State v. TrujilloState v. Trujillo
{1} Wе are faced with the unenviable task of interpreting the statutory labyrinth created by the intersection of the New Mexico Mental Illness and Competency Code (“NMMIC”),
{2} Second, we consider whether defendants with mental retardation who are dangerous, incompetent, and without a substantial
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
{3} Defendant, Daniel Ben Trujillo, stands accused of аttempted first degree murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, and tampering with evidence. The State alleges that he broke into the home of his employer and tried to kill him with a steel bar because of allegations that the employer had raped Defendant’s girlfriend. Defendant has an extreme mental condition resulting from self-inflicted carbon monoxide poisoning that occurred over twenty years ago when Defendant was twenty-six years old. As a result of this suicide attempt, Defendant’s IQ is estimated to be in the high fifties to low sixties. This score puts him in the first percentile, meaning that ninety-nine pеr cent of the population has a higher IQ than he does.
{4} Upon a pretrial defense motion to determine competency, the district court stayed Defendant’s trial and ordered him to undergo a psychological evaluation. Defendant was examined by Dr. Eric Mason West-fried, a clinical psychologist, who determined that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Both parties stipulated to Dr. West-fried’s evaluation and the district court entered a finding that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
{5} The defense subsequently filed a notice of mental retardation, whereupon а hearing was held and the district court ordered Defendant committed for a determination of competency based on mental retardation. A second clinical psychologist, Dr. Renee H. Wilkins, again found that Defendant was incompetent and unlikely to be treated to competency. This expert further found that Defendant was dangerous. However, Dr. Wilkins reported that Defendant did not meet the medical or psychiatric definition of mental retardation for the sole reason that his difficulties did not commence prior to his attaining the age of eighteen, as required by the DSM. See DSM at 41. Rаther, Dr. Wilkins diagnosed Defendant with dementia, a dysfunction that has a medical definition comparable to mental retardation but without the age of onset requirement.
{6} Despite Dr. Wilkins’ failure to diagnose Defendant with mental retardation, the district court found that Defendant had mental retardation per the definition in
{7} Because of the “substantial ground for difference of opinion” regarding the correct interpretation of
{8} The Court of Appeals’ dissent concluded that, rather than supplanting the NMMIC for mentally retarded defendants,
{9} We granted certiorari on two issues: whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Defendant has mental retardation under New Mexico law and whether it erred in holding that he may not be criminally committed under the NMMIC. Both of these questions involve statutory interpretаtion, which is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo. State v. Rivera,
II. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Has Mental Retardation Under New Mexico Law
{10} Mental retardation is defined by
{11} In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. State v. Davis,
{13} To be sure, we have previously recognized the differing purposes of the legal and medical definitions of insanity: “through the legal definition, the law seeks to assess accountability, whereas psychiatry’s purpose is to diagnose and cure mental illnesses.” State v. Neely,
B. Defendant May Not be Criminally Committed
1. Background
{14} At the heart of the matter presented is the intended relationship between the NMMIC and
{15} The purposes of the NMMIC are to provide for: (1) dismissal of the charges when the State cannot рrove its case, thereby eliminating the prospect of an indeterminate detention on meritless charges; (2) confinement of dangerous, incompetent defendants; and (3) “an orderly and progressive method of evaluating and treating defendants who can be returned to competency within a reasonable amount of time and a fair method of detaining incompetent, dangerous defendants who cannot.” Gallegos,
{16}
{17} As pertinent here,
[i]f the [DOH] evaluation results in a finding that the defendant presents a likelihood of serious harm to himself or a likelihood of serious harm to others, within sixty days of the [DOH]’s еvaluation the [DOH] shall commence proceedings pursuant to [the MHDDC] if the defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, first degree criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual contact of a minor or arson in the initial proceedings____
{18} Thus, while the statute requires civil commitment for those defendants who are dangerous, incompetent due to mental retardation, without a substantial probability оf gaining competence, and accused of one of the four enumerated crimes, it does not speak explicitly to the outcome for defendants who are dangerous, incompetent due to mental retardation, without a substantial probability of gaining competence, and not accused of one of the four enumerated crimes. This is the predicament in which we find ourselves: the plain language of
{19} The State advocates that Defendant must be criminally committed. Its argumеnt basically proceeds on four grounds: the plain language of
{20} Defendant and amicus New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association maintain that
{21} Our ultimate goal in statutory construction is to “ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” State v. Cleve,
{22} In addition to looking at the language, we also consider the statute’s history, background, and function in the comprehensive legislative scheme. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A statute оr subsection need not be considered independently or “in a vacuum,” but alongside statutes dealing with the same subject matter. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Whenever possible, ... we must read different legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one another.” State v. Muniz,
2. A Mechanical Application of
{23} The State argues that Defendant must be criminally committed because
{24} However, interpreting
{25} In other words, if we held that
3. The 1999 Deletion to
{26} The State next argues that the 1999 amendment of
{27} The State belabors the 1999 deletion of the provision from
{28} Apart from the addition of language to Section 31-9-1.4(0, our conclusion that the amendment to
4. The State Has the Authority Under the MHDDC to Civilly Commit Defendant
{29} The State’s third and fourth arguments are interconnected. It maintains that, because it has no authority to civilly commit Defendant per the terms of the MHDDC, without criminally committing Defendant, the public safety will be compromised. We conclude that the State’s authority under the MHDDC remains undiminished and the public safety is therefore not at issue.
{30} The State contends that it hаs no authority under the MHDDC to initiate civil commitment proceedings against Defendant because only a guardian may commit an individual with mental retardation to habilitation under that statute. See § 43-l-3(H) (classifying mental retardation as a developmental disability); § 43-l-13(A) (establishing that the commitment of developmentally disabled adults to residential habilitation shall be by petition of a guardian). While it is true that only guardians may commit those with mental retardation to habilitation under the MHDDC, habilitation is not at issue in the instant case; habilitation is altogether different from civil commitment. The MHDDC defines habilitation as:
the procеss by which professional persons and their staff assist the developmentally disabled client in acquiring and maintaining those skills and behaviors that enable the person to cope more effectively with the demands of the person’s self and environment and to raise the level of the person’s physical, mental and social efficiency.
Section 43-l-3(L). Habilitation is akin to the teaching of basic life skills. Youngberg v. Romeo,
{31} Contrary to habilitation, civil commitment is purposed not just on the betterment of the individual, but on the public safety. Because there is a public interest in civilly committing dangerous individuals, the right to initiate the process is not as limited as with habilitation. The MHDDC clearly states that “[a]fter an evaluation and upon reasonable notice, the district court may commit a dangerous defendant charged with a felony pursuant to [the NMMIC] or may dismiss the charges without prejudice and refer the defendant to the district attorney for possible initiation of proceedings under [the MHDDC].” Section 43-l-l(E).
{32} In arguing about habilitation, the State apparently misapprehends the fact that Defendant is subject to civil commitment for his dangerousness, not his mental retardation. See id. The power of the State to civilly commit Defendant has its origin in the police power, the authority to provide the citizenry with a safe community in which to reside. See State v. Rotherham,
{33} The State’s authority — and responsibility — to protect society from dangerous individuals under the MHDDC is unaffected by the Legislature’s statement in Section 31 — 9— 1.6 as to the manner in which those individuals should be detained. Further, society is equally protected from the danger of individuals like Defendant whether they are civilly or criminally committed. The State’s third and fourth arguments are therefore without mеrit.
5. Precluding Defendant From Being Criminally Committed is Sound Policy
{34} Construing
{35} The distinction between mental retardation and mental illness has long been incorporated into the Anglo-American legal system: differing treаtment of “idiots” and “lunatics” is seen at least as far back as the thirteenth century. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 414, 416 (1985). Mental retardation is not a mental illness. Id. at 423. While “[mjentally ill people encounter disturbances in their thought processes and emotions[,] mentally retarded people have limited abilities to learn.” Id. at 424. Another distinction is that mental retardation is largely immutable while mental illness is often episodic. Id. The practical significance of the permanence of mental retardation is that defendants incompetent due to mental retаrdation are less likely to be treated to competency than those incompetent due to mental illness, though there are cases where those with mild mental retardation may be treated to competency. Because mental retardation is inherently different than mental illness, the Legislature made a sound policy decision when it created a distinct mechanism for defendants incompetent due to mental retardation.
{36} Society’s understanding of mental retardation and its effect on criminal culpability is evolving. When the United States Supreme Court first addressed mental retardаtion in 1927, it did so in the context of rejecting equal protection and due process challenges to the involuntary sterilization of a woman with mental retardation. See Buck v. Bell,
{37} Since the time of Buck, the treatment of individuals with mental retardation by the legal system has demonstrated а maturing understanding of the disability and a concomitant recognition of the diminished culpability of criminal defendants with mental retardation. For example, in the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court held that executing defendants with mental retardation violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
{38} Commentators and experts agree that “the presence of mental retardation creates substantive differencеs in causation [and] culpability....” John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with Mental Retardation in the Criminal Justice System, in The Criminal Justice System and Mental Retardation 55, 55 (Ronald W. Conley ed., 1991). In this light,
{39} As a final point, we wish to address the fact that
III. Conclusion
{40} For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Defendant has mental retardation under New Mexico law and that he may not be criminally committed but may be civilly committed.
{41} IT IS SO ORDERED.