State v. ColemanState v. Coleman
{1} Defendant was convicted of aggravated fleeing in violation of
BACKGROUND
{2} At approximately 4:00 a.m. on April 12, 2008, Defendant received a phone call from Mario Montoya and Daniel Martinez. They asked Defendant for a ride from a party, Defendant agreed, picked them up, and then accompanied them back to Mario’s home. Mario then suggested that they go “do some shootings.” Defendant reluctantly agreed to this plan and drove them to a location in Roswell selected by Mario, a trailer located at 2409 North Mesa Street. When they reached the trailer, Mario exited Defendant’s vehicle and fired three rounds at the trailer.
{3} At the time of the shooting, Richard Villa was the owner of the targeted trailer. Although he had recently moved from the trailer, he still kept varying possessions there and parked two vehicles in front of the trailer. The shots Mario fired entered the trailer’s bedroom, living room, and kitchen and struck one of Villa’s cars.
{4} A sheriffs deputy, who happened to be in the vicinity of Villa’s trailer at the time of the shooting, heard the shots and proceeded in his marked sheriffs vehicle toward the sounds. The deputy encountered Defendant as he was driving away from the trailer with Daniel and Mario. The deputy began to follow Defendant, who rapidly accelerated in an attempt to flee. A high speed chase
{5} Defendant, Daniel, and Mario were arrested and taken to the police station. At the station, Defendant was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
{6} In May 2008, Defendant was charged by criminal information with one count of aggravated fleeing in violation of
{7} At his jury trial, Defendant objected to Officer Northcutt’s testimony about Defendant’s post-arrest statements. The district court denied the objection and determined that the State had laid a sufficient foundation. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict as to both counts. Defendant asserted that there was insufficient evidence that he committed aggravated fleeing or conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling. The court disagreed and denied the motion.
{8} As to jury instructions, Defendant asked the court to provide the jury with an instruction informing them of the requirements of
{9} The jury convicted Defendant of both charges. The court entered judgment and sentenced Defendant to eighteen months of incarceration to be followed by one year of parole. Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
{10} Defendant raises five issues on appeal. As to the evidence presented, Defendant claims that the district court erred in admitting Officer Northcutt’s testimony regarding Defendant’s post-arrest statements and asserts that the court erred “in suppressing evidence regarding” the Chaves County high speed pursuit policy. Defendant next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict as to both counts. Finally, Defendant claims two errors in the jury instructions. First, he argues that the court erred in failing to issue an instruction “concerning his right to be informed that he could make three phone calls while in custody, pursuant to ...
Evidentiary Rulings
{11} “We review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse in the absence of a clear abuse. An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is against logic and is clearly untenable
{12} Defendant’s first claim is that Officer Northcutt should not have been permitted to testify about the statements Defendant made during the post-arrest interrogation. Defendant asks this Court to suppress this portion of Officer Northeutt’s testimony on the basis that Defendant’s statements were involuntary. The State objects that this argument was not preserved and asserts that Defendant failed to file a motion to suppress at or before trial nor did he raise the issue of voluntariness at trial. The State asserts that a carefiil review of the record reveals that Defendant objected to the admissibility of Northeutt’s testimony on foundational grounds only. We review the events at trial and the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s objection.
{13} On direct examination, Officer Northcutt testified that he had been on duty the night of the shooting, during which he interviewed Defendant and his two companions. He explained that he read Defendant his Miranda rights prior to questioning him. Officer Northcutt also stated that, in his opinion, Defendant understood his rights. The State asked whether Defendant admitted involvement in the incident at 2409 North Mesa and asked Officer Northcutt, “What did [Defendant] eventually say about how he got involved?” Defendant objected at this point stating, “Your honor, unless he’s [going to] introduce the statement, the court needs to rule on admissibility.” The court appeared confused by this objection and said, “Uh ... well ... [State], I’ll allow you to establish or lay some more foundation if you’d like in regard to a knowing and voluntary statement” by Defendant. The State proceeded to inquire further about whether Defendant had been properly Mirandized. Afterwards, the State addressed the court and stated, “I believe that’s sufficient foundation, your hon- or.” The court agreed and directed the State to “proceed.” Defendant made no further objection.
{14} Defendant cites the portion of the record discussed above and claims that he objected to Officer Northeutt’s statements “arguing that the foundation for a valid and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights had not been laid” and goes on to argue that the district court should have concluded that his statements were involuntary and suppressed Officer Northeutt’s testimony. At trial, Defendant did not, however, raise the issue of voluntariness and did not request suppression. He made only a foundational objection as to whether Officer Northcutt complied with the procedural requirements of Miranda. On appeal, Defendant conflates the necessity for Miranda warnings with the voluntariness of the statement.
{15} In State v. Gallegos,
[U]nless law enforcement officers give certain specified warnings before questioning a person in custody, and follow certain specified procedures during the course of any subsequent interrogation, any statement made by the person in custody cannot over his objection be admitted in evidence against him as a defendant at trial, even though the statement may in fact be wholly voluntary.
Id.
{16} At his trial, Defendant raised a foundational objection implicating the Miranda procedural requirements. On appeal, he argues about the voluntariness requirements. This latter ground was not raised or argued below and will not be reviewed. See
{17} Defendant’s second evidentiary argument concerns the district court’s decision to exclude evidence pertaining to the Chaves County high speed pursuit policy and to also exclude any evidence relating to the deputy’s compliance with that policy. As we understand Defendant’s argument on appeal, he is asking us to hold that he should not have been convicted of aggravated fleeing because the deputy who pursued him violated the Chaves County high speed pursuit policy.
{18} Defendant appears to acknowledge that this argument is contrary to the majority opinion in Padilla where our Supreme Court concluded that officer compliance with the Law Enforcement Safe Pursuit Act,
Directed Verdict
{19} Defendant next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict as to both charges and asks this Court to reverse his convictions. “The question presented by a directed verdict motion is whether there was substantial evidence to support the charge.” State v. Rael,
Aggravated Fleeing
{20} The jury was instructed that the essential elements of aggravated fleeing of a law enforcement officer include:
1. The defendant operated a motor vehicle;
2. The defendant drove willfully and carelessly in a manner that endangered the life of another person;
3. The defendant had been given a visual or audible signal to stop, either by light, siren, or other signal by a uniformed law enforcement officer;
4. The uniformed law enforcement officer was in an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle engaged in pursuit[.]
Defendant takes issue only with the evidence as to element two; he does not contest the evidence underlying the other elements. Specifically, Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence that he drove carelessly and claims that there was insufficient evidence that he endangered the life of another person.
{21} The evidence at trial established that Defendant drove at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour through residential areas of Roswell, New Mexico, and ignored and drove through several stop signs also while traveling at excessive speeds. The chase concluded only after Defendant struck a curb and damaged his vehicle rendering it immobile. We have little difficulty concluding, given these facts, that there was sufficient evidence Defendant “drove willfully and carelessly.”
Conspiracy
{23} Defendant was convicted of conspiracy in violation of
{24} First, Defendant asserts that he had no reason to know that Villa’s trailer was occupied at the time of the shooting which, he claims, is an essential element of the offense of shooting at a dwelling. The State responds that Defendant has conflated shooting at a dwelling with shooting at an occupied building and asserts that knowledge of occupancy is not an essential element of shooting at a dwelling. We agree with the State.
{25}
{26} In this ease, the jury was properly instructed at Defendant’s trial that shooting at a dwelling consists of “1. The defendant willfully shot a firearm at a dwelling; 2. The defendant knew that the building was a dwelling[.]” See UJI 14-340. In addition, the jury was properly instructed that the term “dwelling” means “any structure, any part of which is customarily used as living quarters.” See id. Use Note 1; UJI 14-1631 NMRA. Defendant raises no issues as to whether Villa’s trailer constituted a dwelling. Rather, he focuses on the second part of Section 30-3-8 — the portion relating to the crime of shooting at an occupied building. He relies on State v. Elmquist,
{27} Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge of conspiracy to commit shooting at a dwelling because there was no evidence he “willfully sought to shoot at the trailer.” “In order to be convicted of conspiracy, the defendant must have the requisite intent to agree and the intent to commit the offense that is the object of the conspiracy.” State v. Varela,
Jury Instructions
{28} Defendant raises two issues with respect to the jury instructions proffered at his trial. He argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Defendant was denied his “rights” to post-arrest phone calls as provided by
The standard of review we apply to jury instructions depends on whether the issue has been preserved. If the error has been preserved[,] we review the instructions for reversible error. If not, we review for fundamental error. Under both standards we seek to determine whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction.
State v. Benally,
{29}
{30} Whether Defendant was entitled to an instruction based on
{31} Turning to Defendant’s second argument on appeal concerning the instructions, Defendant claims that the court committed fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury that Defendant must have known Villa’s trailer was occupied at the time of the shooting. We addressed and rejected this argument in the portion of this opinion upholding the district court’s denial of the motion for directed verdict as to the charge of conspiracy. The analysis set out there applies here.
CONCLUSION
{32} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
{33} IT IS SO ORDERED.