JACOBSON, APPELLEE, v. KAFOREY ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 2015-1340
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 28, 2016
2016-Ohio-8434 | 149 Ohio St.3d 398 | 75 N.E.3d 203
O‘NEILL, J.
Submitted April 19, 2016
{1} The Ninth District Court of Appeals identified a conflict between its judgment in this case and prior judgments of the Third, Fifth, and Tenth District Courts of Appeals. The court certified to us, and we agreed to answer, the following question of law: “Does the current version of
Facts and Procedural History
{2} Jessica Jacobson filed a pro se complaint against defendants-appellants Ellen C. Kaforey, Akron Children‘s Hospital, and Cleveland Clinic Children‘s Hospital for Rehabilitation, alleging, as relevant to this appeal, three civil claims brought under
{3} Kaforey and both hospitals moved to dismiss all counts of the complaint under
{4} Jacobson appealed pro se, raising several assignments of error asserting that the trial court should not have dismissed the claims brought under
{5} Kaforey and both hospitals moved the court of appeals under
Analysis
{6} We must answer the straightforward question certified to us by the court of appeals: “Does the current version of
{7} The statute at the heart of the dispute in this case is current
Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil action and attorney‘s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another section of the Revised Code.
{8} When we consider the meaning of a statute, our first step is always to determine whether the statute is “plain and unambiguous.” State v. Hurd, 89 Ohio St.3d 616, 618, 734 N.E.2d 365 (2000). If “the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation,” because “an unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.” Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. Ambiguity, in the sense used in our opinions on statutory interpretation, means that a statutory provision is “capable of bearing more than one meaning.” Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16. Without “an initial finding” of ambiguity, “inquiry into legislative intent, legislative history, public policy, the consequences of an interpretation, or any other factors identified in
{9} We remain careful, however, not to “pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context.” Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941). We instead focus on everything within “the four corners of the enactment” in order to “determine the intent of the enacting body.” Id.
{10} Applying these principles, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.
{11} We make no ruling today beyond answering the certified-conflict question. Any ensuing issues regarding how the statute operates or what a plaintiff must do to prove a claim under
{12} By holding that
Conclusion
{13} By its plain and unambiguous language,
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by JENSEN, J.
O‘DONNELL, J., dissents, with an opinion.
JAMES D. JENSEN, J., of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting for FRENCH, J.
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment only.
{14} I agree with the majority that
{15} Because the statute is ambiguous, we should consider other matters under
{16} The certified-conflict question asks, “Does the current version of
{17} The current version of
Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil action and attorney‘s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another section of the Revised Code.
I. Statutory Construction
{18} “The ultimate inquiry in the interpretation of statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent.” Caldwell v. State, 115 Ohio St. 458, 466, 154 N.E. 792 (1926). One of the cardinal rules of statutory construction is that we must first examine the language of the statute itself. Provident Bank v. Wood, 36 Ohio St.2d 101, 105, 304 N.E.2d 378 (1973). “[I]f the words [are] free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the lawmaking body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.” Risner v. Dept. of Natural Resources, Div. of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 12, quoting Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{19} “[T]he General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and * * * when language is inserted in a statute it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.” State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347 (1997), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 479, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959). When reviewing a statute, we cannot ” ‘pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context,” but we instead must look at “the four corners of the enactment” to determine the intent of the legislature. MacDonald v. Bernard, 1 Ohio St.3d 85, 89, 438 N.E.2d 410 (1982), quoting Black-Clawson Co. v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 100, 104, 38 N.E.2d 403 (1941). If a statute is ambiguous, then the court may consider “other matters” in determining the intention of the legislature.
{20} Because the phrase “has * * * a civil action” in
A. Circumstances Surrounding the Statutory Enactment
{21} Contrary to old English common law, under Ohio common law, a criminal action did not merge with a civil action. See Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio 376, 378 (1831); Howk v. Minnick, 19 Ohio St. 462, 465 (1869). The General Assembly codified this common-law principle in 1877 in the “General Provisions” section of the penal code. See Part Fourth, Title I, Chapter 1, Section 10, 74 Ohio Laws 240, 243. That statute eventually became
Any one injured in person or property by a criminal act may recover full damages in a civil action, unless specifically excepted by law. No record of a conviction, unless obtained by confession in open court, shall be used as evidence in a civil action brought for such purpose.
(Emphasis added.) Former
{22} The Sixth District Court of Appeals was the first Ohio court to conclude in a reported opinion that former
B. Former Statutory Provisions
1. R.C. 2307.60
{23} Years after Schmidt and Peterson were decided, the General Assembly amended
ANYONE injured in person or property by a criminal act HAS, AND may recover full damages in, a civil action, unless specifically excepted by law, AND MAY RECOVER THE COSTS OF MAINTAINING THE CIVIL ACTION, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY‘S FEES IF SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY ANY OTHER SECTION OF THE REVISED CODE OR IF AUTHORIZED UNDER THE COMMON LAW OF THIS STATE. No record of a conviction, unless obtained by confession in open court, shall be used as evidence in a civil action brought PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION.
(Capitalization to indicate revised wording sic; emphasis added.) 140 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3787.
{24} After
{25} Effective in 2007, the General Assembly amended
{26} With the adoption of the new language in
2. R.C. 2307.61
{27} As set forth above, a court‘s paramount concern when interpreting a statute is legislative intent. State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 12. “In reviewing a statute, a court cannot pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context, but must look to the four corners of the enactment to determine the intent of the enacting body.” Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d at 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347. “A court must examine a statute in its entirety rather than focus on an isolated phrase to determine legislative intent.” Massillon City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Massillon, 104 Ohio St.3d 518, 2004-Ohio-6775, 820 N.E.2d 874, ¶ 37. See also
{28} With this guidance in mind, therefore, other amendments to R.C. Chapter 2307 made at the same times as the enactment of
If a property owner brings a civil action pursuant to section 2307.60 of the Revised Code to recover damages from any person who willfully damages the owner‘s property or commits a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, involving the owner‘s property, the property owner may recover [damages and obtain certain other relief as specified].
{29} Since 1985, the legislature has amended
C. Legislative History
{30} “Although this court is not bound by” the analyses prepared by the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, “we may refer to them when we find them helpful and objective.” Meeks v. Papadopulos, 62 Ohio St.2d 187, 191, 404 N.E.2d 159 (1980). When statutes are ambiguous they “are to be read in light of attendant circumstances and conditions, and are to be construed as they were intended to be understood, when they were passed.” Id., quoting Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E.2d 217 (1943), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{31} The Legislative Service Commission prepared a bill analysis of Am.H.B. No. 426, as passed by the House of Representatives on February 21, 1984. That bill analysis described the state of the law as it existed prior to the proposed legislation, in a section labeled “Existing Law“:
Under existing section 1.16 of the Revised Code, anyone who sustains personal injuries or property loss or damage as a result of a criminal act can recover full damages in a civil action unless specifically excepted by law. As judicially construed, section 1.16 does not create statutory civil actions for injury, loss, or damage caused by criminal conduct, but instead codifies Ohio common law that a civil action arising from conduct that is both criminal and tortious (civilly wrong) is not merged in a criminal action and, thus, a victim having a common law or statutory civil action is free to sue an offender for damages even if criminal proceedings have not been completed.
{32} A comment accompanying this text stated: “Ohio courts have indicated that section 1.16 does not create statutory civil actions for injury, loss, or damage caused by criminal conduct. It codifies Ohio common law that a civil action is not barred just because it arises from the same act or acts as a criminal action.” Id. at 2. The comment then cited Story, 4 Ohio 376; Howk, 19 Ohio St. 462; Schmidt, 62 Ohio App.2d 48, 403 N.E.2d 1026; and Peterson, 5 Ohio App.3d 203, 451 N.E.2d 1236.
{33} The next section of the bill analysis then delineated the changes proposed by the bill. In general, the bill proposed to recodify
{34} Moreover, the bill analysis of the legislation as passed by the House stated that the bill also proposed to grant victims of property damage or theft a right to recover specific types of damages and other relief, including compensatory damages, exemplary damages, reasonable attorney fees, and costs of maintaining the action.
{35} Although H.B. No. 426 was revised several times until it was passed in late 1984 and was sent to the governor as Am.Sub.H.B. No. 426 for his signature, there were no substantive changes to the wording of this part of the legislation as introduced, and that wording was ultimately enacted as
{36} As mentioned previously,
Continuing law provides that anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless
specifically excepted by law ***. Prior law prohibited the use of a record of a conviction, unless obtained by confession in open court, as evidence in a civil action brought pursuant to the provision described above. ( R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) .)The act removes this prohibition and provides that a final judgment of a trial court that has not been reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside * * * when entered as evidence in any subsequent civil proceeding * * * precludes the offender from denying * * * any fact essential to sustaining that judgment, unless the offender can demonstrate * * * extraordinary circumstances [or unless an appeal from the judgment is pending]. (
R.C. 2307.60(A)(2) .)
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final Analysis of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 117, at 3 (Dec. 14, 2006). The wording of
D. Consequences of a Particular Construction
1. Construction should not create a disparity in the treatment of victims of crime
{37} Appellants—Ellen C. Kaforey, Akron Children‘s Hospital, and Cleveland Clinic Children‘s Hospital for Rehabilitation—all argue in their respective briefs that
{38} Construing
{39} Conversely, construing
2. Construction should not render other provisions superfluous
{40} Moreover, construing
{41} When a statute is ambiguous and relates to the same subject matter as another statute, we construe them in pari materia “to discover and carry out legislative intent.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Gene‘s Refrig., Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248, 2009-Ohio-2747, 910 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 38, citing State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 13. This is true even if the related statutes were passed at different times. State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{42} As set forth above, at the same time the General Assembly amended and renumbered former
{43} In 1986, the General Assembly codified the Dram Shop Act in
{44} Since its original enactment, the General Assembly has amended
{45} “Notwithstanding” is defined as “in spite of.” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1545 (1993). Therefore, within the statutory context of
{46} In 1995, the General Assembly enacted
An owner or operator of a cable service * * * who is aggrieved by conduct that is prohibited by division (B) of section 2913.04 or division (A) or (B) of section 2913.041 of the Revised Code may elect to commence a civil action for damages in accordance with division (A) of section 2307.60 or section 2307.601 of the Revised Code or to commence a civil action under this section in the appropriate * * * court * * *.
(Emphasis added.)
{47} After its original enactment, the General Assembly amended
{48} In 1999, the General Assembly enacted
{49} In 2014, the General Assembly added division (J) to
In addition to the [criminal] penalties described in division (I) of this section, anyone injured in person or property by a violation of [specified provisions of this statute] who is the owner of the identifying information involved in that violation has a civil action against the offender pursuant to section 2307.60 of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.)
{50} Finally, in conjunction with the amendment of
{51} We presume that the legislature “knows the existing condition of the law, whether common law * * * or statute law.” Wachendorf v. Shaver, 149 Ohio St. 231, 248, 78 N.E.2d 370 (1948), citing State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan, 81 Ohio St. 79, 90 N.E. 146 (1909); Norris v. State, 25 Ohio St. 217 (1874); Johnson v. Johnson, 31 Ohio St. 131 (1876); and S. Sur. Co. v. Std. Slag Co., 117 Ohio St. 512, 159 N.E. 559 (1927). So when the General Assembly amended
{52} Obviously, the General Assembly inserted the language that a person “has a civil action against the offender pursuant to”
II. Appellants’ Reliance on Court Decisions Is Misplaced
{53} Appellants principally rely on six court decisions from 1995 and after to support the position that
{54} First, none of these decisions engaged in a meaningful analysis of
{55} As set forth above, the General Assembly did not merely renumber
{56} As established in the previous discussion in this opinion of the legislative history, the reason for the amended language was that the General Assembly intended to create an independent civil cause of action for any person injured in person or property as the result of a crime. The legislative history also reveals that the legislature was consciously repudiating the established precedent of Story, 4 Ohio 376; Howk, 19 Ohio St. 462; Schmidt, 62 Ohio App.2d 48, 403 N.E.2d 1026; and Peterson, 5 Ohio App.3d 203, 451 N.E.2d 1236, to the extent that the common law and the previous versions of the statute had been judicially interpreted to not have that effect.
{57} The significance of the historical metamorphosis of
{58} In Applegate v. Weadock, the court cited Schmidt for the proposition that
{59} The Tenth District in Edwards v. Madison Twp. cited Schmidt for the same proposition as the Applegate court and then cited Story and Peterson as supporting authority. Edwards, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE06-819, 1997 WL 746415, *7 (Nov. 25, 1997).
{60} McNichols v. Rennicker cited Peterson, Edwards, and Applegate for the proposition that
{61} In Collins v. Natl. City Bank, the court, without citing any authority, held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Collins‘s claim for damages pursuant to
{62} The federal district court in Jasar Recycling, Inc. v. Major Max Mgt. Corp. cited Peterson for the proposition that
{63} In Groves v. Groves, the Tenth District Court of Appeals cited as supporting authority McNichols, Edwards, Applegate, and Guardianship of Newcomb v. Bowling Green, 36 Ohio App.3d 235, 241, 523 N.E.2d 354 (6th Dist.1987), for the proposition that
{64} Appellants fail to explain how these court decisions have any precedential value when it is clear that the General Assembly specifically repudiated the holdings in the cases that the decisions relied on when it enacted the modern version of
{65} Moreover, appellants do not address the failure of the courts in Edwards and Groves to address or distinguish the reasoning of the Tenth District that was stated in Tomas v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Ohio App.3d 624, 607 N.E.2d 944 (10th Dist.1992). In Tomas, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff‘s claim of intentional spoliation of evidence on the ground that the plaintiff‘s evidence supporting the spoliation allegation was “too tender a reed upon which to base a claim for relief.” Id. at 633. In affirming the dismissal of the claim, the court stated:
Arguably, [the tampering-with-evidence statute,
R.C. 2921.12 ], coupled withR.C. 2307.60 , does create a civil action for intentional spoliation of evidence. Moreover,R.C. 2307.61 seems more specifically to create such an action for willful damage of another‘s property, for which recovery may be had “in addition to the value of the property, any other loss sustained as a result of the willful damage.”
Id. at 632, quoting former
III. The General Assembly‘s Public-Policy Decision to Authorize Specific Recovery in Some Related Provisions of the Revised Code Does Not Diminish the Clause in R.C. 2307.60(A)(1) Authorizing an Independent Civil Cause of Action
{66} In support of their position, appellants discuss several statutes in which the General Assembly has authorized civil causes of action for the violation of specific criminal statutes. For example, appellant Cleveland Clinic Children‘s Hospital for Rehabilitation states in its merit brief:
The legislature has clearly set forth civil causes of action for certain crimes as noted herein. If
R.C. § 2307.60 were interpreted to provide for civil causes of action for violation of all criminal statutes, [other] statutes * * * would be rendered meaningless, and in contradiction of long standing Ohio Law.
Appellants’ assertion that one enactment by the General Assembly precludes the effectiveness of another enactment in this way is without any basis in law.
{67} “[O]ur role, as members of the judiciary, requires fidelity to the separation-of-powers doctrine.” State v. South, 144 Ohio St.3d 295, 2015-Ohio-3930, 42 N.E.3d 734, ¶ 28 (O‘Connor, C.J., concurring). Therefore, “we must respect that the people of Ohio conferred the authority to legislate solely on the General Assembly.” Id., citing Sandusky City Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio St. 481, 487-488 (1857), and Article II, Section 1, Ohio Constitution.
{68} As this court stated in Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 35:
It is not the role of the courts “to establish legislative policies or to second-guess the General Assembly‘s policy choices. [T]he General Assembly is responsible for weighing [policy] concerns and making policy decisions * * *” Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212, quoting Arbino [v. Johnson & Johnson], 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 113.
{69} In the version of
{70} While authorizing a new source of independent civil causes of action in
{71} Similarly, in
{72} The General Assembly‘s policy decisions to enact specific provisions that afford the victims of certain crimes a different or greater recovery than the victims of other crimes is clearly within the policymaking province of the General Assembly. See Stetter, 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, at ¶ 35. And we have no authority to second-guess those decisions. Id. The statutory disparities in the recovery available to some crime victims do not diminish the force of the General Assembly‘s clearly stated intention that
IV. Appellants’ Discussion of the Wrongful-Death Statute Is Flawed
{73} Lastly, appellants cite the reasoning stated in dissent in this case below, 2015-Ohio-2624, 39 N.E.3d 799, ¶ 37 (Carr, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in support of their arguments that
The Ninth District‘s decision creates further uncertainty as it relates to finality of judgments/settlements, as set forth in the dissenting opinion ***. Specifically, the dissent noted that the majority position conflicted with prior Ohio law as it relates to the cause of action for wrongful death.
However, this contention is without any basis in the law.
{74} An action for wrongful death did not exist at common law. Sabol v. Pekoc, 148 Ohio St. 545, 549, 76 N.E.2d 84 (1947). If a personal-injury plaintiff died before the trial, “the action abated.” Id. The first Ohio act that permitted a personal representative to file a wrongful-death claim was enacted in 1851. Id.,
{75}
{76} Conversely, the cause of action that arises pursuant to
V. Conclusion
{77} The wording of
JENSEN, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
O‘DONNELL, J., dissenting.
{78} Respectfully, I dissent.
{79}
{80}
Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover full damages in, a civil action unless specifically excepted by law, may recover the costs of maintaining the civil action and attorney‘s fees if authorized by any provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure or another section of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state, and may recover punitive or exemplary damages if authorized by section 2315.21 or another section of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.)
{81} The role of a court of last resort is to resolve conflicts between and among appellate districts and to interpret law as written by the legislature, not to rewrite it or apply its own conceptions of what it would like the law to be. See Article IV, Section 3(B)(4), Ohio Constitution; see also Cablevision of the Midwest, Inc. v. Gross, 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 639 N.E.2d 1154 (1994) (“A court‘s role is to interpret, not legislate“).
{82} In construing a statute, a court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Dircksen v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 109 Ohio St.3d 470, 2006-Ohio-2990, 849 N.E.2d 20, ¶ 16. “In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language of the statute.” Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001). If its meaning is unambiguous and definite, it is to be applied as written. Id. When a statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, however, it is ambiguous and requires judicial interpretation. Id.
{83} In this case, the parties have presented opposing interpretations of the following phrase in
Legislative History
{84} The legislative history and derivation of
{85} The legislature codified the common law in 1877 within the “General Provisions” section of the penal statutes when it enacted Part Fourth, Title I,
{86} In 1953, when the Ohio Revised Code replaced the General Code, see Am.H.B. No. 1, 125 Ohio Laws 7, this provision became
{87} In Schmidt v. State Aerial Farm Statistics, Inc., 62 Ohio App.2d 48, 49, 403 N.E.2d 1026 (6th Dist.1978), the appellate court dealt with a similar question involving the interpretation of former
{88} In 1985, the General Assembly renumbered
{89} Several courts in Ohio have interpreted this statute to continue to be a codification of Ohio‘s common law rule that a civil action is not merged into a criminal prosecution arising from the same act or acts. Applegate v. Weadock, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-95-24, 1995 WL 705214, *3 (Nov. 30, 1995); Edwards v. Madison Twp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 97APE06-819, 1997 WL 746415, *7 (Nov. 25, 1997) (”
{90} It is presumed that the legislature is aware of prior judicial interpretations of a statute when enacting an amendment. Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc., 135 Ohio St.3d 357, 2013-Ohio-989, 986 N.E.2d 983, ¶ 19.
{91} The legislature has amended
Statutory Interpretation
{92} Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are to be read in pari materia in order to determine legislative intent. Sheet Metal Workers’ Internatl. Assn., Local Union No. 33 v. Gene‘s Refrig., Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 248, 2009-Ohio-2747, 910 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 38. “And, in reading such statutes in pari materia, and construing them together, this court
{93} Consistent with the view that
{94} In Celebrezze v. Hughes, 18 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 479 N.E.2d 886 (1985), this court recognized the longstanding rule that ““the General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute, it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.““” Id. at 74, quoting Brown v. Martinelli, 66 Ohio St.2d 45, 50, 419 N.E.2d 1081 (1981), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Euclid, 169 Ohio St. 476, 479, 159 N.E.2d 756 (1959).
{95} Accordingly, if the position asserted by the majority were correct, i.e., that
{96} Similarly, common law civil causes of action already exist for false imprisonment, assault, and battery, see Feliciano v. Kreiger, 50 Ohio St.2d 69, 71, 362 N.E.2d 646 (1977); Smith v. John Deere Co., 83 Ohio App.3d 398, 406, 614 N.E.2d 1148 (10th Dist.1993); Love v. Port Clinton, 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 524 N.E.2d 166 (1988), and therefore it is not necessary for the General Assembly to create civil actions for violating unlawful restraint, assault, and battery statutes.
{97} Further, as pointed out by the dissenting jurist in the appellate court, the Ninth District‘s interpretation of
{98} Because the General Assembly has created separate statutory causes of action to seek damages caused by specific criminal acts, those persons seeking recovery are limited to filing actions pursuant to common law or the specific causes of action created by the legislature.
Conflict Cases
{99} The way the majority answers the certified question is in conflict with decisions from the Third, Fifth, and Tenth District Courts of Appeals, which have correctly concluded that
Conclusion
{100} In this case, the court of appeals improperly reversed the trial court‘s judgment that had granted motions to dismiss filed by Ellen C. Kaforey, Akron Children‘s Hospital, and Cleveland Clinic Children‘s Hospital for Rehabilitation because
{101} For these reasons, I would answer the certified question in the negative, reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals, follow the
The Chandra Law Firm, L.L.C., Subodh Chandra, Donald Screen, Ashlie Case Sletvold, and Sandhya Gupta, for appellee.
Janik, L.L.P., Steven G. Janik, and Audrey K. Bentz, for appellant Ellen Kaforey.
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., Gregory T. Rossi, Douglas G. Leak, and Carol N. Tran, for appellant Akron Children‘s Hospital.
Bonezzi, Switzer, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., Bret C. Perry, and Brian F. Lange, for appellant Cleveland Clinic Children‘s Hospital for Rehabilitation.