State of Maryland, et al., v. Michael Young
No. 27
Supreme Court of Maryland
June 23, 2026
September Term, 2025
If State personnel committed a tortious act or omission within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, then the State personnel have immunity and judgment should be entered against the State, subject to the limitations on the State‘s waiver of sovereign immunity in the Maryland Tort Claims Act.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT – INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE – CAUSE TEST
If a plaintiff proves that only a single negligent act or omission proximately caused the plaintiff‘s injuries or damages, there is only one incident or occurrence under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. If the plaintiff proves that multiple negligent acts or omissions proximately caused the plaintiff‘s injuries or damages, there may be a single incident or occurrence if the acts or omissions are continuous or repeated, are causally related, give rise to the same risk, or act concurrently to produce the same injury. Multiple negligent acts or omissions may result in multiple incidents or occurrences if the acts or omissions are not causally related, introduce different risks, and operate separately to produce injury or damages.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT – INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE – JURY DETERMINATION
In a case tried before a jury, the trial court may not find multiple incidents or occurrences for the purposes of applying the limitation on the State‘s limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act unless the jury has expressly or necessarily found that multiple negligent acts were non-concurrent proximate causes of the plaintiff‘s injuries or damages.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – LONGTIN PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE CLAIMS – MOOTNESS
An issue is moot if the Appellate Court determines that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to prevail on the claim and the plaintiff does not contest that determination on appeal.
Case No. C-03-CV-20-004543
Argued: November 4, 2025
Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ.
Opinion by Fader, C.J.
Filed: June 23, 2026
On a post-trial motion, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County declined to reduce or vacate any of the awards. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland held that the awards against the individual defendants should have been reduced to a combined $800,000 to comply with the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”),
This appeal presents three issues for our resolution. The first two concern the MTCA, in which the State partially waived its sovereign immunity as to certain torts committed by State personnel acting within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, and simultaneously granted State personnel immunity for such torts.
The first issue is whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment against the individual defendants, Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey, in the absence of a finding that they acted with malice or gross negligence. We hold that the circuit court erred. Absent a finding of malice or gross negligence, or that the individual defendants’ actions were outside the scope of their duty, a judgment in an action covered by the MTCA may be entered against only the State.
The second issue presented concerns the number of “incidents or occurrences” in question, which in turn determines the limits applicable to Mr. Young‘s damages. We hold that the circuit court erred in not reducing the verdict to $400,000 to reflect a single incident or occurrence. Under the “cause” test, which we have applied to claims under the Local Government Tort Claims Act and now adopt with respect to the MTCA, the number of incidents or occurrences depends on the number of non-concurrently acting tortious acts or omissions that proximately cause injuries or damages. Here, Mr. Young‘s claim of two incidents or occurrences is premised on his contention that Sgt. Wright engaged in two independent tortious acts, each of which was the proximate cause of a separate attack. However, the jury was not asked whether Sgt. Wright engaged in more than one tortious act and so did not find that he did. Absent such a finding, the circuit court erred in not reducing the damages award to $400,000 to reflect a single incident or occurrence.
Accordingly, we will partially reverse and partially vacate the judgment of the Appellate Court.
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
Sovereign immunity is an “absolute immunity,” State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 347 (2021), that is “[g]rounded in ancient common law,” Condon v. State of Maryland-Univ. of Maryland, 332 Md. 481, 492 (1993). Sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against the State or its entities absent its consent.” Magnetti v. Univ. of Maryland, 402 Md. 548, 557 (2007). It is “one of the highest attributes of sovereignty[.]” Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm‘n, 284 Md. 503, 512 (1979) (quoting Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 288-89 (1932)).
Sovereign immunity may be waived only “directly or by necessary implication.” Katz, 284 Md. at 507-08. “[T]o avoid weakening the doctrine of sovereign immunity by judicial fiat,” Stern v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Maryland, 380 Md. 691, 720 (2004), waivers of sovereign immunity “are strictly construed in favor of the State,” Brawner Builders, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 476 Md. 15, 32 (2021). Because sovereign immunity may be waived only through an act of the General Assembly, it may not be waived by a party to a suit, and therefore can be asserted as a defense “at any time, even ‘for the first time on appeal.’” Bd. of Educ. of Worcester County v. Beka Indus., Inc., 190 Md. App. 668, 691 (2010) (quoting Dep‘t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. ARA Health Servs., 107 Md. App. 445, 459 (1995)), aff‘d in part and rev‘d in part, 419 Md. 194 (2011).
The MTCA contains a partial waiver of the State‘s sovereign immunity for certain tort claims brought in a Maryland court. The waiver applies to tortious acts committed by State personnel acting within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, up to a monetary limit.
In partially waiving the State‘s sovereign immunity for certain tort actions committed by State personnel, the General Assembly granted corresponding immunity to those State personnel.
B. Factual Background1
The events underlying this lawsuit arose while Mr. Young was incarcerated at Maryland Correctional Training Center. He had previously been transferred out of that
After the attack, Mr. Young submitted a formal complaint, called an Administrative Remedy Procedure, in which he stated that he feared for his life. Applicable regulations required that the person receiving the complaint acknowledge receipt, and that the complaint be reviewed and, if necessary, investigated within 15 days.
On the day of the events in question, Sergeant Jeremy Wright was the tier officer for Housing Unit 6-B, where Mr. Young resided. Tier officers are responsible for
At the beginning of recreation periods, the tier officer unlocks all cell doors on the tier from the panel. Incarcerated individuals can choose to go to the recreation hall, located to the right of the control panel, or stay inside their cells. Once the individuals who choose to go to the recreation hall have left their cells, the tier officer is supposed to close and re-lock the cell doors.
On the day in question, Sgt. Wright opened the cell doors at the beginning of the recreation period. Mr. Young elected to stay in his cell. After some of the incarcerated individuals left for the recreation hall and no one remained in the hallway, Sgt. Wright closed and locked all cell doors. A few minutes later, Mr. Young‘s cell door opened again, and a group of “around four or five” men rushed in and attacked him with knives and a combination lock tied inside of a sock. The attack lasted for a minute or two.
Mr. Young eventually escaped from his cell into the tier hallway. From the control panel, Sgt. Wright observed a bloodied Mr. Young walking towards him.2 After making
As Mr. Young opened the door to the recreation hall, multiple people pulled him into the bathroom area and attacked him, this time without weapons. Mr. Young could not identify whether these attackers were the same people who had attacked him in his cell.
Sgt. Wright could partially see into the bathroom during the attack because the partition separating the bathroom from the rest of the area was about mid-waist high. He did not intervene during this attack because he was still waiting for “the appropriate amount of staff” to arrive to ensure his safety.
Mr. Young estimated that the attack in the recreation hall lasted approximately a minute and a half, and ended when officers arrived and the attackers “just stopped.” Mr. Young then walked out of the recreation hall and saw several officers.4 He was taken
C. Procedural Background
Mr. Young filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County against Sgt. Wright, Warden Dovey, and the State of Maryland, among others. He asserted that: (1) the defendants violated his rights under
A jury found both Warden Dovey and Sgt. Wright liable for negligence and awarded Mr. Young $1,000,000 in damages against each. The jury also found for Mr. Young on the Longtin pattern-or-practice claim and awarded $2,000,000 in damages against the State. The jury found for the defendants on all other counts. The trial court entered judgment against Sgt. Wright for $1,000,000, Warden Dovey for $1,000,000, and the State for $2,000,000.
The defendants filed a post-trial motion requesting a new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a reduction in the judgment. The defendants argued that the circuit court erred in submitting the Longtin pattern-or-practice claim to the jury because the State is not subject to such a claim. Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey also contended that because the jury found that they had not acted with malice or
Mr. Young opposed the motion. On the request to reduce the judgment, Mr. Young conceded the application of the MTCA‘s $400,000 limitation per “incident or occurrence.” He contended, however, that there were two separate incidents or occurrences because he was attacked twice: once in his cell and once in the recreation hall. Accordingly, he argued that the negligence judgment against the individual defendants should be reduced from $1,000,000 to $800,000, not $400,000.5 Notwithstanding Mr. Young‘s partial concession, the circuit court denied the defendants’ motion in its entirety without explanation.
The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part and reversed in part. State v. Young, 265 Md. App. 1 (2025). As relevant here, the Appellate Court affirmed the negligence judgments entered against Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey, although it recognized that they are immune from tort liability and stated that the judgment should be “enforceable against the State.” Id. at 10. With respect to the number of incidents or occurrences, in the absence of any finding in the trial court on that issue, the Appellate Court conducted its own review of the record. Id. at 38-39. The court held that, based on the evidence at trial, the attack in the cell and the attack in the recreation hall constituted
The defendants petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. State v. Young, 491 Md. 629 (2025). The issues presented in this appeal are: (1) whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment against Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey individually; (2) whether the judgment against the State should have been limited to $400,000, for a single incident or occurrence, or $800,000, for two incidents or occurrences; and (3) whether a Longtin pattern-or-practice claim can be maintained against the State. Mr. Young did not cross-petition or otherwise challenge the Appellate Court‘s Longtin sufficiency judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court‘s decision to deny a motion for a new trial under the abuse of discretion standard. Williams v. State, 462 Md. 335, 344 (2019). We review denials of motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for legal correctness, while viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” here Mr. Young. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Varghese, 493 Md. 1, 11 (2025) (quoting Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 706 (2015)). All three issues in this appeal present questions of law that we review without deference. State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 351 (2019).
II. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST SGT. WRIGHT AND WARDEN DOVEY
We first address whether the circuit court erred in entering judgment against Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey individually. The parties agree that, under the MTCA, the circuit court should have entered judgment against only the State. We agree as well.
When State personnel commit a tort, either the State or the State personnel may be liable under the MTCA, but never both. See Williams v. Morgan State Univ., 484 Md. 534, 544 (2023) (“[L]iability of the State and liability of individual State personnel are mutually exclusive. If the State is liable, the individual is immune; if the individual is liable, the State is immune.” (quoting Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 635 (2009))). If the negligent State personnel are found to have acted within the scope of their public duties without malice or gross negligence, then they are immune, and the State is liable, subject to the limitations of its waiver. Rodriguez v. Cooper, 458 Md. 425, 451-52 (2018) (stating that in that circumstance, “the MTCA substitutes the State for the State personnel as the appropriate defendant in such an action”);
III. THE NUMBER OF “INCIDENTS OR OCCURRENCES”
The State‘s partial waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA is limited to “$400,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence.”
A. The Meaning of “Incident or Occurrence” in the MTCA Context
1. The “Cause” Test
The MTCA does not define “incident” or “occurrence.” COMAR defines “incident” as “an act or omission of State personnel that constitutes an alleged tort under the [MTCA] and is alleged to have caused injury, loss, or damage to person or property by reason of a single occurrence.”
Although we have not had occasion to consider how to assess the number of incidents or occurrences under the MTCA, we have considered a related issue in the analogous context of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). See
Engaging in an exercise of statutory construction, we observed that the limitation on liability in the LGTCA was “enacted ‘for the purpose of limiting the civil liability of local government.’” Marcas, 415 Md. at 686 (quoting S. Jud. Proc. Comm., Summary of Comm. Rep., S.B. 237, 397th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 3 (Md. 1987)). We cited legislative history observing that the cap on liability was similar to caps in other statutes, including the MTCA, and that the cap was deemed “necessary so that local governments can predict exposure for both insurance and budgetary purposes.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 686 (quoting Governor‘s Legis. Off., Off. of the Governor, Briefing Paper H.B. 253/S.B. 237, 397th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. at 9-10 (1987)).
We also observed that “the LGTCA was enacted at a time when local governments were having problems purchasing insurance,” which caused us to “conclude that the General Assembly intended that courts would use the insurance industry‘s definitions of
Viewing that test as consistent with our statutory analysis of the LGTCA, we adopted the “cause” test as “applicable to the determination of what does, or does not, constitute the ‘same occurrence’ as that term is used in” the LGTCA. Marcas, 415 Md. at 692. We held that the proper inquiry is focused on the cause or causes of the damage or injury, not the effects. Id. At the same time, we clarified that “continuous and repeated acts of negligence may constitute the ‘same occurrence.’” Id. As support for that definition, we quoted a treatise that, in turn, cited the Folz decision for the proposition that the term “single occurrence” “refer[red] to all harm that, although proximately caused by a particular risk arising from the concurrent operation of one or more successive acts of
We determined that under the LGTCA, if a local government acts negligently in maintaining a landfill, “and that negligence is the proximate cause of contamination to one or more adjacent properties, each adjacent owner‘s claim for money damages would arise out of the ‘same occurrence,’ even if the local government was negligent (1) in several different ways, and (2) for an extended period of time.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 689-90. Ultimately, we concluded that “the numerous negligent acts alleged in Appellee‘s complaint[,] all of which occurred at the [landfill], . . . were so uniform, routinized and regularized, and occurred at such steady and frequent intervals, that they merged into one continuous ‘same occurrence’ under” the LGTCA. Id. at 695.
For largely the same reasons set forth in Marcas, we will apply the “cause” test in determining the number of incidents or occurrences under the MTCA. Like the cap on exposure of local governments in the LGTCA, the monetary limitation on the State‘s waiver of sovereign immunity in the MTCA limits the State‘s potential liability and makes that liability more predictable.7 Id. at 686. The cause test is also consistent with the
We will now explore how the cause test has been applied in related circumstances, including in both the insurance context, where the test first emerged, and by other jurisdictions in the tort claims act context.
Under the cause test, where a single negligent act proximately causes multiple injuries, courts have found a single occurrence, incident, or accident.8 Thus, in the leading case of St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689, 690-91, 693 (5th Cir. 1955). The court observed that when people speak of an “accident,” they are usually “referring to a single, sudden, unintentional occurrence[,]” and that they ordinarily use that term “to describe the event, no matter how many persons or things are involved.” Id. at 691 (emphasis omitted).
Courts applying the cause test also generally have found a single occurrence, incident, or accident when multiple tortious acts are causally related, are related in time or
In Flemming v. Air Sunshine, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that four separate instances of negligence resulted in the death of her husband, who had survived a plane accident but then drowned when the plane sank. 311 F.3d 282, 284 (3d Cir. 2002). The plaintiff alleged negligence in: (1) the crash and operation of the airplane; (2) “the failure to provide a preflight safety briefing“; (3) “the failure to notify passengers of the impending crash” and “provide safety instructions“; and (4) “the failure to provide [the victim] with a life vest” after the crash. Id. at 286. The court stated that the relevant question in applying the cause test is whether there “was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage.” Id. at 295 (quoting Appalachian Ins., 676 F.2d at 61). Even assuming that four separate negligent acts occurred, applying the insurance
On the other hand, courts applying the cause test have found multiple occurrences when independent tortious actions that are not causally related were the proximate causes of separately identifiable injury or damages. In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Safeco Insurance Co., for example, an insured facility suffered water damage when water entered through a leaky roof. 444 So. 2d 844, 845 (Ala. 1984). It then suffered additional water intrusion several months later when the company hired to repair the roof failed to effectively cover it while performing repairs, resulting in additional damage. Id. The court concluded that the repair company‘s negligence “was a separate, intervening cause” of the insured‘s injuries, and therefore gave rise to a second occurrence under the policy. Id. at 847.
Similarly, in Maurice Pincoffs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit found multiple occurrences where a supplier of bird seed was sued by eight
3. Cases Applying the Cause Test in the Governmental Tort Claims Act Context10
Several states have applied the cause test in determining how many incidents or occurrences are implicated in tort claims brought under governmental tort claims acts. In
In Burley v. Clackamas County, Oregon‘s intermediate appellate court considered the number of occurrences under its state tort claims act in a whistleblower retaliation claim arising “out of several years of whistleblowing activity and more than a year of retaliatory conduct.” 496 P.3d 652, 653 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). The plaintiff asserted that such conduct was not “a single accident or occurrence.” Id. The court disagreed because, under Oregon law, “accident or occurrence,” for purposes of the tort claims act, “may be read as if it said ‘the tort.‘” Id. (quoting Dowers Farms, Inc. v. Lake County, 607 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ore. 1980)). Because the jury found a single tort of whistleblower retaliation, there was a single accident or occurrence, and the award was correctly capped. Burley, 496 P.3d at 652.
In Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Petty, a Texas intermediate appellate court addressed the number of occurrences implicated under the Texas Tort Claims Act in a case of a woman who had been committed to a state hospital and spent decades in state institutions. 817 S.W.2d 707, 710-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), judgment aff‘d, 848 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1992). The plaintiff “alleged numerous misdeeds and omissions on the part of hospital personnel” over the course of decades resulting in her extended wrongful confinement. Id. at 711. Although the jury found 12 different acts of negligence, the court found that she “alleged a single, ongoing, indivisible injury . . . resulting from the totality and orchestration of numerous negligent acts and omissions on the part of Department employees over many years.” Id. at 720. To recover for multiple
In Chastain v. AnMed Health Foundation, a plaintiff sued a hospital for negligence while she was in the care of six defendant nurses for more than eight months. 694 S.E.2d 541, 542 (S.C. 2010). She alleged that her claim was not subject to the $300,000 per occurrence limit under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act—which applied to suits against charitable organizations, including the hospital—because she alleged multiple instances of negligence contributing to her injuries. Id. at 542-43. The court disagreed, observing that “[j]ust as in any tort action, a . . . plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Id. at 543. Where a plaintiff “alleges multiple occurrences, that is, that there was more than one single act of negligence from which proximately flowed an unfolding sequence of events, [the plaintiff] bears the burden of proving each occurrence.” Id. at 543-44. In that case, however, “the jury was never instructed on the definition of occurrence nor was it asked to determine whether there was more than one occurrence[.]” Id. at 544. Accordingly, the court held, the trial judge correctly reduced the “verdict to reflect a single occurrence.”11 Id.
B. Application
Based on our review of the plain language of the MTCA, our decision in Marcas, and our survey of cases from other jurisdictions, we distill certain principles applicable to determining the number of incidents or occurrences giving rise to a plaintiff‘s injuries under the MTCA.
First, where the plaintiff proves only a single negligent act or omission that proximately causes a plaintiff‘s injuries or damages, there is only one incident or occurrence under the MTCA.
Second, where a plaintiff proves multiple negligent acts or omissions that proximately caused a plaintiff‘s injuries or damages, there still may be a single incident or
Third, where a plaintiff proves that multiple negligent acts or omissions proximately caused the plaintiff‘s injuries or damages, there will be multiple incidents or occurrences if the acts or omissions are not causally related, introduce different risks, and act separately to produce injury or damages. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 444 So. 2d at 847; Maurice Pincoffs Co., 447 F.2d at 205-06; cf. Folz, 797 P.2d at 252-53.
Fourth, as with any other case, it is the plaintiff‘s burden to prove to the trier of fact all elements of their claim. See, e.g., Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 253 (2009) (noting that the determination of proximate cause is a factual question for the jury unless the evidence suggests only one possible logical conclusion). Thus, in a case tried to a jury, a prerequisite to a claim for multiple incidents or occurrences under the MTCA is a jury verdict finding that multiple negligent acts or omissions proximately caused a plaintiff‘s injuries or damages. See Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639, 643 n.4 (W. Va. 1985) (rejecting an insured‘s claim of two “occurrences” under an automobile insurance policy based on two alleged instances of negligence where one of them was never
Following a jury verdict in a case to which the MTCA applies, if the State believes the verdict exceeds the limits on its waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA, it may file a motion for remittitur. If the plaintiff, in response to that motion, then contends that the verdict supports more than one set of limits based on more than one incident or
The State argues that the number of incidents or occurrences is itself a question for the jury. In doing so, the State relies on our observation in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co., 343 Md. 216, 223 (1996), an insurance case, that “what constitutes an occurrence under the various insurance policies and the number of occurrences” were “factual issues” that were tried to the jury in that case. But our statement in CSX Transportation was a description of what had transpired in that case, not a holding. See id. Although at least one jurisdiction has taken that approach, see Chastain, 694 S.E.2d at 543-44, in the context of tort claims acts, we conclude that the better answer is that the number of incidents or occurrences is a matter for the court, but that the court‘s decision must be based on a factual predicate established by the jury‘s verdict. A court may find multiple incidents or occurrences only if the jury has first found multiple negligent acts or omissions each proximately causing specific injuries or damages. Provided that the jury established those factual prerequisites, whether the defendant‘s tortious acts or omissions constitute one or multiple occurrences is a legal question for the court.
Here, Mr. Young claims an entitlement to two incidents or occurrences based on two separate alleged negligent acts by Sgt. Wright: (1) re-opening the cell doors, which allowed Mr. Young‘s attackers to enter his cell; and (2) not opening the locked grille to
Although factual determinations may be reached by a court when “the facts and circumstances only permit one inference with regard to the issue presented,” Est. of Blair v. Austin, 469 Md. 1, 17 (2020) (quoting Nat‘l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Fund for Animals, Inc., 451 Md. 431, 457 (2017)), that is not the case here. Sgt. Wright‘s alleged second act of negligence followed the first by only a matter of minutes. A finder of fact could reasonably have concluded that the second attack was part of the same causally related sequence of events, rather than an intervening act that broke the causal chain, especially if that finder of fact believed Mr. Young‘s contention that his maltreatment at the prison was generally in retaliation for his earlier sexual harassment report. And although the record contains nothing to prove whether the attackers in the recreation hall
Mr. Young makes several counterarguments, but none are availing. First, in response to the State‘s contention that the number of incidents or occurrences is a question for the jury, he argues that trial courts, not juries, routinely apply the statutory limitation on liability under the MTCA after trial. We agree, but, as discussed above, courts can find multiple incidents or occurrences only if the jury‘s verdict establishes the factual predicate for doing so. Notably, in none of the three cases on which Mr. Young relies did the trial courts purport to decide the factual predicate for determining the number of instances or
Second, Mr. Young contends that decisions by juries concerning the number of incidents or occurrences will be uninformed because the jurors will not know why they are being asked to make that decision. Although that might be true if we asked jurors to reach a direct conclusion about the number of incidents or occurrences, that is not our holding. Moreover, jurors are asked regularly to make factual determinations without necessarily being informed of the consequences. Indeed, in this case, the jury was asked to decide whether the individual defendants acted with malice or gross negligence without being informed that the answer would determine whether the State or the individual defendants would bear liability, and whether that liability would be limited.
Third, Mr. Young argues that the defendants are estopped from arguing on appeal that more questions should have been presented to the jury because the State‘s counsel at
Fourth, Mr. Young contends that because sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense, it was the State‘s burden to negate multiple incidents or occurrences, rather than his burden to prove them. He is correct that, under Maryland law, sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense. See Lizzi v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 156 Md. App. 1, 5 (2003) (identifying “the defense[] of sovereign immunity” as one of the “affirmative defenses” raised). And, ordinarily, “[w]hen a defendant asserts an affirmative defense, the defendant . . . assumes the burden of production and the burden of persuasion as to the elements of that defense.” Bd. of Trs., Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore County v. Patient First Corp., 444 Md. 452, 470 (2015). However, in conflating the defense of sovereign immunity with the State‘s assertion that that defense was only partially waived, Mr. Young
The State raised its sovereign immunity defense in its answer to the complaint and in its post-trial motion, in which it asked the court to reduce the verdict to conform to the limitation on its waiver of sovereign immunity. Because the MTCA is an exception to the State‘s defense of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff has the burden of proving its application and scope. Cf. Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 726 (1991) (discussing with approval a decision concluding that a plaintiff should have the burden to prove an exception to a statute of limitations defense); Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, 114 Md. App. 169, 187 (1997) (identifying the plaintiff‘s burden to prove the fraud exception to the statute of limitations defense); see also Fairley v. Dep‘t of Corrs., 871 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Mich. 2015) (“[D]efendants are presumed to be entitled to governmental immunity, and the burden is on plaintiff to prove that one of the exceptions to governmental immunity is applicable.“); Cloyd v. Hartco Flooring Co., 274 S.W.3d 638, 647 (Tenn. 2008) (“When, however, a defendant establishes an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
Here, the jury found that Sgt. Wright and Warden Dovey negligently caused injury to Mr. Young and that they did not act with gross negligence or malice. And it was apparently undisputed that both individuals were acting within the scope of their public duties and that the notice element of the MTCA was satisfied. That left the State responsible to pay the judgment, but only up to the limit provided under the MTCA on the
Lastly, Mr. Young contends that requiring the jury to determine the number of incidents or occurrences, and then to allocate damages if it finds multiple incidents or occurrences, would lead to an overly complicated jury verdict sheet. Although adding questions will increase the complexity of some verdict sheets, we do not think it is beyond the capacity of counsel and trial judges to design special verdict sheets that jurors can comprehend and that will clearly reflect their findings when cases involve a legitimate, timely raised dispute about the number of incidents or occurrences. See also CSX Transp., 343 Md. at 228-29 (discussing the use of a written interrogatory where the jury found that at least 20,235 separate occurrences took place). In that way, juries can be asked whether each of multiple alleged acts or omissions was negligent, grossly negligent, or malicious; whether each act or omission proximately caused damages to the plaintiff; whether the act or omission was causally related to the other acts or omissions at issue; and the amount of
In sum, in a case tried before a jury, a court may determine there are multiple incidents or occurrences for purposes of applying the limitation on the State‘s limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA only if the jury has expressly or necessarily found multiple negligent acts or omissions that were each the proximate cause of specific injuries or damages alleged by the plaintiff. Here, the jury made no such finding, and so
IV. THE LONGTIN PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE CLAIM
The final issue presented is whether a plaintiff may bring a claim against the State for a pattern or practice of engaging in or allowing unconstitutional conduct under this Court‘s decision in Prince George‘s County v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450 (2011). In Longtin, this Court held that such a claim may be brought against a county. Id. at 500. Before the Appellate Court, the parties in this case disputed whether such a claim may lie against the State. The court sided with Mr. Young on that threshold issue. Young, 265 Md. App. at 19. But the Appellate Court also concluded that Mr. Young had failed to present sufficient evidence to prevail on that claim. Id. at 31. Accordingly, the court held that the circuit court had “erred in denying the State‘s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the Longtin claim.” Id.
Before this Court, the State sought review of the Appellate Court‘s determination that Longtin pattern-or-practice claims may be brought against the State. However, Mr. Young has not sought review of the Appellate Court‘s determination that he did not present sufficient evidence to support such a claim. Because the Appellate Court‘s sufficiency decision is now final as to Mr. Young‘s Longtin claim, and he can seek no further review of it, the State‘s appeal is moot as to that claim. See County Council of Prince George‘s County v. Robin Dale Land LLC, 491 Md. 105, 144 (2025) (“A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case comes before the Court
The State argues that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies here because addressing this issue will help future litigants and trial courts determine the proper scope of a claim. We are not persuaded. That exception applies only “when the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest.” Wilson v. Tanglewood Venture, LP, 492 Md. 590, 600 (2025) (citation modified) (quoting Arrington v. Dep‘t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79, 91 (2007)). Such cases are “rare,” Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996), and must implicate “a matter of important public policy[,]” such as “protection from domestic violence[,]” Suter, 402 Md. at 220-21, issues related to an indigent individual‘s eligibility for representation by a public defender, Off. of Pub. Def. v. State, 413 Md. 411, 423-24 (2010), or systemic incarceration of fathers who failed to pay child support, Arrington, 402 Md. at 91-92. The issue of whether Longtin claims apply to the State, although important, is not a matter of such urgency as to justify issuance of an advisory opinion on a moot issue, “a long forbidden practice in this State.” Pizza di Joey, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 470 Md. 308, 340 (2020) (quoting Hickory Point P‘ship v. Anne Arundel County, 316 Md. 118, 129-30 (1989)).
Nonetheless, rather than allow Mr. Young‘s concession of the ultimate merits of his Longtin claim to effectively insulate from this Court‘s review the determination that such claims may be brought against the State, we will vacate the portion of the Appellate Court‘s
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we hold that: (1) the circuit court erred in entering judgment against the individual defendants; and (2) the circuit court erred in not reducing the judgment against the State to $400,000, reflecting a single incident or occurrence. We will therefore reverse the Appellate Court‘s opinion affirming the circuit court on those points. We also vacate the portion of the Appellate Court‘s opinion concluding that a Longtin pattern-or-practice claim is viable against the State of Maryland.
JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND REVERSED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR THAT COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AGAINST ONLY THE STATE OF MARYLAND IN THE AMOUNT OF $400,000. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE APPELLATE COURT TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
Notes
There are, however, important differences between the interpretation of insurance contracts and the interpretation of limited waivers of sovereign immunity. Notably, most states apply rules of construction of insurance contracts that construe at least ambiguous terms against insurers. See Connors v. Gov‘t Emps. Ins. Co., 442 Md. 466, 481-83 (2015) (explaining that “[s]ome of our sister states” construe insurance policies against insurers “as a matter of course,” and that Maryland courts construe “ambiguous language” in such policies against the insurer). By contrast, “waivers of sovereign immunity . . . are strictly construed in favor of the State.” Brawner Builders, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 476 Md. 15, 32 (2021). Thus, while any ambiguities in insurance contracts concerning the definition of terms like “incident” or “occurrence” will be construed in most states against the insurer, any similar ambiguity in a statutory waiver of immunity must be construed in favor of the State.
After engaging in a thorough textual analysis of the Florida statutory scheme, the court concluded that “incident or occurrence” in the relevant section had to refer to “the immediate injury-causing event,” and not the negligent acts or omissions that caused that event. Id. at 515. Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]he phrase ‘same incident or occurrence’ is most reasonably understood as referring to the . . . injury-causing[] event as a whole, not to the smaller segments of time and action that make up the [event] against each individual victim, because this is the way that we commonly talk about this type of tragic occurrence—as a single event with multiple victims.” Id. at 517. Accordingly, the shooting of the six individuals constituted a single incident or occurrence under Florida law. Id.
(A) Court May Require. The court may require a jury to return a verdict in the form of written findings upon specific issues.
. . .
(B) Omission of Issue. If the court fails to submit any issue raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, all parties waive their right to a trial by jury of the issues omitted unless before the jury retires a party demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand, the court may make a finding or, if it fails to do so, the finding shall be deemed to have been made in accordance with the judgment entered.