STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Garrell Ray TSOSIE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 30,070.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Aug. 23, 2011.
266 P.3d 34 | 2011-NMCA-115
Certiorari Denied, Oct. 18, 2011, No. 33,227.
Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C. Nancy L. Simmons, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
OPINION
GARCIA, Judge.
{1} Defendant Garrell Tsosie appeals the district court‘s order for conditional discharge and supervised probation following his plea to one count of battery upon a health care worker, contrary to
{2} Tsosie raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the New Mexico Detoxification Reform Act (the DRA),
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{3} On August 3, 2009, law enforcement officers brought Tsosie to the PCU for the purposes of protective custody and detoxification, pursuant to
{4} When Tsosie arrived at the PCU, Albo was on duty and checked his vital signs and admitted him to the PCU. Approximately ten minutes later, Albo served Tsosie a cup of soup instead of the tray of food that earlier arrivals had received since the meal count had already been completed for the evening. Tsosie became upset and began to throw other clients’ trays on the ground. When Albo attempted to restrain him, Tsosie grabbed Albo‘s neck and injured him. Albo then punched Tsosie in the face. Tsosie had not yet received a formal assessment at the time of the incident because he was still intoxicated, and formal assessments do not occur until clients have been at the PCU for twenty-four hours and are no longer under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
{5} Tsosie moved to dismiss the charge of battery upon a health care worker on the grounds that (1) the DRA does not allow prosecution for batteries committed while a person was under the influence of alcohol; (2) Albo was not a health care worker at a health facility as defined by
{6} At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court clarified that it was deciding as a matter of law whether Albo was a health care worker employed by a health facility based upon the undisputed facts regarding the facility and the nature of Albo‘s employment. Accordingly, this question of law was appropriate for disposition in a motion to dismiss. See State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 14, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (concluding that where the facts were undisputed, it was appropriate for the district court to determine as a matter of law whether security guards were “school employees” as envisioned in a statute prohibiting battery upon school personnel upon a motion to dismiss).
{7} The record reflects that the following undisputed facts were heard by the district court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Four Winds is licensed by the New Mexico Department of Health and Safety (the Department) as an adult residential care facili-ty,
{8} When clients arrive at Four Winds, they are initially admitted to the PCU if they are intoxicated or test positive for any drug at the time of their arrival. Clients are not permitted to leave the PCU for at least twenty-four hours and usually remain in protective custody for seventy-two hours. At that point, they may choose to remain at the PCU for up to twelve days before they are either released or moved to another Four Winds facility for further treatment.
{9} Employees such as Albo are given the title of Counselor Aides. When clients arrive at the PCU, Counselor Aides check clients’ vital signs, perform various laboratory testing, question clients regarding their medical history, dispense meals, and provide care for clients. After clients are admitted to the PCU, Counselor Aides continue checking the clients’ vital signs approximately every two hours, including temperature, respiration, blood pressure, and heart rate. Counselor Aides also monitor the blood sugar of clients with diabetes. As soon as PCU clients are sober enough to interact with the staff, they also begin receiving substance abuse treatment. Treatment may include talking to clients about their drinking behavior and its consequences, prescribing and dispensing medication, and completing behavioral therapy. After clients have been at the PCU for twenty-four hours, formal assessments are completed, and treatment plans are developed. If clients wish to be referred to long-term treatment, then additional assessments must be completed.
{10} Counselor Aides receive special training and become certified medical technicians. They are trained to take vital signs and identify issues associated with detoxification, and they are also instructed regarding the past medical history of specific clients. Counselor Aides are required to have current CPR and first aid certification. Although Albo testified that he had not yet received his certification as a medical technician at the time of the alleged incident, he had prior medical experience, was trained in how to use the equipment, and had also completed his training with Four Winds. Once certified, Counselor Aides at the PCU are permitted to dispense prescription medication. One trained nurse on staff also serves the Four Winds facility, including the PCU. Finally, Four Winds employs a physician who is on call twenty-four hours per day and visits the facility weekly.
{11} The district court denied Tsosie‘s motion to dismiss, concluding that Four Winds was a health facility as defined by
DISCUSSION
The DRA Does Not Preclude Prosecution of Tsosie for Battery Upon a Health Care Worker
{12} Tsosie argues that because he was in protective custody due to intoxication at the time of the incident, the DRA precludes his prosecution for battery upon a health care worker. Specifically, he contends that because the DRA is more specific than the battery upon a health care worker statute, the DRA controls. Tsosie reasons that the broader criminal statute prohibiting battery upon a health care worker cannot impinge upon the specific protections the DRA affords to intoxicated persons and that the criminal statute must yield to the DRA in order to achieve a harmonious interpretation.
{13} The issue of whether the DRA precludes prosecution of intoxicated persons such as Tsosie for battery upon a health care worker is a question of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. See State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. “Our ultimate goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and
{14} Battery upon a health care worker is defined as “the unlawful, intentional touching[,] or application of force to the person of a health care worker who is in the lawful discharge of the health care worker‘s duties, when done in a rude, insolent[,] or angry manner.”
It is the policy of this state that intoxicated and incapacitated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution, but rather should be afforded protection. It is further the policy of this state that alcohol-impaired persons and drug-impaired persons should be afforded treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive members of society.
{15} In State v. Correa, 2009-NMSC-051, ¶ 6, 147 N.M. 291, 222 P.3d 1, our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue regarding whether the DRA precludes prosecution for disorderly conduct. Correa held that the DRA does not prohibit criminal prosecution for disorderly conduct merely because the accused party was intoxicated, as long as the statutory elements of the charge are satisfied. Id. ¶ 1. Correa reasoned that the Legislature‘s intent in adopting
{16} Relying on Correa, we conclude that the DRA does not preclude Tsosie‘s prosecution for battery upon a health care worker under
{17} Tsosie has not distinguished his case from Correa in any meaningful way. Instead, he argues that we should interpret the criminal statute regarding battery upon a health care worker as more broad than the DRA, and thus treat the DRA as an exception which prohibits prosecution in this case. However, this principle is not applicable if the DRA does not conflict with the battery
Albo Met the Definition of a Health Care Worker Under Section 30-3-9.2
{18} Next, we address the issue regarding whether Albo was a health care worker pursuant to
{19} As previously discussed, we first seek to give effect to the language of a statute as written. State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299. “[W]here a statute specifically defines a term, we interpret the statute according to those definitions because those definitions reflect legislative intent.” State v. Smith, 2009-NMCA-028, ¶ 13, 145 N.M. 757, 204 P.3d 1267, cert. quashed, 2009-NMCERT-012, 147 N.M. 601, 227 P.3d 91. “When a term is not defined in a statute, we must construe it, giving those words their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary.” Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Where “language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity[,] or contradiction,” we construe a statute “according to its obvious spirit or reason.” State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064.
{20} As previously noted, battery upon a health care worker is defined as “the unlawful, intentional touching[,] or application of force to the person of a health care worker who is in the lawful discharge of the health care worker‘s duties, when done in a rude, insolent[,] or angry manner.”
a public or private hospital, outpatient facility, diagnostic and treatment center, rehabilitation center[,] or infirmary. ‘Health facility’ also includes those facilities that, by federal regulation, must be licensed by the state to obtain or maintain full or partial, permanent or temporary federal funding, but ‘health facility’ does not include a skilled nursing facility, a nursing facility[,] or other long-term residential care facility[.]
{21} Two categories of persons are considered health care workers under
{22} The district court concluded that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a health facility
{23} “Diagnostic” means “[o]f, relating to, or used in a diagnosis.” Am. Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 500 (4th ed. 2000). “Diagnosis” is “[t]he act or process of identifying or determining the nature and cause of a disease or injury through evaluation of patient history, examination, and review of laboratory data.” Id. Additionally, “treatment” is defined in pertinent part as the “[a]dministration or application of remedies to a patient or for a disease or injury; medicinal or surgical management; therapy.” Id. at 1838. Counselor Aides at the Four Winds PCU identify issues associated with detoxification, and they are also instructed regarding the past medical history of specific clients. Counselor Aides also question clients regarding their medical history, talk to clients about their drinking behavior and its consequences, take vital signs, and perform various laboratory testing. After clients have been at the PCU for twenty-four hours, formal assessments are completed and treatment plans are developed. Treatment may include prescribing and dispensing medication as well as behavioral therapy. We conclude that the ordinary meaning of “diagnostic and treatment center” includes the Four Winds PCU because the PCU identifies substance abuse issues based upon patient history, laboratory testing, and formal assessments and then develops treatment plans based upon those observations.
{24} We also look to related provisions of the DRA to determine whether facilities such as the Four Winds PCU are traditionally viewed as diagnostic and treatment centers. See Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 16, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (examining related provisions of the Administrative Code to determine whether school guards are traditionally viewed as “school employees” when determining the ordinary meaning of statutory language). Tsosie was admitted to the Four Winds PCU pursuant to the DRA, that provides that “[a]n intoxicated or incapacitated person may be committed to a treatment facility.”
(1) an institution under the supervision of the [D]epartment and approved by the [D]epartment for the care and treatment of alcohol-impaired persons or drug-impaired persons;
(2) a public institution approved by the [D]epartment for the care and treatment of alcohol-impaired persons or drug-impaired persons, but not specifically under the supervision of the [D]epartment; or
(3) any other facility that provides any of the services specified in the [DRA] and is licensed by the [D]epartment for those services.
(Emphasis added.)
{25} The Four Winds PCU falls within the meaning of “treatment” as defined by the DRA.
{26} Furthermore, the PCU constitutes a “treatment facility” under the definition provided by the DRA. Under
{27} Tsosie argues that the Four Winds PCU is not a health facility because it is not a hospital or outpatient facility in its capacity as a protective custody facility.
{28} Finally, Tsosie argues that the Four Winds PCU is not a health facility because it is licensed as an adult residential care facility and therefore is a long-term residential care facility excluded under the definition of a health facility under
{29} Based upon the ordinary meaning of a “diagnostic and treatment center” and the DRA‘s traditional consideration of facilities such as the PCU as treatment facilities, we hold that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a “health facility” under
The Battery Upon a Health Care Worker Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague
{30} Tsosie argues that
{31} We review a vagueness challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo in light of the particular facts of the case and the conduct prohibited by the statute. State v. Smile, 2009-NMCA-064, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 525, 212 P.3d 413, cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-006, 148 N.M. 584, 241 P.3d
{32} “A statute may be void for vagueness if its meaning is so uncertain that the court is unable, by the application of known and accepted rules of construction, to determine what the Legislature intended with any reasonable degree of certainty.” State v. Castillo, 2011-NMCA-046, ¶ 22, 149 N.M. 536, 252 P.3d 760, (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-004, 150 N.M. 648, 264 P.3d 1171 (No. 32,913, Apr. 13, 2011). We have concluded above that the Four Winds PCU constitutes a “health facility” under the plain meaning of
CONCLUSION
{33} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court‘s denial of Tsosie‘s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the district court did not err by accepting Tsosie‘s plea and sentencing him to a conditional discharge with probationary supervision.
{34} IT IS SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR: JONATHAN B. SUTIN and MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judges.