State ex rel. Bowling v. DeWineState ex rel. Bowling v. DeWine
Rendered on August 24, 2021
On brief: DannLaw, Brian D. Flick, Marc E. Dann, and Emily White; Advocate Attorneys, LLP, and Andrew M. Engel, for appellants. Argued: Andrew M. Engel.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Julie M. Pfeiffer, and Allison D. Daniel, for appellee Ohio Governor Mike DeWine; Eric A. Baum, for appellee Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services. Argued: Julie M. Pfeiffer.
On brief: Jones Day, Michael R. Gladman, and Elizabeth A. Benshoff, for Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center.
On brief: Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Daniel E. Shuey, and Erica M. Rodriguez, for Amici Curiae the Ohio Chamber of Commerce, the Ohio Business Roundtable, the Ohio Restaurant Association, the Ohio Hotel and Lodging Association, the Ohio Grocers Association, and the Ohio Trucking Association.
On brief: Policy Matters Ohio, and Hannah C. Halbert, for Amici Curiae Policy Matters Ohio, American Sustainable Business Council, National Employment Law Project, William E. Spriggs, Economic Policy Institute, and Andrew Stettner.
MENTEL, J.
{¶ 1} After Governor DeWine terminated an agreement with the United States Department of Labor, thereby cutting off certain unemployment benefits authorized by Congress in the wake of the unemployment crisis brought on by the coronavirus pandemic, Shawnee Huff, Candy Bowling, and David Willis (collectively, “Appellants“) filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in the trial court against the Governor, Mike DeWine, and Matt Damschroder, the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“Director“) (collectively with Governor DeWine, “Appellees“). The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denied appellants’ motion and they filed this interlocutory appeal. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that appellants had no likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, and we reverse.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In response to the unprecedented economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES“) Act on March 27, 2020.
{¶ 3} The CARES Act also created Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (“FPUC“).
{¶ 4} The CARES Act required the United States Secretary of Labor to provide PUA, PEUC, and FPUC benefits pursuant to agreements with states. See
{¶ 5} On March 28, 2020, Governor DeWine entered into an agreement with the Secretary of Labor authorizing a number of CARES Act unemployment benefits for Ohioans, including PUA, PEUC, and FPUC benefits. (Mar. 28, 2020 Agreement Between the State of Ohio and the Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor (hereinafter, “Agreement“), Ex. B. to July 22, 2021 Joint Stipulations of All Parties (hereinafter, “Joint Stipulations“).)
{¶ 6} On May 13, 2021, the Governor announced that Ohio would terminate its participation in FPUC. (Joint Stipulations at ¶ 5.) In a letter sent to the United States Department of Labor on May 24, 2021, he stated that FPUC “will end with the week ending June 26, 2021,” and gave the 30-day notice of intent to terminate participation required by the CARES Act. (Ex. A to Joint Stipulations.) He cited “positive trends” in the Ohio economy, including “a current low unemployment rate of 4.7 percent” and the increasing number of vaccinations in the state. Id. The Governor acknowledged that FPUC had “been a great help to Ohioans in need” and “a lifeline” that had “helped buy groceries and pay
It is clear that Ohio workers are no longer out of work because of the pandemic shutdown. The FPUC extra $300 a week in assistance is now discouraging some from returning to work. This assistance was always intended to be temporary. Now is the time to end it.
Id.
{¶ 7} On July 16, 2021, appellants filed a complaint for mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief with an accompanying motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in the trial court against appellees. In the complaint, Mr. Huff alleged that after his layoff from a call center in February 2021 “due to the pandemic,” he was dependent upon “$339.00 in unemployment compensation plus $300.00 weekly in FPUC” that he received to support his family. (July 16, 2021 Compl. at ¶ 9.) Without these benefits, Mr. Huff alleged, he would “lose the ability to pay all of his living expenses including his housing, utilities, and food.”1 Id. at ¶ 10.
{¶ 8} Ms. Bowling attested to unemployment from a layoff that had occurred in January 2020. Id. at Ex. 1, Bowling Aff. at ¶ 4. According to Ms. Bowling, she used the unemployment benefits she had received, including FPUC, to pay for “household expenses including rent, utilities and food,” as well as for “medical expenses and necessary expenses for [her] service animal.” (Bowling Aff. at ¶ 8.) Her FPUC benefit had terminated on June 26, 2021, and, as a result, Ms. Bowling stated that she “face[d] the immediate financial distress of being unable to pay for my on-going expenses such as rent, utilities, and food.” Id. at ¶ 9-10.
{¶ 9} Mr. Willis attested to similar circumstances. He had been laid off from his position as a landscaper in March 2020 “due to the Pandemic,” used unemployment compensation and FPUC to pay for household expenses, utilities, and food, and faced the “immediate financial distress of being unable to pay for” those expenses after the termination of his FPUC benefits on June 26, 2021. (Compl. at Ex. 2, Willis Aff. at ¶ 4-10.)
{¶ 10} The complaint alleged that, by terminating the agreement for FPUC benefits, the Governor and Director violated the mandate of
{¶ 11} Appellants also sought immediate relief by filing a motion under
{¶ 12} Appellees responded with a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment and mandamus claims, as well as a memorandum opposing the request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. They argued that
{¶ 14} In appellants’ reply to the motion to dismiss, they made the following points. First, they argued that the Ohio Constitution delegated “the authority to legislate matters concerning the welfare of employees,” including unemployment compensation, exclusively to the Ohio General Assembly, not the Governor. (July 23, 2021 Reply at 5.) Second, appellants argued that the Ohio General Assembly expressly adopted a policy of requiring the executive to secure “all advantages available” under the federal unemployment statutes listed in
{¶ 15} The trial court denied appellants’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction on July 29, 2021. It cited the standard for granting a motion for a preliminary injunction, as stated in P & G v. Stoneham, 140 Ohio App.3d 260, 267 (1st Dist.2000):
[A] party requesting a preliminary injunction must show that (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) no third parties will be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction is granted, and (4) the public interest will be served by the injunction.
{¶ 16} The trial court disagreed with appellants’ assessment of their likelihood of success of the merits of their claim based on its determination that
{¶ 17} Appellants appealed and requested expedited consideration, which was granted. (Aug. 2, 2021 Notice of Appeal; Aug. 2, 2021 Mot. to Expedite Appeal.) In response, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the trial court‘s decision was not a final, appealable order. (Aug. 4, 2021 Appellees’ Joint Combined Response to Appellants’ Mot. for Expedited Appeal and Mot. to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction (hereinafter, “Joint Combined Response“).) Various third parties have also filed amicus briefs in support of appellants and appellees.3
II. JURISDICTION
{¶ 18} Because appellees’ motion tests this court‘s ability to hear this interlocutory appeal, “we begin by examining the question of the court‘s jurisdiction.” Jack Maxton
{¶ 19} Under
An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
Id.
{¶ 20} By definition, a “proceeding for a preliminary injunction” is a “provisional remedy.”
{¶ 21} The second prong of
{¶ 22} Appellees argue that because “FPUC benefits are readily calculable,” appellants would have an effective remedy in the form of money damages if they were to prevail at a trial on the merits. (Joint Combined Response at 9.) We agree with the general proposition cited to support the premise of appellees’ argument: relief in the form of money damages does not constitute a “meaningful or effective remedy” under
{¶ 23} First, “[n]ot every claim for monetary relief constitutes ‘money damages.’ ” Interim HealthCare of Columbus, Inc. v. State Dept. of Adm. Servs., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-747, 2008-Ohio-2286, ¶ 15. “Even when the relief sought consists of the state‘s ultimately paying money, a cause of action will sound in equity if ‘money damages’ is not the essence of the claim.” Id., citing Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 114 Ohio St.3d 14, 2007-Ohio-2620, ¶ 15. Thus, “[w]hen a party seeks funds to which a statute allegedly entitles it, rather than money in compensation for the losses that the party will suffer or has suffered by virtue of the withholding of those funds, the nature of the relief sought is specific relief, not relief in the form of monetary damages.” Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-471, 2007-Ohio-1499, ¶ 29. See also Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 62 Ohio St.3d 97, 104 (1991) (holding that an “order to reimburse Medicaid providers for the amounts unlawfully withheld is not an award of money damages, but equitable relief“), citing and quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts
{¶ 24} Furthermore, a party‘s possible award of future monetary damages may not amount to a “meaningful or effective remedy” under
If the AIDS Taskforce is prevented from immediately appealing the court‘s denial of its preliminary injunction, the Part B funds for which the Taskforce has applied and been denied will likely be distributed by the ODH to the appellee organizations before the trial court renders its final judgment. As such, the Part B funds will have been exhausted. Moreover, there is no evidence that the federal program will make additional funds available in the future. And even if the Taskforce ultimately prevails on its claim for declaratory judgment, such a declaration that the ODH was in error in denying the Taskforce the Part B funds lacks any meaning or effectiveness if the funds no longer exist.
AIDS Taskforce of Greater Cleveland at ¶ 17.
{¶ 25} Here, as well, the federal funds in question are only available for a limited amount of time. Any federal-state agreement dispersing FPUC “shall apply to weeks of unemployment * * * ending on or before September 6, 2021,” and there is no indication that Congress will extend the availability period.
{¶ 26} And, as the Supreme Court of Ohio stated when interpreting
I think that the importance of providing purchasing power for these people, even though temporary, is of very great significance in the beginning of a depression. I really believe that putting purchasing power in the form of unemployment-insurance benefits in the hands of the people at the moment when the depression begins and when the first groups begin to be laid off is bound to have a beneficial effect. Not only will you stabilize their purchases, but through stabilization of their purchases you will keep other industries from going downward, and immediately you spread work by that very device.
California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1971).
{¶ 27} In short, future monetary damages would not allow appellants “to subsist on a reasonably decent level” today or have any effect on appellants’ immediate ability to pay for rent, utilities, or food. This harm could not be rectified by money damages at a later date, when the injury could not be undone. Appellants would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment, as
III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 29} We turn to appellants’ assignment of error, which states:
The trial court erred in overruling Appellants’ motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction by failing to find that Appellants were likely to prevail on the merits of their claims.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 30} Two standards of review apply to the issues raised in this appeal. An abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court‘s ultimate ruling denying injunctive relief under
{¶ 31} In addition, the “question of statutory construction presents an issue of law that we determine de novo on appeal.” Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, ¶ 8. See also Akron Centre Plaza, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, ¶ 10 (on questions of statutory interpretation, the “review is not deferential, but de novo“). The “main objective” when interpreting a statute “is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent.” Turner v. Certainteed Corp., 155 Ohio St.3d 149, 2018-Ohio-3869, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen‘s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65 (1995). In doing so, “[w]e owe no deference to the lower court‘s decision, nor are we limited to choosing between the different interpretations of the statute presented by the parties.” Id.
{¶ 32} Appellants support their contention that the trial court erred by denying their motion for injunctive relief with two arguments, each of which addresses the ruling that they were unlikely to succeed on the merits. We consider each in turn.
A. Whether R.C. 4141.43(I) mandates that Ohio accept “all available” unemployment benefits offered under certain federal statutes
{¶ 33} Appellants argue that
{¶ 34} In response, appellees assert that ”
When construing a statute, this court‘s paramount concern is legislative intent. State ex rel. Musial v. City of N. Olmsted, 106 Ohio St. 3d 459, 2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 23. “If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary.” State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St. 3d 543, 545, 1996-Ohio-291, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996).
R.C. 1.42 instructs: “Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” Our role is to evaluate the statute as a whole and to interpret it in a manner that will give effect to every word and clause, avoiding a construction that will render a provision meaningless or inoperative. State ex rel. Myers v. Bd. of Educ., 95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917).
{¶ 36} Our task is to interpret
{¶ 37}
The director shall cooperate with the United States department of labor to the fullest extent consistent with this chapter, and shall take such action, through the adoption of appropriate rules, regulations, and administrative methods and standards, as may be necessary to secure to this state and its citizens all advantages available under the provisions of the “Social Security Act” that relate to unemployment compensation, the “Federal Unemployment Tax Act,” (1970) 84 Stat. 713,
26 U.S.C.A. 3301 to 3311 , the “Wagner-Peyser Act,” (1933) 48 Stat. 113,29 U.S.C.A. 49 , the “Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970,” 84 Stat. 596, 26
U.S.C.A. 3306 , and the “Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act,”29 U.S.C.A. 3101 et seq. 5
{¶ 38} We think it inarguable that
[T]his court is not permitted to concern itself with the question whether supplemental unemployment benefits should be sanctioned by the law of this state. That, of course, is not a judicial problem but one of legislative policy for determination by the General Assembly or by constitutional amendment. And, as has been said repeatedly in matters of statutory construction, it is not a question as to what the Legislature intended to enact; rather it is a question of the meaning of that which the Legislature did enact.
{¶ 39} The “question of the meaning” of
{¶ 40} However, as appellees state in their brief: “To the extent that the statute does more than mandate ‘cooperation’ by the ODJFS director to conform with federal unemployment law, it is triggered only when benefits are made available under one of the five federal statutes specifically enumerated in
{¶ 41} Citing
{¶ 42} Appellees counter that FPUC benefits are actually “funded by the general fund of the Treasury,” not the provisions cited by appellants, and that appellants have therefore “improperly conflate[d] the FPUC provisions with the PUA and PEUC provisions.” (Appellees’ Brief at 11-12.)
{¶ 43} Appellees are correct insofar as appellants do not accurately describe the funding mechanisms set up by the CARES Act that govern PUA, PEUC, and FPUC benefits.
{¶ 44} The FPUC provision, in contrast, states only that “[t]here are appropriated from the general fund of the Treasury, without fiscal year limitation, such sums as may be necessary for purposes of this subsection.”
{¶ 45} However, this purported distinction recedes into inconsequentiality when one considers the CARES Act definitions of FPUC and applies them under
For purposes of this section—
(1) the terms “compensation“, “regular compensation“, “benefit year“, “State“, “State agency“, “State law“, and “week” have the respective meanings given such terms under section 205 of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (
26 U.S.C. 3304 note ); and
(2) any reference to unemployment benefits described in this paragraph shall be considered to refer to—
(A) extended compensation (as defined by section 205 of the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970);
(B) regular compensation (as defined by section 85(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) provided under any program administered by a State under an agreement with the Secretary;
(C) pandemic unemployment assistance under section 2102 [
15 U.S.C. 9021 ];(D) pandemic emergency unemployment compensation under section 2107 [
15 U.S.C. 9025 ]; and(E) short-time compensation under a short-time compensation program (as defined in section 3306(v) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [
26 U.S.C. 3306(v) ]).
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 46} According to subsection (2)(A) above, one definition of FPUC is “extended compensation” as defined under the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970 (“EUCA“), codified at
{¶ 47} FPUC is also defined as “pandemic unemployment assistance under”
B. Whether the Governor violated the principle of separation of powers by terminating the Agreement for FPUC benefits
{¶ 48} In the second argument in support of their appeal, appellants argue that the Governor “usurped the legislative power reserved to the General Assembly” under the Ohio Constitution and
{¶ 49} In response, appellees argue that the Governor acted within his authority under the Ohio Constitution, which “gives the Governor broad power to enter into agreements with other jurisdictions, including federal agencies.” (Appellees’ Brief at 27-28.)
{¶ 50} The doctrine of separation of powers “is implicitly embedded in the entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.” S. Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1986), citing State v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250 (1877). ” ‘The essential principle underlying the policy of the division of powers of government into three departments is that powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other departments, and further that none of them ought to possess directly or indirectly an overruling influence over the others.’ ” State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 134 (2000), quoting State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 120 Ohio St. 464, 473 (1929). “The Ohio Constitution is the paramount law of this state, and we recognize that the framers chose its language carefully and deliberately, employed words in their natural sense, and intended what they said.” Cleveland v. State, 157 Ohio St.3d 330, 2019-Ohio-3820, ¶ 16, citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188 (1824). Thus, our discussion must begin with the text of the constitutional provisions that grant the powers in question.
{¶ 52} It is instructive that, in addition to the division of power between the executive and legislative branches, the Ohio Constitution also commands that “no other provision of the constitution shall impair or limit [the] power” of the General Assembly to “provid[e] for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare” of employees in this state. This command applies with force to the policy mandate of
{¶ 53} “A fundamental principle of the constitutional separation of powers among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy.’ ” Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, ¶ 21. However, the Governor‘s own words demonstrate that he assumed the mantle of “ultimate arbiter” on the decision of whether to continue FPUC benefits. Id. He justified their termination with his assessment that “[t]he shortage of workers is having a real impact on our supply chain and the cost and availability of goods“; his belief that “Ohio workers are no longer out of work because of the pandemic shutdowns“; and his personal resolution of a complex and controversial economic issue: “The FPUC extra $300 a week in assistance is now discouraging some from returning to work.” (Joint Stipulation, Ex. A.) Thus, he concluded, “[n]ow is the time to end it.” Id. In doing so, he encroached upon the legislative
{¶ 54} Appellees respond by citing Ohio Roundtable v. Taft, 112 Ohio Misc.2d 49, 2002-Ohio-3669, in which the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas ruled that “the Governor‘s power to decide whether Ohio will enter into an agreement with other states is grounded in the Constitution,” and that such power “exists independently” of a statute governing interstate lottery agreements that had not yet taken effect. There is no question that the executive has the authority to enter into an agreement with another sovereign under the express grant of such power in the Constitution. See Ohio Constitution, Article III, Section 5. But this case, in contrast, involves an executive action that stood in direct contrast to a specific policy mandate in a long-standing statute,
{¶ 55} Based on our de novo review of the applicable statutory and constitutional texts, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that appellants were not likely to succeed on the merits of the claim and denied the preliminary injunction. The assignment of error is sustained.
C. Whether appellants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Ohio Appellate Rule 12(B)
{¶ 56} As a remedy on appeal, appellants request that we “reverse the trial court‘s judgment and, pursuant to
{¶ 57} However, appellants have not demonstrated that they are entitled to such relief.
When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed error prejudicial to the appellant and that the appellant is entitled to have judgment or final order rendered in his favor as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall reverse the judgment or final order of the trial court and render the judgment or final order that the trial court should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court with instructions to render such judgment or final order. In all other cases where the court of appeals determines that the judgment or final order of the trial court should be modified as a matter of law it shall enter its judgment accordingly.
{¶ 58} Under this standard, appellants need to have demonstrated that they have satisfied all requirements for a preliminary injunction, thereby showing that they are “entitled” to it before this court could order the trial court to enter the order “as a matter of law.” For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, the party seeking the injunction must show “(1) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) no third parties will be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest will be served by the injunction.” Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-421, 2020-Ohio-4664, ¶ 32. See also Hydrofarm, Inc. v. Orendorff, 180 Ohio App.3d 339, 2008-Ohio-6819, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.) (stating four factors). And, “in determining whether to grant injunctive relief, * * * the factors ‘must be balanced,’ and * * * ‘no one factor is dispositive.’ ” Escape Ents., Ltd. v. Gosh Ents., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-834, 2005-Ohio-2637, ¶ 48, quoting Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 115 Ohio App.3d 1, 14 (8th Dist.1996).
{¶ 59} Typically, “the likelihood of success and irreparable harm factors predominate.” Youngstown City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-941, 2017-Ohio-555, ¶ 68 (Brunner, J., dissenting). In this case, the trial court settled the issue of irreparable injury, which was not appealed, and on remand, this opinion‘s resolution of the issue of appellants’ likelihood of success on the merits will be the law of the case. See Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594, 2018-Ohio-1694, ¶ 1 (“The law-of-the-case doctrine
{¶ 60} In doing so, the trial court did not address two of the four factors relevant to the preliminary injunction analysis: unjustifiable harm to third parties or any public interest served by the injunction. The trial court may have ignored those factors in the interests of judicial economy, because in finding no likelihood of success on the merits, its ruling precluded relief. But the analysis remains incomplete. See Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Ents., 302 F.3d 1352, 1362-63 (Fed.Cir.2002) (where the trial court denied the preliminary injunction motion and “did not complete its analysis of the four factors [required] to show entitlement to a preliminary injunction,” the analysis “still rests within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, the appropriate remedy is not to reverse with instructions to enter the injunction,” but to remand for the trial court to complete the analysis). We are also mindful that a “court should exercise great caution regarding the granting of an injunction which would interfere with another branch of government,” and therefore believe that a complete analysis of the four factors must occur before the issuance of any injunctive relief. Toledo v. State, 154 Ohio St.3d 41, 2018-Ohio-2358, ¶ 16, quoting Lake Hosp. Sys. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn., 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 526 (1994). For these reasons, we decline to order the trial court to enter the injunction without completing the required analysis, and therefore remand this case to the trial court so that it may consider the previously unaddressed factors relevant to appellants’ request for a preliminary injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
{¶ 61} Appellants’ sole assignment of error is sustained and appellees’ motion to dismiss is denied. The final order of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Motion to dismiss denied; Judgment reversed and case remanded.
JAMISON, J., concurs.
SADLER, J., dissents.
{¶ 62} Because I would grant appellees’ motion to dismiss this interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 63} As discussed by the majority, to constitute a final, appealable order, the order must be one in which “[t]he appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.”
{¶ 64} Given the issue currently before us and the unique factual circumstances presented herein, including the current posture of the case and the fact that the FPUC benefits were terminated prior to the filing of the complaint, I cannot conclude that appellants have no adequate remedy from the effect of the trial court‘s order on appeal from final judgment on the remaining claims. Thus, in my view the majority‘s discussion of the merits of this action is premature.
{¶ 65} Accordingly, I would grant appellees’ motion to dismiss this interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and refrain at this time from passing judgment on the merits of appellants’ asserted assignment of error.