STETTER ET AL. v. R.J. CORMAN DERAILMENT SERVICES, L.L.C., ET AL.
No. 2008-0972
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted February 18, 2009—Decided March 23, 2010.
125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Brian N. Ramm, and Elizabeth A. Harvey; and Borgstahl & Zychowicz, Ltd., and Michael J. Zychowicz, for appellant.
{¶1} We accepted review of certified questions of state law from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, regarding the validity of
I. The Certification Order and the Questions to Be Answered
{¶2} The federal district court‘s amended certification order sets forth the following brief statement of the facts:
{¶3} “The Complaint alleges that on March 13, 2006, while employed by Defendant R.J. Corman Derailment Services LLC, Plaintiff Carl Stetter was injured while working in the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff Carl Stetter applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the injuries he sustained on March 13, 2006.
{¶4} “Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Wood County Common Pleas Court. Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division. Federal jurisdiction is based upon
{¶5} “Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendants committed an employer intentional tort. On February 29, 2008, pursuant to an order of this Court, Defendants filed an Amended Answer in which they asserted that Plaintiffs are
{¶6} The federal court certified the following eight questions to this court:
{¶7} “1. Is
{¶8} “2. Is
{¶9} “3. Is
{¶10} “4. Is
{¶11} “5. Is
{¶12} “6. Is
{¶13} “7. Is
{¶14} “8. Does
{¶15} We reviewed the parties’ preliminary memoranda and consented to answer the eight certified questions of the amended order. 119 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2008-Ohio-4562, 893 N.E.2d 520.2
{¶16} Plaintiffs Carl and Doris Stetter are the petitioners in this matter. The respondents are defendants R.J. Corman Derailment Services, L.L.C., and R.J. Corman Railroad Group, L.L.C.
{¶17}
{¶18} “(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee, or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.
{¶19} “(B) As used in this section, ‘substantially certain’ means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.
{¶20} “(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct result.
{¶21} “(D) This section does not apply to claims arising during the course of employment involving discrimination, civil rights, retaliation, harassment in violation of Chapter 4112 of the Revised Code, intentional infliction of emotional distress not compensable under Chapters 4121 and 4123 of the Revised Code, contract, promissory estoppel, or defamation.” 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5533.
{¶22} In Kaminski, we reviewed the history and development of employer intentional-tort law in Ohio. In particular, we examined this court‘s decisions in Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, and Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 298, 707 N.E.2d 1107, both of which struck down legislation governing employer intentional torts. We draw upon Kaminski in answering the certified questions of this case.3
A. The Statutory Purpose
{¶23} In an argument going to the eighth certified question, petitioners assert that
{¶24} Petitioners first contend that the portion of
{¶25} Petitioners accordingly contend that the General Assembly meant to accept this court‘s holdings in Brady and Johnson.
{¶26} For reasons also discussed in Kaminski, we reject petitioners’ construction of
{¶27} To accept petitioners’ view of the statute, we must ignore the history of employer intentional-tort law in Ohio and the dynamic between the General Assembly‘s attempts to legislate in this area and this court‘s decisions reacting to those attempts. Instead, we find that
{¶28} It does not necessarily follow, however, that
B. Sections 34 and 35, Article II, Ohio Constitution
{¶29} The seventh certified question asks whether
{¶30} To the extent that this court in Johnson, and the plurality in Brady, construed Sections 34 and 35 as preventing the General Assembly from enacting legislation in this area, we disclaim that reasoning. See Kaminski, 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, ___ N.E.2d ___, at the syllabus. Because of the significant differences between the current statute and the statutes invalidated in Johnson and Brady, we limit those decisions to the specific statutes invalidated in those cases. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Kaminski, we answer the seventh certified question in the negative and hold that
C. Other Constitutional Provisions
{¶31} The remaining certified questions in this case test the constitutionality of
{¶32} Our inquiry is guided by familiar and well-established principles of constitutional adjudication. In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, we reiterated that all statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality: “Before a court may declare unconstitutional an enactment of the legislative branch, ‘it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.‘” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶33} Furthermore, a party raising a facial challenge to a statute, as petitioners do here, must demonstrate that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Arbino at ¶ 26, citing United States v. Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697. “The fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under some plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” Arbino at ¶ 26, quoting Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37. See also Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 25-26.
{¶34} “A fundamental principle of the constitutional separation of powers among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch of government is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy.‘” Arbino at ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 21. In fulfilling that role, the legislature is entrusted with the power to continually refine Ohio‘s laws to meet the needs of our citizens. Id.
{¶36}
{¶37} “While stare decisis applies to the rulings rendered in regard to specific statutes, it is limited to circumstances ‘where the facts of a subsequent case are substantially the same as a former case.’ Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 539 N.E.2d 103. We will not apply stare decisis to strike down legislation enacted by the General Assembly merely because it is similar to previous enactments that we have deemed unconstitutional. To be covered by the blanket of stare decisis, the legislation must be phrased in language that is substantially the same as that which we have previously invalidated.
{¶38} “A careful review of the statutes at issue * * * reveals that they are more than a rehashing of unconstitutional statutes. In its continued pursuit of reform, the General Assembly has made progress in tailoring its legislation to address the constitutional defects identified by the various majorities of this court. The statutes before us * * * are sufficiently different from the previous enactments to avoid the blanket application of stare decisis and to warrant a fresh review of their individual merits.” Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 123-24. See also Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 104-106.
{¶39} Like the statutes at issue in Arbino and Groch, the statute at issue in this case resembles previous invalid legislation in some respects, but it differs in significant and important ways. Consequently, even though this court has struck down employer intentional-tort statutes in previous cases, stare decisis does not
1. Open Courts and Right to a Remedy (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
{¶40} The second certified question asks whether
{¶41}
{¶42} Additionally, separate concerns are implicated by Section 16‘s provisions that this state‘s courts shall be open to every person with a right to a remedy for injury to his person, property, or reputation. “‘When the Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property, or reputation, it requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.‘” Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 44, quoting Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626. “A statute need not ‘completely abolish the right to open courts’ to run afoul” of Section 16. Arbino at ¶ 45, quoting Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 426, 633 N.E.2d 504. Any statute that eliminates a right to a judgment or to a properly rendered verdict is unconstitutional, and an individual cannot be “wholly foreclosed from relief after a verdict is rendered in his or her favor.” Arbino at ¶ 45. This court has invalidated statutes and rules as violative of this aspect of Section 16, Article I in cases involving a “serious infringement of a clearly preexisting right to bring suit.” Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 355, 639 N.E.2d 31.
{¶43} We now address the open-courts and right-to-a-remedy provisions of Section 16 as applicable to this case.
{¶44} Petitioners contend that requiring employees to show a “deliberate intent” to cause injury denies a meaningful remedy to employees injured by acts committed with the “substantially certain” level of intent, who are relegated to workers’ compensation recovery only. Petitioners assert that “[t]he right to bring a civil action for damages is the only meaningful remedy for an intentional tort in any context, including the context of employment.”
{¶46} As we noted in Kaminski, 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, ___ N.E.2d ___, at ¶ 96, the majority opinion in Johnson did not rely solely on Sections 34 and 35, Article II in overturning the employer intentional-tort statute at issue in that case. Much of the discussion in Johnson shows that the statute was determined to be unconstitutional based in large part on the heavy burden it placed on employees seeking a civil remedy.
{¶47} In this regard, this court stated in Johnson, 85 Ohio St.3d at 306, 707 N.E.2d 1107, that former
{¶48} Current
{¶49} Additionally, current
{¶50} It is apparent that the General Assembly responded to this court‘s previous decisions by eliminating many of the features identified by this court as unreasonable, onerous, and excessive. Thus, in reviewing
{¶51} Petitioners point out that the Johnson court objected to requiring an employee to prove the equivalent of a criminal assault. But Johnson‘s objections were largely based on former
{¶52} In Hardy, 32 Ohio St.3d at 49, 512 N.E.2d 626, we rejected the notion that “causes of action as they existed at common law or the rules that govern such causes are immune from legislative attention.” This is because “[n]o one has a vested right in rules of the common law. * * * The great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to new circumstances.” Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner (1917), 95 Ohio St. 232, 248, 116 N.E. 104. See Leis v. Cleveland Ry. Co. (1920), 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73, paragraph one of the syllabus (because there is no property or vested right in rules of the common law, “they may be added to or repealed by legislative authority“); see also Munn v. Illinois (1876), 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77 (there is no vested interest in any rule of the common law; alteration of the common law is permissible unless prohibited by specific constitutional limitations).
{¶53} “““This court would encroach upon the Legislature‘s ability to guide the development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by the courts. * * * Such a result would offend our notion of the checks and balances between the various branches of government, and the flexibility required for the healthy growth of the law. ““” Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 118, quoting Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 193, 202, 551 N.E.2d 938, quoting Klein v. Catalano (1982), 386 Mass. 701, 712-713, 437 N.E.2d 514, and Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co. (1978), 476 Pa. 270, 280-281, 382 A.2d 715.
{¶54} As this court has often recognized, workers’ compensation laws are the result of a unique compromise between employees and employers, in which employees give up their common-law remedy and accept possibly lower monetary recovery, but with greater assurance that they will receive reasonable compensation for their injury. Employers in turn give up common-law defenses but are
{¶55} For the reasons that follow, we hold that current
{¶56} First,
{¶57} Second,
{¶58} Third,
{¶59} Fourth, workers’ compensation recovery is a meaningful remedy for workers whose injuries result from conduct committed with an intent less than deliberate intent, such as conduct that is reckless (as it is under our current case law). Furthermore, when an injury results from an employer‘s violation of a specific safety requirement, an additional recovery by the injured worker is constitutionally available.
{¶60} The General Assembly enacted
2. Right to Trial by Jury (Section 5, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
{¶61} The first certified question asks whether
{¶62} Petitioners argue that requiring employees to show an employer‘s deliberate intent to injure in order to recover civil damages “would deprive the victims of non-deliberate intentional tortfeasors of their right to trial by jury” and that “[a]ny deprivation of the right to bring a civil action amounts to an ipso facto deprivation” of that right.
{¶63} Petitioners’ arguments fail to take into account that the right to a jury trial is not absolute. Section 5, Article I applies only to those causes of action to which the right attached at common law when Section 5 was adopted. Arbino at ¶ 32. Moreover, Section 5‘s specific guarantee is that a jury will resolve any questions of fact, and a challenge to a statute under that section will succeed “only if the statute actually intrudes upon the jury‘s fact-finding function.” Id. at ¶ 34, 90.
{¶64} The right to trial by jury does not act as “a limit on the ability of the legislature to act within its constitutional boundaries.” Id. at ¶ 126 (Cupp, J., concurring). “[I]t is long-settled constitutional law that it is within the power of the legislature to alter, revise, modify, or abolish the common law as it may determine necessary or advisable for the common good.” Id. at ¶ 131. Thus, the right to trial by jury does not prevent the General Assembly from altering a cause of action. Id. at ¶ 131-132.
{¶65} In Arrington, we observed that employer intentional-tort claims typically retain a right to trial by jury because, under Blankenship, intentional torts do not arise from employment, and the employer thus loses immunity from a common-law suit. 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 24,
{¶66} With
{¶67} An employee who can establish a prima facie case that his employer deliberately intended to injure him is not prevented by
{¶68} Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative and hold that
3. Due Process (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
{¶69} The fourth certified question asks whether
{¶70} Petitioner asserts that we are required to apply strict scrutiny to our review of the statute‘s effect on an employee‘s right of due process because the statute violates fundamental rights to an open court, to a remedy, and to a jury trial. Under this standard, a statute will be held unconstitutional unless it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 155; Sorrell, 69 Ohio St.3d at 423, 633 N.E.2d 504.
{¶71} A statute that does not impinge upon a fundamental right, however, will be reviewed under a rational-basis test. Under this test, a statute will be upheld
{¶72} Because the statute does not impinge upon fundamental rights and does not violate the right to an open court, the right to a remedy, or the right to trial by jury, we reject petitioners’ argument that strict scrutiny should apply, and we instead review under the rational-basis standard. See Groch at ¶ 156; Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 49.
{¶73} As an initial matter,
{¶74} Furthermore,
{¶75} As to the first important reason, “it must be remembered once again that this is a no-fault system as to both employer and employee.” Id. Conventional standards regarding what a “just” result might be are subordinated to other concerns in this setting, and awards are routinely made to employees injured as the result of their own misconduct. Id. See State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 249, 2007-Ohio-4916, 874 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 20, 22 (a claimant who willfully or deliberately violates a workplace rule and is thereby injured is not statutorily disqualified from receiving workers’ compensation
{¶76} As to the second important reason, “every presumption is on the side of avoiding the imposition of the complexities and uncertainties of tort litigation on the compensation process.” 6 Larson‘s Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 103.03. One of the fundamental pillars supporting Section 35, Article II is the exclusivity of the no-fault compensation system. The inclusion of this feature in Section 35, Article II underscores the importance the Constitution places on avoiding litigation over workplace injuries.
{¶77} No more extensive examination of the relationship between the statute‘s purposes and its effects is necessary. When conducting a rational-basis review, “we are to grant substantial deference to the predictive judgment of the General Assembly.” Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 58, quoting State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 N.E.2d 342. See also Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, at ¶ 72. Courts may not “usurp the legislative function” by substituting their judgment for that of a legislative authority. Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 653 N.E.2d 639.
{¶78} The state manifestly has a legitimate interest in legislating in the area of employer intentional torts. The fact that a clear majority of jurisdictions apply standards the same as or similar to those contained in
4. Equal Protection (Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
{¶79} The fifth certified question asks whether
{¶80} Because no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated in this case, we review
{¶81} Petitioners assert that
{¶82} For reasons similar to those that led us to conclude above that the statute does not violate the due-course-of-law provision of Section 16, Article I, we also find that
{¶83} Moreover, the Ohio Constitution itself draws the classification between persons who, as employees, are injured on the job and those persons who are injured other than in the workplace. The workers’ compensation system authorized by Section 35, Article II provides that employers who comply with the requirements of that system “shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for * * * death, injuries, or occupational disease” sustained by employees on the job.
{¶85} Because the classifications created by
5. Separation of Powers
{¶86} The sixth certified question asks whether
{¶87} “The separation-of-powers doctrine represents the constitutional diffusion of power within our tripartite government. The doctrine was a deliberate design to secure liberty by simultaneously fostering autonomy and comity, as well as interdependence and independence, among the three branches. See, e.g., Fairview v. Giffee (1905), 73 Ohio St. 183, 187, 76 N.E. 865; Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel. & Tel. Co. (1900), 63 Ohio St. 442, 451, 59 N.E. 109; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (Jackson, J., concurring). The doctrine is “implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.“” State ex rel. Bray v. Russell [2000], 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 729 N.E.2d 359, quoting S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136. We previously explained as follows:
{¶88} “““[T]he people possessing all governmental power, adopted constitutions, completely distributing it to appropriate departments.” Hale v. State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 210, 214, 45 N.E. 199, 200. They vested the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly (
{¶89} Petitioners assert that
{¶90} Because the General Assembly has acted within its grant of power to define the scope and contours of the tort of workplace intentional injury, the separation-of-powers doctrine is not violated by requiring all employees whose injuries are not the result of the statutorily defined tort of workplace intentional injury to recover within the workers’ compensation system. Such employees are situated similarly to employees injured as the result of the employer‘s negligence or even recklessness for purposes of Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Just as the Industrial Commission does not exercise a judicial function when it determines, pursuant to Section 35, the recovery for employees who are injured as a result of negligence, recklessness, or other cause, the same is true when the commission determines the recovery for employees who are injured by more egregious conduct of an employer that falls short of deliberate intent.
{¶91} In addition,
{¶92} Accordingly, we answer the sixth certified question in the negative and hold that
III. Conclusion
{¶93} As we noted in Groch, 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212, “It is not this court‘s role to establish legislative policies or to second-guess the General Assembly‘s policy choices. ‘[T]he General Assembly is responsible for weighing [policy] concerns and making policy decisions; we are charged with evaluating the constitutionality of their choices. * * * Using a highly deferential standard of review appropriate to a facial challenge to these statutes, we conclude that the General Assembly has responded to our previous decisions and has created constitutionally permissible limitations.’ (Emphasis sic.) Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 113.”
{¶94} In enacting
{¶96} In response to question seven:
{¶97} In response to question eight:
So answered.
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur.
O‘CONNOR, J., concurs in the answers only.
PFEIFER, J., dissents.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶98} I dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons stated in my dissent in Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066. Additionally, I would hold that
{¶99}
{¶100} No, the purpose of
{¶101} The majority acknowledges that this court found fault with former
{¶102} The majority answers the eighth certified question—“Does
Barkan & Robon, Ltd., Joseph R. Deitz Jr., R. Ethan Davis, and James M. Tuschman, for petitioners.
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Margaret Mattimoe Sturgeon, Robert J. Gilmer Jr., and Sarah E. Pawlicki, for respondents.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Robert X. Eskridge and Sharon A. Jennings, Assistant Attorneys General, in support of respondents for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio.
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, Anne Marie Sferra, and Vladimir P. Belo, in support of respondents for amici curiae American Insurance Association and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America.
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Joseph W. Ryan Jr., and Daniel B. Miller; and Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, L.L.P., and Mark S. Olson, in support of respondents for amicus curiae International Association of Defense Counsel.
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey; Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant; and Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease,
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Schuster, Michael J. Hendershot, Kristi K. Wilhelmy, and Benjamin A. Shepler, in support of respondents for amicus curiae Ohio Council of Retail Merchants.