STATE OF IOWA, Aрpellee, vs. KEVIN DWAYNE WOODS, JR., Appellant.
No. 24–0261
In the Iowa Supreme Court
June 27, 2025
Amended September 4, 2025
Submitted February 18, 2025
A criminal defendant challenges his conviction under
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., joined. Oxley, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. McDermott, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman and May, JJ., joined. May, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman and McDermott, JJ., joined.
Jessica Donels (argued) and Kyle Dawson of Parrish Kruidenier, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
During a traffic stop, Kevin Woods was found to be in possession of drugs, a scale, a loaded semiautomatic pistol, and additional high-capacity firearm magazines. He was charged with and pleaded guilty to (1) possession of a controlled substance and (2) carrying a dangerous weapon while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense. Woods challenges the latter conviction in this appeal. He argues that he has a federal and state constitutional right to carry a firearm while simultaneously in the illegal possession of a controlled substance and while committing an indictable offense. We disagree. There is no federal or state constitutional right to carry a firearm while criming.
I.
An officer pulled Kevin Woods over for having inoperable taillights on the trailer of the commercial vehicle he was driving. During the stop, the officer detected the odor of marijuana emanating from inside the vehicle, and the officer saw in plain view a THC vape pen on the center console. Having probable cause to believe a crime was being committed, the officer conducted a search of the vehicle, including a backpack on the center console. The officer found marijuana and a scale inside the backpack. Also in the backpack with the drugs and the scale was a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol with a loaded magazine in the magazine well. In addition to the drugs, the scale, and the loaded pistol, the officer found three additional magazines, two of which were loаded, and two of which were high-capacity. In total, the officer found sixty-eight rounds of ammunition.
Woods was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of
A person determined to be ineligible to receive a permit to carry weapons under section 724.8, subsection 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6, a person who illegally possesses a controlled substance included in chapter 124, subchapter II, or a person who is committing an indictable offense is prohibited from carrying dangerous weapons. Unless otherwise provided by law, a person who violates this section commits a serious misdemeanor.
A pistol is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute.
Woods moved to dismiss the dangerous weapon charge on the ground that prosecution of the case would violate his federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms, as protected by the
After the district court denied Woods’s motion to dismiss, Woods entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges, preserving his right to challenge the
II.
Woods contends that his conviction for carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of
In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass‘n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Supreme Court instructed courts to engage in a particular analytical process when evaluating Second Amendment claims. Under the first step of the Bruen test, courts must make a threshold determination whether the challenger is part of “the people” included in the Second Amendment and whether the “Second Amendment’s plain text covers [the] individual’s conduct.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17; see id. at 31–32 (stating that it was “undisputed” that the petitioners were “part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects“). If the individual is part of “the people” and his conduct is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 17. If the Federal Constitution protects the conduct at issue, the burden then shifts to the government “[t]o justify its regulation.” Id. To justify the regulation, “the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest.” Id. Instead, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. To determine whether a firearm regulation is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition, “[a] court must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29).
B.
Woods’s challenge to section 724.8B fails at the first step of the Bruen test. See 597 U.S. at 18 (stating that if “the regulated conduct falls beyond the Amendment’s original scope, ‘then the analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unprotected’ ” (quoting United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1)); Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518 (stating that “the analysis can stop” once a court determines that the plain text of the Second Amendment does not protect the conduct prohibited by the statute at issue (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011))). The Second Amendment does not cover or protect a right to carry a firearm while also illegally possessing a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense.
The federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms “is not unlimited.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). The federal constitutional right is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. Instead, it is a limited right of responsible, law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms when engaged in lawful conduct. The Supreme Court has made this crystal clear. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8–9 (“[T]he Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun . . . .“); id. at 9–10 (“In this case, petitioners and respondents agree that ordinary, law-abiding citizens have a similar right to carry handguns publicly for their self-defense. We too agree . . . .“); id. at 26 (stating that the Second Amendment ” ‘elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms’ for self-defense” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635)); id. at 31–32 (“It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.“); id. at 38 (discussing the lack of historical tradition regarding limitations on public carry for “law-abiding citizens“); id. at 60 (discussing the lack of historical limitations on “law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from carrying arms in public for that purpose“); id. at 70 (noting that “law-abiding, responsible citizens”
Federal courts have thus consistently held that “[t]he Constitution does not give anyone the right to be armed while committing a [crime].” United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009). In United States v. Risner, 129 F.4th 361, 364 (6th Cir. 2025), the Sixth Circuit evaluated a post-Bruen Second Amendment challenge to a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm while committing certain federal crimes. The court focused “on whether the Second Amendment’s right ‘protected the possession of weapons by individuals engaged in criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 367–68 (quoting Greeno, 679 F.3d at 519). The court reasoned that it did not, and it ended its analysis there. See id. at 368 (“Because we started and stopped our inquiry at step one of the prior test in [United States v.] Greeno, nothing in Bruen dictates a different approach here.“).
Other federal cases, also decided after Bruen, are in accordance with Risner and Johnson. See, e.g., United States v. Page, No. CR–25–024–RAW, 2025 WL 1489540, at *1 (E.D. Okla. May 23, 2025) (stating that only “law-abiding citizens have a right to carry a gun outside the home for self-defense“); Madrid v. United States, No. 1:21cv507, 2024 WL 5466859, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2024) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to a conviction under
Statе courts have also concluded that there is no federal constitutional right to carry a firearm while also committing a crime. People v. Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127 (Ct. App. 2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, is materially indistinguishable from this case. In that case, a police officer found the defendant “asleep in his car with a bag of methamphetamine and a loaded gun at his feet.” Id. at 128. As relevant here, the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance while armed. Id. Like Woods, the defendant contended his conviction “violate[d] the Second Amendment by restricting a nonviolent offender’s right to possess firearms.” Id. The court rejected the challenge. Id. It explained that the first step in determining a challenged statute’s constitutionality under the Second Amendment is to determine ” ‘whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee’ of protecting the right of responsible, law-abiding citizens to possess firearms.” Id. at 130 (quoting Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 668–69 (1st Cir. 2018), abrogated in part on other
Although People v. Gonzalez was issued before Bruen, its threshold analysis was later affirmed post-Bruen. See People v. Allen, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d 474, 476 (Ct. App. 2023) (“We reject the constitutional challenges, and we publish our analysis concerning possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm to confirm that [Gonzalez] remains good law.“); see also Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19 (stating that the first step of the predominant Second Amendment framework pre-Bruen was “broadly consistent” with the first step of the Bruen test). In People v. Allen, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 475, the defendant was convicted of “possessing a controlled substance while armed with a firearm.” The defendant challenged the conviction on Second Amendment grounds. Id. at 476. The court rejected the challenge at the first step of the Bruen analysis. Id. at 479. The court concluded that the Second Amendment protects ” ‘law-abiding citizens only’ and does not ‘protect[] a right to carry a gun while simultaneously engaging in criminal conduct.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130). Consistent with Gonzalez, the court did not even proceed with the second step of the Bruen analysis:
Allen focuses exclusively on the second step of the Bruen analysis, arguing that there were “no regulation[s] in or around 1791 that prohibited individuals in possession of any drug from also being armed” and that there are no other relevant, analogous prohibitions. . . . [U]nder Bruen we need not analyze whether a regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation” if the individual’s regulated conduct is not covered by the Second Amendment.
Id. at 479–80 (first alteration in original) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24).
In State v. Jones, 249 N.E.3d 782, 792–94 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024), the court rejected a federal and state constitutional challenge to a law that enhanced the defendant’s criminal sentence for possession of a firearm while possessing drugs. The court explained that the Second Amendment right applies to ” ‘law-abiding,’ responsible citizens, not those who would violate the nation’s laws.” Id. at 794 (quoting State v. Windland, No. 2023 CA 00068, 2024 WL 2037674, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 6, 2024)). Like Woods, the defendant argued that the Second Amendment should apply because the handgun was not used during the commission of or in the furtherance of any crime. Id. The court rejected the
Indeed, in two cases decided prior to Bruen (and Heller, actually), this court had already reached the common-sense conclusion that the federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms does not include the right to carry while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense. In State v. Mehner, 480 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Iowa 1992), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of
In State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Iowa 1997), the defendant was charged with interference with official acts while armed, in violation of
While we acknowledge that Mehner and Brecunier are not controlling because they pre-date Heller and Bruen and thus do not feature an adequate historical analysis, see Risner, 129 F.4th at 366–67 (noting that the first step of the historical analysis post-Heller was “embrace[d]” by the Supreme Court in Bruen, but pre-Heller cases may have used a different mode of analysis), nothing in Bruen undermines their holdings. The holding in each case—that there is no Second Amendment right to carry a firearm while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense—is widely supported by post-Heller and post-Bruen caselaw. See, e.g., id. at 368 (“[W]e have no reason to depart from Greeno’s holding that the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to the use of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.“); United States v. Cole, No. 24–10877, 2025 WL 339894, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2025) (per curiam) (affirming a post-Bruen and post-Rahimi felon-in-possession conviction based on a pre-Bruen decision because neither Bruen nor Rahimi came close to “demolish[ing]” or “evisercat[ing]” the pre-Bruen case’s “fundamental props” (alterations in original) (quoting Del Castillo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Health, 26 F.4th 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2022))); Allen, 314 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 479 (concluding that Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, “remain[ed] good law after Bruen“).
C.
Even if the conduct at issue here—the possession of a firearm while illegally possessing a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense—was covered by the Second Amendment, Woods’s federal challenge to his conviction would nonetheless fail. To justify the regulation, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. The challenged law must be ” ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). “Why and how the regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.” Id. The “why” analysis instructs that “if laws at the Founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible category” of firearms regulation. United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692). The “how” analysis warns that “a law . . . may not be compatible with the right if it [is regulated] to an extent beyond what was done at the Founding.” Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692).
We start with the “why” behind the challenged law. “The state possesses a strong compelling interest in maintaining public safety and preventing gun violence.” State v. Weber, 132 N.E.3d 1140, 1148 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019). Carrying a firearm during the commission of an indictable offense increases the risk of danger and violence to the perpetrator, the victim, if any, and those investigating
The government’s interest in public safety, generally, and peace officer safety, particularly, extends to drug offenses. “[D]rugs and guns are a dangerous combination.” Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993). Contrary to Woods’s (and the dissent’s) assertion, mixing drugs and guns together is inherently dangerous, even in the case of personal use. “Even one who simply possesses a controlled substance . . . must generally obtain it from someone else, and firearms are often involved in drug transactions. This dangerous connection between illegal drugs and firearms is well-known and has been recognized by Congress.” United States v. Levasseur, No. 1:22–cr–00155–LEW, 2023 WL 6623165, at *9 (D. Me. Oct. 11, 2023). Further,
[I]t is reasonable to assume a person armed with a loaded, operable firearm during the commission of any crime may be willing to resort to use of that weapon to avoid arrest and—in the case of section 11370.1 [drug possession statute], specifiсally—to maintain possession of their illicit stash. It is also reasonable to assume that some people who have controlled substances . . . also abuse those drugs, making their immediate access to a loaded, operable firearm more of a threat to public safety than someone . . . who isn’t in the process of committing a crime. Indeed, the potentially “deadly combination” of illegal drugs and firearms is precisely what the Legislature intended to address by enacting section 11370.1.
Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130–32 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Pena, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 659 (Ct. App. 1999)).
The facts of this case bear out that concern. Woods was pulled over because of an inoperable light on the trailer of his commercial vehicle. During the traffic stop, the officer observed a THC vape pen on the center console of the vehicle and smelled marijuana wafting from the cabin, indicating that Woods may have been using while driving and while in possession of a loaded pistol. The loaded pistol was contained in a backpack on the center console, readily accessible to Woods. Although Woods did not use the loaded pistol to avoid apprehension in this case, that does not make the potential for death or physical injury to the officer and Woods any less real. Traffic stops, especially stops where the motorist is in possession of drugs and guns, are inherently dangerous:
Even for routine traffic violations, traffic stops are “fraught with danger to police officers.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). An “inordinate risk confront[s] an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (per curiam). That is in part because officers operate at a “tactical disadvantage” when “approaching an unknown vehicle, with limited visibility and unpredictable threats.” Brief for National Fraternal Order of Police as Amicus Curiae 4. As this Court noted nearly 50 years ago, “a significant percentage of
murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.” Mimms, 434 U.S., at 110, 98 S. Ct. 330 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234, n. 5, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973)). Traffic stops remain highly dangerous today. . . . Officers cannot let their guard down and assume that any particular traffic stop will be safe—even if a driver is pulled over for nothing more than a speeding violation, a broken taillight, or the like. The driver may be drunk, on drugs, armed, or some combination thereof. Or the driver may have committed (or may be about to commit) a serious crime. “People detained for minor offenses” such as ordinary traffic violations “can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.” Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 334, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 182 L. Ed. 2d 566 (2012). . . .
So even though most traffic stops end without incident, traffic stops are nonetheless inherently risky for police officers.
Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1360–61 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., with whom Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., join, concurring) (alteration in original) (emphases added).
Having looked at the “why” underlying the current law, we now turn to “how” the law is implemented.
Woods fails to appreciate the limited nature of the regulation at issue in this case and thus makes a categorical error when looking at historical analogues. Rather than comparing
[D]ispossession laws prohibit individuals from possessing firearms in the future based on their past criminal conduct [or status]. Section 11370.1 [a conduct-based law], in contrast, prohibits individuals from possessing firearms while simultaneously committing criminal activity. [A] convicted nonviolent felon, could at least argue that if he were allowed to possess firearms, he would use them for a lawful purpose (e.g., defense of the home or certain military purposes). [The defendant] cannot make that argument. Instead he seeks to validate his possession of a gun for an unlawful purpose, something on which Second Amendment jurisprudence, for all its murkiness, is quite clear. There is no constitutional right to carry a gun while committing a crime.
Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130–32.
Indeed, the primary case on which Woods relies, United States v. Daniels, 124 F.4th 967, 970 (5th Cir. 2025), undercuts his argument because it makes the distinction between historical conduct-based laws that regulated when a person could carry a firearm and historical status-based laws that prohibited a person from even possessing a firearm. In that case, the defendant was convicted of violating
Unlike the dispossession law at issue in Daniels and Connelly, carry laws like
In 1788, the Northwest Territory—a federal jurisdiction with laws enacted by a governor and three judges, all subject then to congressional approval, see An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprinted in Documents Illustrative of the Union of the American States, House Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927) (Northwest Ordinance)—punished breaking and entering more severely when a person was “armed with any dangerous weapon or weapons” by causing offenders to forfeit their estate and to face 40 years in gaol (jail), see Laws Passed in the Territory of the United
States, North-West of the River Ohio, from the Commencement of the Government to the 31st of December, 1791, 20 (1792). Federal legislation establishing the Mississippi Territory (later Alabama and Mississippi) based its governance on the Northwest Territory’s model, and its earliest laws in 1799 and 1800—later known as the Sargent’s Code based on the Federalist Governor Winthrop Sargent—increased punishment for both burglary and robbery when the culprit was armed with a dangerous weapon. See A Law Respecting Crimes and Punishments (Feb. 28, 1799), reprinted in Sargent’s Code: A Collection of the Original Laws of the Mississippi Territory Enacted 1799–1800: By Governor Winthrop Sargent and the Territorial Judges 12–13 (1939) (e.g., enhancing sentence for burglary with a dangerous weapon from three to four years); see also Michael H. Hoffheimer, Murder and Manslaughter in Mississippi: Unintentional Killings, 71 Miss. L. J. 35, 55 n. 47–48 (2001).
In the interest of brevity, we need not recite all the relevant historical analogues that demonstrate
In United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th 1124, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2023), the court rejected a challenge to a federal sentencing enhancement triggered by the possession of a firearm. The court reasoned that there was a “well-established” “historical tradition” of criminalizing the possession of a firearm while committing a crime or increasing “the severity of punishment for certain felonies when weapons were possessed, but not necessarily used, during the commission
In Commonwealth v. Webb, 2025 WL 898249, at *1, the court rejected a defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute criminalizing the possession оf a firearm while in the possession of a controlled substance. Like Woods, the defendant argued that the criminal statute was unconstitutional as applied to him following Bruen and Rahimi because “disarming an individual based solely on the possession of a controlled substance lacked a historical precedent.” Id. Like Woods, the defendant argued that a showing of dangerousness was required and there was no showing of dangerousness. See id. at *4. The court disagreed. Id. at *4–5. “[A] person possessing both a controlled substance and a firearm together is dangerous” and “the United States has a historical tradition of disarming the dangerous.” Id. at *4. Further, like
We agree with these conclusions, and we note that the Virginia Court of Appeals expanded this analysis recently in Fitzgerald. There, the court stated that “there is no historic evidence suggesting that persons had a right to possess firearms during an offense” and that founding-era English smuggling laws served
[T]he actus reus of both [laws] required the intentional and knowing possession of a firearm and the possession of contraband, which in the case of
Code § 18.2-308.4 is a Schedule I/II controlled substance. See Blackstone, supra, *155. Both statutes regulated “firearm use to address particular problems,” with this problem being the possession of the firearm to protect the contraband from discovery. Connelly, 117 F.4th at 274. AndCode § 18.2-308.4 regulates firearms to a much more limited extent than this smuggling felony as Blackstone noted that courts “cannot surely be too cautious in inflicting the penalty of death” for that felony due to its effect on the English economy by facilitating illicit trade. See Blackstone, supra, *155. UnderCode § 18.2-308.4 , the offender is only disarmed where he possesses both the substance and the weapon, which are both indicative of involving in the illicit drug trade of which the smuggling offense is but an older and broader relative. It may not be a “dead ringer,” but it is clearly a “historical analogue” for purposes of the Bruen analysis. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 708–09 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30).
Fitzgerald, 2025 WL 1559568, at *13 (footnote omitted). We agree with this analysis.
D.
Woods is asking this court to do what no other court in the country has done and hold that there is a federal constitutional right to carry a firearm while simultaneously in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while simultaneously engaged in indictable criminal activity. See Wigfall, 677 F. Supp. 3d at 800 (rejecting the defendant’s challenge to a federal sentencing enhancement and stating, “Mr. Wigfall cites no cases that have ruled his way, and tellingly the court finds none”); Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 130 (rejecting the defendant’s challenge to his conviction for possession of a controlled substance while armed and stating that the court was “aware of no court decision holding that the United States Constitution protects a right to
III.
Woods also contends that his conviction for carrying a firearm while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance and while committing an indictable offense violates In 2022, Iowa voters ratified an amendment to the The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. The sovereign state of Iowa affirms and recognizes this right to be a fundamental individual right. Any and all restrictions of this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny. In assessing a constitutional challenge to a statute or regulation under With those considerations in mind, we conclude that Woods’s state constitutional challenge fails at this threshold step. Like the federal constitutional right to keep and bear arms, the state constitutional right does not include the right to carry a firearm while in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while committing an indictable offense. See Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d at 370 (holding that there is “no constitutional right to be armed” while committing a crime); Mehner, 480 N.W.2d at 879 (“Although Mehner argues the constitution gives him the right to possess firearms, the statute involved prohibits only the possession of firearms while participating in a drug offense; a criminal activity. The statute does not forbid conduct which is constitutionally protected.”); see also Risner, 129 F.4th at 368 (reaffirming Greeno’s holding that Even if there were such a right, and even if As discussed above, the state has a compelling interest in public safety, including preventing death and physical injury caused by firearms. See State v. Kellogg, 534 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 1995) (stating that the government has a “compelling interest in the public safety”); see also Harper, 634 F. Supp. 3d at 603; Weber, 132 N.E.3d at 1148 (“The state possesses a strong compelling interest in maintaining public safety and preventing gun violence.”). In particular, the state has a compelling interest in curbing the increased risk of death and physical injury associated with an individual’s possession of a firearm while simultaneously in the illegal possession of a controlled substance or while simultaneously committing an indictable offense. The government also has a compelling interest in protecting the safety of peace officers, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977) (per curiam), who are placed at increased risk of death and physical injury when investigating and responding to crimes committed when the suspect is in possession of a firearm. Woods concedes that these are compelling state interests. The Louisiana Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in a materially indistinguishable case. Louisiana, like Iowa, is one of the few states that has a strict scrutiny provision in its state constitution protecting the right to keep and bear arms. See According to the defendant, the simultaneous possession of an illegal drug and a firearm is an innocuous coincidence. The defendant also argues that in no way does possessing a firearm by an alleged consumer of illegal drugs, such as himself, promote drug trafficking. Apparently, the defendant would have this court overlook the obvious fact that because possessing marijuana is unlawful, the defendant must have employed some unlawful means to obtain the drug. The defendant would also have this court hold that the firearm must actually be used in some manner in order for Id. at 979. We agree with the reasoning, and we conclude that the application of We end where we began: there is no federal or state constitutional right to carry a pistol in the same backpack with one’s illegal drugs. We affirm the defendant’s conviction for violating Affirmed. McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., joined. Oxley, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. McDermott, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman and May, JJ., joined. May, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Waterman and McDermott, JJ., joined. Oxley, Justice (concurring in the judgment). The plurality takes the unnecessary—and unsupported—route of broadly declaring that carrying a firearm while engaging in any indictable offense is conduct that is never protected by the First, the plurality’s overly broad analysis is unnecessary. This case involves an as-applied challenge to a conviction for violating Because we can decide this case based on Woods’s illegal possession of a controlled substance (which more closely corresponds to the cases relied upon by the plurality), we need not—and should not—address whether the act of carrying a firearm while committing any other indictable offense is separately protected by the [I] sympathize with the desire to articulate a bright-line rule that district courts could apply going forward. But, with due respect, the [all indictable offenses] rule advanced by the [plurality] relies on . . . an understandable but unwarranted aversion to letting Id. at 978 (5th Cir. 2025) (footnote omitted). Whether carrying a firearm while committing other indictable offenses in violation of Second, the plurality’s overbroad analysis is unsupported. Its reasoning greatly extends, rather than merely follows, the cases it relies upon, blurring critical distinctions. The consensus identified by the plurality is not as broad-reaching as the plurality declares. At most, there is a consensus among courts that the Nonetheless, I agree with the plurality that there is no constitutional right to carry (or possess or use) a firearm for an unlawful purpose. With that qualification, I concur in the judgment. “[I]ndividual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the I agree with the plurality that “the ‘historical understanding’ of the This is a critical qualifier: carrying a firearm is beyond the protection of the The vast majority of cases cited by the plurality fall into this category: where the firearm is possessed for an unlawful purpose, most often to facilitate drug trafficking. See, e.g., Risner, 129 F.4th at 369 (“Because The plurality also relies on cases holding that the Properly considered, the cases relied upon by the plurality stand for the more limited principle that the constitutional right to carry a firearm in public does not extend to using (or carrying) a firearm for an unlawful purpose. Those The plurality’s unnecessary categorical approach could lead to improper results. The plurality broadly concludеs that the The court of appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the officer violated the Does an individual who is barred from driving lose his constitutional right to carry a firearm when he then illegally drives to the corner convenience store, as Richter did? In my view, that depends on whether it could be said that carrying his firearm had the potential to facilitate the underlying crime of driving while barred, i.e., whether he carried it for an unlawful purpose. That case is not before us, and the resolution of that issue must await a constitutional challenge in a case that presents that issue. But the plurality’s reasoning would foreclose us from even considering those very different circumstances. Further, if the historical tradition applies only to law-abiding citizens, as the plurality suggests, there is no reasoned basis to stop at indictable offenses. The plurality’s reasoning would extend as well to simple misdemeanors, such as speeding. Or jaywalking. If a defendant loses his constitutional right to carry a firearm for self-protection in public simply because he gets pulled over while keeping up with the speeding traffic flow or crosses the street mid-block, there is, as Justice McDermott’s dissent aptly points out, little to the There must be a nexus between the firearm and the criminal conduct before the plurality’s underlying premise—that the fundamental constitutional right to carry a firearm for self-protection does not extend to carrying the firearm for an illegal purpose—kicks in. With this limitation in proper focus, I agree with the plurality that Woods‘s as-applied challenge to his conviction for carrying a firearm while possessing marijuana under As the plurality rightly recognizes, “The analogues show a longstanding tradition of enhancing a defendant‘s sentence for the increased risk of violence created by mere possession of a firearm during the commission of certain crimes,” and “[d]rug trafficking fits squarely within that category.” United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to sentencing enhancement under But the fact that this is a drug possession case, not a drug trafficking case, makes it a closer call than the plurality suggests. See, e.g., United States v. Regans, 125 F.3d 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing differences between drug trafficking and drug possession for personal use in addressing a firearm sentencing enhancement). As discussed, the core question in this case boils down to whether Woods has shown that his particular conduct falls within the protections of the Second Amendment or article I, section 1A, i.e., that he did not carry his firearm for an unlawful purpose. On this point, the drug-possession-for-personal-use versus drug-possession-for-dealing distinction is not necessarily decisive on the question of a nexus (or lack of one) between carrying firearms and possessing illegal drugs. Even in the context of drug trafficking, for a firearm to be used “during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime” under Courts have focused on this same distinction between facilitation and coincidence or happenstance when considering whether a firearm was used “in connection with” a felony drug possession conviction for purposes of a federal sentencing enhancement. Two Eighth Circuit cases illustrate the distinction. In United States v. Regans, officers conducted a pat-down search of the passenger of a car stopped for a traffic violation who appeared to be concealing a weapon, and he was ultimately convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession of a fireаrm. 125 F.3d at 685. A search of his person at the police station uncovered .29 grams of heroin, which the defendant claimed was for personal use. Id. On appeal, the defendant challenged the four-level sentencing enhancement under The Eighth Circuit noted the nexus between firearms and drug trafficking—where courts have repeatedly referred to “a firearm [a]s a ‘tool of the trade’ for drug dealers.” Id. at 686 (emphasis added). Thus, “a ‘weapon‘s physical proximity to narcotics may be sufficient to provide the nexus required between the weapon and the drug [dealing] charges.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 60 F.3d 422, 423 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), a case in which a drug dealer was arrested with a firearm, crack cocaine, and drug paraphernalia in his home). Despite the differences between dealing drugs and possessing drugs for personal use, the Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded that a sufficient nexus was The firearm may not be a ‘tool of the trade,’ because possession for use is not a ‘trade’ like drug trafficking. But when a drug user chooses to carry his illegal drugs out into public with a firearm, there are many ways in which the weapon can facilitate the drug offense and dangerously embolden the offender. Id. Carrying a loaded firearm in close proximity to illegal drugs in public was not a mere happenstance. The Eighth Circuit distinguished Regans in a subsequent case where a firearm was found near a personal-use-quantity of illegal drugs, but the drugs were in the defendant‘s home rather than out in public. See United States v. Smith, 535 F.3d 883, 885-86 (8th Cir. 2008). This case is distinguishable from Regans where the defendant was found in a car possessing a small amount of drugs for personal use and a firearm. The Regans court rejected the defendant‘s argument of coincidence, stating that “when a drug user chooses to carry his illegal drugs out into public with a firearm, there are many ways in which the weapon can facilitate the drug offense and dangerously embolden the offender.” In our case, Smith did not venture into public with either the methamphetamine residue or the firearms; he simply possessed them in his home. This combination of factors makes an emboldenment theory impermissible in this case. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Regans, 125 F.3d at 687). These cases shed light on the sрecific facts that help determine whether or not carrying a loaded firearm in close proximity to even a personal-use-quantity of drugs is for an unlawful purpose. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the potential for a firearm to facilitate the underlying criminal offense is sufficient to say it was used “during and in relation to [a] . . . drug trafficking crime” for purposes of federal law. See Smith, 508 U.S. at 238. This focus on the potential to facilitate is consistent with Given this understanding of the interplay between firearms and illegal drugs, the facts surrounding Woods‘s conviction are closer to Regans than to Smith. Cf. People v. Gonzalez, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 132 (Ct. App. 2022) (“[I]t is reasonable to assume a person armed with a loaded, operable firearm . . . may be willing to resort to use of that weapon to avoid arrest and—in the case of I agree with the plurality that Woods‘s as-applied constitutional challenge fails, and I join in the judgment. McDermott, Justice (dissenting). Both the Federal and State Constitutions preserve “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.” Although the plurality repeatedly says that there‘s no right to carry a gun while committing a crime, the plurality offers nothing to convince the reader that simply possessing a personal-use amount of marijuana presents any semblance of danger to justify abridging Woods‘s right to bear arms. And if any crime—dangerous or not—will do to support a gun restriction, then restricting the right to bear arms when committing other nondangerous crimes gets the constitutional green light under the plurality‘s reasoning too. But the constitutional right to bear arms is not so easily dispensed with. The plurality‘s failure to distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous activities leads it to uphold a firearm restriction that in this case has no anchor in our historical traditions. Because the plurality gets the analysis wrong under both the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution, I must respectfully dissent. I. Factual Background. Some expansion of the plurality‘s recitation of facts is necessary. Because Woods brings an “as applied” challenge—where we look to whether the particular When the trooper stopped the truck that Woods was driving to investigate a nonfunctioning taillight on the truck‘s trailer, it was just after 6:00 a.m. on a Tuesday morning in late July. The pickup‘s doors displayed company decals for a parking lot maintenance company based in nearby Carlisle. Woods, it appears, was simply driving to work in a work truck pulling a trailer. In his initial visit to the driver‘s window, the trooper informed Woods about the reason for the stop. Woods was unaware of any problem with the trailer‘s lights, so the trooper walked with Woods to the rear of the trailer to show him. The trooper asked Woods for the registrations for the truck and trailer and, because the truck was a commercial vehicle, the annual vehicle inspection reports. Woods wasn‘t immediately able to locate the inspection reports, so he called his boss for help. Woods soon located some of the paperwork, provided it to the trooper, and returned to the truck. After reviewing the paperwork, the trooper began his own equipment inspection of the truck and trailer. At some point, the trooper returned to the driver‘s window to return the paperwork. The officer reports that at this point, he detected the odor of marijuana. But the trooper didn‘t say anything about it. Instead, he continued with the equipment inspection. He walked around the vehicle to perform the inspection. He even asked Woods to assist with some inspection-related tasks, such as testing the parking brake. While standing outside the passenger window during the inspection, the trooper looked inside and saw a THC vape pen in the truck‘s center console. A THC vape pen is a portable pen-shaped device used to vaporize and inhale THC, When the trooper asked Woods whether he had any other contraband, Woods responded that he had another vape pen in his pocket. After searching Woods‘s person and finding nothing else, the trooper began searching the truck. When the trooper was about to search a backpack inside the truck, Woods informed the trooper that the backpack contained marijuana and a firearm. In the backpack, the trooper found a pistol, three additional magazines (two full and one empty), a small cylindrical container containing some marijuana, and a scale. Although the record does not disclose the precise amount of marijuana in the container, it‘s undisputed that the amount was, at most, a personal-use quantity. The State charged Woods with two counts: (1) possession of a controlled substance under Woods filed a motion to dismiss the second count, arguing that II. The Restriction is Unconstitutional Under the Second Amendment. Woods argues that Woods‘s conduct falls within two categories of the statute: illegally possessing a controlled substance and committing an indictable offense. An “indictable offense” is simply “an offense other than a simple misdemeanor.” The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” A. “Plain text” Analysis Under the First Inquiry. The plurality decides this case on the first part of the inquiry, concluding that marijuana possessors forfeit any Second Amendment rights. But it‘s not easy to get to the plurality‘s result through analysis of the plain text, as Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, instructs. The text provides that the right to bear arms is held by “the people.” The State fails to offer a persuasive rationale to conclude that “the people” excludes marijuana possessors. “The people,” the Supreme Court has said, “unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 580. Under the plain tеxt of the Second Amendment, Woods is a “person” who, in carrying a firearm in his truck, was “bear[ing] Arms.” B. Historical Traditions Analysis Under the Second Inquiry. Under the second inquiry, we consider whether The State bears the burden of showing that the challenged regulation is “relevantly similar” to restrictions that our nation has traditionally permitted. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). The State need not provide a “dead ringer” or “historical twin” to the challenged law. Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30). A historical analogue is sufficient. Id. The challenged law and the historical law must share a common “why“—that they both address a comparable problem—and a common “how“—that they both place a similar burden on the person. United States v. Connelly, 117 F.4th 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692). First, we consider the “why” inquiry. As the State acknowledges, “founding-era legislatures did not regulate the possession, use, manufacturing, or trading of drugs like marijuana at all.” Other courts have explained that the historical evidence shows “very little regulation of drugs (related to firearm possession or otherwise) until the late 19th century“—long after the Second Amendment‘s ratification. Id. at 279. The State thus does not present firearm restrictions tied to the use or possession of controlled substances as historical analogues for The State instead presents historical restrictions that prohibited firearm possession by groups deemed to be dangerous. It cites law review articles that To justify disarming a person for public safety reasons under the Second Amendment, the firearm restriction must address a material danger that the restricted person presents. See United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 915–16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 304 (2024). Again, Federal cases addressing challenges to a similar federal firearm restriction are instructive. That statute, Next, the court considered historical laws targeting “dangerous” groups, such as Catholics and colonists who refused to take an oath of loyalty. Id. at 277. The panel observed that these laws had “unique socio-political motivations” beyond merely protecting public safety. Id. at 278. “The Founders did not disarm English Loyalists because they were believed to lack self-control; it was because they were viewed as political threats to our nascent nation‘s integrity.” Id. (citing Joseph G.S. Greenlee, Disarming the Dangerous: The American Tradition of Firearm Prohibitions, 16 Drexel L. Rev. 1, 60–63 (2024)). “So too with laws disarming religious minorities—the pеrceived threat was as political as it was religious, if not even more so.” Id. Marijuana users, the Connelly court reasoned, are not dangerous because they present a risk of political or religious insurrection. Id. at 278–79. These laws thus did not establish a historical tradition protecting public safety to make them analogues to Finally, the court considered historical laws barring the carrying of weapons while under the influence. Id. at 279–80. The court observed that these laws principally sought to maintain the sobriety of members of the armed services who might be called to duty since service members can‘t perform their duties (or can‘t perform them well) while intoxicated. Id. at 281. The court hit The Connelly court thus held in favor of the nonviolent marijuana user in her as-applied challenge to The statute challenged in this case, If a marijuana user is not considered dangerous unless they are under the actual influence of marijuana, there‘s no reason to conclude that someone who similarly is not actually under the influence of marijuana but merely possesses marijuana is somehow dangerous. Neither the State nor the plurality offers anything to suggest that a sober marijuana possessor presents a danger to public or officer safety. The question isn‘t whether recreational marijuana possession is unlawful; in Iowa, it is. (Under Iowa law, dispensaries are allowed to sell cannabidiol products that contain the active ingredients in marijuana—THC and CBD—for medicinal purposes. See The historical laws targeting “dangerous” groups that the State offers in this case are simply not relevantly similar. Whatever the danger Woods posed by possessing recreational marijuana, it has little in common with the insurrection-based justification offered for the Founding-era disarmament of groups based on religious, political, and class affiliations. The State “identifies no class of persons at the Founding who were ‘dangerous’ for reasons comparable to marijuana users.” Connelly, 117 F.4th at 278; see also United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794, 805 (6th Cir. 2024) (Bush, J., concurring except for Sections III.A–B, and in the judgment) (“This history and tradition of disarming ‘dangerous’ political groups and religious minorities seems too far afield to provide supporting precedent for disarmament based on substance abuse, at least when, as here, the defendant has no history of violence through firearm misuse.“). The State‘s proffered analogues thus fail to offer the same answer to Bruen‘s “why” test. When a challenged regulation burdens the right to bear arms for different reasons than our historical laws, that difference in why the burdens were imposed points toward the modern regulation being unconstitutional. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692. The plurality never explains the danger presented by someone merely possessing a personal-use amount of marijuana to justify Again, although plenty of evidence supports the notion that carrying a firearm while presently intoxicated may present a danger, see Connelly, 117 F.4th at 282; United States v. Harrison, 654 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1200–03 (W.D. Okla. 2023), and that carrying a firearm while engaging in drug distribution may present a danger, United States v. Carter, 802 F. Supp. 2d 180, 184 (D.D.C. 2011), the danger of carrying a firearm while simply possessing a personal-use amount of marijuana is never established. The State cites no authority connecting the dots between someone possessing recreational marijuana and any risk of danger in carrying a firearm deriving from that mere possession. See also United States v. Daniels, 124 F.4th 967, 975 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding that We turn to the “how” inquiry, which requires us to examine how the historical regulation burdened the right to bear arms compared to the modern regulation. The State cites as analogues laws that increased the severity of punishment for certain crimes if the defendant possessed a weapon during the commission of the crime, offering a Massachusetts law from 1806, see Commonwealth v. Hope, 39 Mass. 1, 22 Pick. 1 (1839), and a Louisiana law from 1875, see State v. Morris, 27 La. Ann. 480 (1875). Both enhanced the penalty for burglary if the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon. The State also cites a Sixth Circuit case that includes other examples of laws that applied enhancements to the degree of the underlying crime (for example, making a second-degree charge a first-degree charge) or to the crime‘s sentence when a defendant used a weapon while committing the underlying crime. See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1. But the plurality‘s enhancement argument misses an important feature of The sentence imposed in this case makes this point clear. The district court in its sentencing order treated the convictions for the two counts separately. On the possession of marijuana charge (count I), the district court fined Woods $430 and sentenced him to 180 days’ imprisonment. On the unlawful carrying charge (count II), the district court fined Woods $430 and sentenced him to 365 days’ imprisonment. The district court ordered the two terms of imprisonment to run concurrently but then suspended both sentences. A different drug statute not at issue in this case, The State‘s enhancement argument thus fails Bruen‘s “how” test—the historical statutes do not place a similar burden on firearm possession as The plurality‘s reliance on State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 1997), and State v. Mehner, 480 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1992), are unhelpful. We decided Brecunier twenty-five years, and Mehner thirty years, before the Supreme Court decided Bruen. Neither case considers the questions that Bruen asks courts to answer about whether the challenged restriction fits within “this Nation‘s Stated simply, the analogues that the State offers (and that the plurality relies on) “stray[] too far from the ‘how and why’ of ‘historical regulations.’ ” Cooper, 127 F.4th at 1095 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29). Section 724.8B is not “relevantly similar” to Founding-era laws. By restricting Woods‘s right to carry a firearm based on his mere possession of a personal-use amount of marijuana, The plurality also concludes that Strict scrutiny, both as a concept and an analytical tool, is well-established in our caselaw. It is the most exacting standard of constitutional review, placing “all the burden of justification on the State.” Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 975 N.W.2d 710, 731 (Iowa 2022). It requires the state to show that the challenged action is “narrowly tailored” to achieve “a compelling state interest” and requires the state to use “the least restrictive means” in doing so. Mitchell County v. Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2012). The State argues that it has a compelling interest in preserving public and officer safety and that In strict scrutiny analysis, if a less restrictive law would achieve the same compelling government interest, the more restrictive one fails the test. In this way, strict scrutiny, by design, cuts with a sharp blade. It‘s not hard to conceive of a less restrictive means to achieve the public- and officer-safety goal advanced in this case: Instead of making it a crime to carry a firearm while possessing a personal-use quantity of marijuana as But the plurality doesn‘t differentiate between the dangers present in trafficking and personal-use possession. Indeed, as mentioned, the plurality suggests that the “dangerousness” threshold is met any time a firearm might be present during any interaction with an officer pertaining to a violation of law. “There is no category of crime where the perpetrator‘s possession of a pistol during the commission of the crime makes the situation safer,” the plurality declares, before suggesting that infractions resulting in traffic stops would be enough to justify a firearm restriction. But if every crime that might result in an interaction with an officer presents a sufficient danger to justify a firearm restriction, then the right to bear arms becomes illusory. After all, people are subject to a dizzying array of criminal laws, many of them “reach[ing] far beyond what common sense and generally accepted moral principles would forbid.” Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 725, 734 (2012). People are subject to so many criminal laws that they routinely violate them—some estimates suggest as often as three times a day. See generally Harvey A. Silverglate, Three Felonies A Day (2009). Estimates suggest there are “over 300,000 different types of conduct that are prohibited either by statute or regulation in the federal system for which a person could be imprisoned and prosecuted as a criminal“—and this number doesn‘t include state criminal laws. Edwin Mеese III, Overcriminalization in Practice: Trends and Recent Controversies, 8 Seton Hall Cir. Rev. 505, 510 (2012); see also Neil Gorsuch & Janie Nitze, Over Ruled: The Human Toll of Too Much Law 21 (2024) (“How many federal crimes do you think we have these days? It turns out no one The constitutional right to bear arms becomes an empty promise if any criminal act that creates an interaction with law enforcement—regardless of the act‘s dangerousness—is enough to justify a firearm restriction. Speeding, failing to use a turn signal, driving with a malfunctioning taillight, fishing without a license—all are examples of crimes that might bring about an interaction with law enforcement. And despite the lack of danger inherent in any of them that might be enhanced by carrying a firearm, each would justify a firearm regulation under the plurality‘s reasoning. Indeed, Congress has seemingly acknowledged that firearm restrictions associated with nondangerous crimes—even felonies—are unwarranted. In the Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, for instance, Congress limited a prohibition on convicted felons’ possession of firearms by exempting certain nondangerous crimes, including felony offenses “pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices.” The plurality also suggests that firearm regulations on the books when voters ratified Amendment 1A should survive a constitutional challenge because we can assume that voters were familiar with existing restrictions when they ratified the amendment. But as an initial matter, the record contains no evidence When the “compelling interest” under our strict scrutiny analysis is public or officer safety, as it is here, then the key inquiry must be whether bearing a firearm heightens the danger that the underlying crime creates. Restricting carrying a firearm while possessing a personal-use amount marijuana simply doesn‘t meet this test. The plurality focuses on the fact that possession of marijuana is a crime but disregards any actual danger that the crime presents. In doing so, the plurality points its spotlight in the wrong place. If we‘re concerned about safety, it doesn‘t matter whether an act happens to violate a criminal statute; what matters is whether the act is dangerous. The element of danger in personal-use possession of marijuana is absent. Under both the Waterman and May, JJ., join this dissent. May, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I join Justice McDermott‘s well-reasoned opinion. I write separately to address Justice Oxley‘s thoughtful opinion concurring in the judgment. Although the concurrence makes many proper observations about the law and, indeed, identifies the correct rule for deciding this case, the concurrence‘s failure to correctly apply that rule leads to the wrong result. As noted, I agree with many of the concurrence‘s points, including (1) its emphasis on the “fundamental” nature of our right to “keep and bear arms” under the But the concurrence does not answer that question. The concurrence does not explain whether Woods was carrying the gun “for an unlawful purpose” or not. His “purpose” is not identified. Instead, the concurrence substitutes a “nexus” analysis that requires no inquiry into purpose. This nexus analysis asks only whether the firearm has “the potential to facilitate” a drug crime. This test is satisfied, the concurrence says, if the person possesses a firearm “in close proximity to illegal drugs” and the I disagree. Again, as the concurrence says, the crucial question is whether Woods was carrying his gun “for an unlawful purpose.” But the substituted nexus approach does not answer this question. Indeed, the nexus approach could justify punishing a citizen for carrying firearms even when it is known that the citizen has no “unlawful purpose” for carrying. To illustrate how this could happen, consider the hypothetical person described in the State‘s brief: “the 80-year-old grandmother who uses marijuana for a chronic medical condition and keeps a pistol tucked away for her own safety.” See United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 917-18 (8th Cir. 2024). The State seems to assume—or, at least, I will assume—that this grandmother does not possess a firearm for an unlawful purpose. Rather, the gun is just to protect her against a violent world, a core justification for the Even though she lacks an unlawful purpose for arming herself, the concurrence‘s approach would allow the grandmother to be jailed for arming herself. For instance, suppose she chooses to drive to Fareway to pick up baking supplies. Suppose also that she brings her purse with her, and that she always keeps her “pistol tucked away” in that purse “for her own safety.” Id. at 918. Naturally, she keeps it loaded—so she can use the gun to protect her own safety. Finally, suppose that the purse also contains crumbs from her homemade marijuana brownies, the ones she uses “for a chronic medical condition.” Id. In that scenario, there would be no meaningful daylight between the grandmother‘s situation and Woods‘s. The grandmother‘s gun would be just as accessible—and, therefore, would have the same “potential to facilitate” a This is not the way. Instead, if the proper test is whether Woods was carrying “for an unlawful purpose,” we should require the State to show that Woods was carrying “for an unlawful purpose.” The concurrence would shift the burden of proof over to Woods, but that can‘t be correct. Bruen makes it clear that because Woods‘s conduct of carrying a firearm falls squarely within the In any event, because the State hasn‘t shown that Woods was carrying the firearm “for an illegal purpose,” the Waterman and McDermott, JJ., join this dissent.
IV.
I.
II.
Notes
In the district court, Woods also claimed that a conviction under section 724.8B would deprive him of his fundamental right to keep and bear arms without due process of law, an argument that he also raises on appeal. The district court did not rule on that issue, however, and Woods did not request that the district court make a ruling on the issue. Error is thus not preserved on Woods’s due process claim, see State v. Chawech, 15 N.W.3d 78, 83 (Iowa 2024) (stating that error preservation rules apply in criminal cases and that an issue must be “(1) properly raised in the district court and (2) ruled on by the district court” to preserve error), and we need not address it any further.
Woods appears to assert both a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge to his conviction under section 724.8B. In a facial challenge to a statute, the party contends that there is “no application of the statute [that] could be constitutional under any set of facts.” Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 716 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 764 (Iowa 2019)). In an as-applied challenge, the party “alleges the statute is unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of facts.” Id. (quoting Bonilla, 930 N.W.2d at 764). A facial challenge “is the ‘most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it requires a defendant to ‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693 (2024) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). To successfully prevail against a facial challenge, the “[g]overnment need only demonstrate that [the challenged law] is constitutional in some of its applications.” Id. We need not dwell on the distinction between these two types of challenges here because section 724.8B “is constitutional as applied to the facts of [Woods’s] own case.” Id.