State v. Langston, 346 Conn. 605

Background

Richard Langston was tried for armed robbery, criminal possession of a firearm and first‑degree assault; jury convicted him of robbery and firearm possession but acquitted him of assault.
At sentencing the prosecutor asked the court, citing United States v. Watts, to find by a preponderance that Langston committed the assault and to consider that conduct in sentencing.
The sentencing judge reviewed trial testimony, stated he found the witnesses credible and declared the victim had been shot in the back of both legs by the defendant; the judge imposed consecutive sentences totaling 25 years, each within statutory ranges.
Langston filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence arguing that considering acquitted conduct violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process; the trial court denied the motion.
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that sentencing courts may consider acquitted conduct if it has a minimal indicium of reliability or is proven by a preponderance and the resulting sentence remains within statutory limits; the Court declined to adopt a supervisory rule banning the practice but warned judges to avoid expressing disagreement with jury verdicts.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Langston)	Held
1. Does considering acquitted conduct at sentencing violate the federal Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?	Watts and subsequent federal precedent permit consideration of acquitted conduct proven by a preponderance so long as sentence stays within statutory maximums.	Apprendi/Booker protect jury factfinding; Watts is limited and cannot justify undercutting jury role or due process.	Allowed: Court held federal law permits consideration when there is minimal indicium of reliability / preponderance proof and sentence is within statutory range.
2. Does article first, §§ 8 and 19 of the Connecticut Constitution bar considering acquitted conduct at sentencing?	Connecticut provisions mirror federal protections; Geisler factors favor permitting consideration with minimal indicium of reliability.	Connecticut constitution affords greater protection and should prohibit reliance on acquitted conduct.	Denied: After applying Geisler, Court held state constitution does not prohibit consideration under same limits (reliability + statutory range).
3. Should the court use supervisory authority to ban consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing?	Supervisory ban would thwart judicial fact‑finding and transparency; existing rules suffice.	Even absent a constitutional violation, supervisory action is needed to protect jury role.	Denied: Court declined to create a prohibition but strongly cautioned judges about implying disagreement with jury verdicts.
4. Did the sentencing court’s explicit statement that the defendant shot the victim require reversal?	Judge heard live testimony, had opportunity to assess credibility; relied on minimally reliable evidence and stayed within statutory limits.	The judge’s declarative statement undermines jury role and public confidence; it was imprudent and unconstitutional.	Partial: Statement was imprudent and discouraged, but not unconstitutional or a basis for reversal given the reliability and statutory‑range sentence.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (U.S. 1997) (sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence)
State v. Huey, 199 Conn. 121 (Conn. 1986) (sentencing courts may consider information having a minimal indicium of reliability)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (facts that increase penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (U.S. 2005) (reaffirmed judicial discretion to impose sentence within statutory range)
State v. Pena, 301 Conn. 669 (Conn. 2011) (applied Huey and upheld consideration of acquitted conduct that met minimal reliability standard)