STATE OF MINNESOTA, Respondent, vs. Jquan Leearthur McInnis, Appellant.
A20-0492
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT
August 11, 2021
Anderson, J.
Hennepin County; Filed: August 11, 2021, Office of Appellate Courts
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
S Y L L A B U S
- Because appellant unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent during a custodial investigation, his statement to police should have been suppressed, but the failure to do so was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The evidence presented by the State was sufficient to prove that appellant had an intent to kill when he fired the gunshot that killed the infant.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing appellant to consecutive life sentences.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, Justice.
Appellant Jquan Leearthur McInnis was convicted of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder for the deaths of Gustav (Gus) Christianson, an adult, and J.R., an infant. On each count, McInnis was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of release after 30 years. Because the sentences were imposed consecutively, however, McInnis would not be eligible for release for at least 60 years. McInnis was 17 years old when he committed the offenses.
McInnis challenges his convictions and sentences on several grounds. First, he argues that his statement to police should have been suppressed because he unambiguously invoked his constitutional right to remain silent during the police interrogation. Second, McInnis argues that the evidence supporting his conviction for the murder of the infant is insufficient because the State failed to prove that he had an intent to kill when he fired the gunshot that killed the infant. And finally, McInnis challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Although we agree that McInnis‘s statement to police should have been suppressed, we conclude that the failure to do so by the district court was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, we conclude that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to prove that McInnis had an intent to kill when he fired the gunshot that killed the infant.
FACTS
Gus Christianson and an infant were shot and killed while sitting in a car in Minneapolis. The State charged McInnis with two counts of first-degree murder. Before trial, McInnis moved to suppress his confession to police because his constitutional right to remain silent had been violated. The district court denied his motion. McInnis waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a court trial on stipulated evidence, pursuant to
C.R., the child‘s father, drove a car to a Minneapolis house and parked in a driveway with an alley directly behind his car. Inside of the vehicle were C.R., C.R.‘s girlfriend, their infant child, Christianson, and another woman. C.R.‘s girlfriend and the other woman left the car and entered the house. C.R., Christianson, and the child remained inside of the car, except for a short time in which C.R. and Christianson got out to smoke. C.R. sat in the driver‘s seat, Christianson sat directly behind him in the back seat, and the child was buckled into a rear-facing car seat on the passenger side of the back seat.
Around the same time, McInnis was the passenger in a vehicle driven by D.A. As the two men drove past C.R.‘s parked car, McInnis told D.A. to pull over a few blocks away. McInnis left the vehicle wearing a blue hoodie and headed toward C.R.‘s parked car.
McInnis then turned back towards the alley. As he began walking away, McInnis fired a final gunshot into the back of C.R.‘s parked car. The gunshot entered the left side of the rear window at an angle, just above a white baseball hat that was sitting on the back window ledge behind Christianson. The bullet shattered the window, continued on, and struck the infant. Both Christianson and the infant died of their injuries.
After the shooting, many witnesses gave statements to police. C.R. told police that he saw a black male in a blue shirt with the hood pulled up over his head come down the alley. He then heard someone walk to the open car door where Christianson was sitting and, without speaking, begin shooting. C.R. told police that the same person ran away in the alley moments later and that he heard Christianson exclaim that he had been “hit.”
Another witness, M.S., observed the shooting from a park across the street from the driveway. She told police that she saw a black male wearing a blue hoodie walk down the alley. M.S. claimed that the driver left the parked car and argued with the person wearing the hoodie. The person wearing the hoodie then opened the rear driver‘s side door of the parked car, leaned into the back seat, and started shooting. She also stated that someone from inside the car shut the door and that the person wearing the hoodie walked to the rear
Two paramedics were responding to a nearby medical emergency call at the time of the shooting. A video recording from the ambulance shows both paramedics visibly reacting to the sound of gunshots. The paramedics told police that, after hearing the gunshots, they observed a black male in a blue hoodie running in the alley with the hood up.
A.B., who lived nearby, observed McInnis, wearing a white T-shirt but no hoodie, leap over her back gate and run through her yard around the time of the shooting. When officers walked the route from the scene of the shooting toward A.B.‘s house, they found a blue hoodie in a garbage can in an alley.
The police also interviewed D.A., who explained that McInnis had a dispute with Christianson over $250. D.A. also told police that McInnis had asked him to pull over a few blocks away from where C.R.‘s car was parked shortly before the shootings and that McInnis admitted to him later that day that he had “hit” a baby and left his blue hoodie behind.
McInnis‘s girlfriend told police that McInnis said he regretted killing the baby but “don‘t regret killing that dude.”
An autopsy revealed that Christianson was struck in the chest by six bullets, two of which passed through his arm; the infant was struck in the chest by one bullet. Using trajectory rods, police determined the probable path of the final gunshot fired by McInnis, which passed through the back window of the car and struck the infant.
Two days after the shooting, McInnis was arrested and questioned by police. Initially he denied knowing anything about the shootings or even knowing Christianson. McInnis claimed that, at the time of the shooting, he was with his girlfriend. When confronted with facts that contradicted his story, McInnis eventually confessed that he had committed the murders.
McInnis explained that he was angry with Christianson for stealing $250 in connection with the sale of a gun. He admitted that, on the day of the shootings, he saw Christianson while riding with D.A. and asked D.A. to pull over a few blocks away.
McInnis described the killings to police in this way: “Boom, I walked up on the car and I—I—I hit ‘em like four or five times—boom, and then when I, right before I ran off I threw one more through the window—bam—and then I ran off.” He told police that he had no intention of killing Christianson; he only intended to “holla” at Christianson and beat him up. McInnis claimed that he was aiming at Christianson‘s legs when he fired the gunshots and that he did not know an infant was in the car.
The district court found McInnis guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.2 Because McInnis was a juvenile at the time of the shooting, and because the State was seeking a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, the court held a Miller hearing and determined that McInnis was not “irreparably corrupt.”3 Accordingly, the
ANALYSIS
I.
McInnis first argues that his convictions must be reversed because the district court failed to suppress his confession to police. According to McInnis, his confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We consider whether the district court erred by failing to suppress his statement, and if so, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A.
The validity of a suspect‘s invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Ortega, 798 N.W.2d 59, 67 (Minn. 2011). A suspect must invoke the right “sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer
“If a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, law enforcement officers must cease interrogation and ‘scrupulously honor[ ]’ the suspect‘s right to remain silent.” Id. at 67–68 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975)). But “nothing short of an unambiguous or unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent will be sufficient to implicate Miranda‘s protections.” State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Minn. 1995); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (stating that under the federal constitution, the Miranda rights—including the right to remain silent—must be unambiguously and unequivocally invoked before police must cease questioning). When an invocation is ambiguous or equivocal, the interrogating officers are not required to clarify the suspect‘s intent. Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 285.
At issue in this case is the following exchange, which took place about an hour and fifteen minutes after McInnis was read his Miranda warning but before McInnis confessed to the murders:
[Detective 2]: It‘s not just us, it‘s what the video saw you doing and there were a lot of people outside that day was a beautiful Sunday at 1:30 in [the] afternoon. They had a football game going on across the street—lots of people out so people and videos—so it‘s not just us saying you were there.
[McInnis]: I wasn‘t there. I have nothing else to say now because now I feel like that I‘m being—I‘m a suspect and I don‘t wanna talk about this anymore because I know I didn‘t have anything to do with this. [Detective 1]: We ca- we can respect that, you know, but this is—remember back when I told you that this is gonna be the point where people are gonna make, not he or I, people are gonna make judgments on this case.
[McInnis]: Mm-hmm.
The district court found that McInnis did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent because he freely talked with police prior to this exchange and continued to answer questions on “lighter” subjects after this exchange. The State repeats this argument and adds that the words “because” and “about this” cloud McInnis‘s request. For his part, McInnis insists that his invocation was clear and that his responses to later questions were unconstitutionally elicited.
In assessing this exchange, our decision in Day is instructive. In Day, law enforcement agents read the defendant his Miranda warning and then asked whether the defendant would be willing to talk with them. 619 N.W.2d at 747. After mumbling a response, the defendant stated, “Said I don‘t want to tell you guys anything to say about me in court.” Id. Nevertheless, the agents proceeded to question him. Id. We held that the defendant‘s invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent was unambiguous and unequivocal because the first part of his statement clearly indicated that there was “no action, event, or time that [the defendant] was willing to discuss” with the agents, and the second part of the statement “further cemented” his invocation by repeating part of the Miranda warning. Id. at 750.
Under the circumstances, a reasonable police officer would have understood the statements by McInnis to be an invocation of his right to remain silent because he unequivocally stated that he did not want to continue talking with the detectives about the shootings. Indeed, one of the detectives questioning McInnis understood McInnis‘s request because he responded by saying, “[W]e can respect that, you know, but . . . .“, and continued to question him. Instead of trying to elicit additional responses from McInnis, the detectives should have immediately stopped the questioning and “scrupulously honored” McInnis‘s right to remain silent. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74 (“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.“).
The State attempts to distinguish Day based on the timing of the statements made by McInnis. In Day, the defendant invoked his right to remain silent immediately after receiving the Miranda warning. 619 N.W.2d at 747. But McInnis invoked his right to remain silent about an hour and fifteen minutes after receiving the Miranda warning, after
This argument is not persuasive. Certainly, the timing of the defendant‘s statement in Day was a relevant factor because we view a suspect‘s invocation in context. See id. at 749; Ortega, 798 N.W.2d at 68 (“[W]e review invocations of the right to remain silent in light of all the circumstances.“). But it was not the timing alone that made the defendant‘s request in Day unambiguous. We relied heavily on the content of his statement, reasoning that the sentence, “Said I don‘t want to tell you guys anything,” showed that there was “no action, event or time” in which he would talk to police. Id. at 750. And the defendant‘s reference to the possibility that his words would be used against him “in court” cemented that he was exercising the right of which he had just been informed. Id. Here, McInnis clearly stated that he had nothing else to say and that he no longer wanted to talk about the shootings because he realized that he was a suspect. The timing of his invocation does not cast doubt on his statements or nullify Miranda‘s protections, which are triggered at any time a suspect indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent. See 384 U.S. at 473–74.
The State also argues that, when viewed in the context of the entire conversation, the statements made by McInnis are ambiguous and equivocal. For example, the State contends that McInnis‘s refusal to talk “about this” showed only that he was unwilling to talk about a particular subject—namely, the detective‘s claim that McInnis was lying about where he was at the time of the shootings—but was not trying to cut off questioning completely. Similarly, the State claims that the word “because” showed that McInnis
These arguments are also unpersuasive. The State is correct that a suspect‘s expression of a willingness to discuss some, but not other, topics is generally inadequate to constitute a clear invocation of the right to remain silent. See, e.g., Williams, 535 N.W.2d at 284 (holding that the statement “I don‘t have to take any more of your bullsh*t” was insufficient to invoke the right to remain silent when the defendant “never exhibited a general refusal to answer any of the questions” and merely “expressed insult” when accused of lying); State v. Jobe, 486 N.W.2d 407, 415 (Minn. 1992) (holding that the defendant‘s answer that he would not talk about the claimed assault of the night before but would talk about other “lighter” subjects was not unambiguous); State v. Wilson, 535 N.W.2d 597, 602–03 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the refusal to “talk about Mary just then” was ambiguous when the defendant appeared willing, and in fact proceeded, to answer questions relating to other subjects). But in this case, McInnis expressed a general refusal to answer any further questions.
Our decision in Ortega provides a helpful contrast. There, the defendant talked with police for about 25 minutes before saying, “I ain‘t got nothin’ else to say man. That‘s it, I‘m through. I told you.” 798 N.W.2d at 65. We concluded that the defendant‘s invocation
Like the defendant in Ortega, McInnis stated that he had nothing else to say. That was a general refusal to continue talking. But unlike in Ortega, McInnis did not follow that statement by saying, “I‘m through. I told you,” which could cast doubt on the clarity of the refusal. Instead, he clarified that he had nothing else to say “because” he recognized that police viewed him as a suspect, which, as in Day, eliminated any possibility that he was merely expressing his lack of further knowledge on a particular subject. See Day, 619 N.W.2d at 750. Furthermore, McInnis immediately repeated his refusal by saying that he did not want to talk anymore and again linked the refusal to his status as a suspect. In this context, neither McInnis‘s prior willingness to talk with police nor the words “about this” are sufficient to cast doubt on his general refusal to continue talking.
In addition, McInnis‘s later willingness to answer “lighter” questions does not make his invocation ambiguous. Under Miranda, a suspect has the constitutional right to discontinue questioning by police “at any time.” 384 U.S. at 473–74. When a suspect clearly exercises that right, police must immediately stop questioning, id., and they may
We conclude that, because McInnis‘s invocation of his right to remain silent was unambiguous and unequivocal, the district court erred by failing to suppress his statement to police.
B.
We next consider whether the district court‘s failure to suppress McInnis‘s confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012) (“When an error implicates a constitutional right, we will award a new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.“). According to McInnis, the erroneous admission of his confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
“An error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury‘s verdict was ‘surely unattributable’ to the error.” Id. (citation omitted). We must “look to the basis on which the [factfinder] rested its verdict and determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict.” Townsend v. State, 646 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn. 1997) (explaining that the harmless error analysis is “better labelled as ‘harmless error impact analysis,’ because it is the impact of that error that the appellate court must consider“).
In deciding whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider “the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether it was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by the defendant.” State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2005). In addition, “[o]verwhelming evidence of guilt is a factor, often a very important one, in determining whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error has no impact on the verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting Townsend, 646 N.W.2d at 224). The standard applies to trials before a district court, not just to trials before a jury. See, e.g., State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 162–63 (Minn. 2020) (court trial on stipulated evidence); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Minn. 2006) (court trial). We address each factor in turn.
The first factor is the manner in which the evidence was presented. See Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d at 748. Because the trial in this case was based on stipulated evidence that was submitted without a formal presentation, this factor weighs in favor of the error being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 174 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that the error was harmless in part because the introduction of the evidence was “without drama or fanfare and likely had no unduly prejudicial effect“).
2.
The second factor asks whether the erroneously admitted evidence is “highly persuasive.” Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d at 748. A confession can be highly persuasive. See State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 784 N.W.2d 355, 365 (Minn. 2010) (holding that an erroneously admitted confession had “powerful evidentiary value” because it was “unquestionably the strongest piece of evidence” against the defendant and was the “central focus” of the prosecutor‘s closing argument). But the erroneous admission of a statement can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when it does not amount to a confession, and other evidence of guilt is strong, State v. Johnson, 915 N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn. 2018); State v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d 642, 650 (Minn. 1999) (holding that erroneously admitted statements, including a reference to “my victim,” were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the statements did not amount to a confession and there was overwhelming independent evidence of guilt), or when the impact of the statement is merely “cumulative” to that of properly admitted evidence, State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2013).
In addition, to the extent that McInnis confessed to some of the underlying facts on which the district court relied to convict him, his admissions were cumulative of other evidence presented by the State. See id. (observing that all of the facts admitted by the defendant were “easily proven with other evidence“). Concerning McInnis‘s intent to kill Christianson, the district court noted that the “strongest evidence” was the manner of the attack. Specifically, the court observed that the “natural and probable consequence of firing six shots into a person‘s torso is that the person will die.” See State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997) (holding that a factfinder may infer that a person intends “the natural and probable consequences” of the person‘s actions even when contrary to the person‘s stated intent). Even without McInnis‘s confession, the manner of Christianson‘s death is established by abundant evidence in the record, including the medical autopsy report and several eyewitness accounts.
Concerning McInnis‘s premeditation to kill Christianson, the district court relied on three categories of evidence: McInnis‘s planning activities, the nature of the killing, and
There is also ample evidence of the nature of the killing, which the district court considered to be “some of the strongest evidence supporting a finding of premeditation.” Evidence related to the nature of the killing includes “the number of wounds inflicted, infliction of wounds to vital areas, infliction of gunshot wounds from close range, [and] passage of time between infliction of wounds.” State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 736 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court determined that McInnis decided to shoot Christianson before he reached the parked car because he purposefully carried a gun, immediately fired six shots at Christianson without provocation and without speaking, aimed at a vital region of Christianson‘s body, and later told his girlfriend that he did not regret Christianson‘s death. Again, although McInnis confessed to many of the underlying facts, his admissions were cumulative with other evidence, including statements made by other witnesses and the autopsy report.
Finally, McInnis admitted to his girlfriend that, although he regretted the death of the infant, he did not regret the death of Christianson. This admissible statement is strongly indicative of both intent to kill and premeditation.5
To establish intent and premeditation for the death of the infant, the district court again relied on circumstantial evidence. The district court found that, after McInnis shot Christianson six times in the chest, he fired a final shot through the rear window. According to McInnis, he fired the last shot not to harm Christianson but to deter C.R. from chasing him. The court rejected this explanation because there was no evidence that McInnis‘s intent in firing the final shot was different from his intent in firing the first six
There is corroborating forensic evidence about the timing of the shots from the ambulance video, the Shot Spotter system, a 911 call, and witness statements. And based on the use of trajectory rods to determine the path of the bullet, there is corroborating forensic evidence of McInnis‘s location when he fired the final shot. See State v. Larson, 788 N.W.2d 25, 33 (Minn. 2010) (noting there was “other extensive evidence” of guilt when multiple witnesses testified and their testimony was corroborated by forensic evidence). And we agree with the district court that there was no evidence of retaliation. Thus, although McInnis‘s confession corroborates these details, we again conclude that the statement is cumulative.
In sum, because McInnis‘s confession to the police was “exculpatory” as to intent and premeditation, and because the underlying facts are “easily proven” by other evidence, this factor weighs in favor of the error being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
3.
The third factor is whether the erroneously admitted evidence was used in the State‘s closing argument. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d at 748. Although the State did not rely exclusively on McInnis‘s confession, the State summarized the statement in detail and relied on it to establish intent and premeditation. Accordingly, this factor weighs against the error of the district court being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336, 344 (Minn. 2007) (holding that an erroneously admitted
4.
The fourth factor is whether McInnis was able to “effectively counter the questioned evidence.” Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 315. “[U]nrebutted evidence” weighs against an error being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, even when the reason the evidence is unrebutted is because the defendant chose to challenge admissibility and not to counter the evidence on the merits. Id. That is the case here. Because this was a trial based on stipulated evidence, McInnis did not testify, cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise rebut the State‘s use of his confession to police. Thus, this factor weighs against the error being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 174 (Minn. 2013) (weighing the fact that the defendant‘s counsel “effectively countered” the effect of the erroneously admitted statements in favor of the error being harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
5.
The fifth factor is whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d at 748. This is an “important consideration,” McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d at 19, but not one that “controls” over all other factors, Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 317.
In this case, the evidence of intent by McInnis to kill Christianson is overwhelming. It is undisputed that McInnis repeatedly shot Christianson in the chest from a close range. We agree with the district court‘s observation that “[t]he natural and probable
There is also strong evidence of premeditation. Premeditation does not “require proof of extensive planning or preparation, nor does it demand that a specific time period elapse for deliberation.” State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 412 (Minn. 2016). It requires only “some appreciable passage of time between a defendant‘s formation of the intent to kill and the act of killing, and that during this time [the] defendant deliberated about the act.” Id.
Here, witness statements establish that McInnis ordered D.A. to stop his car, walked some distance to C.R.‘s parked car, carried a gun, and immediately fired multiple shots at Christianson without provocation or even conversation. Based on the medical autopsy report, it is clear that McInnis was aiming at Christianson‘s chest. These facts demonstrate the targeted and deadly nature of the attack, which strongly shows that McInnis had decided to shoot Christianson before he reached the car in which Christianson was sitting. In addition, D.A.‘s statements to police and the time-stamped footage from the surveillance camera establish that McInnis had sufficient time—at least three minutes—to consider the act.
Based on our assessment of the relevant factors, we conclude that the verdicts on both counts were surely unattributable to the erroneously admitted confession. The
II.
McInnis next claims that his conviction for the murder of the infant must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence that he intended to kill at the time he fired the gunshot that killed the infant.
As a state of mind, intent is generally proved circumstantially. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d at 179. When reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, we apply a “heightened two-step test.” State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn. 2018). At the first step, we identify the circumstances proved by the State, deferring to the factfinder‘s acceptance of the State‘s evidence and rejection of inconsistent evidence. Id. at 7. At the second step, we determine “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). In doing so, we do not defer to the factfinder but examine the reasonableness of the inferences ourselves. Id. “If a reasonable inference other than guilt exists, then we will reverse the conviction.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017). “But if circumstantial evidence forms ‘a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a
McInnis argues that the circumstances proven by the State support a reasonable inference that, when he fired the shot that killed the infant, he intended to only scare C.R. and did not intend to kill. In particular, McInnis relies on the manner in which he fired the final shot—through the back window as he began to run away—and the presence of C.R. as a potential threat to support his theory. The State counters that the manner of McInnis‘s final shot is not meaningfully different because it was still aimed at Christianson and was fired in quick succession with the prior shots.
The relevant circumstances proven by the State in this case are the following: C.R. was sitting in the driver‘s seat of the parked car, and Christianson was seated directly behind him in the rear passenger seat. McInnis approached the parked car from the alley with his hood up, walked up behind the parked car, immediately started firing gunshots without speaking, and fired six times directly at Christianson. McInnis fired the final gunshot as he started to flee the scene. There was only a moment or a matter of moments between the first six shots and the final shot. McInnis was still close to the car when he fired the final shot. The shot entered through the left side of the rear window at an angle, passed just above a white baseball cap that was sitting on the window ledge behind Christianson, and struck the infant, who died from the injury. McInnis then fled the scene through the alley.
III.
McInnis also claims that the district court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release after 30 years.
We review a district court‘s decision to impose consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237, 247 (Minn. 2017). “A trial court‘s decision regarding permissive, consecutive sentences will not be disturbed unless the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant‘s conduct.” State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1998). In evaluating a sentence, we “look to past sentences received by other offenders in determining whether the district court abused its discretion.” State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 322 (Minn. 2009).
McInnis gives five reasons why the consecutive sentences imposed by the court exaggerate his culpability. First, his conduct was consciously directed at only one person, Christianson. According to McInnis, every other juvenile who has been given consecutive sentences on murder convictions has “intentionally directed [the criminal act] towards more than one person.” He cites State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 2017), State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 2007), State v. Ouk, 516 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1994), and State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1990). He asserts that his conduct is not comparable to the conduct in those cases.
Although in most of the cases cited by McInnis the juvenile defendant consciously directed force at more than one victim, that is not true in McLaughlin. In McLaughlin, the juvenile defendant brought a gun to school and, although he fired multiple times at one student, not only did he shoot the student, but he also shot another student and both died.
McInnis‘s second reason for claiming that consecutive sentences exaggerates the culpability of his conduct is that he did not engage in extensive planning that would exhibit callousness. He again cites McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d at 705, 714, in which the defendant brought his father‘s gun to school in a gym bag with the intention to shoot people, and State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 452 (Minn. 1999), in which the defendant “drove at least 24 miles to obtain the murder weapon and made it clear to his friends that he planned to shoot the victims.” This argument is not persuasive. Certainly, extensive planning and preparation can be an aggravating factor. See id. Here, the district court acknowledged that the shooting was impulsive to the extent that McInnis “made the decision to act very quickly after he spotted [Christianson] on the street” and acted “without appreciation or consideration for the long-term consequences.” But the court deemed it relevant that McInnis “showed planning and purpose” by walking straight up to Christianson and immediately shooting him repeatedly in the chest at point-blank range. This was a
The third reason given by McInnis is that his actions did not create a high level of risk to others because he did not discharge his gun in the direction of a nearby park where many people were present. This argument has no merit. C.R. was in the parked vehicle at the time of the shooting, and McInnis‘s conduct put C.R. in significant danger. He also endangered others in the vicinity, including a bicyclist who was a few yards away on the sidewalk, a mother and daughter across the street, and numerous people in the park across the street.
McInnis‘s fourth reason is that his sentence fails to account for the effects of his age and troubled past on his brain development. McInnis points to his extensive history of childhood trauma, stress, and neglect, and also to his heavy drug and alcohol use, diagnosed mental health conditions, and susceptibility to peer influence. We agree that those are relevant considerations, see Flowers v. State, 907 N.W.2d 901, 907 (Minn. 2018) (stating that a district court may consider a defendant‘s “unique circumstances” when determining a sentence), but it is clear that the district court considered them and nevertheless concluded that consecutive sentences were appropriate. The court relied on a variety of factors, including McInnis‘s “significant” criminal history, the “brazen and heartless” nature of his act, the fact that he acted alone, and his killing of an infant who died in front of his father. We see no indication that the court abused its discretion when giving these factors more weight than McInnis‘s age and personal history.
Finally, McInnis asserts that his sentence is unconstitutional because it is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. McInnis acknowledges that we have previously rejected this argument, see id., Ali, 895 N.W.2d at 246; Williams, 862 N.W.2d at 703, but raises the argument to preserve it “for potential further litigation.” For the reasons explained in those decisions, we reject McInnis‘s argument.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
McInnis also criticizes the district court for relying on the absence of evidence of retaliation from C.R., or anyone else at the scene, citing State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 473-74 (Minn. App. 2019) (“[T]he absence of evidence in the record regarding a certain circumstance does not constitute a circumstance proved.“). We reject this argument. The district court did not rely on the absence of any evidence of retaliation to prove that no retaliation occurred; it relied on the absence of that evidence simply to show that McInnis could point to no facts that would raise his hypothesis beyond mere conjecture. See Lahue, 585 N.W.2d at 789. In any event, because we reach our conclusion without relying on the absence of retaliation as a separate circumstance proved, this argument is unavailing.