]llowing judges to rely on acquitted or uncharged conduct to impose higher sentences than they otherwise would impose seems a dubious infringement of the rights to due process and to a jury trial”); see also, e.g., United States v. Norman, supra, 926 F.3d 811 (“Justice [Antonin] Scalia wrote, in a dissent from [the] denial of certiorari joined by Justices [Clarence] Thomas and [Ruth Bader] Ginsburg, that [t]his has gone on long enough, and that the [United States] Supreme Court should take up the issue to put an end to the unbroken string of cases disregarding the [s]ixth [a]mendment—or to eliminate the [s]ixth [a]mendment difficulty by acknowledging that all sentences below the statutory maximum are substantively reasonable. . . . The Supreme Court has not yet done what Justice Scalia suggested. Therefore, we continue to recognize that [w]hatever the merits of Justice Scalia‘s argument, it is not the law.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)). Notwithstanding this criticism, federal precedent overwhelmingly supports the state‘s position that a judge may constitutionally consider acquitted conduct during sentencing.
The fourth Geisler factor directs us to consider the precedent of other states. Sister state precedent is divided into three primary categories.9 First, numerous states permit sentencing courts to consider a wide range of conduct, including acquitted conduct or facts not established beyond a reasonable doubt, without running afoul of state or federal constitutional provisions. See, e.g., People v. Towne, 44 Cal. 4th 63, 85-86, 186 P.3d 10, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530 (2008) (“[n]othing in the applicable statute or rules suggests that a [sentencing] court must ignore evidence related to the offense of which the defendant was convicted, merely because that evidence did not convince a jury that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of related offenses”); People v. Jackson, 149 Ill. 2d 540, 548, 599 N.E.2d 926 (1992) (“outstanding indictments or other criminal conduct for which there has been no prosecution or conviction may be considered in sentencing”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973, 113 S. Ct. 1416, 122 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1993); State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Iowa 2000) (“There is no general prohibition against considering other criminal activities by a defendant as factors that bear on the sentence to be imposed. . . . We are convinced that a sentencing judge is not required to deviate from the judge‘s own characterization of the nature of
Second, a minority of states completely prohibit the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Koch, 107 Haw. 215, 225, 112 P.3d 69 (2005) (sentencing court “did not have the discretion to consider alleged conduct of which [the defendant] was acquitted in sentencing him”); People v. Beck, 504 Mich. 605, 629, 939 N.W.2d 213 (2019) (“[W]e do not believe existing United States Supreme Court jurisprudence prevents us from holding that reliance on acquitted conduct at sentencing is barred by the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. We hold that it is.”), cert. denied, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 1243, 206 L. Ed. 2d 240 (2020).
Finally, other states prohibit consideration of acquitted conduct when it results in an aggravated or enhanced sentence. New Jersey is one example. In State v. Melvin, 248 N.J. 321, 258 A.3d 1075 (2021), the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered claims under the federal and New Jersey constitution. See id., 339. The court held that principles of fundamental fairness underlying the state constitutional right to due process prohibited trial courts from subjecting a defendant to enhanced sentencing for conduct of which the defendant was acquitted. See id., 326, 347-49; see also State v. Marley, 321 N.C. 415, 425, 364 S.E.2d 133 (1988) (“[t]o allow the trial court to use at sentencing an essential element of a greater offense as an aggravating factor, when the presumption of innocence was not, at trial, overcome as to this element, is fundamentally inconsistent with the presumption of innocence itself”).
Other state precedent is divided in its practices, and this divide is further complicated by the variety of each state‘s sentencing schemes. As discussed in part I of this opinion, Connecticut sentencing practices confine sentencing judges to statutory ranges for each conviction. Other states utilize guideline approaches or give sentencing judges more latitude to increase sentences based on aggravating factors or other subjective considerations. Those jurisdictions raise constitutional concerns that are not present here and, therefore, make it difficult to glean guidance from their decisions. Accord-
The fifth Geisler factor instructs us to look to the historical insights and intent of the framers regarding the rights at issue.10 The right to trial by jury has remained consistent from the enactment of the 1818 Connecticut constitution, which declared that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Conn. Const. (1818), art. I, § 21.11 This court has long held that the trial by jury described in the Connecticut constitution is “the same in its essential features as the jury trial at common law, which had been adopted by the [c]onstitution of the United States and by the constitutions of other [s]tates.” State v. Gannon, 75 Conn. 206, 226, 52 A. 727 (1902). Even prior to 1818, in 1672, Connecticut colonial laws called for “a special verdict [on] which the court shall declare the law in accordance with English practice, guarantee[d] to all persons tried for life or banishment a jury of twelve whose verdict must be unanimous . . . define[d] the duty of juries in accordance with the settled doctrine of the common law [as] . . . a jury of twelve . . . who shall find the matter of fact . . . and [stated that] the judges shall declare the sentence, or direct the jury to find according to the law.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 228. The respective roles of the jury and the judge as finder of fact and arbiter of law have remained consistent in this state over centuries. “[T]he jury trial provisions in the [f]ederal and [s]tate [c]onstitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 739, 741 A.2d 913 (1999) (Berdon, J., dissenting). The right to a trial by jury and the right to have a jury find all necessary facts are deeply rooted in our history. Equally deeply rooted, however, is the role of the judge as the sole party to impose a sentence. “[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law.” Williams v. New York, supra, 337 U.S. 246. In these instances, the scope of the sentencing court‘s authority is curtailed by the jury‘s verdict. This factor demonstrates that our state constitutional right to trial by jury has developed in a similar manner to its federal counterpart. Accordingly, there is nothing in the historical insights or in the intent of the framers to suggest that there is greater weight afforded to the right to trial by jury under our state constitution than under the federal constitution. Although the historical insight strongly emphasizes the respective roles of judge and jury, we see no infringement on those roles when the judge is confined to sentencing within a range author-
The sixth and final Geisler factor asks us to consider contemporary norms and public policy. The defendant argues that there are several public policy concerns at issue in this appeal, namely, that allowing sentencing judges to consider acquitted conduct undermines the jury‘s role and gives the prosecution a “second bite at the apple” without affording the defendant the same procedural safeguards as at trial. The defendant contends that the combination of these two concerns and the general concern that this acts as a form of “ ‘judge nullification’ ” of the jury‘s verdict undermines important public policy regarding the jury‘s important role as a “check on state power.” The state counters that the sentencing court‘s consideration of acquitted conduct does not undermine the role of the jury because, “[i]f the court considers conduct proven by a lesser standard of proof than the jury applied, it does not find facts contrary to any findings necessarily [inherent in] the verdict.” The state further argues that discouraging sentencing judges from considering as much information as possible may limit the thoroughness of the sentencing procedures and “frustrate the broad inquiry that sentencing is supposed to entail . . . .”
We agree with the defendant that the sanctity of the role of the jury should never be infringed on. Although the law largely supports the state‘s position, there is a modern push to prohibit the practice of considering acquitted conduct during sentencing. See A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice: Sentencing (3d Ed. 1994) standard 18-6.5 (a), p. 230 (“[a] sentencing court should impose a sanction appropriate to the offense of conviction and should not consider other offenses . . . of which the defendant was acquitted”). Commentators have expressed the concern that “the civic value of jury service suffers” when judges are permitted to put aside the product of a jury‘s fact-finding, an event “likely to engender consternation among the public.” J. Bilsborrow, Note, “Sentencing Acquitted Conduct to the Post-Booker Dustbin,” 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 289, 333 (2007). “To work effectively, it is important that society‘s criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,” in addition to producing just results. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1980) (plurality opinion). These contemporary public policy concerns weigh in favor of the defendant‘s arguments.
The six Geisler factors, in totality, lead us to the conclusion that our state constitution does not prohibit the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing when the sentence is within the statutory range for the convicted offenses and the information relied on has a “minimal indicium of reliability.” State v. Huey, supra, 199 Conn. 127. In sum, the first, second, and third factors weigh heavily in favor of our conclusion. The fourth
III
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
The defendant next argues that, even if we conclude that a trial court‘s consideration of acquitted conduct during sentencing does not amount to a constitutional violation, we should exercise our supervisory authority to impose a rule prohibiting the practice in order to remedy a perceived injustice. The state argues that we should follow our precedent in Pena and again decline to exercise our supervisory authority, as the exercise of that authority would frustrate the ability of sentencing courts to consider a broad range of conduct in determining an appropriate sentence.
“It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rose, 305 Conn. 594, 607, 46 A.3d 146 (2012). “Under our supervisory authority, we have adopted rules intended to guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process. . . . The exercise of our supervisory powers is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only when circumstances are such that the issue at hand, [although] not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.” (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 576, 4 A.3d 1176 (2010).
We previously declined to exercise our supervisory authority to overrule Huey and to create a rule prohibiting consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing in Pena. See State v. Pena, supra, 301 Conn. 683-84. We agreed with our previous analysis in Huey that it is not the province of our appellate courts to interfere with the discretion of sentencing judges, so long as they
We continue to agree with that rationale. To limit the information that sentencing judges may rely on does not provide any benefit under our state sentencing system. Under our system, sentencing judges are not required, or even permitted, to make findings of fact relating to aggravating factors, or other factors that may increase or decrease a sentence outside the statutory range. See
Notwithstanding our decision not to exercise our supervisory authority, we emphasize that sentencing judges should undertake every effort to refrain from basing a sentence on facts that cast doubt, either directly or indirectly, on any aspect of the jury‘s verdict. See State v. Pena, supra, 301 Conn. 684. This practice undermines many of our foundational principles regarding the critical role of the jury in our system of justice and the trust we place in the jury‘s verdict. Many courts and scholars have expressed similar concerns about the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing. Although, as we explained, federal courts, bound by decades of precedent, continue to utilize the practice, many have expressed displeasure with it. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting in part) (“there are good reasons to be concerned about the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing, both as a matter of appearance and as a matter of fairness”); Id., 409 (Millett, J., concurring) (“lumping acquitted conduct in with those tradi-
Scholars and commentators harbor similar concerns regarding the appearance and fairness of the practice. See, e.g., B. Johnson, “The Puzzling Persistence of Acquitted Conduct in Federal Sentencing, and What Can Be Done About It,” 49 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2016) (“[t]he use of acquitted conduct has been characterized as, among other things, ‘[Kafkaesque], repugnant, uniquely malevolent, and pernicious’ ‘mak[ing] no sense as a matter of law or logic,’ and . . . a ‘perver-[sion] of our system of justice,’ as well as ‘bizarre’ and ‘reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland’ ” (footnotes omitted)); E. Ngov, “Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing,” 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 242 (2009) (“[c]onsideration of acquitted conduct by a judge after a jury has already deliberated sends a message that the work of the jury was unnecessary and, in turn, threatens to undermine the role the jury serves and advantages it provides over judicial fact-finding”). Although these concerns are valid, and weigh in favor of great caution, we are not persuaded that they warrant the extraordinary remedy contemplated by the exercise of our supervisory authority.
In sum, we encourage sentencing judges to be thoughtful regarding the information they utilize when sentencing a defendant and mindful of the way the reasoning that underlies the sentence is conveyed during sentencing proceedings. We find no fault in judges who wish to consider the full context of the offense of which the defendant was convicted and, in fact, encourage the practice. In doing so, however, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for the judge to express or imply his or her disagreement with the jury‘s verdict. Such a practice may harm public confidence in the fairness of our judicial system and undermine the importance of the jury‘s role in fair adjudications. In this case, although we cannot conclude that the sentencing judge‘s declarative statement that the victim “was shot in the back of both legs by the defendant” was unconstitutional or illegal, we believe that it was imprudent. Certainly, the sentencing judge could have explained that the sentence was intended to reflect the fact that the defendant was directly involved in a dangerous and violent robbery that resulted in the shooting of the victim, with serious and permanent consequences, but that is far different
CONCLUSION
The sentencing court‘s consideration of conduct underlying charges of which the defendant was acquitted did not violate his rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, or under article first, §§ 8 and 19, of our state constitution. We reach this conclusion because the underlying conduct and evidence considered by the sentencing court had a “minimal indicium of reliability” and because the sentence imposed was within the permissible statutory range for the convictions. Furthermore, we decline to exercise our supervisory authority to prohibit consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing, as we believe the negative ramifications of such a rule outweigh any benefit. Nonetheless, we discourage sentencing courts from expressing disbelief or disagreement with the jury‘s verdict and using that disbelief or disagreement as a basis for crafting a sentence.
The trial court‘s denial of the defendant‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
MCDONALD, J.