State v. NelsonState v. Nelson
Lead Opinion
Appellant Larry Allen Nelson challenges his felony conviction under
I.
Nelson and his ex-wife have two. adult children. Beginning in 1993, when the children were minors, the district court ordered Nelson to pay child support. Nelson stopped making child-support payments sometime in 1997. Since then, Olmsted County and Nelson’s ex-wife have repeatedly attempted to recover child support from Nelson, whom the court has held in civil contempt on multiple occasions due to his refusal to pay child support. As of April 2008, Nelson owed $83,470.27 in child support.
The State charged Nelson by complaint in August 2008 with felony-level failure to provide care and support to his children for more than 180 days, a violation of
Before trial, Nelson moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. Nelson argued that the absence of any facts in the complaint alleging that he had omitted and failed to provide both care and support to his children required dismissal of the complaint. The State opposed Nelson’s motion, arguing that a person violates the care-and-support statute if he or she omits and fails to provide either care or support (or both) to a spouse or child. The district court agreed with the State and denied Nelson’s motion.
The State then filed a motion in limine to prohibit Nelson from “making any claim, eliciting or attempting to elicit testimony, or making [any] argument concerning the defendant’s alleged non-monetary care of [his] children as a defense to the current action.” The district court granted the State’s motion. In response, Nelson waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a trial on stipulated facts to expedite review of the court’s pretrial rulings. See
1. That beginning before April 12, 2007 and continuing through April 30, 2008, Mr. Nelson was legally obligated to provide care and support to his minor children.
2. That during said time frame, Mr. Nelson knowingly omitted and failed without lawful excuse to pay $315 per month as he had been ordered to do by District Court Order dated September 27, 2006.
3. That said failure to pay child support continued for a period in excess of one hundred and eighty (180) days, and Mr. Nelson is in arrears in Court-Ordered child support in an amount equal to or greater than nine (9) times his total monthly support obligation.
4. That Mr. Nelson’s nonsupport of his children occurred in Olmsted County, Minnesota.
Based on those facts, the court convicted Nelson of a felony violation of the care- and-support statute.
The court of appeals affirmed Nelson’s conviction. State v. Nelson,
II.
The question presented by this case is whether Nelson’s omission and failure to pay court-ordered child support is sufficient, standing alone, to support his conviction of knowingly omitting and failing “to provide care and support” for his children. See
A.
We begin our analysis with the text of the care-and-support statute,
Subdivision 1. Crime defined. Whoever is legally obligated to provide care and support to a spouse or child, whether or not the child’s custody has been granted to another, and knowingly omits and fails to do so is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Nelson would define the term “care” as nonmonetary assistance and the term “support” as monetary assistance. The State does not advance an alternative defi
The term “care” means “[w]atchful oversight; charge or supervision ... [or] [attentive assistance or treatment to those in need.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 281 (5th ed.2011); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 338 (1976) (defining “care” as “responsibility for or attention to safety and well-being”); Black’s Law Dictionary 225 (8th ed.2004) (defining “care” in family-law context as “[t]he provision of physical or psychological comfort to another, esp. an ailing spouse, child, or parent”).
In contrast, the term “support” means “[t]he provision of money or the necessities of life: child support.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1751 (5th ed.2011); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2297 (1976) (defining “support” as “a means of livelihood, sustenance, or existence”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1480-81 (8th ed.2004) (defining “support” in part as “[o]ne or more monetary payments to a current or former family member for the purpose of helping the recipient maintain an acceptable standard of living”). Like the term “care,” the term “support” has a plain and ordinary meaning that is consistent with the types of legal obligations that arise under Minnesota law. The most familiar example is court-ordered child support, which “includes the dollar amount ordered for a child’s housing, food, clothing, transportation, and education costs, and other expenses relating to the child’s care.” Minn.Stat. § A.26, subd. 4 (2012). Cf. Minn.Stat. § C.101(u) (2012) (defining “support order” in part to mean an “order ... for the benefit of a child, spouse, or former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimbursement”). In the context of the care-and-support statute, therefore, the term “support” reasonably refers to a legal obligation to provide monetary assistance or other material necessities to a spouse ox-child.
Justice Dietzen’s dissent adopts a different approach to the care-and-support statute. Rather than ascribing independent meaning to the terms “care” and “support,” he would conclude that “care and suppoi't” is a term of ai-t or a legal doublet that refers exclusively to “a person’s obligation to pay court-ordered child or spousal suppoi't.” Thus, for slightly different reasons, Justice Dietzen reaches the same conclusion as the court of appeals, which held that the phrase “care and support” refers exclusively to “a person’s financial obligations” to a spouse or child. Nelson,
While Justice Dietzen’s interpretation of the care-and-support statute is reasonable, it suffers from several flaws, the most serious of which is that it renders the term “care” superfluous in the statute. Under our interpretation and that adopted by Justice Lillehaug, the term “support,” standing alone, refers to the obligation to provide monetary assistance or other material necessities. Thus, Justice Dietzen’s interpretation, which ascribes the same meaning to the phrase “care and support,” necessarily means that the word “care” does no work at all in his interpretation, which violates the canon against surplus-age in the interpretation of a statute.
Justice Dietzen provides two explanations for why the canon against surplus-age does not apply in the context of the care-and-support statute, but neither is persuasive. Justice Dietzen’s first explanation is that the phrase “care and support” is a legal term of art that refers exclusively to financial support. In a vacuum and without reference to the care-and-support statute, Justice Dietzen’s explanation has merit. But in the context of the care-and-support statute itself, it falls apart. If “care and support” were a legal term of art, as Justice Dietzen asserts, then the Legislature would have used that phrase consistently to refer to a person’s financial obligations to a spouse or child. Yet the phrase “care and support” appears only in subdivisions 1 and 8 of
Justice Dietzen alternatively explains that “care and support” is a legal doublet, meaning that the canon against surplusage is inapplicable. However, like the term-of-art explanation, the legal-doublet explanation does not withstand scrutiny. Specifically, the legal-doublet explanation begs the underlying question of whether the term “care” in the care-and-support statute is meaningless. But we can only declare a phrase to be a legal doublet once we have determined that a word within that phrase is meaningless. See Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 294-97 (3d ed.2011) (entry for “Doublets, Triplets, and Synonym-Strings”). That determination, in turn, depends on whether the canon against surplusage applies in the context of a particular statute. Justice Dietzen flips the relevant analysis on its head by first declaring that “care and support” is a legal doublet and then determining, through largely conclusory reasoning, that the canon against surplus-age does not apply.
B.
Having established that “care” and “support” may refer to different obligations, we now turn to the heart of the parties’ dispute in the case: whether the care-and-support statute requires the State to prove a knowing omission and failure to provide both care and support or a knowing omission and failure to provide either care or support. The care-and-support statute uses “and,” rather than “or,” in identifying the affirmative duties of “care” and “support.” While the term “and” ordinarily has a conjunctive meaning, see Lennartson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11,
Setting aside the statute’s mens rea requirement for a moment, the phrase “to omit and fail to provide care and support” is equivalent to the phrase “to not provide care and support.” When a coordinated phrase such as “provide care and support” is negated, two interpretations are possible. Rodney Huddleston and Geoffrey K. Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language 1298 (2002) (“Cambridge Grammar”). An everyday example will illustrate the point. When a person states, “I am not free on Saturday and Sunday,” we often interpret the statement as “I am not free on Saturday and I am not free on Sunday.” Id. at 1299. Yet a second, “less salient reading” is also possible by interpreting the statement as “I am not free on both days,” allowing for the possibility that the person making the statement is free on one of the two days. Id.
The State urges us to adopt the equivalent of the latter interpretation in the context of the care-and-support statute. According to the State, people who are legally obligated to do two acts (e.g., to provide care and support) fail to fulfill their obligation to do both if they fail to do one or the other. The State’s argument is, in effect, an application of De-Morgan’s Theorem — a principle used in formal logic. DeMorgan’s Theorem posits that the negative of a conjunctive phrase (i.e., not (A and B)) is equivalent to the disjunction of the negated terms (i.e., (not A) or (not B)), and the negative of a disjunctive phrase (i.e., not (A or B)) is equivalent to the conjunction of the negated terms (i.e., (not A) and (not B)). See Websters Third New International Dictionary 600 (1976) (defining DeMorgan’s Theorem as a pair of logical theorems meaning that “the denial of a conjunction is equivalent to the alternation of the denials and the denial of an alternation is equivalent to the conjunction of the denials”); see also United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce,
Nelson also advances a reasonable interpretation of the care-and-support statute. Under Nelson’s interpretation, “to omit and fail to provide care and support” means “to omit and fail to provide care and to omit and fail to provide support.” Indeed, in common usage, Nelson’s reading of the care-and-support statute is the more natural interpretation. Cambridge Grammar 1299. Furthermore, Nelson’s interpretation is consistent with Famam v. Linden Hills Congregational Church,
The State argues that Nelson’s interpretation is absurd because it would allow a defendant to avoid criminal liability by, for example, “picking a child up from school once.” We disagree for two reasons. First, the State’s example would not absolve a parent of criminal liability under the care-and-support statute. The fact that a person has provided some care does not mean that the person has fulfilled his or her legal obligation to provide “care.” Indeed, just as a parent can violate a duty to provide support by failing to pay the full amount of child support due each month, so too can a parent violate a duty to provide care by failing to fulfill a parenting-time or visitation obligation when that obligation is required by law (as, for example, when a court-ordered parenting-time arrangement is designed to enable one parent to work while the other takes care of a child).
Second, it is not absurd for the Legislature to criminalize the conduct of only profoundly delinquent parents — those who are charged with, and ignore, multiple obligations, both monetary and nonmonetary, to their dependents. See Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t,
Justice Lillehaug’s dissent would adopt the “less salient reading” of the care-and-support statute, which requires the State to prove a knowing omission or failure to provide either care or support, but not necessarily both, to convict a person of a violation of the statute. Justice Lillehaug appears to support his interpretation by application of the canon of in pari mate-ria, which “ ‘allows two statutes with common purposes and subject matter to be construed together to determine the mean
Far from supporting Justice Lillehaug’s interpretation of the care-and-support statute, these additional provisions provide further evidence that the care-and-support statute is ambiguous. Justice Lillehaug first relies on a number of other subdivisions of
Justice Lillehaug’s interpretation also is in tension with another provision in
Similarly, Justice Lillehaug’s attempt to read MinmStat.
A person who fails to pay court-ordered child support or maintenance may be charged with a crime, which may include misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony charges, according to Minnesota Statutes, section 609.375 .
(Emphasis added.) The statutory notice twice uses the term “may,” once to describe the possibility of criminal charges for nonpayment of support and again to describe the potential classification of any charges brought against a delinquent obli-gor.
For that reason, the notice provision is itself susceptible to at least two reasonable interpretations. The first is the interpretation adopted by Justice Lillehaug’s dissent: the notice makes it clear that nonpayment of support alone can establish a violation of
C.
Because Minn.Stat. § .375, subd.l, is subject to at least three reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous. See Lietz v. N. States Power Co.,
In this case, however, none of the reasonable interpretations is most persuasive. We therefore look to the rule of lenity, which applies to the interpretation of criminal statutes when “a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute” remains after we have considered other canons of statutory construction. Dean v. United States,
In this case, the State presented insufficient evidence to support Nelson’s conviction under the care-and-support statute. The State concedes that it did not present any evidence at trial that Nelson knowingly omitted and failed to provide care to his children, and a review of the record confirms the accuracy of the State’s concession. We therefore reverse Nelson’s conviction.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
Reversed.
Notes
. Justice Dietzen's dissent criticizes us for relying on what it calls "an uncommon dictionary definition of the word ‘care.’ ” The dissent accurately points out that the most-common meaning of "care” is "[a] concerned or troubled state of mind, as that arising from serious responsibility; worry.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 281 (5th ed.2011). According to the dissent, our failure to use the most common definition — a definition that makes no sense in the context of the care-and-support statute— somehow undermines our interpretation of the statute.
The dissent's criticism is flawed because it overlooks the basic principle that the relevant definition of a term depends on the context in which the term is used. See Deal v. United States,
context in which the term was used in a statute). An everyday example illustrates the point. The most common definition of the term "foot” in the dictionary is "[t]he lower extremity of the vertebrate leg that is in direct contact with the ground in standing or walking.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 683 (5th ed.2011). Much less commonly, "foot” means “[a] unit of poetic meter consisting of stressed and unstressed syllables in any of various set combinations.” Id. In the context of a discussion of the metrical properties of lyric poetry, no one would conclude that the discussion is referring to someone’s limb, even if the dictionary lists the "poetic meter” meaning as the eighth most common definition of the term "foot.”
Similarly, in the context of the care-and-support statute, the term "care” means "[wjatchful oversight; charge or supervision • • • [or][a]ttentive assistance or treatment to those in need.” Id. at 281. Indeed, the example attached to the first half of this definition of the term "care” is "left the child in a neighbor’s care," which is consistent with the context in which the term is used in the care- and-support statute. Id. at.
. In his dissent, Justice Lillehaug focuses on the meaning of the word “support” and leaves open the question of what the word “care” means in the care-and-support statute. Yet Justice Lillehaug’s approach is in some tension with Justice Dietzen’s assertion that the phrase "care and support" is a term of art that refers solely to "support” and has carried such a meaning for approximately 90 years. It is odd to imply, as the dissents collectively do, that the word "support” alone refers to a monetary obligation and that the phrase "care and support” means the same thing. In any event, the fact that Justice Lillehaug and Justice Dietzen do not entirely agree on how to read the care-and-support statute reinforces our conclusion that the statute is ambiguous and that the rule of lenity applies.
. The case cited in Justice Dietzen's dissent, Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., - U.S. -,
. Justice Lillehaug’s dissent describes our application of the rule of lenity as "knee-jerk,” but our holding today derives from a common-sense recognition that the care-and-support statute fails to provide "fair warning of the boundaries of criminal conduct.” Crandon v. United States,
. In light of our decision in this case, we need not, and do not, address the question of whether the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Nelson's evidence of nonmonetary care to his children.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I agree with Justice Lillehaug’s analysis, but would affirm for different reasons, and therefore write separately. In my view, our longstanding use of the phrase “care and support” to describe a person’s financial obligations to a child or spouse has given the phrase a special or technical meaning. Thus, in accordance with
In reversing Nelson’s conviction, the majority ignores our longstanding use of the phrase “care and support,” fails to acknowledge that the presumption against surplusage does not apply to doublets (two ways of saying the same thing that reinforce its meaning), and ascribes the least common dictionary definition to the word “care” to artificially create separate obligations to provide “care” and “support.” The result is an interpretation of the statutory language that is strained, illogical, and contrary to our use of the phrase “care and support” over the last 90 years. My analysis follows.
I.
Nelson was convicted of a violation of
Whether Nelson paid court-ordered support is not an issue in this case. He did not. Instead, the issue is whether ■ the word “care” in the phrase “care and support” has a separate, independent meaning in the statute other than financial support. I begin my analysis by explaining my view of the plain and unambiguous language of
Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Rick,
Keeping these principles in mind, I begin my analysis by considering whether Minnesota courts have ascribed a well-established meaning to the phrase “care and support.” For over 90 years, we have consistently used the phrase “care
In Morrissey v. Morrissey, we considered whether the district court erred when it ordered the defendant to pay the sum of $250 a month “as alimony, for the support, care and maintenance of plaintiff and the children.”
In Austin v. Rosecke, we considered whether the district court erred when it entered a judgment against a father for child support payments that were past due.
In a later child support case, we considered whether the district court erred when it entered judgment against the plaintiff father for $2,400 in accrued child support payments. Smith v. Smith,
Wiebke, Morrissey, Austin, and Smith are just four examples of the many cases where we have used the phrase “care and support” to refer to the sole obligation to provide financial support. See also In re Martinson,
In determining whether this technical or special meaning should be ascribed to the phrase “care and support” as used in
Whoever is legally obligated to provide care and support to a spouse or child, whether or not the child’s custody has been granted to another, and knowingly omits and fails to do so is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
II.
I next discuss my concerns with the majority’s interpretation of
When the court interprets the phrase “care and support” in
Perhaps more importantly, the majority has not identified any instance in which the Legislature has used the phrase “care and support” in a manner that is inconsistent with the longstanding use of the phrase. The fact that the Legislature has used a number of phrases to describe a person’s obligation to provide financial support does not make any one of those phrases “ambiguous.” Instead, a phrase is ambiguous only when the phrase is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Just as the Legislature’s use of the phrase “care and support” does not make the phrase “child support” ambiguous, the Legislature’s use of the phrase “child support” does not make the phrase “care and support” ambiguous, especially when there is no indication that the Legislature has ever used the phrase “care and support” in a manner that is inconsistent with our longstanding use of the phrase.
Additionally, the majority’s reliance on the presumption against surplusage is misplaced in this case. In Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., the United States Supreme Court recently explained that the presumption against surplusage did not undermine its conclusion that the words in the statutory phrase “portion, split, or percentage” “all mean the same thing — a perhaps regrettable but not uncommon sort of lawyerly iteration” like “ ‘give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey.’ ” — U.S. -,
Finally, the majority’s analysis relies on an uncommon dictionary definition of the word “care” to artificially create separate obligations to provide “care” and to provide “support.” Specifically, the majority relies upon a definition of “care” in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language to argue that “care” means watchful oversight, attentive assistance, or supervision of a spouse or child. But the most common definition of “care” is “[a] concerned or troubled state of mind, as that arising from serious responsibilities; worry.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 281 (5th ed.2011). The next two definitions of care are “[a]n object or source of worry, attention, or solicitude” and “[ijnterest, regard, or liking.” Id. Instead of using the most common definitions of “care,” the majority reaches to the sixth and seventh
III.
In sum, when the phrase “care and support” in
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm Nelson’s conviction.
. The majority asserts that under the interpretation “adopted by Justice Lillehaug, the term 'support,' standing alone, refers to the obligation to provide monetary assistance or other material necessities.” Supra at 438. Based upon that assertion, the majority argues that Justice Lillehaug and I "do not entirely agree on how to read the care-and-support statute,” and therefore the statute is ambiguous. Supra at 438 n. 3. The majority’s argument is unavailing because Justice Lillehaug does not conclude that the term "support,” standing alone, refers to the obligation to provide monetary assistance. Instead, Justice Lillehaug’s analysis assumes without deciding that the phrase "care and support” refers to two distinct commands. Although Justice Lillehaug and I have analyzed the statutory interpretation issue differently, nothing in our competing analyses suggests that the phrase "care and support” is ambiguous.
. The majority attempts to distinguish Freeman based on the Court's comment that Freeman’s proposed interpretation of the phrase "portion, split, or percentage” also failed to avoid surplusage. - — • U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. at
. The majority attempts to redefine "legal doublet” as any phrase that contains a meaningless word. Based on its new definition of "legal doublet,” the majority contends that we must first apply the canon of surplusage to the phrase "care and support” and only if we can ascribe no separate meaning to the word “care,” can we declare the "phrase to be a legal doublet.” Supra at 438-40. Additionally, the majority notes that the phrase "care and support” is not identified in the list of over 100 common legal doublets set forth in Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style § 11.2(f) (2d ed.2006). The majority’s analysis is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, under the majority's definition of "legal doublet” a number of well-established legal doublets like "aid and comfort” would no longer be considered a legal doublet because a court could plainly ascribe separate meanings to the words "aid” and "comfort” using the common dictionary definitions of the two words. Second, the majority's analysis reflects the precise type of reasoning that led commentator Bryan Garner to advise against the use of legal doublets when drafting documents. Bryan A. Garner, Gamer's Dictionary of Legal Usage 296 (3d ed.2011). More specifically, Gamer has emphasized that the presumption against surplusage could be used to give a legal doublet “unforeseen meanings by clever interpreters,” especially when one is faced “with less common doublets.” Id. Third, the majority does not consistently apply its legal-doublet analysis to the language of
. According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, entries containing more than one sense "are arranged for the convenience of the user with the central and often the most commonly sought meaning appearing first.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language xxiv (5th ed.2011).
. The majority concedes that the most common definition of "care” "makes no sense in the context of the care-and-support statute.” Supra at 437 n. 2. Nevertheless, the majority argues that this fact bolsters its analysis because it illustrates the "basic principle that the relevant definition of a term depends on the context in which the term is used.” Id. More specifically, the majority contends that its reliance on the sixth and seventh definitions, which define "care” as "[wjatchful oversight; charge or supervision ... [or] [attentive assistance or treatment to those in need,” is appropriate because the sixth and seventh definitions are the first definitions that make sense in the context of a child. The majority's argument is unavailing because, as discussed above, the Legislature used the word "care” in the context of "a spouse or child,” and the "watchful oversight” definition of "care” makes no sense in the context of an ex-spouse.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
Because the majority misreads an unambiguous statute and thereby undermines an important child support enforcement law, I respectfully dissent.
I.
This case requires us to interpret
A.
Passed in 1963,
I read
Nelson contends that the statute’s use of the phrase “care and support” requires that the State must prove both that the defendant knowingly failed to provide monetary “support” and, separately, that the defendant knowingly failed to provide non-monetary “care.” As a matter of plain meaning, I do not — and cannot reasonably — read the statute as Nelson urges. The word “and,” located between the words “care” and “support,” does not create an additional element that the state must satisfy. The plain words of the statute focus on what the defendant is legally obligated to do; thus, the crime is committed by the defendant’s knowing failure to do so, that is, the failure to fulfill the defendant’s legal obligation. If I am legally commanded to do more than one thing, then I violate my legal obligation when I fail to do so by failing to perform each command.
B.
The majority acknowledges that the way I read the statute is reasonable. But the majority also finds reasonable Nelson’s proposed alternative construction, requiring the State to prove, not just knowing failure to provide support, but also knowing failure to provide non-monetary “care.” In my view, the alternative construction is unreasonable for four reasons.
First, as discussed above, the alternative construction is unreasonable as a matter of logic and grammar. The focus of the statute is on violation of a legal obligation: in this ease, a district court order. If the Legislature had truly intended to require proof of two separate violations of a legal obligation, it would have used the word “both” rather than “so” in the phrase “knowingly omits and fails to do so.”
Second, the alternative construction of subdivision 1 runs headlong into the language of the rest of the statute. See Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl,
Under subdivision 2b, one may not be charged at all under subdivision 1 (or be eligible for the enhancements of subdivisions 2 and 2a) without a prior attempt to obtain a contempt order “for failing to pay support or maintenance.” Enhancements under subdivisions 2 and 2a are triggered if “the violation” (in the singular, meaning the violation of one’s legal obligation) continues for a specified period of time, or if the defendant “is in arrears in court-ordered child support or maintenance payments, or both” in a multiple of the monthly obligation. Subdivision 5, which establishes venue, makes clear that subdivision 1 is aimed at “the support obligor.” So does subdivision 7: work release is allowed only upon automatic income withholding, and upon conviction of a felony, “[njonpayment of child support is a violation of any probation granted.”
The premise of each subdivision is that a knowing violation of one’s legal obligation is a violation of the statute. Each subdivision suggests that a knowing failure to pay child support violates one’s legal obli
Third, the alternative construction is unreasonable because it conflicts directly with two additional child support statutes that specifically reference and tie themselves to
The statute that immediately follows
Minnesota Statutes
3. NONSUPPORT OF A SPOUSE OR CHILD — CRIMINAL PENALTIES
A person who fails to pay court-ordered child support or maintenance may be charged with a crime, which may include misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony charges, according to Minnesota Statutes,section 609.375 . A copy of that section is available from any district court clerk.
Fourth, remembering that the statute covers both child support and spousal sup
For these reasons, the majority’s alternative construction of section 605.375, subdivision 1, is unreasonable. Therefore, considering the plain language of
C.
The foregoing analysis is sufficient to resolve the issue before the court. Because
Finally, because the statute is unambiguous, we need not consider other matters in ascertaining the intention of the Legislature, such as those in
Instead of discussing the rules of statutory construction, the majority leaps directly to the common law rule of lenity. While common law rules of construction survive under Minnesota’s criminal code, see
Having thus leapt, the majority applies the rule of lenity in what could fairly be described as a knee-jerk fashion. As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, a statute that is “not a model of the careful drafter’s art” is not enough to trigger the rule. See United States v. Hayes,
In this case, there is no “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.” We need not “simply guess” as to whether the Legislature intended to criminalize knowing failure to pay support. Indeed, I cannot help but express regret that the majority’s decision today eliminates, or at least badly dulls, a well-established, important tool created by the Legislature to enforce court orders for the benefit of children and spouses.
By national standards, Minnesota has an excellent child support enforcement program, but the task remains daunting. As of June 30, 2012, the total amount of outstanding Minnesota child support debt was $1,688 billion, of which 85% was more than a year old.
For half a century,
The importance of criminal liability for non-support is evident from this case. The record shows that in 1994 the district court ordered Nelson to pay support for his two children but that, not long thereafter, Nelson stopped paying. By 2006 he was in arrears for more than $72,000. Nelson has been held in civil contempt on multiple occasions, see State v. Nelson,
By requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of new, additional elements of knowing failure to provide non-monetary “care,” the majority’s decision today handcuffs the State from using
II.
Finally, given my reading of
For these reasons, I would affirm the court of appeals on other grounds.
. This is the law the majority repeatedly refers to as the "care-and-support statute.” While this case involves child support, the law also covers court-ordered spousal maintenance.
. For example, in a trade secret case, if a defendant were legally obligated by court order to stop using a trade secret and to return all protected data, no defendant could reasonably assert that its legal obligation had been fulfilled by compliance with only one of the court's commands. To fulfill its legal obligation, such defendant must stop using the secret and return the data.
. Famam v. Linden Hitts Congregational Church,
. Subdivision 8 of
. This notice was attached to the district court’s order of September 27, 2006, adjudging Nelson to be in continuing constructive civil contempt for willful failure to pay child support.
. The statutory notice further makes clear that "[p]ayment of support ... is to be as ordered, and the giving of gifts or making purchases of food, clothing, and the like will not fulfill the obligation.”
.The use of the term "may,” rather than "shall” or "must,” in the notice does not undermine its clarity and obvious intent. A violation of the legal obligation may or may not be “knowing,” and, in any event, the prosecutor retains discretion whether or not to charge.
. The court of appeals determined that the phrase “care and support” was ambiguous simply because the statute did not define those terms. State v. Nelson,
. If, instead of construing the words of
. Child Support Enforcement Div., Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 2012 Minnesota Child Support Performance Report 21, charts 4, 5.
. According to data gathered and maintained by State Court Administration in the Minnesota Court Information System (MNCIS) Justice database, in the last decade Minnesota prosecutors have filed
.See Carmen Solomon-Fears, Alison M. Smith & Carla Berry, Cong. Research Serv., Child Support Enforcement: Incarceration as the Last Resort Penalty for Nonpayment of Support 24-27 (2012), http://greenbook. waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.
. See
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I join the dissent of Justice Lillehaug.