Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Services, L.L.C.Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Services, L.L.C.
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} We accepted review of certified questions of state law from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, regarding the validity of
I. The Certification Order and the Questions to Be Answered
{¶ 2} The federal district court’s amended certification order sets forth the following brief statement of the facts:
{¶ 3} “The Complaint alleges that on March 13, 2006, while employed by Defendant R.J. Corman Derailment Services LLC, Plaintiff Carl Stetter was injured while working in the course and scope of his employment. Plaintiff Carl Stetter applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the injuries he sustained on March 13, 2006.
{¶ 4} “Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Wood County Common Pleas Court. Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division. Federal jurisdiction is based upon28 U.S.C. § 1332 because there is diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
{¶ 5} “Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendants committed an employer intentional tort. On February 29, 2008, pursuant to an order of this Court, Defendants filed an Amended Answer in which they asserted that Plaintiffs are*282 unable to establish any deliberate intent by the Defendants to cause Plaintiffs’ injuries and therefore Plaintiffs’ claims are barred byR.C. 2745.01. On March 17, 2008, pursuant to an Order of this Court, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Strike and/or For Declaratory Judgment asserting thatR.C. 2745.01 is unconstitutional. To fully adjudicate this matter and determine the rights and liabilities of each party, this Court needs a determination by the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality ofR.C. 2745.01 under the Ohio Constitution. The Supreme Court of Ohio has not yet had opportunity to issue a decision on the constitutionality ofR.C. 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498 effective April 7, 2005.”
{¶ 6} The federal court certified the following eight questions to this court:
{¶ 7} “1. IsR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to trial by jury?
{¶ 8} “2. IsR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to a remedy?
{¶ 9} “3. IsR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to an open court?
{¶ 10} “4. IsR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to due process of law?
{¶ 11} “5. IsR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the right to equal protection of the law?
{¶ 12} “6. IsR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers?
{¶ 13} “7. IsR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, unconstitutional for conflicting with the legislative authority granted to the General Assembly by § 34 and § 35, Article II, of the Ohio Constitution?
{¶ 14} “8. DoesR.C. § 2745.01 , as enacted by House Bill 498, effective April 7, 2005, do away with the common law cause of action for employer intentional tort?”
{¶ 15} We reviewed the parties’ preliminary memoranda and consented to answer the eight certified questions of the amended order.
{¶ 16} Plaintiffs Carl and Doris Stetter are the petitioners in this matter. The respondents are defendants R.J. Corman Derailment Services, L.L.C., and R.J. Corman Railroad Group, L.L.C.
{¶ 17}
{¶ 18} “(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee, or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.
{¶ 19} “(B) As used in this section, ‘substantially certain’ means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.
{¶ 20} “(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct result.
{¶ 21} “(D) This section does not apply to claims arising during the course of employment involving discrimination, civil rights, retaliation, harassment in violation of Chapter 4112 of the Revised Code, intentional infliction of emotional distress not compensable under Chapters 4121 and 4123 of the Revised Code, contract, promissory estoppel, or defamation.” 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5533.
{¶ 22} In Kaminski,
A. The Statutory Purpose
{¶ 23} In an argument going to the eighth certified question, petitioners assert that
{¶ 24} Petitioners first contend that the portion of
{¶ 25} Petitioners accordingly contend that the General Assembly meant to accept this court’s holdings in Brady and Johnson.
{¶ 26} For reasons also discussed in Kaminski, we reject petitioners’ construction of
{¶ 27} To accept petitioners’ view of the statute, we must ignore the history of employer intentional-tort law in Ohio and the dynamic between the General Assembly’s attempts to legislate in this area and this court’s decisions reacting to those attempts. Instead, we find that
{¶ 28} It does not necessarily follow, however, that
B. Sections 34 and 35, Article II, Ohio Constitution
{¶ 29} The seventh certified question asks whether
{¶ 30} To the extent that this court in Johnson, and the plurality in Brady, construed Sections 34 and 35 as preventing the General Assembly from enacting legislation in this area, we disclaim that reasoning. See Kaminski,
C. Other Constitutional Provisions
{¶ 31} The remaining certified questions in this case test the constitutionality of
{¶ 32} Our inquiry is guided by familiar and well-established principles of constitutional adjudication. In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson,
{¶ 33} Furthermore, a party raising a facial challenge to a statute, as petitioners do here, must demonstrate that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Arbino at ¶ 26, citing United States v. Salerno (1987),
{¶ 34} “A fundamental principle of the constitutional separation of powers among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch of government is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy.’ ” Arbino at ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Dupuis,
{¶ 36} Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides that all legislative power of the state is vested in the General Assembly. Thus, the General Assembly possesses the authority to enact any law that does not conflict with the Ohio and United States Constitutions. See State ex. rel Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1967),
{¶ 37} “While stare decisis applies to the rulings rendered in regard to specific statutes, it is limited to circumstances ‘where the facts of a subsequent case are substantially the same as a former case.’ Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989),
{¶ 38} “A careful review of the statutes at issue * * * reveals that they are more than a rehashing of unconstitutional statutes. In its continued pursuit of reform, the General Assembly has made progress in tailoring its legislation to address the constitutional defects identified by the various majorities of this court. The statutes before us * * * are sufficiently different from the previous enactments to avoid the blanket application of stare decisis and to warrant a fresh review of their individual merits.” Arbino,
{¶ 39} Like the statutes at issue in Arbino and Groch, the statute at issue in this case resembles previous invalid legislation in some respects, but it differs in significant and important ways. Consequently, even though this court has struck down employer intentional-tort statutes in previous cases, stare decisis does not
1. Open Courts and Right to a Remedy (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
{¶ 40} The second certified question asks whether
{¶ 41} Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides, “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” Section 16 contains several distinct guarantees. First, legislative enactments may restrict individual rights only “by due course of law,” a guarantee equivalent to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
{¶ 42} Additionally, separate concerns are implicated by Section 16’s provisions that this state’s courts shall be open to every person with a right to a remedy for injury to his person, property, or reputation. “ ‘When the Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property, or reputation, it requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Arbino,
{¶ 43} We now address the open-courts and right-to-a-remedy provisions of Section 16 as applicable to this case.
{¶ 44} Petitioners contend that requiring employees to show a “deliberate intent” to cause injury denies a meaningful remedy to employees injured by acts committed with the “substantially certain” level of intent, who are relegated to workers’ compensation recovery only. Petitioners assert that “[t]he right to bring a civil action for damages is the only meaningful remedy for an intentional tort in any context, including the context of employment.”
{¶ 46} As we noted in Kaminski,
{¶ 47} In this regard, this court stated in Johnson, 85 Ohio St.3d at 306,
{¶ 48} Current
{¶ 49} Additionally, current
{¶ 50} It is apparent that the General Assembly responded to this court’s previous decisions by eliminating many of the features identified by this court as unreasonable, onerous, and excessive. Thus, in reviewing
{¶ 51} Petitioners point out that the Johnson court objected to requiring an employee to prove the equivalent of a criminal assault. But Johnson’s objections were largely based on former
{¶ 52} In Hardy,
{¶ 53} “ ‘ “ ‘This court would encroach upon the Legislature’s ability to guide the development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by the courts. * * * Such a result would offend our notion of the checks and balances between the various branches of government, and the flexibility required for the healthy growth of the law.’ ” ’ ” Groch,
{¶ 54} As this court has often recognized, workers’ compensation laws are the result of a unique compromise between employees and employers, in which employees give up their common-law remedy and accept possibly lower monetary recovery, but with greater assurance that they will receive reasonable compensation for their injury. Employers in turn give up common-law defenses but are
{¶ 55} For the reasons that follow, we hold that current
{¶ 56} First,
{¶ 57} Second,
{¶ 58} Third,
{¶ 59} Fourth, workers’ compensation recovery is a meaningful remedy for workers whose injuries result from conduct committed with an intent less than deliberate intent, such as conduct that is reckless (as it is under our current case law). Furthermore, when an injury results from an employér’s violation of a specific safety requirement, an additional recovery by the injured worker is constitutionally available. Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.
{¶ 60} The General Assembly enacted
2. Right to Trial by Jury (Section 5, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
{¶ 61} The first certified question asks whether
{¶ 62} Petitioners argue that requiring employees to show an employer’s deliberate intent to injure in order to recover civil damages “would deprive the victims of non-deliberate intentional tortfeasors of their right to trial by jury” and that “[a]ny deprivation of the right to bring a civil action amounts to an ipso facto deprivation” of that right.
{¶ 63} Petitioners’ arguments fail to take into account that the right to a jury trial is not absolute. Section 5, Article I applies only to those causes of action to which the right attached at common law when Section 5 was adopted. Arbino at ¶ 32. Moreover, Section 5’s specific guarantee is that a jury will resolve any questions of fact, and a challenge to a statute under that section will succeed “only if the statute actually intrudes upon the jury’s fact-finding function.” Id. at ¶ 34, 90.
{¶ 64} The right to trial by jury does not act as “a limit on the ability of the legislature to act within its constitutional boundaries.” Id.,
{¶ 65} In Arrington, we observed that employer intentional-tort claims typically retain a right to trial by jury because, under Blankenship, intentional torts do not arise from employment, and the employer thus loses immunity from a common-law suit.
{¶ 66} With
{¶ 67} An employee who can establish a prima facie case that his employer deliberately intended to injure him is not prevented by
{¶ 68} Accordingly, we answer the first certified question in the negative and hold that
3. Due Process (Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
{¶ 69} The fourth certified question asks whether
{¶ 70} Petitioner asserts that we are required to apply strict scrutiny to our review of the statute’s effect on an employee’s right of due process because the statute violates fundamental rights to an open court, to a remedy, and to a jury trial. Under this standard, a statute will be held unconstitutional unless it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. Groch,
{¶ 71} A statute that does not impinge upon a fundamental right, however, will be reviewed under a rational-basis test. Under this test, a statute will be upheld
{¶ 72} Because the statute does not impinge upon fundamental rights and does not violate the right to an open court, the right to a remedy, or the right to trial by jury, we reject petitioners’ argument that strict scrutiny should apply, and we instead review under the rational-basis standard. See Groch at ¶ 156; Arbino,
{¶ 73} As an initial matter,
{¶ 74} Furthermore,
{¶ 75} As to the first important reason, “it must be remembered once again that this is a no-fault system as to both employer and employee.” Id. Conventional standards regarding what a “just” result might be are subordinated to other concerns in this setting, and awards are routinely made to employees injured as the result of their own misconduct. Id. See State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm.,
{¶ 76} As to the second important reason, “every presumption is on the side of avoiding the imposition of the complexities and uncertainties of tort litigation on the compensation process.” 6 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, Section 103.03. One of the fundamental pillars supporting Section 35, Article II is the exclusivity of the no-fault compensation system. The inclusion of this feature in Section 35, Article II underscores the importance the Constitution places on avoiding litigation over workplace injuries.
{¶ 77} No more extensive examination of the relationship between the statute’s purposes and its effects is necessary. When conducting a rational-basis review, “ ‘we are to grant substantial deference to the predictive judgment of the General Assembly.’ ” Arbino,
{¶ 78} The state manifestly has a legitimate interest in legislating in the area of employer intentional torts. The fact that a clear majority of jurisdictions apply standards the same as or similar to those contained in
4. Equal Protection (Section 2, Article I, Ohio Constitution)
(¶ 79} The fifth certified question asks whether
{¶ 80} Because no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated in this case, we review
{¶ 81} Petitioners assert that
{¶ 82} For reasons similar to those that led us to conclude above that the statute does not violate the due-course-of-law provision of Section 16, Article I, we also find that
{¶ 83} Moreover, the Ohio Constitution itself draws the classification between persons who, as employees, are injured on the job and those persons who are injured other than in the workplace. The workers’ compensation system authorized by Section 35, Article II provides that employers who comply with the requirements of that system “shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for * * * death, injuries, or occupational disease” sustained by employees on the job.
{¶ 85} Because the classifications created by
5. Separation of Powers
{¶ 86} The sixth certified question asks whether
{¶ 87} “The separation-of-powers doctrine represents the constitutional diffusion of power within our tripartite government. The doctrine was a deliberate design to secure liberty by simultaneously fostering autonomy and comity, as well as interdependence and independence, among the three branches. See, e.g., Fairview v. Giffee (1905),
{¶ 88} “ ‘ “[T]he people possessing all governmental power, adopted constitutions, completely distributing it to appropriate departments.” Hale v. State (1896),55 Ohio St. 210 , 214,45 N.E. 199 , 200. They vested the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly (Section 1, Article II, Ohio Constitution), the executive power in the Governor (Section 5, Article III, Ohio Constitution), and the judicial power in the courts (Section 1, Article IV, Ohio Constitution). They also specified that ‘ “ ‘[t]he general assembly shall [not] * * * exercise any judicial power, not herein expressly conferred.’ ” ’ Section 32, Article II, Ohio Constitution.’ ” Norwood v. Horney,110 Ohio St.3d 353 ,2006-Ohio-3799 ,853 N.E.2d 1115 , ¶ 114-115, quoting State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.*297 Sheward (1999),86 Ohio St.3d 451 , 462,715 N.E.2d 1062 ; see also State v. Hochhausler (1996),76 Ohio St.3d 455 , 463,668 N.E.2d 457 .
{¶ 89} Petitioners assert that
{¶ 90} Because the General Assembly has acted within its grant of power to define the scope and contours of the tort of workplace intentional injury, the separation-of-powers doctrine is not violated by requiring all employees whose injuries are not the result of the statutorily defined tort of workplace intentional injury to recover within the workers’ compensation system. Such employees are situated similarly to employees injured as the result of the employer’s negligence or even recklessness for purposes of Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Just as the Industrial Commission does not exercise a judicial function when it determines, pursuant to Section 35, the recovery for employees who are injured as a result of negligence, recklessness, or other cause, the same is true when the commission determines the recovery for employees who are injured by more egregious conduct of an employer that falls short of deliberate intent.
{¶ 91} In addition,
{¶ 92} Accordingly, we answer the sixth certified question in the negative and hold that
III. Conclusion
{¶ 93} As we noted in Groch,
{¶ 94} In enacting
{¶ 96} In response to question seven:
(¶ 97} In response to question eight:
So answered.
Notes
. Some of the issues of this case and of Kaminski overlap. In resolving the issues that overlap, we have considered all the briefs that have been filed in both cases.
. The federal district court had previously certified similar questions to this court, and this court accepted those questions on August 6, 2008.
. To facilitate our discussion of the numbered certified questions, we address them out of order.
. The final sentence of Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides: “When it is found, upon hearing, that an injury, disease or death resulted because of [the] failure by the employer [to comply with any specific requirement for the protection of the lives, health or safety of employees], such amount as shall be found to be just, not greater than fifty nor less than fifteen per centum of the maximum award established by law, shall be added by the board [i.e., the Industrial Commission of Ohio], to the amount of the compensation that may be awarded on account of such injury, disease, or death * *
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 98} I dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons stated in my dissent in Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co.,
{¶ 99}
{¶ 100} No, the purpose of
{¶ 102} The majority answers the eighth certified question- — “Does