Ohio Democratic Party et al. v. Frank LaRose, in his official capacity as Ohio Secretary of State
Nos. 20AP-421, 20AP-428 (C.P.C. No. 20CV-4997)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 29, 2020
2020-Ohio-4664
KLATT, J.
(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Rendered on September 29, 2020
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Heather L. Buchanan, and Renata Y. Staff, for defendant-appellant Frank LaRose, in his official capacity as Ohio Secretary of State. Argued: Renata Y. Staff.
On brief: JONES DAY, Edward M. Carter, M. Ryan Harmanis, John M. Gore and E. Stewart Crosland, for intervenors-appellants. Argued: M. Ryan Harmanis.
On brief: Miller Canfield Paddock and Stone, P.L.C., Scott R. Lesser, and Nancy A. Valentine; The Brennan Center for Justice, Lawrence Norden, Daniel I. Weiner, and Derek Tisler, for amici curiae Election Cybersecurity Experts and Voting Rights Organizations.
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
KLATT, J.
{¶ 1} Appellants, Frank LaRose in his official capacity as Ohio Secretary of State (“Secretary LaRose” or “the secretary“) and Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the Ohio Republican Party, and the National Republican Congressional Committee (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Republican committees“), appeal from a September 11, 2020 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting a motion for preliminary injunction filed by appellees, Ohio Democratic Party (“ODP“) and Jay Michael Houlahan to enjoin the secretary from enforcing his directive that boards of election accept delivery of applications for absentee ballots only as submitted in person or by mail and therefore not by electronic means such as email or fax. Because of the unrebutted, compelling evidence of harm to third parties and the great public interest in preserving the security of Ohio‘s 2020 general election, and because appellees have demonstrated only that
I. BACKGROUND
A. Absentee voting by mail in Ohio
{¶ 2} The Ohio Elections Code authorizes a “no-fault” system of absentee voting in which any “qualified elector”1 may choose to vote by absentee ballot in an election. (Grandjean Aff. at ¶ 5;
{¶ 3} The Ohio secretary of state is authorized to issue directives to county boards of elections.
B. The 2020 Ohio primary election and lead up to the November general election
{¶ 5} Ohio‘s primary election was scheduled for March 17, 2020. On March 9, 2020, Governor Mike DeWine declared a state of emergency in response to the spread of COVID-19 and, the day before the election, announced that it was unsafe to hold in-person voting for the primary election. Legal challenges surrounding the primary election and the various government responses followed, including: a lawsuit seeking an emergency delay of the election (denied); an order from the Ohio‘s Department of Health Director prohibiting polling locations from operating; Secretary LaRose issuing a Directive 2020-06 to suspend in-person voting in the primary election until June 2, 2020; lawsuits challenging the secretary‘s Directive; the General Assembly passing H.B. No. 197 (to, among many other COVID-19 related relief provisions, set April 28, 2020 as the deadline by which absentee ballots must be received); and a lawsuit challenging that law (temporary restraining order
{¶ 6} The stay-at-home order was lifted in May 2020. Since then restrictions gradually have been removed and replaced by guidance and requirements for reopening; a state-wide mask order added by the governor in July remains in place.3
{¶ 7} In anticipation of the 2020 general election, on July 17, 2020, Secretary LaRose issued a temporary directive, Directive 2020-13, to all county boards of elections to address “Preparation for the Statewide Mailings of Absentee Ballot Applications for the November 3, 2020 General Election.” (Directive 2020-13, Am. Compl., Ex. A at 1.) The directive announced that the secretary of state‘s office will mail an absentee ballot application to every registered Ohio voter in “active” or “confirmation” status. (Directive 2020-13 at 1.) Citing
C. Instant litigation
{¶ 8} On July 31, 2020,4 appellees filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief pertaining to the methods of submitting a completed written application for an absentee ballot under the language of
COUNT ONE
R.C. 3509.03 does not prohibit qualified electors from making application for an absentee ballot by emailing an image of their application to their countyboard of elections or by other viable electronic form of transmission, such as facsimile machine[.] COUNT TWO
Qualified electors have a right under
R.C. 3509.03 to make application for an absentee ballot by emailing an image of their application to their county board of elections or by other viable electronic form of transmission, such as facsimile machine, and to have their application processed in the same manner as a hard-copy application[.][COUNT THREE]
[R]efusal to accept qualified electors’ applications for absentee ballots that are timely emailed or transmitted by other viable electronic form of transmission, such as facsimile machine, to the appropriate county board of elections and contain all the required information set forth in RC. 3509.03 constitutes a denial of the electors’ rights to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.
[COUNT FOUR]
[R]efusal to accept qualified electors’ applications for absentee ballots that are timely emailed or transmitted by other viable electronic form of transmission, such as by facsimile machine, to the appropriate county board of elections and contain all the required information set forth in RC. 3509.03 constitutes a denial of the electors’ due process rights guaranteed by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.
(Am. Compl. at 15-18.) Appellees attached Directives 2019-28 and 2020-13 to their amended complaint.
{¶ 9} On the same day they filed the complaint, appellees filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and expedited schedule. In it, appellees “move[d] the Court * * * for a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of [Secretary LaRose‘s] interpretation of
{¶ 11} On August 17, 2020, the Republican committees moved to intervene as party defendants. The trial court granted the motion to intervene on September 8, 2020. The trial court denied a motion for leave to file a brief of amicus curiae filed by a group of “cybersecurity and voting rights experts” comprised of eight individuals and two organizations.
{¶ 12} On September 11, 2020, the trial court granted the motion for preliminary injunction. In doing so, the trial court found that:
{¶ 13} On the same day the decision was issued by the trial court, the Republican committees filed an answer, and, on September 14, 2020, filed a combined memorandum in opposition to appellees’ motion for preliminary injunction and a motion to dismiss.
{¶ 14} The secretary and Republican committees filed separate appeals, which have been consolidated for purposes of oral argument and determination. This court granted
II. ASSIGNMENT(S) OF ERROR
{¶ 15} Secretary of State LaRose assigns the following as trial court error:
The trial court erred by granting a preliminary injunction requiring Ohio‘s 88 county boards of elections to accept non-UOCAVA absentee ballots via email or fax.
{¶ 16} The Republican committees5 assign the following as trial court error:
[I.] The trial court erred in holding that Plaintiffs have standing in the absence of a concrete, particularized injury different from that of citizens generally.
[II.] The court erred in holding that laches does not apply despite Plaintiffs’ 13-year delay in bringing this case with no valid excuse.
[III.] The court erred in rejecting the Secretary‘s reasonable and longstanding interpretation of
R.C. 3509.03 in Directive 2020-13 and holding that statutory silence requires Ohio‘s boards of elections to accept electronic absentee ballot applications.[IV.] The court erred in holding that the remaining equitable factors weighed in favor of an injunction.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
{¶ 17} Collectively, appellants challenge the trial court‘s decision in three aspects: (1) appellees’ standing to bring the declaratory judgment action; (2) the applicability of laches; (3) and the merits of whether the preliminary injunction is warranted. For the
A. Standing
{¶ 18} Before a court may consider the merits of a legal claim, the plaintiff must establish standing to sue. State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 147 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-1176, ¶ 18. To demonstrate traditional standing, the plaintiff must show that it has “suffered (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant‘s allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 22. Standing requires a litigant to “have a ‘direct, personal stake’ in the outcome of the case; ‘ideological opposition to a program or legislative enactment is not enough.’ ” Walgate at ¶ 18, quoting ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7.
{¶ 19} Here, with regard to plaintiff Houlahan, both the secretary and the Republican committees assert that Houlahan lacks standing because he has not shown that he has suffered any injury. To establish the first element of traditional standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged action will cause it injury in fact, whether that injury is economic or otherwise. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Kasich, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-639, 2012-Ohio-947, ¶ 34. The injury must be concrete, not simply abstract or suspected. State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, 153 Ohio St.3d 1, 2018-Ohio-555, ¶ 20. Additionally, the injury must be particularized, meaning the injury is not bourne by the population in general, but affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016); League of United Latin Am. Citizens at ¶ 21. Importantly, the injury need not be large, but only “palpable.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens at ¶ 21. Accord New York Republican State Commt. v. Secs. & Exchange Comm., 927 F.3d 499, 504 (D.C.Cir.2019) (“[E]ven slight injury is sufficient to confer standing[.]“); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that standing “requires only a minimal showing of injury“).
{¶ 20} With regard to Houlahan‘s alleged injury, the amended complaint states:
Plaintiff Houlahan, who is 81 years old and is a qualified Ohio elector, intends to vote by absentee ballot in the November 3, 2020 general election, and he desires to submit his completed
application for an absentee ballot to his county board of elections via email. But Plaintiff Houlahan is subject to Defendant Secretary‘s interpretation of R.C. 3509.03 as precluding voters from requesting absentee ballots in this manner, and as a result, his right to request an absentee ballot via email or through other viable forms of electronic transmission, such as facsimile, will be impeded. This, in turn, will require Plaintiff Houlahan to choose between submitting his absentee ballot request in-person, which would require him to spend the time and resources necessary to travel to his county board of elections and requiring him [to] risk his health and election officials’ health in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, or submitting the request by mail, which would require him to spend the resources necessary to mail his request and to risk disenfranchisement due to delays in mail delivery.
(Am. Compl. at ¶ 48.)
{¶ 21} Given these allegations, Houlahan has established that submitting an absentee ballot in-person or through the mail will require him to expend his time and resources. While Houlahan will most likely not spend much time or money in delivering his absentee ballot to his board of elections or a mail receptacle, he will incur a real—not an abstract or suspected—loss of resources. Moreover, that loss is specific to his time and money, not the public generally. Houlahan, therefore, has established an injury that is both concrete and particularized.
{¶ 22} The Republican committees argue that Houlahan‘s injury is not particularized because it is the same sort of injury that any Ohioan applying to vote absentee will suffer. We are not persuaded by this argument.
{¶ 23} A plaintiff who complains only of an injury sustained by the general public raises a generalized grievance against the law instead of establishing a particularized injury. Walgate, 2016-Ohio-1176 at ¶ 19. Thus, for example, in Walgate, the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of gambling legislation because they failed to allege any injury beyond the negative effects of gambling that applied equally to all members of the general public. Id. at ¶ 22, 26. This case is not like Walgate. Here, Houlahan asserts an injury applicable to a subset of the general population, i.e., those Ohioans who decide to vote via absentee ballot. While many Ohioans will suffer or have suffered the same sort of injury as Houlahan, “[t]he fact that an injury may be suffered by
{¶ 24} Next, we turn to the Republican committees’ argument that plaintiff ODP lacks standing. As an association, ODP has standing to sue on behalf of its members when (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, (2) the interests ODP seeks to protect are germane to ODP‘s purpose, and (3) neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Food & Water Watch, 2018-Ohio-555 at ¶ 18. Significantly, the Republican committees challenge only the first element, contending that ODP did not establish that its members would have standing to sue on their own right. For the reasons we set forth with regard to plaintiff Houlahan, we conclude that the Republican committees are incorrect. ODP members could, in fact, sue on their own behalf.
{¶ 25} In sum, we determine that both Houlahan and ODP have standing. Accordingly, we overrule the Republican committees’ first assignment of error.
B. Laches
{¶ 26} In their second assignment of error, the Republican committees contend the trial court abused its discretion in failing to bar appellees’ claims based upon the equitable doctrine of laches. We disagree, at least in the current posture of this case.
{¶ 27} The Republican committees essentially assert that, due to laches, relief cannot be granted on appellees’ stated claims, requiring dismissal. They inherently raise the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying6 appellants’ motion to dismiss based on laches. “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
{¶ 28} The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) actual or constructive knowledge of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party. State ex rel. Citizens for Responsible Green Govt. v. Green, 155 Ohio St.3d 28, 2018-Ohio-3489, ¶ 16, citing State ex rel. Carrier v. Hilliard City Council, 144 Ohio St.3d 592, 2016-Ohio-155, ¶ 8. ” ‘Extreme diligence and promptness are required in election-related matters.’ ” State ex rel. Ascani v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections, 83 Ohio St.3d 490, 493 (1998), quoting In re Contested Election of November 2, 1993, 72 Ohio St.3d 411, 413 (1995). When a party seeking relief in an election-related matter fails to exercise the requisite diligence and promptness, laches may bar the action. State ex rel. Demaline v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 90 Ohio St.3d 523, 526 (2000), citing State ex rel. Bona v. Orange, 85 Ohio St.3d 18, 20-21 (1999).
{¶ 29} As the present case involves an election-related matter, appellees bear the burden of establishing that they acted with the requisite diligence. Id., citing State ex rel. Manos v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 83 Ohio St.3d 562, 564 (1998); State ex rel. Carberry v. Ashtabula, 93 Ohio St.3d 522, 523-24 (2001); State ex rel. Vickers v. Summit Cty. Council, 97 Ohio St.3d 204, 2002-Ohio-5583, ¶ 13. In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “[o]ur consistent requirement that expedited election cases be filed with the required promptness is not simply a technical nicety.” Carberry at 524.
{¶ 30} Here, in their amended complaint, appellees “affirmatively allege that they have acted with the utmost diligence in bringing the instant action, that there has been no
C. Merits of preliminary injunction
{¶ 31} A fine line separates an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from an action in mandamus. See State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, ¶ 16-24 (discussing the distinction between actions that seek to compel official action that state a claim in mandamus and those that seek to prevent official action cognizable as claims for declaratory action and injunctive relief). In this case, no appellant argues that appellees’ action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief asking to enjoin the secretary‘s enforcement of his directive is actually a request for mandamus to cause the secretary to adjust his directive. In the interest of expedition necessitated by the timing of the filings and considering all parties have assumed that this case is properly assessed within the context of the law of injunctions, we adopt that analysis. Compare, e.g., Gilligan v. Hoddinott, 36 Ohio St.2d 127, 131 (1973), quoting State ex rel. Armstrong v. Davey, 130 Ohio St. 160, 163 (1935) (” ‘No executive act dependent on the judgment or discretion of the Governor is subject to judicial control, and mandamus will not lie unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’ “).
{¶ 32} A party requesting a preliminary injunction must show that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) no third parties will be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest will be served by the injunction. Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Columbus v. Anderson, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-151, 2015-Ohio-5083, ¶ 11; Escape Ents., Ltd. v. Gosh Ents., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-834, 04AP-857, 2005-Ohio-2637, ¶ 22. A party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden of establishing a right to the preliminary injunction by demonstrating clear and convincing evidence of each of these factors. Hydrofarm, Inc. v. Orendorff, 180 Ohio App.3d 339, 2008-Ohio-6819, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, not one of the four factors is dispositive; rather, a balancing should be applied. Escape Ents., Ltd. at ¶ 48. “A court should exercise great caution regarding the granting of an injunction which would interfere with another branch of government, and we have recognized that a court cannot employ equitable principles to circumvent valid legislative enactments[.]” Toledo v. State, 154 Ohio St.3d 41, 2018-Ohio-2358, ¶ 16.
{¶ 33} Whether the trial court erred in granting or denying an injunction is reviewed on appeal for a clear abuse of discretion. Escape Ents., Ltd. at ¶ 22. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court‘s decision is “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Intralot, Inc. v. Blair, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-444, 2018-Ohio-3873, ¶ 30.
1. Substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits
{¶ 34} Appellants challenge the trial court‘s determination that appellees demonstrated a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits of their claims for declaratory judgment relating to
a. Claims based on R.C. 3509.03
{¶ 35} Appellees seek a declaratory judgment acknowledging
{¶ 36} “A dispute over the meaning of a statute presents a question of law that we consider de novo.” Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., 157 Ohio St.3d 497, 2019-Ohio-2499, ¶ 16, citing Progressive Plastics, Inc. v. Testa, 133 Ohio St.3d 490, 2012-Ohio-4759, ¶ 15. “Our
{¶ 37} ” ‘The court must first look to the plain language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent.’ ” State ex rel. Peregrine Health Servs. of Columbus, LLC v. Sears, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-16, 2020-Ohio-3426, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Bundy, 4th Dist. No. 11CA818, 2012-Ohio-3934, ¶ 46. “[W]ords in a statute do not exist in a vacuum.” D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health, 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, ¶ 19. “This means that ‘our attention should be directed beyond single phrases, and we should consider, in proper context, all words used by the General Assembly in drafting [the relevant statute] with a view to its place in the overall statutory scheme.’ ” State v. Gonzales, 150 Ohio St.3d 276, 2017-Ohio-777, ¶ 5, quoting D.A.B.E., Inc. at ¶ 19. See Peregrine Health Servs. at ¶ 29 (“We must consider the statutory language in context, construing words and phrases according to the rules of grammar and common usage.“). Furthermore, “[w]e may not restrict, constrict, qualify, narrow, enlarge, or abridge the General Assembly‘s wording.” State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 131 Ohio St.3d 478, 2012-Ohio-1484, ¶ 18.
{¶ 38} “When a statute‘s meaning is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written” without turning to statutory interpretation. Gonzales at ¶ 4. A court may only interpret a statute when the words of a statute are ambiguous. In re Brooks, 136 Ohio App.3d 824, 829 (10th Dist. 1999). “Ambiguity exists when the language of a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Peregrine Health Servs. at ¶ 30. ”
{¶ 39} Where a case involves a challenge to the Secretary of State‘s interpretation of an ambiguous statute, generally courts defer to the secretary‘s interpretation of election law “if it is subject to two different, but equally reasonable, interpretations.” Colvin at ¶ 57. However, we need not defer to the Secretary of State‘s interpretation where that interpretation runs counter to the plain language of the statute. State ex rel. Stokes v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 250, 2008-Ohio-5392, ¶ 29; State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-5097, ¶ 26. In the context of reviewing the Ohio Elections Code,
{¶ 40} Regarding “[a]pplication for absent voter‘s ballot,”
(A) Except as provided in division (B) of section 3509.08 of the Revised Code, any qualified elector desiring to vote absent voter‘s ballots at an election shall make written application for those ballots to the director of elections of the county in which the elector‘s voting residence is located.
(B) Except as otherwise provided in division (C) of this section, the application need not be in any particular form but shall contain all of the following:
(1) The elector‘s name;
(2) The elector‘s signature;
(3) The address at which the elector is registered to vote;
(4) The elector‘s date of birth;
(5) One of the following:
(a) The elector‘s driver‘s license number;
(b) The last four digits of the elector‘s social security number;
(c) A copy of the elector‘s current and valid photo identification, a copy of a military identification, or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document, other than a notice of voter registration mailed by a board of elections under section 3503.19 of the Revised Code, that shows the name and address of the elector.
(6) A statement identifying the election for which absent voter‘s ballots are requested;
(7) A statement that the person requesting the ballots is a qualified elector;
(8) If the request is for primary election ballots, the elector‘s party affiliation;
(9) If the elector desires ballots to be mailed to the elector, the address to which those ballots shall be mailed.
(C) If the elector has a confidential voter registration record, as described in section 111.44 of the Revised Code, the elector may provide the elector‘s program participant identification number instead of the address at which the elector is registered to vote.
(D) Each application for absent voter‘s ballots shall be delivered to the director not earlier than the first day of January of the year of the elections for which the absent voter‘s ballots are requested or not earlier than ninety days before the day of the election at which the ballots are to be voted, whichever is earlier, and not later than twelve noon of the third day before the day of the election at which the ballots are to be voted, or not later than six p.m. on the last Friday before the day of the election at which the ballots are to be voted if the application is delivered in person to the office of the board.
(E) A board of elections that mails an absent voter‘s ballot application to an elector under this section shall not prepay the return postage for that application.
(F) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 3505.24 and 3509.08 of the Revised Code, an election official shall not fill out any portion of an application for absent voter‘s ballots on behalf of an applicant. The secretary of state or a board of elections may preprint only an applicant‘s name and address on an application for absent voter‘s ballots before mailing that application to the applicant, except that if the applicant has a confidential voter registration record, the secretary of state or a board of elections shall not preprint the applicant‘s address on the application.
(Emphasis added);
{¶ 41} The trial court found the plain language of
{¶ 43} A court does not have the authority to qualify or restrict the General Assembly‘s wording or otherwise add a prohibition. Carna, 2012-Ohio-1484 at ¶ 18; State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, ¶ 34-35 (“If the General Assembly had intended to restrict [certain election] statutes to persons seeking more than one office at the same election, it would have done so with appropriate language.“). Having reviewed
{¶ 44} However, we disagree with appellees’ argument that, because
{¶ 45} Here, the trial court observed that “[t]he statute does not address in what form [that is, by what means of delivery] the boards of elections are to receive absentee
{¶ 46} In this case, we find that the secretary acted within his authority to issue a directive supplying the methods of delivery where the statute did not, and, on this record, did so reasonably.
{¶ 47} First, the statutory scheme governing elections gives broad authorization to the secretary to issue directives and instructions to the boards “as to the proper methods of conducting elections.”
{¶ 48} In our view, the lack of specification of appropriate delivery methods in
{¶ 49} Second, we cannot on this record say the secretary acted unreasonably in exercising his authority to issue a directive limiting county boards to accepting application deliveries by mail and in-person delivery. The language and liberal timeframe within the elections code, the long-standing practice of Ohio secretaries of both major parties, and the record as developed so far in this case support this method of conducting the election.
{¶ 50} Unlike the UOCAVA provisions,8
{¶ 52} Importantly, too, and unlike in State ex rel. Myles, 2008-Ohio-5097 at ¶ 23, this record shows a vital public purpose or public interest is furthered by not allowing electors to return their applications for absentee ballots by electronic means. Appellants presented evidence, explored in more detail in the equitable factors below, demonstrating the substantial risks that permitting electronic delivery at the present time and under the present system pose to the safety and administration of the general election. This evidence was unrebutted by evidence showing the safety of electronic delivery by email or fax under stress of a higher volume or the viability of implementing such a plan within a few months of the general election.
{¶ 53} At least on the evidence presented to date, the secretary‘s decision to continue the long-established practice of mail and in-person return of these applications, instead of jeopardizing the security and administration of the election by implementing a new procedure to allow electronic return of the applications, cannot be deemed unreasonable.9 Ohio law has accorded voters “no excuse” absentee voting since 2006, and there has been no showing that electors’ ability to do so has been vitiated by the requirement that their
{¶ 54} For these reasons, we find appellees demonstrated a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits on the first count of the amended complaint (which alone does not provide basis for injunction) but did not demonstrate a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits on the second count of the amended complaint.
b. Claims based on the Ohio Constitution
{¶ 55} With this action, appellees additionally seek a declaratory judgment that “refusal to accept” qualified electors’ applications for absentee ballots by email or fax violates qualified electors’ rights to equal protection and due process under
{¶ 56} We note that the “DECISION” portion of the trial court‘s ruling did not refer to appellees’ constitutional arguments at all in making its determination of substantial likelihood of success on the merits. (Decision & Entry at 9-11.) Rather, the trial court reasoned from its observation that ”
{¶ 57} Although appellees advance their constitutional claims only under the Ohio and not the federal Constitution, they cite us to no substantive Ohio case law in the area
{¶ 58} Specifically, this record shows that the rule allowing absentee ballot applications to be submitted in person or by mail has been in effect for the last 13 years, spanning three secretaries. Yet appellees offered no evidence of even one person over that time who was precluded from voting—or even from applying for an absentee ballot—because of the application methods specified by the secretaries. And they offered no evidence whatsoever that they will be precluded from voting in the upcoming elections either. Appellee Houlahan, for example, avers that he intends to vote by absentee ballot in this November‘s general election, see Houlahan affidavit at ¶ 6, and although he does “not want to” submit his application by mail, id. at ¶ 11, he does not claim that he cannot do so. He expresses a fear that first-class mail may take as long as seven to nine days to deliver, id. at ¶ 14. Given that he could have sent in his application by as early as January 1, 2020,
{¶ 59} The state interests and the related evidence in the equities will be further discussed below, but for present purposes it is enough to note that appellees have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their state constitutional claims. Compare, e.g., Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775 (6th Cir.2020) (even where burden on actual right to vote is “moderate,” as with not allowing any opportunity to vote for people who have not yet voted or applied for ballots but who are arrested within days before an election, such claims can be outweighed by state interests arising from limited resources to administer orderly elections; denial of summary judgment to secretary reversed). After all, we, too, evaluate the claimed burden “from the perspective of only affected electors and within the landscape of all opportunities that Ohio provides to vote.” Id. at 785 (also quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973), where petitioners could have registered to vote earlier, ” ‘but chose not to’ ” and any lack was due to ” ‘their own failure to take timely steps to effect their enrollment’ “).
2. Irreparable injury to plaintiff
{¶ 60} ” ‘Irreparable harm’ is an injury ‘for the redress of which, after its occurrence, there could be no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, and for which restitution in [money] would be impossible, difficult or incomplete.’ ” Aids Taskforce of Greater Cleveland v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 8th Dist. No. 105971, 2018-Ohio-2727, ¶ 52, quoting Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 115 Ohio App.3d 1, 12 (8th Dist.1996); Obama for Am. at 436. “Irreparable harm depends upon the context in each case.” Aids Taskforce of Greater Cleveland at ¶ 52.
{¶ 61} Within the context of elections, where a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, a threat or impairment to their constitutional right to vote, irreparable harm is presumed. Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-929, 2016-Ohio-5043, ¶ 38; State ex rel. Colvin, 2008-Ohio-5041, at ¶ 62; Robert W. Clark, M.D., Inc. v. Mt. Carmel Health, 124 Ohio App.3d 308, 315 (10th Dist.1997). Conversely, assertions of a threat or impairment to the constitutional right to vote that are vague and speculative do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of
{¶ 62} Appellants argue10 the trial court erred in its constitutional analysis because there is no evidence of an infringement on the fundamental right to vote and if a burden exists on qualified electors’ right to vote, that burden is insignificant. The Republican committees add that the minimal costs involved with following Directive 2020-13 are not an obstacle to voting.
{¶ 63} Appellees contend the trial court correctly concluded the harm facing appellees and other voters is irreparable and not speculative since a “number of eligible voters are currently being negatively impacted under the current directive,” the “negative impact and the denial of the right to submit an absentee ballot request via email or fax cannot be compensated with money damages,” and that Directive 2020-13 “places an additional burden on eligible voters’ access to voting” that constitutes irreparable harm, and that irreparable harm is presumed when constitutional rights are threatened or impaired. (Appellees’ Brief at 31.)
{¶ 64} We agree with appellants. While constitutional protections concerning the fundamental right to vote are presumed to constitute irreparable injury, as previously explained, appellees have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their state constitutional claims. This is in no small part due to the lack of evidence of harm in this case. Appellees have not provided evidence that they will be unable to have their votes counted unless Directive 2020-13 is enjoined to allow return of applications for absentee ballots by email and fax. Compare Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 431 (“Plaintiffs introduced extensive evidence that a significant number of Ohio voters will in fact be precluded from voting without the additional three days of in-person early voting“). The record shows nothing that stops Houlahan, or others, from mailing in an application now (just as nothing is shown to have stopped him from doing so over the last nine months). Even under the time parameters he posits, his access to the ballot would be secured.
{¶ 66} Therefore, we find, on this record, that any harm to appellees carries little weight in favor of the preliminary injunction.
3. Unjustifiable harm to third parties if the injunction is granted, and the public interest
{¶ 67} In opposing appellees’ motion, appellants submitted evidence pertaining to cybersecurity and the impact of this injunction on the secretary‘s office, Ohio‘s boards of elections, and the election itself if it is granted.
{¶ 68} The Ohio Chief Information Officer for the Ohio Secretary of State testified to “numerous problems” with cybersecurity threats to Ohio‘s elections infrastructure, including exposing Ohio‘s internet-based election system infrastructure (particularly voter registration bases and associated information technology (“IT“) systems) to hackers who use tactics such as cyber-attacks by “phishing,” “spear-fishing,” and “ransomware.” (Wood Aff. at ¶ 2a, 2c, 2d, 3f, 3g, 3f.) He is well qualified to assess this threat, as he is responsible for directing the secretary‘s office‘s use of information technology and, among other duties, developing and implementing the secretary‘s cybersecurity program for both the secretary‘s office and each one of Ohio‘s 88 county boards of elections. Id. at ¶ 1f. This includes protecting the secretary‘s elections-related systems from foreign and domestic hackers and directing the county boards of elections how to do so. Id. at ¶ 1k.
{¶ 69} Wood noted that currently, “[a] range of adversaries, both foreign and domestic, have both the capability and the intent to inflict harm on our democratic process using cyber and mis- and disinformation operations tools.” Id. at ¶ 3a. In fact, foreign hackers have penetrated the statewide voter registration system of a large U.S. state, and, recently, two Ohio counties suffered cyber-attacks that compromised their voter registration systems. Id. at ¶ 2d, 4b, 4c, 4d.
{¶ 71} Wood explained that the secretary issued by directive a comprehensive strategy for both local boards of elections and the state to help ensure the election system infrastructure. Id. at ¶ 5b. The secretary requires boards of elections to receive cybersecurity training annually, and IT staff frequently send alerts to employees and county boards of elections with updates about cyber-attacks. Id. at ¶ 5e, 5h.
{¶ 72} Still, in Wood‘s opinion, “[t]ransitioning to a process of transmitting thousands or tens of thousands absentee ballot application to the county boards of elections via email will substantially increase the likelihood that bad actors will slip emails with malicious attachments into the huge volume of absentee ballot request emails.” Id. at ¶ 6e. Adequate security would be “impossible * * * to implement” given the timing and likely volume of emails—it “cannot be done,” and opening such emails is specifically counter to the existing instruction to employees to not open unsolicited or suspicious emails. Id. at ¶ 6f, 6k.
{¶ 73} Considering the security risks involved and the timing prior to the general election, in Wood‘s professional opinion he averred that implementing a new procedure permitting email or fax absentee ballot application delivery would significantly increase the risks of “profound” or “catastrophic” problems. Id. at ¶ 3c, 3d, 6g, 6h, 6k. “Because the county boards of election have not been trained to securely review thousands or tens of thousands of absentee ballot applications sent as email attachments, * * * implementing a new, untried, untested, and unsecure system * * * will substantially increase the likelihood
{¶ 74} Two directors of separate county boards of elections submitted affidavits outlining the process for receiving UOCAVA applications by email and fax. According to the Hamilton County director, the board does not have a separate, secure system to receive forms submitted by UOCAVA voters, but they have safeguards to prevent and recover from cyber-attacks. (Poland Aff. at ¶ 15.) Employees receive security training in which they are taught to not open suspicious emails. If an email is suspicious, it must be reviewed by the IT team before it can be opened. Id. “Based on [her] professional training and experience and given the amount of absentee applications already submitted, [she] anticipate[s] that the [b]oard would receive tens of thousands electronically submitted absentee applications if the Court were to allow voters to submit these applications electronically.” Id. at ¶ 13. She anticipates receiving significantly more applications for absentee ballots than in the past general election years; as of August 5, 2020, the board received 15,077 applications from both UOCAVA and non-UOCAVA voters—a 4,994 percent increase from 2016. Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶ 75} The Hamilton County director states that the board “currently has no plan in place for reviewing electronic submission of application for absentee ballots submitted by non-UOCAVA voters.” Id. at ¶ 13. In her professional opinion, if the court were to allow all voters to submit absentee applications electronically, the board would have to hire additional staff singularly dedicated to processing these applications, and may also have to hire IT professionals: “[a]bsent increases in staffing and resources, the Hamilton County Board of Elections would not be able to process the significant increase in electronically transmitted applications for absentee ballots.” Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 76} The Delaware County director, who has administered five presidential elections, agreed. “Significant advance planning is required to ensure that the election runs
{¶ 77} Furthermore, the board has been trained on handling security threats associated with suspicious emails by not opening suspicious emails or attachments and to then forward those suspicious emails to IT staff. Id. at ¶ 19. Implementing this security protocol is possible given the small number of UOCAVA email applicants. Id. at ¶ 20.) In her opinion, the board would not be able to maintain these security protocols if the board were required to accept non-UOCAVA applications. Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶ 78} The director believed such a change could invite fake applications and the security risks could compromise both the network and election day voting. Id. at ¶ 22, 24. In her experience, “implementing new election processes right before an election, without sufficient time for planning, training and implementation imposes significant burdens on boards and presents opportunities for errors that did not previously exist. Id. at ¶ 25. Overall, in her opinion, the Delaware County board would not be able to safely implement a procedure for accepting emailed absentee ballot applications in time for the November 2020 general election, and would not have the staffing resources to fulfill all of the applications and complete all of the other statutory tasks required of it to implement the November election. Id. at ¶ 26.
{¶ 79} Appellees did not rebut the evidence of harm to the secretary and to the boards of elections and did not dispute evidence showing the risks associated with email and fax delivery of absentee ballot applications have the potential to jeopardize the election itself. Indeed, the brief submitted on appellees’ behalf by the Brennan Center, the ACLU of Ohio, and various individuals in the cyber-security field only underscores the seriousness
{¶ 80} Nevertheless, the trial court seemed to discount appellees’ evidence and the impact of any harm they asserted. Instead, the trial court found appellants’ argument about the disruption, security, administration, and integrity of the election amounted to “[a]rguing that the county boards of election may need to work harder to ensure eligible voters have access to a ballot is not harm,” an argument the trial court said “cannot stand.” (Decision & Entry at 11, 12.) The trial court‘s characterization of this argument was against the record. And the trial court was required to consider and weigh appellants’ asserted harm within the framework of granting the preliminary injunction. It appears the trial court did not do so here, which is contrary to the legal standard and therefore a fundamental error in its decision. See Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Columbus, 2015-Ohio-5083, at ¶ 11 (stating standard for issuing preliminary judgment).
{¶ 82} In fact, the trial court largely seems to believe considerations of the timing of issuing an injunction in this case to be irrelevant. We disagree. The injunction imposed in this case does not preserve status quo but instead disrupts it. The Supreme Court of the Unites States has warned that, ordinarily, courts should not alter the election rules close to an election. See Republican Natl. Commt. v. Democratic Natl. Commt., 140 S.Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006) (per curiam) (“Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.“). And this is hardly the time to fuel distrust in the integrity of the election process. The unrebutted evidence in this case clearly demonstrated how issuing an injunction close to an election increases the harm to the boards of elections and, as a result, the general public by placing the security and administration of the election at risk. In other words, the evidence showed the impact to the current procedures would be substantial rather than be “minimal.” (Decision & Entry at 12.)
{¶ 83} Moreover, we disagree that the public interest weighs in favor of injunction; quite the opposite. Appellees submitted an affidavit of the Ohio ODP executive director that projects a marked increase in the number of Ohio electors who will choose to vote an absentee ballot and that notes a general familiarity with the reports of delays in mail delivery during the Ohio 2020 primary election. The three newspaper articles submitted by appellants discussing mail delay are hearsay, State ex rel Colvin, 2008-Ohio-5041, at ¶ 59, and regardless do not clearly and convincingly show U.S. mail issues prevent absentee ballot applications. Houlahan avers to generally not wanting to submit his application in
{¶ 84} On this record, appellees have not demonstrated either that “no third parties will be unjustifiably harmed if the injunction is granted” or “the public interest will be served by the injunction.” Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Columbus, 2015-Ohio-5083, at ¶ 11.
4. Decision on preliminary injunction
{¶ 85} The appellees demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that they would have a substantial likelihood of success on their first count of the amended complaint if they show an entitlement to relief: The plain language of
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 87} Having sustained the secretary‘s sole assignment of error, overruled the Republican committees’ first and second assignments of error, sustained the Republican committees’ third assignment of error to the limited extent indicated herein, and sustained the Republican committees’ fourth assignment of error, we reverse the trial court‘s judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with the law and this decision.
Judgment reversed, cause remanded.
NELSON, J., concurs.
DORRIAN, J., concurs in judgment only.
DORRIAN, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 88} I concur in judgment only. In so doing, I am persuaded in particular by: (1) the secretary‘s reasonable interpretation that
{¶ 89} I write separately, however, to address the majority‘s analysis and conclusions that: (1) the secretary acted reasonably, pursuant to his authority under
{¶ 90} I preface my analysis by acknowledging the immense task the secretary has had in administering the 2020 primary and general elections, and by noting that my conclusions are confined to the very unique circumstances of this case: the continuing state of emergency in Ohio due to COVID-19 and the uncertainty of normal postal service
A. State of emergency due to COVID-19 and effect on elections
{¶ 91} On March 9, 2020, the Governor of Ohio declared a state of emergency to protect the well-being of Ohioans from the effects of COVID-19. Office of Governor Mike DeWine, Executive Order 2020-01D (Mar. 9, 2020). Executive Order 2020-01D noted that COVID-19 “is a respiratory disease that can result in serious illness or death * * * and can easily spread from person to person” and that the virus causing COVID-19 “is spread between individuals who are in close contact with each other (within about six feet) through respiratory droplets produced when an infected person coughs or sneezes.” Executive Order 2020-01(D) indicated that as of March 9, 2020, the Ohio Department of Health (“Ohio Dept. of Health“) confirmed that three patients in Ohio had tested positive for COVID-19, and there were no reported deaths.11 Later that same week, the Director of Ohio Dept. of Health (“the Director“) issued orders closing all K-12 schools in the state and limiting or prohibiting mass gatherings. Ohio Dept. of Health, Director‘s Order In Re: Order the Closure of All K-12 Schools in the State of Ohio (Mar. 14, 2020); Ohio Dept. of Health, Director‘s Order In Re: Order to Limit and/or Prohibit Mass Gatherings in the State of Ohio (Mar. 12, 2020).
{¶ 92} On March 16, 2020, the Director issued an order closing polling locations for the primary election to be held the following day “to avoid the imminent threat with a high probability of widespread exposure to COVID-19 with a significant risk of substantial harm to a large number of the people in the general population, including the elderly and people with weakened immune systems and chronic medical conditions.” Ohio Dept. of Health, Director‘s Order In Re: Closure of the Polling Locations in the State of Ohio on Tuesday March 17, 2020 (Mar. 16, 2020). The Director further concluded that “[t]o conduct an election at this time would force poll workers and voters to face an unacceptable risk of contracting COVID-19.” Id. The same day, the secretary issued a directive suspending the
{¶ 93} The statewide state of emergency declared by Executive Order 2020-01(D) remains in effect, as COVID-19 remains a threat to public health. Although limited reopening has been authorized under the Responsible RestartOhio Plan, Governor DeWine stated “[w]e put this plan together based on all the information we have about how dangerous COVID-19 still is right now, balanced with the fact that it‘s also dangerous to have people not working. COVID-19 is still out there. It‘s still killing people. We‘re asking Ohioans to be reasonable and rational.” Gov. of Ohio, Press Release: Governor DeWine Announces Details of Ohio‘s Responsible RestartOhio Plan (Apr. 27, 2020), https://governor.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/governor/media/news-and-media/covid19-update-april-27 (accessed Sept. 27, 2020). Ohio Dept. of Health data indicates that when the secretary issued his directive suspending the March 17, 2020 primary election, there had been 1,593 confirmed and probable cases of COVID-19 in Ohio, 86 hospitalizations, and 1 death. As of July 17, 2020, when the secretary issued Directive 2020-13, there had been 82,314 confirmed and probable cases of COVID-19 in Ohio, 9,300 hospitalizations, and 3,276 deaths. By the time oral argument in this expedited appeal was held on September 24, 2020, there had been 150,851 total reported confirmed and probable cases of COVID-19 in Ohio, 13,815 hospitalizations, and 4,727 deaths.1213
{¶ 94} Appellee Houlahan is 81 years old. He is in a high-risk category for exposure to COVID-19.14 Many members of appellee Ohio Democratic Party, as well as intervenor Ohio Republican Party, likely fall into a high-risk category as well.15 Houlihan avers that he “do[es] not want to risk [his] health or the health of any elections officials that [he] would come into contact with by submitting [his] application for an absentee ballot to the Board in person.” (Houlahan Aff. at ¶ 9.) The risk to Houlahan is not speculative. Nor is it insignificant. Furthermore, in-person delivery, one of the two methods of delivery permitted under Directive 2020-13, while in the past may have provided a reasonable opportunity to deliver absentee ballot applications, now presents a risk of exposure to and infection by COVID-19.
B. Uncertainty of normal postal operations and effect on elections
{¶ 95} During the period when the 2020 primary election was being conducted exclusively by absentee ballot pursuant to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197 (i.e., late-March 2020 through late-April 2020), the secretary became aware that delays in delivery of mail by the United States Postal Service created a risk that a voter who requested an absentee ballot might not receive that ballot in time to receive it and return their voted ballot by election day. (The Columbus Dispatch, Mail delays during coronavirus outbreak hurting Ohio election, Secretary of State Frank LaRose says (Apr. 23, 2020), attached as Exhibit C-1 to Houlahan Affidavit.)16 The secretary expressed concern about postal delays affecting voting in a letter to Ohio‘s congressional delegation; in that letter, the secretary indicated that
{¶ 96} Since April 2020, delays in postal delivery have continued to present concerns for the absentee ballot process in Ohio. The secretary has been advised by the general counsel for the United States Postal Service that there is a significant risk that delays in postal delivery may result in absentee ballots being requested by voters and returned promptly, but not delivered in time to be counted. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose, Franklin C.P. No. 20CV-5634 (Sept. 15, 2020).
{¶ 97} Appellee Houlahan avers he “do[es] not want to submit [his] completed absentee ballot application in the mail.” (Houlahan Aff. at ¶ 11.) Houlahan asserts he has “read numerous news reports and statements from elections officials, including [Secretary LaRose], about delays in mail delivery that could result in [his] absentee ballot application not being delivered to the Board in time.” (Houlahan Aff. at ¶ 13.) After addressing the articles attached to his affidavit, Houlahan states that “[b]ased on these reports and others, I am deeply concerned that if I submit an absentee ballot application in the mail that it will not be delivered to the Board in time for me to receive and return my absentee ballot.” (Houlahan Aff. at ¶ 17.) Houlahan‘s concerns are not speculative. Nor are they insignificant. Furthermore, delivery by United States mail, the other of two methods of delivery permitted under Directive 2020-13, while in the past may have provided a
C. Feasibility of secure alternative means of delivery given appropriate time and resources
{¶ 98} The record in this appeal indicates the secretary has been able to advise and assist the county boards of elections in implementing secure procedures for receiving electronically submitted absentee ballot requests. As pointed out by the majority, under
{¶ 99} Additionally, the secretary has been able to create and maintain a secure online system for voter registration. In 2016, Ohio law was amended to require the secretary to implement a secure online voter registration system. 2016 Ohio S.B. No. 63. Pursuant to that law, the secretary was required to establish a secure online system that permits “[a]n applicant to submit a voter registration application to the secretary of state online through the internet.”
{¶ 100} Furthermore, the secretary and his predecessors have issued directives requiring county boards of elections to implement information technology security measures. Secy. of State, Directive 2020-12 (July 14, 2020); Secy. of State, Directive 2019-08 (June 11, 2019); Secy. of State, Directive 2018-15 (June 21, 2018). The
{¶ 101} The secretary has demonstrated the feasibility of secure alternative means of delivery given appropriate time and resources.
D. Conclusion
{¶ 102} The public health emergency existing in 2020 makes the unique circumstances surrounding the 2020 general election substantially different than an ordinary election. See Republican Natl. Commt. v. Democratic Natl. Commt., 140 S.Ct. 1205, 1210 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court‘s suggestion that the current situation is not ‘substantially different’ from ‘an ordinary election’ boggles the mind.“). The evidence in this case indicates that because of those circumstances it is likely a substantial number of voters will seek to vote by absentee ballot.19 As noted above, the unusual public health conditions in which this election is being conducted are compounded by the disruption in normal postal delivery service. If the procedures for application,
{¶ 103} As the majority notes, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested the burden on the right to vote in this type of case should be considered ” ‘within the landscape of all opportunities that Ohio provides to vote.’ ” Majority opinion at ¶ 59, quoting Mays at 785. However, courts cannot accurately evaluate all of the opportunities Ohio provides to facilitate voting, including absentee voting, without considering the unique circumstances within which those opportunities exist. Courts must consider whether such circumstances increase the magnitude of the injury or compromise the reasonableness of the opportunities or of any limitations on the same. The unique circumstances surrounding the 2020 general election that must be considered are the continuing state of emergency in Ohio due to COVID-19 and the uncertainty of normal postal service operations. Taking all this into consideration, I respectfully disagree with the majority‘s analysis and conclusions that (1) the secretary acted reasonably, pursuant to his authority under
Notes
The secretary of state shall establish procedures that allow any person who is eligible to vote as a uniformed services voter or an overseas voter in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 1973ff 6 to apply by electronic means to the office of the secretary of state or to the board of elections of the county in which the person‘s voting residence is located for a uniformed services or overseas absent voter‘s ballot.