THE STATE EX REL. CLAY, APPELLEE, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER‘S OFFICE, APPELLANT.
No. 2016-0387
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
November 30, 2017
Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8714
Kennedy, J.
Submitted May 16, 2017. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 103514, 2016-Ohio-407.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-8714
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner‘s Office, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8714.]
Coroner‘s records—Next of kin—Records request by incarcerated person—
{¶ 1} The Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner‘s Office (“ME“) appeals the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals granting a writ of mandamus to compel the release of autopsy records to relator-appellee, Michael Clay, under
{¶ 2} “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous * * * there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is applied, not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. Because the language of
I. Case Background
{¶ 3} On August 28, 2006, Clay‘s eight-month-old daughter, M.C., died as a result of blunt-force impacts to her head. State v. Clay, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23889, 2008-Ohio-2158, ¶ 2. Clay was convicted of murder, felonious assault, and child endangering in connection with her death and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 4} On April 15, 2015, while imprisoned, Clay sent a letter addressed to the ME, requesting all copies of x-rays, autopsy photos, the death certificate, and written doctors’ reports pertaining to his deceased daughter. In support, Clay cited
{¶ 5} Consequently, Clay filed an original action in the Eighth District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the ME to provide him the requested records, but, unlike his request by letter, the complaint relied solely upon
{¶ 6} On February 3, 2016, the court of appeals denied the ME‘s summary-judgment motion and issued a writ of mandamus compelling the ME to provide the complete autopsy file to Clay within a reasonable period of time. 2016-Ohio-407, 58 N.E.3d 552, at ¶ 9. The ME timely appealed and asserts two propositions of law. The first states:
R.C. 149.43 andR.C. 313.10 relate to the same general subject, access to coroners’ records, and must be construed in pari materia.
The second states:
A coroner‘s office is not required to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal conviction to inspect or to obtain a copy of records concerning a death investigation if the person requesting the record is incarcerated for causing the death of the person who is the subject of the record unless the incarcerated person has complied with
R.C. 149.43(B)(8) , regardless of whether the incarcerated person is the next-of-kin of the decedent.
{¶ 8} Writing in support of the ME, amicus curiae, Ohio State Coroners Association, argues that public policy weighs against the release of autopsy files to next-of-kin convicted murderers and that therefore, the court of appeals’ judgment that failed to harmonize
II. Standard of Review
{¶ 9} The court of appeals denied the ME‘s motion for summary judgment and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Clay. 2016-Ohio-407, 58 N.E.3d 552, at ¶ 9. When a party moves for summary judgment and the nonmovant has had an opportunity to respond, a court—after consideration of the relevant evidence—may enter judgment against the moving party even though the nonmovant did not file its own motion for summary judgment. State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, ¶ 8, citing Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 17. We review that determination de novo. Id. at ¶ 9, citing Troyer v. Janis, 132 Ohio St.3d 229, 2012-Ohio-2406, 971 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 6.
III. Mandamus
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Clay must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the ME to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. Clay has the burden to prove that he is entitled to the writ by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at ¶ 13.
{¶ 11} As set forth above, Clay based his complaint for a writ of mandamus solely on his rights as a next of kin under
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} The statute begins by designating all records of the coroner to be public records.
The coroner shall provide a copy of the full and complete records of the coroner with respect to a decedent to a person who makes a written request as the next of kin of the decedent. The following persons may make a request pursuant to this division as the next of kin of a decedent:
* * *
(c) If there is no surviving spouse or child over eighteen years of age, * * * the parents of the decedent, with each parent having an independent right to make a request pursuant to this division.
{¶ 14} When construing the language of a statute, we begin with a familiar objective: a determination of the intent of the General Assembly. Caldwell v. State, 115 Ohio St. 458, 466, 154 N.E. 792 (1926). Almost two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court wrote, “The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95-96, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820).
{¶ 15} In keeping with Chief Justice Marshall‘s words, this court has held that “[t]he primary rule in statutory construction is to give effect to the legislature‘s intention,” Cline v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991), citing Carter v. Youngstown Div. of Water, 146 Ohio St. 203, 65 N.E.2d 63 (1946), paragraph one of the syllabus, by looking at the language of the statute, Stewart v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections, 34 Ohio St.2d 129, 130, 296 N.E.2d 676 (1973). When there is no ambiguity, we must abide by the words employed by the General Assembly, see State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St.3d 630, 631, 646 N.E.2d 821 (1995), and have no cause to apply the rules of statutory construction, see Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 236, 2014-Ohio-5511, 29 N.E.3d 903, ¶ 22-23. “We do not have the authority to dig deeper than the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute ‘under the guise of either statutory interpretation or liberal construction.‘” Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8, quoting Morgan v. Adult Parole Auth., 68 Ohio St.3d 344, 347, 626 N.E.2d 939 (1994).
{¶ 16} The ME‘s first proposition of law argues that the court should use the in pari materia rule of statutory construction in determining the meaning of
{¶ 17} The in pari materia rule of statutory construction applies to “statutes relating to the same general subject matter,” State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi, 86 Ohio St.3d 620, 622, 716 N.E.2d 204 (1999), citing Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24, 29, 697 N.E.2d 610 (1998), but it is applied only “where some doubt or ambiguity exists in the wording of a statute” (emphasis added), State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 27-28, 512 N.E.2d 332 (1987), citing Hough v. Dayton Mfg. Co., 66 Ohio St. 427, 434, 64 N.E. 521 (1902); see also Hulsmeyer, 142 Ohio St.3d 236, 2014-Ohio-5511, 29 N.E.3d 903, at ¶ 22. Under our rules of statutory construction, ambiguity means that the statutory provision is “capable of bearing more than one meaning.” Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16, citing Fairborn v. DeDomenico, 114 Ohio App.3d 590, 593, 683 N.E.2d 820 (2d Dist.1996).
{¶ 18} The ME does not argue that the words employed by the General Assembly are ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning. And we cannot, after reading the statute and giving the words the legislature chose their plain and ordinary meanings, find that the words of the statute are ambiguous. Therefore, the in pari materia rule of statutory construction is not applicable.
{¶ 19} The ME‘s second proposition of law argues that despite the language of
{¶ 20} The plain and unambiguous language that the General Assembly employed in
{¶ 21} The ME further argues that if this court does not reverse the appellate court‘s judgment and harmonize
{¶ 22} “The absurd result principle in statutory interpretation provides an exception to the rule that a statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning.” (Emphasis added.) Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 Am.U.L.Rev. 127 (1994). It is premised on a guiding principle of statutory construction: that when the General Assembly enacts a statute, it does not intend to produce an absurd result. See
{¶ 23} In Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., this court was construing the meaning of a tax statute, which requires “strict construction against the state, with any doubt resolved in favor of the taxpayer.” Id. at ¶ 34. We noted, however, that there is an absurdity exception to the strict-construction doctrine. Id. at ¶ 35. If strict construction of a statute would result in “unreasonable or absurd consequences,” a construing court may reject the strict-construction doctrine, because courts must presume that the legislature enacted a statute for a “just and reasonable result.” Id., citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Kosydar, 44 Ohio St.2d 208, 339 N.E.2d 820 (1975), paragraph two of the syllabus, and
{¶ 24} Similarly, in State ex rel. Cooper v. Savord, this court held that “[i]t is the duty of the courts, if the language of a statute fairly permits or unless restrained by the clear language thereof, so to construe the statute as to avoid [an unreasonable or absurd] result. 153 Ohio St. 367, 92 N.E.2d 390 (1950), paragraph
{¶ 25} In this case, the ME does not argue that application of the plain language of
{¶ 26} The absurd-result exception to the plain-meaning rule of construction “entails the imputation of legislative intent based on the judge‘s perception” and “vastly expands the [c]ourt‘s authority.” Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv.L.Rev. 2387, 2476 (2003). Therefore, all courts should exercise restraint in the application of the absurd-result exception, employing it in only those cases in which the plain language of a statute results in an obviously unintended result. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 239 (2012) (“The doctrine of absurdity is meant to correct obvious unintended dispositions, not to revise purposeful dispositions that, in light of other provisions of the applicable code, make little if any sense” [emphasis sic]).
{¶ 27} Because the plain language of
{¶ 29} Even if
{¶ 30} The provision at issue,
{¶ 31} In contrast,
{¶ 32} In reality, however, the ME‘s construction of the absurd-result exception is really akin to the rule of statutory construction stating that “[i]f a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider * * * [t]he consequences of a particular construction,”
{¶ 33} The parties do not dispute that Clay does not have an adequate remedy at law or that he is the next of kin to the decedent. The crux of the dispute is the ME‘s argument that Clay is not entitled to a writ of mandamus because he has no clear legal right to—and the ME has no clear legal duty to provide—the autopsy records.
{¶ 34}
{¶ 35} Thereafter, the legislature begins the definition of the phrase “full and complete records of the coroner” with the words “includes, but is not limited to, the following.”
{¶ 36} Clay made a written request to the ME asking for copies of x-rays, autopsy photos, the death certificate, and written doctors’ reports pertaining to his deceased daughter. The photographs and written doctor‘s reports requested by Clay are expressly included as part of the “full and complete record” of the coroner as defined in
{¶ 37} Except for the death certificate, the records requested by Clay, who is a next of kin of the decedent for purposes of
{¶ 38} While we are acutely aware of the fact that Clay has been convicted of and is currently incarcerated for the heinous act of murdering his daughter and that he is using
{¶ 39} Courts should be ever mindful that “[j]ustice is even-handed and equally administered to all, irrespective of any and all considerations.” Koppelman v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 202 F.2d 955, 956 (3d Cir.1953) (Kalodner, J., dissenting). Even when dealing with an “unsympathetic party,” a court “should not abandon settled rules of law merely to correct what we perceive to be an improper result.” West v. Goldstein, 830 S.W.2d 379, 388 (Ky.1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
[C]ourts are not at large. * * * They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. * * * A Judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradiction. * * *
[T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication and legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained, reluctance to do so.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 527, 533, 535 (1947).
{¶ 40} Because our role as members of the judiciary is not “‘to establish legislative policies or to second-guess the General Assembly‘s policy choices,‘” Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 35, quoting Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212, or to declare that the General Assembly by way of inadvertence or inattention made a slip of the pen in an attempt to rewrite the statute in a manner that is pleasing to us, we must adhere to the plain language of the statute. If after reflection on our decision, the General Assembly finds that its original intention was not accomplished in the words that it chose, then it, and it alone, has the constitutional authority to amend the statute to conform to its intention.
VI. Conclusion
{¶ 41} The in pari materia rule of statutory construction and the absurdity exception to the plain-language rule of statutory construction are not applicable to
Judgment affirmed.
O‘DONNELL and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FRENCH and O‘NEILL, JJ.
FISCHER, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 42} The lead and dissenting opinions consider the relationship between two statutes appearing in separate titles of the Revised Code and disagree on how to apply our absurd-result jurisprudence. Rather, the statutes address different avenues by which a requestor can obtain different sets of records. The fact that there is some overlap between the two sets of records does not create any relevant relationship between the statutes.
{¶ 43}
{¶ 44}
{¶ 45} It is true that some of the records that form part of the “full and complete records of the coroner” are public records. Nonetheless,
{¶ 46} Here, as the lead opinion correctly notes, Clay submitted a letter to the ME requesting records related to his daughter, and he cited both
{¶ 47} Despite reaching this conclusion, I share some of the concerns raised in the dissenting opinion.
O‘DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion to the extent that it encourages the General Assembly to address the issue.
O‘Connor, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 48} The lead opinion misconstrues this court‘s absurd-result jurisprudence. Contrary to the lead opinion‘s view that the absurd-result exception applies only when the plain language of a single statute yields an unreasonable or absurd result, we have long held that we may consider the legislature‘s intent when the plain meanings of two statutes, considered together, lead to absurd consequences. I therefore must dissent.
{¶ 49} In 1853, we held that “where, out of several acts touching the same subject matter, there arise collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, the obvious intention of the law must prevail over a literal interpretation.” Slater v. Cave, 3 Ohio St. 80, 83 (1853). Indeed, “it is even said, that provisions leading to collateral consequences of great absurdity or injustice, may be rejected as absolutely void.” Id.
{¶ 50} Nearly 90 years later, the Supreme Court of the United States hailed the power of the courts to interpret statutes not based just on their plain meanings but also their purposes:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. * * * When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however,
even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole’ [Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194, 43 S.Ct. 65, 67 L.Ed. 199 (1922)] this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, [Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48, 49 S.Ct. 52, 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928)] however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial [inspection].’ [Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 54 S.Ct. 806, 78 L.Ed. 1361 (1934).] The interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is exclusively a judicial function. This duty requires one body of public servants, the judges, to construe the meaning of what another body, the legislators, has said. Obviously there is danger that the courts’ conclusion as to legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the judges’ own views or by factors not considered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the danger is the best assurance of escape from its threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts available information for reaching a correct conclusion.
(Some citations omitted.) United States v. Am. Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-544, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940); see also Lawson v. FMR, L.L.C., 571 U.S. 429, 134 S.Ct. 1158, 1183, 188 L.Ed.2d 158 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“the majority‘s reading runs afoul of the precept that ‘interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available‘“), quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contrs., Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982); Pub. Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (court can look beyond statutory language when plain meaning would “‘compel an odd result‘“), quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989); accord State ex rel. Belford v. Hueston, 44 Ohio St. 1, 5, 4 N.E. 471 (1886) (“We are, if we can, to ascertain what the legislature intended by its use in this law. For, ‘while the popular or received import of words furnishes a general rule for the interpretation of statutes, they must be interpreted according to the intent and meaning, and not always according to the letter; and where the intent can be discovered, it should be followed, though such construction seems contrary to the letter of the statute‘“), quoting an unidentified source.
{¶ 51} This concept remains alive and well in our jurisprudence. Just two years ago, this court, including some of the justices who join the lead opinion today, found in State v. White that the application of an unambiguous criminal-enhancement statute to a law-enforcement officer was “neither just nor reasonable” given other statutes relating to the duties of law-enforcement officers. 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939, ¶ 32-33. In White, a police officer was charged with one count of felonious assault, with a firearm specification pursuant to
{¶ 52} In White, we reiterated that “‘[o]ur role, in the exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Constitution, is to interpret the law that the General Assembly enacts, and the primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.‘” Id. at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Taylor, 138 Ohio St.3d 194, 2014-Ohio-460, 5 N.E.3d 614, ¶ 14. In doing so, we presume that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result by enacting a statute. Id., citing
{¶ 53} In White, we did not find that
{¶ 54} Considering these laws together, we wisely concluded that it would not be just or reasonable to apply
Given the need for hurried judgments without the chance for reflection, and given the extensive training that causes officers to act reflexively when encountering potentially dangerous situations, it is neither just nor reasonable to apply a firearm specification to a police officer involved in an on-duty shooting based only on a showing of poor judgment or negligence in using force.
White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939, at ¶ 33. We concluded, “[T]he General Assembly did not intend the firearm specification to apply to a police officer who fired a gun issued to him to protect himself * * * from a person he thought was about to brandish a weapon.” Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶ 56} Thus, consistent with more than a century of precedent, courts may properly consider, without first finding that statutory language is ambiguous, whether the literal interpretation of a statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable result based on its plain language, the interplay of related statutes, and the General Assembly‘s intent.
{¶ 57} As with the statute at issue in White, we cannot give effect to the legislative intent behind
{¶ 58}
{¶ 59} But
{¶ 60}
{¶ 61} Thus, the lead opinion‘s application of
{¶ 62} But even if the lead opinion chooses to disregard more than a century of case law and hold tight to the notion that we do not have the authority to consider
{¶ 63} The lead opinion makes a conclusory statement, with no analysis, that “the plain language of
{¶ 64} The United States Supreme Court has, in fact, recognized that murderers are in a position to exploit these types of records. In a case involving a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA“) request for death-scene photographs of Vince Foster Jr., a deputy counsel to President Clinton who committed suicide, the
We are advised by the Government that child molesters, rapists, murderers, and other violent criminals often make FOIA requests for autopsies, photographs, and records of their deceased victims. Our holding ensures that the privacy interests of surviving family members would allow the Government to deny these gruesome requests in appropriate cases. We find it inconceivable that Congress could have intended a definition of “personal privacy” so narrow that it would allow convicted felons to obtain these materials without limitations at the expense of surviving family members’ personal privacy.
Natl. Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004). Similarly, in seeking to protect the privacy of victims’ families under
{¶ 65} Notwithstanding that it is absurd and unreasonable to permit Clay to obtain autopsy information pursuant to
{¶ 66} If we were to recognize these laws as conflicting, we would have to recognize conflicts between a substantial number of laws creating collateral
{¶ 67} Likewise, Ohio law provides that every United States citizen who is 18 years old and meets certain residency and registration requirements “has the qualifications of an elector.”
{¶ 68} Similarly, the Ohio Constitution enshrines the right of the people to bear arms, without restriction. Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 4. However, a statute makes it a crime for an individual convicted of a felony offense of violence to carry a firearm.
{¶ 69} Like the statutes here governing coroners’ reports and restricting the disclosure of public records to incarcerated individuals, there is no legislatively created conflict in these examples. The laws create classes of individuals. Just as an individual in line for an inheritance will receive nothing if that person murdered
{¶ 70} Indeed, if the lead opinion‘s logic were applied to all of
{¶ 71}
{¶ 72} The lead opinion‘s decision will not only subvert the General Assembly‘s intent here, it will set a calamitous precedent. An inmate imprisoned for murdering a spouse, parent, or sibling is still a convicted murderer, yet
{¶ 73} The lead opinion here, with its strict adherence to a literal-interpretation dogma, implies that we would usurp the legislature‘s role if we applied the plain language of a statute rationally and in concert with the General Assembly‘s intent. Using the lead opinion‘s guidance, a statutorily identified relative is entitled to the autopsy records, period. And no other statute need be consulted on the matter, even if the relative is a murderer guilty of matricide, patricide, fratricide, or filicide. I disagree. This case calls for us to apply two relevant laws to one murderer, which does not require us to add words to a statute or to ignore statutory provisions altogether. This case began with a murderer‘s request for his victim‘s autopsy records. Pursuant to
{¶ 74} I dissent.
FRENCH and O‘NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Michael Clay, pro se.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelly Kay Perk, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Barnes & Thornburg, L.L.P., and C. David Paragas, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio State Coroners Association.