STATE OF IOWA v. EZEKIEL LAWRENCE KIEFFER
No. 23-0598
In the Iowa Supreme Court
February 21, 2025
A defendant appeals his convictions and sentence for domestic abuse assault. Affirmed.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer (argued) and Michelle E. Rabe (until withdrawal), Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
After an argument with his girlfriend (we will call her Daphne)1, Ezekiel Kieffer assaulted and strangled her. Following a jury trial, Kieffer was convicted of domestic abuse assault impeding the flow of air or blood and domestic abuse assault causing injury, both under
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
Kieffer and Daphne started dating on May 29, 2022. Daphne testified at trial that she had “just moved [her] stuff in” to Kieffer‘s residence on June 24 but had previously stayed there for consecutive days. At the time she moved in, Kieffer believed that Daphne was pregnant with his child, and he planned to introduce her to his mother that weekend.
The same day, Daphne, Kieffer, and Kieffer‘s roommate attended Sturgis Falls, a community event in Cedar Falls. They returned to Kieffer‘s house intoxicated in the early hours of June 25. Kieffer and Daphne got into a heated argument, the argument escalated physically, and Kieffer strangled Daphne as they wrestled on the floor before she escaped and ran from the home. At
Following trial on February 2, 2023, a jury found Kieffer guilty on both charges: an aggravated misdemeanor, see
Kieffer raises three arguments in his direct appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find that he and Daphne were in a domestic relationship (i.e., were “persons cohabiting“), (2) the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial based on the State‘s violation of the district court‘s order in limine, and (3) the firearms prohibition is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. We consider Kieffer‘s arguments in turn.
A. Sufficient Evidence to Establish “Cohabiting.”
As discussed above, Kieffer was convicted under
We review sufficiency-of-evidence claims for correction of errors at law and will uphold the jury‘s verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 2022). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that is sufficient to “convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018)). In making this determination, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Iowa 2002)).
Both of Kieffer‘s convictions fall under
“Cohabiting” does not require a sexual relationship, but does require more than dwelling or living together in the same place. To determine if the Defendant and [Daphne] were cohabiting at the time of the alleged offense, you may consider whether they had sexual relations while sharing the same living quarters; they shared income or expenses; they jointly used or owned property together; they held themselves out as husband and wife; the continuity and length of their relationship, and any other facts shown by the evidence bearing on their relationship with each other.
We use this explanation in reviewing the record for sufficient evidence to support Kieffer‘s convictions. See State v. Schwartz, 7 N.W.3d 756, 764 (Iowa 2024) (“Where, as here, the defendant does not object to the relevant jury instruction, the instruction is ‘the law of the case for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” (quoting Mathis, 971 N.W.2d at 518)).
The jury instruction follows from State v. Kellogg, where we rejected the defendant‘s argument that cohabiting required “living together as man and wife.” 542 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 1996). In seeking to clarify what is meant by cohabiting, we adopted six nonexclusive factors identified by the California Court of Appeal “as appropriate considerations for making a factual determination as to whether a couple is cohabiting under the umbrella of chapter 236.” Id.2 The jury instruction used in this case reflects these factors. Kieffer argues that because his relationship with Daphne does not satisfy some of the factors listed in Kellogg, he and Daphne were not “cohabiting,” and his conviction must be reversed. We disagree.
To be sure, the Kellogg factors are instructive and “can be outcome determinative.” Id. at 881. However, as expressly stated in Kellogg, those factors are nonexclusive. See Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 518 (referring to the six factors as “appropriate considerations” but identifying no threshold number that needed to be satisfied before determining that two people were cohabiting). Contrary to Kieffer‘s argument, the fact that his relationship with Daphne does not satisfy some of the factors listed in Kellogg (and reflected in the jury instruction) does not, in itself, mean that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury‘s verdict. The Kellogg factors are not a checklist that requires each listed item to be met. Cf. Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys., Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 945 (1st Cir. 1995) (describing the difference between legal tests using “elements,” where the “[f]ailure to satisfy any one among two or more ‘elements’ is fatal,” and legal tests using “factors,” where a “[w]eakness of the showing of one factor, or even total failure to show it, is not fatal; a strong showing as to other factors may outweigh the deficiency“).
Sufficient evidence in the record supports the jury‘s finding that Kieffer and Daphne were cohabiting within the meaning of
The existence of a sexual relationship and some form of shared dwelling has generally been considered sufficient evidence on appeal to support a jury‘s finding of cohabiting. See, e.g., State v. Wooten, No. 23-1785, 2024 WL 4615747,
Here, Kieffer and Daphne were in a serious relationship, thought Daphne was pregnant with Kieffer‘s child, and had just moved in together. These facts are sufficient to establish that they were cohabiting. While the length of the relationship is one factor to consider, that does not mean the parties must reside together for any particular length of time as long as other considerations establish the presence of cohabitation. Thus, the fact that Daphne had just moved in does not preclude a finding that she and Kieffer were cohabiting. Based on the facts presented, sufficient evidence supports the jury‘s finding that Kieffer
B. Order in Limine Violations.
Kieffer next argues that the State committed two violations of the district court‘s order in limine during trial that were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. We review a district court‘s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 5 N.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Iowa 2024). Our review recognizes that the district court is entitled to “considerable discretion” because it is “in a better position than the reviewing court to gauge the effect of the matter in question on the jury.” Id. at 615 (quoting State v. Jirak, 491 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)). “[W]e ordinarily only find an abuse of discretion upon the denial of a mistrial ‘where there is no support in the record for the trial court‘s determination.’ ” Id. (quoting Jirak, 491 N.W.2d at 796); see also State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 498 (Iowa 2017) (“A trial court‘s exercise of discretion [in denying a motion for mistrial based on admission of improper evidence] may be reversed on appeal only when it is demonstrated that the discretion of the trial court ‘was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’ ” (quoting State v. Brewer, 247 N.W.2d 205, 211 (Iowa 1976))).
When evidence is introduced contrary to an order in limine, but the district court promptly strikes the evidence and admonishes the jury to disregard it, a mistrial may be granted only when the forbidden evidence is so prejudicial that its effect on the jury could not be erased by the district court‘s admonition. See Huser, 894 N.W.2d at 498. For Kieffer to succeed on appeal, he must establish that the State‘s violation of the district court‘s order in limine prejudiced the jury against him to the point that he was denied a fair trial. State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Iowa 2023). Based on our review of the record, Kieffer fails to meet this standard.
Kieffer‘s counsel filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence referring to Kieffer‘s prior arrests or interactions with the police. The motion in limine also sought to exclude any reference to the complaining witness as a “victim” by the State or any of its witnesses. The district court granted the motion as to both points.
Kieffer challenges two specific instances at trial that he claims violated the order in limine. The first occurred during Daphne‘s testimony related to her initial reluctance to talk to law enforcement. The State engaged in the following questioning:
Q. Did you have some reluctance to involve law enforcement or to tell them who had caused those injuries?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. I just didn‘t want it to come to this because I‘ve been in this situation before and it‘s a long process.
Kieffer immediately objected. After the jury was removed from the courtroom, Kieffer argued that the statement implied that he had abused Daphne on a prior occasion. Even though voir dire revealed that Daphne was referring to an ex-boyfriend rather than Kieffer, Kieffer moved for a mistrial, asserting that the characterization of Daphne as a domestic abuse victim “paints a different kind of picture.” The district court denied Kieffer‘s request for a mistrial or for a limiting instruction. But it directed the State to clarify through further questioning of Daphne in the jury‘s presence that her reference to “be[ing] in this situation before” referred to an ex-boyfriend, not Kieffer. The State complied with the district court‘s direction when questioning resumed.
Q. And so when you arrived at the scene were you directed towards where the interested parties might be?
A. Yes, and I had been to that residence.
Kieffer immediately objected, arguing that the State had elicited testimony implying that he was involved in prior interactions with the police, again violating the order in limine. Kieffer pointed out that the State had a responsibility to ensure its witnesses understood what testimony was precluded by the order in limine. Even though voir dire of Officer Fey confirmed that he was referring to a psychiatric call for Kieffer‘s roommate, the district court agreed that the testimony “is in direct violation of the motion in limine.” But the district court again denied Kieffer‘s request for a mistrial, this time warning the State that “the cumulative effect of the prior violation . . . plus this . . . is getting close to me to being a cumulative effect that might be a mistrial.” The district court again directed the State to correct the record when the jury returned to the courtroom. The State asked Officer Fey two questions to clarify that the prior visit was unrelated to Kieffer and that the visit had not been due to any criminal activity.
It is not clear that Daphne‘s testimony about having been “in this situation before” violated the order in limine. Kieffer moved in limine to exclude any references to Daphne as a “victim” because it would “prejudicially convey[] the speaker‘s opinion that the crime in question in fact has occurred,” in violation of the presumption that Kieffer was innocent. While Daphne‘s testimony could have led the jury to believe that Kieffer had done something similar to her before, the district court properly directed the State to correct that possible misperception through further questioning, clarifying that Daphne was referring to a prior
We agree with the district court that the second instance violated the order in limine. In his motion in limine, Kieffer sought to exclude “[a]ny reference that law enforcement officers know or are familiar with Defendant.” Kieffer explained that he anticipated that the State might introduce evidence about prior interactions between Kieffer and police officers, arguing that “[s]aying things such as ‘they have been to this house before’ or ‘this is not the first time they have been out here’ ” would serve only to “to show bad character and a propensity for criminality,” improper evidence prohibited by
Despite this violation, we conclude that the district court‘s remedy cured any prejudice that might have followed from the testimony. “We . . . allow trial courts broad discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial. Such discretion is a recognition of the trial court‘s better position to appraise the situation in the context of the full trial.” Fry v. Blauvelt, 818 N.W.2d 123, 132 (Iowa 2012) (omission in original) (quoting Eldridge v. Casey‘s Gen. Stores, Inc., 533 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)). Here, as soon as the jury returned to the courtroom, Officer Fey clarified that his prior “visit” to Kieffer‘s residence was unrelated to Kieffer and did not involve criminal activity. The jury was unaware that the prior visit involved Kieffer‘s roommate—who was a witness at trial—or that it involved a psychiatric call. Thus, Kieffer‘s concerns about tainting his roommate‘s credibility as a witness were avoided. “[I]n the context of the full trial,” Fry, 818 N.W.2d at 132, the district court‘s efforts were more effective than striking the testimony or otherwise providing a limiting instruction, both of
Given the scale of the multiday trial, the two alleged order in limine violations—both of which the district court cured immediately and effectively—do not support Kieffer‘s request for a mistrial. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. See Huser, 894 N.W.2d at 499 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for mistrial where “the three improper questions were a very small part of the fourteen-day trial with forty-five witnesses“); State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 32 (Iowa 2006) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for a mistrial where “[t]he reference to drug charges occurred only once, and there were no questions that elaborated on this information“). The facts of this case demonstrate why we give broad discretion on such matters to the district court. The district court judge, being in a better position to ensure the fairness of the proceeding, ably and efficiently cured the asserted order in limine violations to minimize the risk of any potential prejudice
C. Constitutional Challenge to Firearm Prohibition.
Kieffer also challenges the firearm prohibition referenced in the judgment and sentence order, included in the sentencing no-contact order, and included in the notice of firearm prohibition as violating his right to “keep and bear arms” under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution. In addition to addressing the merits of the challenge, the State raises a number of procedural issues, arguing that the firearms prohibition is not properly before us in Kieffer‘s direct appeal of his underlying convictions.
1. Is the firearm issue properly raised in Kieffer‘s direct appeal? The State argues that the firearms issue is not ripe because Kieffer has not yet sought to be removed from the background check system database as provided in
The March 31, 2023 judgment and sentence order required that the previously entered no-contact order remain in effect for five years. It also stated: “A Notice of Firearm Prohibition Pursuant to Code of Iowa 724.31A will be entered as a separate order.” Accordingly, the district court entered both a sentencing no-contact order and a notice of firearm prohibition pursuant to
The sentencing no-contact order stated: “The defendant has been convicted of the following crime(s): Domestic Assault (2 COUNTS). The court
Therefore, the court orders as follows:
5. . . . [T]he defendant has been convicted of domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code 708.2A. Therefore, the defendant shall not possess, ship, transport, or receive firearms, offensive weapons, or ammunition unless such rights have been restored in accordance with Iowa Code section 724.27. Defendant shall deliver all firearms to BLACK HAWK County Sheriff . . . on or before IMMEDIATELY.
The separate notice of firearm prohibition, also entered the same day, provided:
Pursuant to I.C. 724.31A, the court hereby notifies the party named above that, in the case number indicated above, the court issued an order or judgment by which the party named above lost firearm rights because the party named above met one or more of the following criteria [Judge: check applicable criteria]:
* Misdemeanor crime of domestic violence [I.C. 724.26(2) and
18 USC 922(g)(9) ].
This notice is consistent with what the district court told Kieffer at the end of the sentencing hearing: “[B]ecause these were domestic assaults, there is a firearm prohibition pursuant to Iowa law 724.31(A) [sic]. That‘s gonna be entered as a separate order but you‘ll see that. That prohibits you from having firearms.” Kieffer filed a notice of appeal on April 11 “from the final order entered in this case on the 31st day of March 2023, and from all adverse rulings and orders inhering therein.”
Ordinarily, “errors in sentencing may be challenged on direct appeal even in the absence of an objection in the district court.” See State v. Lathrop,
In State v. Rasmussen, we considered a no-contact order entered in a dismissed simple misdemeanor case on direct appeal in a related criminal case “because the district court incorporated [the no-contact order from the dismissed case] into the sentencing order in this case.” 7 N.W.3d 357, 365 (Iowa 2024); see also State v. Hall, 740 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (considering a constitutional challenge to no-contact order included in the defendant‘s sentence over the state‘s argument that the issue was not preserved because it was not presented in district court). Likewise, conditions of probation can be considered on direct appeal as long as the conditions are included in the judgment and sentence order. Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d at 292-93. So too can terms and conditions of bail—again, only to the extent they are included in the judgment and sentence order. See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 727 (Iowa 2002) (distinguishing bail as “separate and independent from the underlying judgment and sentence entered by the court” but nonetheless considering a challenge to the terms of bail included in the judgment on direct appeal). The same is true for orders to
The State argues that Kieffer was merely provided with notice that other federal and state laws prohibit him from possessing a firearm based on his conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and that his name would be included in the national instant criminal background check system database. See
Kieffer‘s no-contact order, which was expressly extended in the judgment and sentence order and entered immediately after the judgment, expressly prohibited Kieffer from possessing firearms or ammunition and directed him to “IMMEDIATELY” turn over any firearms that he possessed to the Black Hawk County Sheriff. When a defendant is convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as described in
2. Does the firearm prohibition violate Kieffer‘s rights under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution? We first address Kieffer‘s challenge to the firearm prohibition under the Second Amendment. Kieffer does not state
As relevant here, section 724.26(3) required the district court to inform Kieffer, as a “person who is the subject of” “a judgment of conviction described in subsection 2,” “that [he] shall not possess, ship, transport, or receive a firearm, offensive weapon, or ammunition while such order is in effect.”
Since Rahimi, federal courts that have addressed Second Amendment challenges to firearm prohibitions for those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence under
With respect to Second Amendment challenges to the firearm prohibition imposed on felons contained in § 922(g)(1), federal courts either: (1) apply a categorical rule rejecting the challenge, see, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2024) (affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss indictment charging a violation of § 922(g)(1) premised on underlying “non-violent” drug offenses against an as-applied Second Amendment challenge and “conclud[ing] that there is no need for felony-by-felony litigation regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)“), or (2) they consider whether the underlying felony is sufficiently analogous to a founding-era law supporting a firearm prohibition, see, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471 (5th Cir. 2024) (affirming a conviction for being a felon-in-possession under § 922(g)(1) premised
Kieffer was convicted of domestic abuse assault impeding the flow of air or blood and domestic abuse assault causing injury after he hit and choked Daphne, leaving scratches on her neck and face, marks on her back and legs, a broken blood vessel in her eye, and a bloody lip. Whether considered under Rahimi‘s test of “pos[ing] a clear threat of physical violence to another,” 602 U.S. at 684-85, or the Sixth Circuit‘s individualized “dangerous” standard, see Williams, 113 F.4th at 661-62, we have little trouble concluding that the firearm prohibition included in Kieffer‘s no-contact order does not offend the Second Amendment under the current landscape of federal jurisprudence.
3. Does the firearm prohibition violate Kieffer‘s rights under article I, section 1A of the Iowa Constitution? While we disagree with the State‘s procedural objections to reaching Kieffer‘s challenge to the firearm prohibition, we agree with the State that we must limit our analysis to the specific restrictions imposed on Kieffer as a term of his sentence.
“By its explicit terms, article I, section 1A subjects to strict scrutiny state infringements or restrictions of the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms.” In re N.S., 13 N.W.3d at 837 (McDonald, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For example, if Kieffer were to violate the order by possessing a firearm, he could be charged with violating state law. See
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes clear that the Iowa Constitution has nothing to say about a firearm prohibition imposed by federal law. See
To the extent Kieffer‘s state constitutional challenge turns on a consideration of
III. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Kieffer‘s convictions and sentence.
Affirmed.