STATE OF NEW MEXICO v. PETER CHAVEZ
NO. 33,084
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
October 26, 2015
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRANT COUNTY, H.R. Quintero, District Judge
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Sri Mullis, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
WECHSLER, Judge.
{1} Defendant Peter Chavez appeals his convictions for the crimes of aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer (aggravated fleeing), contrary to
{2} At approximately 10:00 p.m. on November 6, 2012, Silver City police officer Joseph Arredondo was patrolling in Grant County when he observed a dirt bike traveling eastbound on Highway 180 without any lights illuminated. Officer Arredondo caught up with the dirt bike at an intersection and noticed that the vehicle did not have a license plate. The officer activated his emergency lights and followed the dirt bike as it turned into a Wal-Mart parking lot. The driver looked back over his shoulder at the officer, but instead of pulling over, he accelerated through the parking lot. Defendant jumped the curb of the Wal-Mart parking lot, drove onto a dirt path, and entered the parking lot of the Tractor Supply Store. Officer Arredondo followed the dirt bike in his police cruiser toward the Tractor Supply Store and activated his emergency siren while pursuing Defendant through the parking lots. Two cars, one traveling eastbound and one traveling westbound on Highway 180, were forced to slow down as Defendant and Officer Arredondo exited the parking lot. No other vehicles were in the area.
{3} As Defendant and Officer Arredondo traveled along the highway, approximately five cars pulled over to the side of the highway to avoid the chase. Officer Arredondo testified that Defendant‘s speed on Highway 180 reached approximately sixty-five miles per hour, which was ten miles over the highway‘s
{4} The aggravated fleeing statute reads, in pertinent part, that a person commits aggravated fleeing by “willfully and carelessly driving [a] vehicle in a manner that endangers the life of another person after being given a visual or audible signal to stop . . . by a uniformed law enforcement officer in an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle[.]”
{5} We view the aggravated fleeing statute as evincing legislative intent to more severely punish people who jeopardize the safety of others while fleeing from law enforcement officers. Historically, conduct intended to thwart the efforts of an arresting officer constituted the misdemeanor crime of resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer.
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
{6} In order to determine the merits of Defendant‘s sufficiency of evidence challenge, we must first address the contrasting interpretations of the aggravated fleeing statute presented by the parties. Defendant contends that the statute‘s essential
{7} Our goal when interpreting statutes is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 1047. We first look to the statute‘s plain language, which is “the primary indicator of legislative intent.” State v. Young, 2004-NMSC-015, ¶ 5, 135 N.M. 458, 90 P.3d 477 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” State v. Wilson, 2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 706, 228 P.3d 490 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[Appellate courts] will not read into a statute any words that are not there, particularly when the statute is complete and makes
The Plain Language of the Statute
{8} Neither the aggravated fleeing statute nor the associated uniform jury instruction defines the term “endangers” as used in the statute. “When a term is not defined in a statute, we must construe it, giving those words their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary.” State v. Tsosie, 2011-NMCA-115, ¶ 19, 150 N.M. 754, 266 P.3d 34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our courts often use dictionary definitions to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words that form the basis of statutory construction inquiries. State v. Boyse, 2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 9, 303 P.3d 830. “Endangerment” is defined as “[t]he act or an instance
Expansion of the Scope of the Statute by Judicial Opinion
{9} The State argues that the word “potential” was effectively added to the statute by our Supreme Court as part of its holding in Padilla II. In Padilla II, our Supreme
[The d]efendant drove in a willful and careless manner that endangered the lives of others—he ran ten stop signs, he exceeded the speed limit, there was at least one other motorist, apart from the officer, potentially placed at risk because of [the d]efendant‘s conduct, and the passengers in the car were placed at risk when [the d]efendant careened around corners causing the door with the faulty lock to open.
Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added).
{10} Based upon these facts, our Supreme Court held that “the defendant‘s conduct gives rise to the imposition [of the aggravated fleeing statute].” Id. ¶ 14. However, we do not believe that the Court‘s use of the word “potentially” was intended to indicate that anyone who flees from law enforcement necessarily endangers all persons in the vicinity during any police pursuit.
{11} A comprehensive review of the factual background reveals that the defendant “ran a stop sign while going fifty miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone [and] barely missed colliding with another motorist.” State v. Padilla (Padilla I), 2006-NMCA-107, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 333, 142 P.3d 921, rev‘d, Padilla II, 2008-NMSC-006. On review, this Court held, “We think a rational jury could have found that [the d]efendant endangered another person . . . [including] another motorist on the
{12} Because the facts of Padilla I support a finding of actual endangerment to the other motorist, we believe that our Supreme Court‘s use of the word “potentially” in this context was chosen to express that a collision nearly occurred, rather than to express that another motorist was simply in the vicinity while the pursuit was taking place. Because, in Padilla I, other persons, including passengers and other motorists, were actually endangered, we assume that the plain language of the statute remains in effect and that only those who actually endanger others while fleeing from law enforcement are subject to punishment under the statute.2
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
{13} Having decided that the aggravated fleeing statute requires that the State prove actual endangerment to another person, we now turn to Defendant‘s argument that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Defendant advances a sufficiency of evidence claim only as to the essential element of
{14} “The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]e must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject Defendant‘s version of the facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The function of an appellate court with respect to challenges to the sufficiency of evidence is to “ensure that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We apply these principles to determine if Defendant‘s conviction for aggravated fleeing is supported by sufficient evidence.
{15} As a threshold matter, we note that drawing inferences from the previous published opinions of our courts related to aggravated fleeing is not entirely useful
{16} Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, the State has not presented sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant endangered another person as required by the statute. The uncontroverted testimony of two participating officers was that the pursuit did not create a public safety concern or place anyone in danger. While other vehicles on the roadway were required to slow down or pull over in response to the emergency lights and sirens, no evidence of near collisions was presented at trial. We do not believe that merely taking simple, evasive maneuvers in response to emergency lights and sirens constitutes endangerment to motorists on a roadway. As such, no reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant endangered another person within the meaning of the aggravated fleeing statute.
{17} This is not to say that endangerment requires that a fleeing motorist pass within inches of another vehicle or that an accident is avoided only through extraordinary evasive maneuvering by another driver. When a jury returns a verdict based on evidence indicating actual endangerment, that verdict should not be disturbed. However, when, as here, the record is completely devoid of evidence of actual endangerment to passengers or other motorists, the verdict cannot stand.
{18} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Defendant‘s conviction for aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer, contrary to
{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge