State v. MuncieState v. Muncie
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Cook, Moyer, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, Resnick, Douglas
Appellate procedure—Final orders—R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) and (B)(4), construed—Criminal procedure—Petition for forced medication under R.C. 2945.38 is a “provisional remedy” ancillary to the criminal action against an incompetent defendant—Trial court’s order to forcibly medicate an incompetent defendant with psychotropic drugs in an effort to restore the defendant to competency is a final and appealable order.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT
- A petition for forced medication under
R.C. 2945.38 is a “provisional remedy” ancillary to the criminal action undertaken by the state against an incompetent defendant. (R.C. 2505.02[A][3] , construed.) - When a trial court orders an incompetent defendant to be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs in an effort to restore the defendant to competency, that order is final and appealable. (
R.C. 2505.02[B][4] , construed.)
COOK, J.
{¶ 1} The court of appeals in this case determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review a “Forced Medication Order” that had been issued by the trial court in an effort to restore appellant’s competency to stand trial. The court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal from that order, deciding that it was not final and appealable under
I. Background
{¶ 2} After allegedly mailing a threatening letter to a Clermont County Municipal Court judge, appellant Donald Muncie was arrested and indicted for retaliation in violation of
{¶ 3}
{¶ 4} Two days after receiving Ross’s petition for forced medication, the trial court entered a “Forced Medication Order.” In this order, the court found that “it is in the best interest of the Defendant, based upon the recommendation of his treating psychiatrist, to be administered, forcibly if necessary,” the four drugs listed in Ross’s July 12 letter.2 The court also authorized Twin Valley personnel
order and that Ross had confirmed the court’s belief that no hearing was required prior to issuing the order.
{¶ 5} On July 16, Muncie filed a “Motion to Reconsider Order for Forced Medication” in the common pleas court. In this motion, Muncie requested that the court stay its forced medication order pending appeal, should his motion for reconsideration be overruled. The trial court overruled Muncie’s motion for reconsideration and motion for stay. On July 28, Muncie appealed to the Clermont County Court of Appeals.
{¶ 6} Muncie filed a motion requesting the court of appeals to stay the trial court’s forced medication order pending appeal. The state filed objections to this motion and moved to dismiss Muncie’s appeal for lack of a final appealable order. The court of appeals denied both Muncie’s requested stay and the state’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeals declined to dismiss Muncie’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction at that juncture, but permitted the state to raise the issue of appealability again in its merit brief.
{¶ 7} On January 11, 2000, after the parties had filed their merit briefs in the court of appeals, the trial court found Muncie competent to stand trial. The trial court ordered Muncie to remain hospitalized until trial and to continue taking his medication. On February 2, Muncie entered a plea of no contest to the charge of retaliation. On February 10, 2000, the trial court sentenced Muncie to five years of community control. As components of this sentence, the trial court ordered Muncie to complete the Tender Mercies Residential Program and to take all medications as directed by his physician.
{¶ 8} On April 4, 2000, the court of appeals unanimously dismissed Muncie’s appeal for lack of a final appealable order. The court of appeals observed that the trial court’s forced medication order, issued without a hearing, raised significant due process concerns. Even so, the court of appeals concluded that the forced medication order was not a final order for purposes of
{¶ 9} On September 20, 2000, this court allowed Muncie’s discretionary appeal, but only as to Muncie’s first proposition of law—to determine whether an order authorizing the forced medication of an incompetent defendant is a final appealable order. State v. Muncie (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 1417, 735 N.E.2d 456.3
{¶ 10}
State v. Hunt
{¶ 11} The court of appeals noted that, in State v. Hunt (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 170, 1 O.O.3d 99, 351 N.E.2d 106, syllabus, this court held that an order finding a defendant incompetent and committing him to a state hospital under
{¶ 12} We are unpersuaded by the court of appeals’ analogy to Hunt. A commitment order and forced medication order are superficially similar, in that both orders arise from proceedings under
{¶ 13} But the commitment order issued by the trial court in Hunt merely directed authorities to transfer Hunt—an illiterate individual who suffered from hearing and speech impairments—to an institution where his communication skills could be improved. Hunt, 47 Ohio St.2d at 171, 1 O.O.3d at 99, 351 N.E.2d at 107. Orders of forced medication, however, do not necessarily follow from orders of commitment and are designed to do far more than merely restrict an incompetent
Amended R.C. 2505.02(B)
{¶ 14} The court of appeals correctly noted that our decision in Hunt predated the General Assembly’s recent amendments to
“An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
“(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
“(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;
“(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;
“(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
“(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
“(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action. “(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class action.”
{¶ 15} The court of appeals held that the forced medication order issued by the trial court in this case did not satisfy any of
R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) —A Three-Step Analysis
{¶ 16} As noted above,
{¶ 17} Neither
interpretation is necessary, the General Assembly has expressly provided that courts should interpret statutory terms and phrases according to their common and ordinary (or, if applicable, technical) usage.
1. Provisional Remedy
{¶ 18} To satisfy the definition of “final order” contained in
{¶ 19} As a threshold matter, we note that the court of appeals’ statement, “[n]or is this order a provisional remedy under
{¶ 20} The court of appeals also decided, without explanation, that the trial court’s forced medication order was not “in the nature of a preliminary injunction, discovery of privileged matter, or suppression of evidence.” In its merit brief to this court, the state urges us to adopt the court of appeals’ view that a forced medication order does not resemble those orders that result from the proceedings listed as examples in
{¶ 21} Without citing supporting legal authority, the state asserts that “the list of examples of provisional remedies in
{¶ 22} The phrase “proceeding ancillary to an action,” which appears in
{¶ 23} We disagree with the manner in which the state seeks to apply this court’s precedent to support its narrow interpretation of
{¶ 24} We agree, instead, with Glenn Weaver and the Bishop court that for purposes of
proceeding considered as principal. Auxiliary or subordinate.’ ” Sorg, 1998 WL 904945 at *3, citing Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 78. See, also, Black’s Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 85 (defining “ancillary” as “[s]upplementary; subordinate”).
{¶ 25} The Bishop and Sorg courts’ understanding of the term “ancillary” corresponds to the word’s common and ordinary meaning, as well as to this court’s prior understanding of the term. See
{¶ 26} Applying this common understanding of the statutory term “ancillary” to the case at bar, we agree with Muncie and Glenn Weaver that a petition for forced medication under
{¶ 27} We note that an appellate court’s determination that a particular proceeding constitutes a “provisional remedy” is only one step of the analysis required under
2. R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a)
{¶ 28} Even if a reviewing court determines that a particular order arises from a “provisional remedy,” the reviewing court must still determine whether that order effectively determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy. Only those orders meeting these additional requirements will be deemed final under
{¶ 29} This question is easily answered in this case. The forced medication order issued by the trial court determined the action against Muncie with respect to Ross’s petition for forced medication. The order definitively provided that the
3. R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b)
{¶ 30} Finally, the General Assembly has determined that an order arising from a provisional remedy is not a final order unless “the appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.”
{¶ 31} In Gibson-Myers, supra, the Summit County Court of Appeals determined that an order compelling the production of documents containing trade secrets was a final order, for the party resisting disclosure of those documents would have had no ability after final judgment to restore the cloak of secrecy lifted by the trial court’s order compelling production. Id., 1999 WL 980562, at *2. In Cuervo, the Franklin County Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion when confronted with an appeal from an order compelling production of certain communications about asset transfers—communications that were allegedly subject to the attorney-client privilege. Cuervo, 2000 WL 1376510, at *2.
{¶ 32} We find that an order compelling the administration of psychotropic medication under
III. Conclusion
{¶ 33} In State v. Garcia (1995), 233 Conn. 44, 62, 658 A.2d 947, 956, the Supreme Court of Connecticut assessed whether that state’s appellate courts had jurisdiction to hear an incompetent defendant’s interlocutory appeal from an order authorizing the involuntary administration of medication. The Garcia court conceded that interlocutory appeals were generally disfavored in criminal cases, that appellate jurisdiction was limited by statute, and that an interlocutory order was appealable only “where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” Id. at 64, 658 A.2d at 957, citing State v. Curcio (1983), 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566, 569-570. The Garcia court decided, however, that the forced medication order infringed upon the incompetent defendant’s vested liberty interest, and that “once such an interest is infringed upon by the state, the defendant’s personal rights cannot be restored.” Id. at 66, 658 A.2d at 958. We agree, and hold that when a trial court orders an incompetent defendant to be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs in an effort to restore the defendant to competency, that order is final and appealable. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
RESNICK, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment.
Rosenhoffer, Nichols & Schwartz and James A. Hunt, for appellant.
A.J. Stephani, Executive Director, Glenn Weaver Institute of Law and Psychiatry, urging reversal for amicus curiae Glenn Weaver Institute of Law and Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati School of Law.
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association.